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ABSTRACT 
The Small Business Rate Relief (SBRR) reduces the business rates 
payable by firms occupying lower cost premises. This thesis evaluates the 
success of the SBRR with regards to productivity and survival rates using 
longitudinal datasets from the Office for National Statistics. Simultaneously, 
the thesis adapts and adopts Duranton’s et al. (2011) theoretical framework 
on non-domestic UK property taxation.  
The framework argues that although in the short-term SBRR is likely 
to reduce deaths during a recession, it decreases total factor productivity 
(TFP) as well. However, in the medium term, SBRR may even be 
overcapitalised into rents, meaning that higher rents may fully offset the 
business rate reliefs. No long-term effects are identified. The framework 
argues that the degree of these effects should depend on the market supply 
constraints and spillovers such as concentration (Marshall-Arrow-Romer, 
1890), competition (Porter, 1990) and diversity (Jacob, 1969). 
In order to capture the complex clustering of effects within and across 
firms, the standard econometric approaches are supplemented with the 
recently developed non-parametric Random Effects Expectation 
Maximisation Decision Tree algorithm for productivity analysis and the 
Survival Tree algorithm for interval-censored survival estimation. As a result, 
the complex interaction and clustering of hierarchical effects are inferred 
from the data. This empirical approach is based on extensive micro data for 
all UK firms from which coarsened matching across a wide range of 
characteristics is employed to create a representative sample.  
Contrary to policy expectations and widespread rhetorics, the 
findings show that property tax reductions are associated with consistently 
lower productivity and only a very marginal initial improvement in survival. 
The thesis also finds indications that market concentration towards major 
players is related to the extent of SBRR capitalisation into property prices, 
and that output diversity is associated with higher TFP. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This thesis utilises non-parametric hierarchical analyses to investigate whether the 
homogeneous reductions in commercial property taxes for small firms has released 
putative pent-up animal spirits and led to gains in firm productivity or ability to survive 
demand shocks. These reductions, termed Small Business Rate Reliefs (SBRR), were first 
introduced in Scotland in 2003, England in 2005 and Wales in 2007. The most recent 
extension to reductions from April 2017 and 2018 will further reduce tax revenue across 
England by £9 billion over five years and remove 600,000 firms from liability (HM 
Treasury, 2017). This is just as the gradual return of Business Rate (BR) revenue to local 
control in England via devolution of powers or greater revenue retention. 
In general, the UK government collects a higher proportion of its tax through 
property taxation than any other OECD country (Section 1.3 based on OECD, 2017). Tax on 
property is defined by the OECD “as recurrent and non-recurrent taxes on the use, 
ownership or transfer of property” (OECD, 2017:1). In the UK, different systems apply to 
commercial and residential properties. Residential property owners are likely to pay Stamp 
Duty Land Tax on the change of ownership of property, Income Tax on their rental income 
and Council Tax based on the value of residential premises they are occupying. Whilst, 
commercial property owners pay Stamp Duty Land Tax and in some instances Value Added 
Tax on the change of ownership of property, Corporation Tax on its rental profits and, 
finally, Business Rates (BRs) based on the value of commercial premises they are 
occupying. 
Business rates, a tax on non-domestic property, is inherited in the UK taxation 
policy and dates back to 1572. In 1990, it was transformed by Margaret Thatcher’s 
government which introduced the uniform non-domestic property tax that existed until 
2016. This meant that central government was made responsible for setting and 
distributing business rates for England1. On the 5th October 2015, George Osborne 
announced opposing plans to allow councils to set and distribute all BRs collected. The 
Chancellor stated that it is the ‘biggest transfer of power to our local government in living 
memory’ (BBC, 2015:online). This is regarded as the “end of the national tax on local 
growth” (H.M. Treasury 2016:9).  
                                                             
1 Other UK countries have set and collect their own business rates, but systems are relatively 
similar as described in Section 1.4.2. 
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The UK Government planned to devolve the setting and administration of BRs from 
the national to local governments in 20202. A principal element of this policy was to further 
local flexibility to reduce rates set nationally for specific projects or types of businesses and 
stimulate local growth. Nonetheless, in the March 2017 Budget, this flexibility was 
undermined by the same national Government. It significantly expanded and made 
permanent the current policy of National (English) reductions in the property tax for small 
businesses called Small Business Rate Relief3.  
 
Figure 1:1 BRs collected by councils in England between 2005 and 2015 compared 
to cost of SBRR (available only after 2006). Notes: £ million (nominal). Source: 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Official Statistics 
2011 to 2015. 
In fact, it was Scotland that was the first to introduce the property tax relief for small 
businesses as a temporary support lasting only a year with an aim “to target help at 
genuinely small businesses” (Scottish Government, 2004:1). However, the SBRR was also 
introduced in England in 2005, Wales in 2007 and Northern Ireland in 2010 and extended 
each year. Currently in England, this reduction in tax applies to properties with a rateable 
value below £18,000 (or £25,000 in London) per year, occupied by businesses. SBRR is 
entirely based on the rateable value, which weakly corresponds to the rent4, and it does not 
account for any other characteristics. The reductions now remove 600,000 businesses or 
around one-third of all businesses from local tax bases (H.M. Treasury, 2017). As the Figure 
1:1 illustrates, SBRR was not proportionately increased to the tax collections. The bars 
indicate a marginal increase in tax collections, but the line shows a substantial rise in SBRR 
                                                             
2 The timetable for the devolution of local finance has become unclear following the 
unexpected national elections in June 2017, which interrupted the legislative progress of the Local 
Government Finance Bill 2017. 
3 In Scotland, it is called Small Business Bonus Scheme.  
4 See Section 1.4.3 for more details. 
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spending. This raises concerns about future revenue, greater reliance on a small number of 
large firms and restrictions on local autonomy to achieve local objectives. 
Furthermore, the exact objectives of the policy in the Small Business Rate Relief 
Orders were not identified. However, it seems that the justification of the SBRR might be 
based on the two most frequently used arguments. Firstly, it is likely that SBRR was justified 
on the belief that BRs form a higher proportion of small business’ fixed costs than those for 
large businesses (e.g. repeated in H.M. Treasury 2016). Another often appearing perception 
is that small firms contribute more to innovation and productivity than their share of gross 
value added. These views are often expressed not just in the media with continuously 
published articles on both BRs and SBRR5 but also policy reports. For instance, JLL 
(2017:21) maintains that “small businesses complain they pay more in rates as a 
proportion of turnover than larger ones. The small business rates relief produces an 
artificial boundary and can lead to occupiers in the same building having a very different 
liability.” However, the arguments do not account for capitalisation of the tax form, meaning 
that they do not acknowledge that SBRR is likely to be captured in rents and these higher 
costs, in themselves, might be difficult to justify as a sufficient reason for reliefs. 
In fact, those two arguments are likely to be shaped by intense political pressures. 
The policy to expand and reduce the property tax follows a persistent campaign by the 
small business community. The then Prime Minister told the Federation of Small Businesses 
in 2014 that small business’ number one complaint was BRs, which had risen relative to 
other costs over the economic recession (Adam and Miller, 2014 and Cabinet Office, 2014). 
In fact, the Federation of Small Businesses notes on their website6 that the BRs system “is 
out-dated, unfair and not related to the ability to pay, or changing economic circumstances.” 
The organisation prides themselves on extensive lobbying to sustain and increase SBRR.  
Little consistent evidence to back those claims influenced the governments to 
appoint several different reviews to evaluate SBRR: in Scotland in 2004, Wales in 
2010/2012 and Northern Ireland in 2014. The most recent evaluation of SBRR was 
conducted by the Northern Ireland Centre for Economic Policy in 2014. This study 
investigated the recipients of SBRR by area and sector. It identified no correlation between 
deprivation of areas and SBRR, meaning that the relief did not specifically support the most 
deprived areas. The report’s authors acknowledged that, because of capitalisation, 
                                                             
5 On 28/07/2018 google news had 95,100,000 results for the term ‘business rates’ and 11 
articles were published in the past 3 days. 
6 Their website can be accessed: http://www.fsb.org.uk/standing-up-for-you/policy-
issues/local-government-and-communities/business-rates (Accessed 03.01.2018). 
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property owners were the primary beneficiary of the scheme. The 552 respondents to their 
survey suggest that the scheme was not able to drive increased employment or investment 
but helped with cash flow, survival and keeping the cost of overheads down. Further 
responses from their public consultation highlighted the need for better targeting with 
regards to turnover and employment. Political parties agreed that it was appropriate to 
introduce the temporary reliefs at that time but called for better targeting as well. The 
report recommended capping the relief at £17.3m during 2015/16 and over the following 
three years, to reduce the total amount awarded. The report asked for a better alternative 
to deliver better value for money. Contrary to the findings of this review, the Northern 
Ireland’s government has recently extended the scheme until 31 March 20197. 
In contrast, it is worth noting that Scottish and Welsh evaluations were in favour of 
retaining the relief. The Welsh study (Peck et al., 2014), as with the Northern Irish report 
(2014), included capitalisation into rents in their methodology, acknowledging that at least 
some of the relief might be taken by the increased rents. Two thirds (66%) of respondents 
with rented property reported that their landlords do not charge extra rent because of the 
SBRRS. 12% reported that landlords took most of the SBRR in extra rental charges. Given 
that relatively marginal reliefs in Wales were available just from 2007 (as detailed in 
Section 1.4.3.2), and the survey was conducted in 2010, the respondents were probably 
evaluating the short-term effects. This Peck’s et al. (2014) study with many others are more 
extensively discussed in the Empirical Review Chapter (Section 3.3). In the long term, the 
evidence shows that the SBRR is likely to be offset by higher rents (Bond et al., 1996, 2013; 
Mehdi, 2003).  
To account for the capitalisation effect, a longitudinal study should be conducted 
because cross-sectional studies (e.g. Peck et al., 2014) fail to include time. This need for a 
longitudinal study is also evident in the Barclays Review 2016, which was arranged by the 
Scottish government with the aim of reviewing BRs reforms. The review mainly focused on 
the BR system as a whole. They provided many suggestions how BR could be improved. One 
of their recommendations was that “the effectiveness of the Small Business Bonus Scheme 
should be evaluated” (online). 
In response to the relative lack of reliable evidence, and extensive changes in policy, 
several HM Treasury reports (2015, 2016) also requested evidence regarding whether 
                                                             
7 Source: The Rates (Small Business Hereditament Relief) (Amendment) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2018 Order, which can be accessed at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/nisr/2018/61/regulation/1/made (Accessed 28.07.2018). 
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SBRR is successful. For instance, in the HM Treasury release (2016:22), the following 
questions were published in their call for evidence:  
If business rates remain a property tax, how do you suggest business rates could 
take into account the individual circumstances of businesses such as their size or ability to 
pay rates? 
How does the proportion of total operating costs accounted for by business rates 
vary by the sector and size of business?  
What is the impact of the business rates system on the competitiveness of UK 
businesses? Are there any particular impacts on SMEs? 
How could the government better target support for SMEs given that the size of a 
company may not be reflected in the rateable value of property it uses? 
In a similar vein, in academia, there were several direct and indirect calls for further 
investigation (Huggins and Williams, 2011; Bond et al., 2013; Muldoon-Smith and 
Greenhalgh, 2015). Most directly, Bond et al. (2013:81) called for exploration of ‘how tax 
incentives affect the process of economic development and who actually benefits.’ They ask 
for assessment of whether SBRR has any measurable benefits. This direct request for 
empirical evaluation might be also because of the contradicting theoretical evidence8. For 
instance, Simon’s (1943) traditional view broadly implies that the occupiers should receive 
the relief but Mieszkowski’s (1972) new view infers that owners rather than occupiers are 
the actual recipients.  
Calls from the government and academia, political rhetoric without a reliable 
evidence base and the concerns about the effects of this high-profile policy on the tax base 
and local autonomy had led this thesis to evaluate both the mechanism and the focus of the 
current tax policy and inform the debate about future local financing. More specifically, this 
thesis aims to understand whether SBRR has any effects on small business performance. To 
achieve this, the detailed microanalysis draws together and adds to diverse sets of 
literature. This thesis contributes to the literature on the role of taxation in both simulating 
small firms and reducing churn as well as the sparse BR literature. This thesis provides 
evidence that challenges the established policy narrative that taxation reductions for small 
firms aid small firm productivity and longevity. Simultaneously, the thesis summarises 
existing methodological approaches and introduces new recently developed approaches 
                                                             
8 See the Theory Review (in particular, Section 2.1.2) for a detailed discussion on these and 
other theories. 
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such as the RE-EM and survival trees to the field as well as applies several extensions to the 
more standard statistical methods. The broad findings show that property tax reductions 
are consistently associated with lower productivity and have marginal effect on survival 
especially in the longer terms. These findings bring into question the Treasury’s 
homogeneous micromanagement of local property taxes. 
The introduction chapter starts by defining a small firm (Section 1.1) and looking 
at statistics of UK business performance (Section 1.2) to identify the key factors related to 
business performance. Then, the reader is introduced to property based taxation (Section 
1.3), British tax system (Section 1.4) and SBRR (Section 1.4.3). Also, to show complexities 
within the UK business support, key trends in government-backed support incentives are 
discussed in Section 1.5. Finally, the chapter is summarised and objectives of this thesis are 
presented (Section 1.5). 
1.1 DEFINING A SMALL FIRM 
SBRR is entirely based on the rateable value and it does not account for any other 
characteristics. However, it would probably be challenging for the government to define 
the exact criteria because of the differences in knowledge. Even the very definition of the 
firm depends largely on the economic school and the perspective. For example, standard 
neoclassical economists such as Coase (1937) and Williamson (1987) define a firm 
according to its output or profit. In management studies, a firm should include people who 
combine resources to gain competitive advantage (Teece, 2007). To behavioural 
economists such as Greve (2008), the firm is a social stage on which managers build their 
social status and prestige. Finally, the most cited9 growth article defines a firm as a 
‘collection of resources bound together in an administrative framework, the boundaries of 
which are determined by the ‘area of administrative coordination’ and ‘authoritative 
communication’’ (Penrose, 1995:xi). The Penrose’s definition highlights administrative 
framework. Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) show that the majority of job-creating firms are 
small. Those firms may require other resources, more than managerial services (Pitelis, 
2002). Thus, it might be misleading to base the definition only on the administrative 
framework.  
However, the government may not be right in choosing only one criterion to 
differentiate between small and large firms. For simplicity, empirical studies often choose 
to quantify the firms according to their employment and turnover. These criteria might be 
                                                             
9 As according to the literature review done by Ferreira et al. (2015). 
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compared with the one chosen by the government. The government chooses to simplify its 
definition and does not include any of these measurements. UK policy scholars often cite 
two definitions, either the definition of SMEs derived from the Companies Act (2006) or 
from the EU (Commission Recommendation, 2003). These are entirely based on the 
employment and turnover. The first two columns in the Table 1:1 indicates that, according 
to the EU definition, a micro firm does not have more than ten employees and turnover 
higher than two million, a small firm not more than fifty employees and turnover higher 
than ten million and a medium firm not more than 250 employees and turnover greater 
than fifty million. Whilst, the UK government for the purpose of SBRR indirectly defines 
small businesses entirely based on the rateable value of the property during the revaluation 
(see Section 1.4.1). The third column in the Table 1:1 compares these definitions. In the 
SBRR context, a micro property would receive 100% available relief at that year, a small 
firm would get between 1% and 99% relief at that year, and a medium firm would receive 
no relief.  
For the purpose of this study, these two definitions are combined to define a firm 
as according to the Table 1:1. A micro firm would not have more than ten employees and 
turnover higher than two million but receive 100% SBRR after 2009 (or 50% before 2010). 
A small firm would not have more than fifty employees and turnover higher than ten million 
but receive between 1 and 99% SBRR after 2009 (or 50% before 2010). Whilst, a medium 
firm not more than 250 employees or turnover greater than fifty million and no SBRR.  
 Employees Turnover (m) Balance Sheet (m) Rateable Value 
 EU The UK EU The UK EU The UK The UK 
Micro ≤10  ≤ €2  ≤ €2   100% (50%)  
Small ≤50 ≤50 ≤ €10 ≤ £6.5 ≤ €10 ≤ £3.26 1-99% (1-49%) 
Medium ≤250 ≤250 ≤ €50 ≤ £25.9 ≤ €43 ≤ £12.9 0% 
Table 1:1 Definition of a small firm. The table is based on Companies Act (2006) 
and EU Commission Recommendation (2003) and the UK government’s orders on 
non-domestic property taxation. 
1.2 UK BUSINESS PERFORMANCE 
The broad aim of this thesis is to understand whether SBRR has any effects on small 
business performance. The small firm was also defined as having not more than 50 
employees, turnover not exceeding €10 million and receiving some SBRR. To further 
develop the aim, this subsection reviews three fundamental business performance 
indicators, which are the unemployment rate, productivity and churn. According to the 
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discussion presented in this section, this thesis chooses to assess business performance by 
estimating productivity and survival.b 
The focus should not be on the employment because the UK had a lower 
unemployment rate than other advanced economies. To compare UK unemployment to the 
other OECD countries, OECD (2017) statistics on harmonised unemployment rates were 
used. The OECD defines the unemployed as people of working age who are without work, 
are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work. The first reliefs were 
introduced in 2003, that is why 2000 was chosen as a starting year in the Figure 1:2. This 
graph shows that between 2000 and 2016, the UK unemployment rate was lower than the 
OECD average and significantly lower than other advanced economies in G710, EU and EU 
eurozone averages. This indicates that employment levels might be less of an issue in the 
UK economy. 
 
Figure 1:2 Harmonised unemployment rates. Total, % of labour force, 2000 – 
2016. Source: OECD Labour market statistics (2017). 
As a result, instead of looking at employment as it was done by previous scholars 
assessing BRs (e.g. Bond et al., 1996, 2013), the focus of this thesis is on productivity. 
Productivity is known to be a key measure of supply-side economic performance and 
labour efficiency. Higher productivity is often linked to lower average costs, improved 
competitiveness and trade performance, higher profits and wages and economic growth. 
There are two widely used measurements of productivity, labour productivity and total 
factor productivity (TFP). The former relates to how efficiently labour input is combined 
with other factors of production and used in the production process, whilst the latter 
                                                             
10 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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reflects the overall efficiency with which labour and capital inputs are used together in the 
production process. 
The figures related to UK labour productivity are more concerning than those 
related to employment. Figure 1:3 (p. 15) highlights the major trends reported by the OECD 
(2017). Britain performed worse than other advanced economies with regards to labour 
productivity. All countries were growing steadily except during the recession. The UK 
historically underperformed G7 and EU Euro area countries but outperformed OECD and 
all EU countries. This underperformance was further enhanced by the recession as the UK 
recovered slower than other countries. The OECD reports that some countries such as 
Luxemburg or Ireland experienced 75% higher labour productivity than the UK in 2015. 
Less extreme but similar trends are evident when UK is compared to the Euro area and G7 
countries11. It is also worth noting that in 201612, the UK labour productivity turned lower 
than the 28 EU countries’ average. This suggests that the UK should focus its resources 
towards enhancing productivity.  
 
Figure 1:3 GDP per hour worked between 2000 and 2015. US dollar constant 
prices, 2010. Source: OECD data (2017). 
The data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) provides more recent 
evidence on the UK productivity. Figure 1:4 (p. 16) shows the main trends within service 
and manufacturing sectors. Manufacturing output per hour has been more unstable than 
service output. This reflects a degree of divergence in manufacturing between gross value 
added (GVA) and hours, especially in 2009 and 2011 to 2012, while in services, GVA and 
hours follow similar trends. More specifically, non-financial services are the main positive 
contributor to productivity growth over this period (2007-2017), partly offset by negative 
contributions from non-manufacturing production and finance. 
                                                             
11 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
12 This is not reported in the Figure because of missing data for OECD and G7 countries for 
2016. 
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Figure 1:4 Comparing output per hour (orange), output (blue) and hours (light 
blue) across service and manufacturing sectors between 2007 and 2017. It 
indicates that the output per hour is up in services but down in manufacturing. 
Source: ONS (2017). 
The thesis argues that labour productivity is not sufficient to account for the overall 
business performance because a different picture of productivity emerges when the capital 
efficiency is also accounted for with such indicators as TFP. Official statistics rarely report 
on the TFP, but Harris and Moffat (2017) provided an up to date descriptive analysis of TFP 
in the UK. Their methodology is described in Methodology Review with other empirical 
articles using generalised method of moments (GMM) approach in Section 5.1.4.5.3 
(Methodology Review Chapter).  
Harris and Moffat showed that all productivity indicators experienced significant 
post-recession declines. TFP declined slightly slower than labour productivity or GVA after 
the recession (Figure 1:5, p. 17). Furthermore, the differences between TFP and labour 
productivity can be identified by comparing the manufacturing and service sectors. Harris 
and Moffat’s results are different from those provided by ONS. In fact, they show that the 
growth in TFP in the manufacturing sector was sustained during the post-recession period. 
This suggests that the decline in labour productivity, as reported in Figure 1:4, p. 16, in 
manufacturing may be explained by changes in factor proportions, but not by an absolute 
decline in TFP (reported in the Figure 1:6, p. 17). However, they demonstrate that the 
service sector accounts for the total decrease in TFP. Further insights come to light when 
Harris and Moffat (2017) group firms by their size of the output. As illustrated in Figure 1:7 
(p. 17), the post-2008 decline in TFP is mainly caused by the smallest plants and is absent 
for plants producing over £714,000 sales per year (in 2000 prices).  
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Figure 1:5 Weighted mean TFP and labour productivity for all marketable output 
sectors (1997 ¼ 1) for Great Britain. Source: Harris and Moffat (2017:537). 
 
Figure 1:6 Weighted mean TFP for manufacturing and services (1997 ¼ 1 for all 
plants) for Great Britain. Source: Harris and Moffat (2017:538). 
  
Figure 1:7 Weighted mean TFP for plants of different size based on real gross 
output (1997 ¼ 1 for all plants) for Great Britain. Source: Harris and Moffat 
(2017:539). 
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These statistics direct the discussion to two contradicting arguments. Firstly, it is 
unclear whether the TFP could be improved by supporting those businesses that caused a 
decline in TFP in line with standard arguments presented in the introduction of this 
chapter. On the other hand, the government might only sustain those supported 
underperforming businesses and their inefficient practices by providing them with reliefs 
like SBRR. These arguments are further unpacked in the Theory Review (Section 2.2). 
Building on the previous argument that the relief might help to sustain 
underperforming firms that drive the decline in TFP, statistics on churn are also included. 
In general, the births13 and deaths14 of firms play an essential role in economic growth and 
productivity. The OECD provides some statistics for churn, but these are not complete for 
all countries and limited to 2007 onwards data for the UK. The Figure 1:8 and Figure 1:9 (p. 
19) illustrates that both UK births and deaths have exceeded the OECD or EU average 
figures historically and especially substantially since 2012. This suggests that SBRR might 
enhance those new births of small firms that are incapable of sustaining activity in the long 
term. 
ONS also provides annual statistics of birth and death rates. In 2008-2011, business 
births have surpassed deaths. In recent years, businesses are born at a rate which is 4.9 
percentage points higher than the death rate. The increase in the rate of business births is 
consistent with the strengthening of the labour market from an employment rate of 70.1% 
in September 2011 to 74.1% at the end of 2015. The data indicates that the rate of business 
births rose to 14.3% in 2015 (highest level since 2000). The churn does not seem to deviate 
much across regions and sectors with some minor exemptions like London being more 
active than Northern Ireland. The differences between regions and sectors are also 
discussed in Appendix 10.1.2 (p. 264).  
 
                                                             
13 Enterprise births are defined (in Commission Regulation (EC) No 2700/98 of 17 
December 1998 concerning the definitions of characteristics for structural business statistics) as 
follows: “A count of the number of births of enterprises registered to the population concerned in 
the business register corrected for errors. A birth amounts to the creation of a combination of 
production factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved in the event. Births do 
not include entries into the population due to: mergers, break-ups, split-off or restructuring of a set 
of enterprises. It does not include entries into a sub-population resulting only from a change of 
activity.” 
14  The Commission Regulation No 2700/98 defines enterprise deaths as follows: “A count 
of the number of deaths of enterprises registered to the population concerned in the business 
register corrected for errors. A death amounts to the dissolution of a combination of production 
factors with the restriction that no other enterprises are involved in the event. Deaths do not include 
exits from the population due to mergers, take-overs, break-ups and restructuring of a set of 
enterprises. It does not include exits from a sub-population resulting only from a change of activity.” 
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Figure 1:8 Death and birth rates in OECD countries. Birth (death) rate meaning the 
number of enterprise births (deaths) in the reference period (t) divided by the 
number of enterprises active in t; t is between 2008 and 2015. Source: OECD data 
(2017). 
 
 
Figure 1:9 Birth and death rates of UK businesses between 2001 and 2015. Source: 
ONS (2010; 2015). 
To sum up, this subsection reviewed two outputs that will be investigated 
throughout this thesis. The first one is productivity. Britain seems to perform worse than 
other advanced economies concerning labour productivity. It also recovered its labour 
productivity growth since the recession slower than other advanced economies. Further 
analysis of TFP, highlights the differences between TFP and labour productivity. 
Manufacturing output per hour has been more unstable than service sectors, but TFP shows 
that the overall decrease in TFP may be explained by a decrease of TFP in the service sector. 
TFP in the manufacturing sector has been increasingly growing throughout the period, 
which could probably be explained by different proportions of labour, capital and output. 
When it comes to the churn, births have started exceeding deaths since 2011. The ratio of 
births and deaths are more diverse through sectors than regions. These insights will be 
supplemented by the Theory Review Chapter to inform the Framework. 
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1.3 INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON PROPERTY TAXATION 
The central aim of this thesis is to understand whether SBRR has any effects on 
small business performance with regards to productivity and survival. This subsection 
shows why the focus of this thesis should be on the property taxation and how the UK 
compares to other countries. It also discusses non-domestic property taxation in other 
countries and explains why the theories formed for other countries may not be directly 
applicable for the UK system implying that the UK needs its own theories and evidence. This 
subsection is mainly based on the Kenyon’s et al. (2012). 
Historically, UK collects more substantial proportion of its revenue from property 
than any other country in the OECD (Figure 1:10). Other countries choose different mixes 
of taxation. The chapter starts with several figures (Figure 1:11 - Figure 1:15, p. 21) 
discussing how the receipt deviate within OECD countries. It is evident, that Hungary’s tax 
system is more based on a tax on goods and services, while Denmark collects 
proportionately more in income tax than other countries. Norway has a larger proportion 
of collection from corporate profits than others. Finally, the greatest proportion of the 
percentage of GDP from property tax is in the UK. However, since 2011 Britain has been 
having close to the OECD average percentage of GDP from tax on goods and services and 
slightly lower before. Income is being taxed at a higher rate than the OECD average and 
corporate profits around the same as the OECD average. It seems apparent that the only 
major difference between the UK and other OECD countries is in terms of its property 
taxation. 
There are some advantages and disadvantages to each form of taxation. The often-
applied narrative in favour of property taxation is lower rates of tax avoidance and easy 
administration (e.g. the Green Book of HM Treasury, 2013). The property tax tends to be a 
reliable option to estimate the tax but arguably profits might be a better indication of ability 
to pay. Whilst, with regard to tax avoidance, property is much easier to tax and cannot be 
moved to other countries like other taxes such as corporation tax, which multinational 
enterprises often shift to the countries with lower taxation rates. Large companies are 
known to devote substantial resources to corporate income tax avoidance. They have more 
opportunities for tax avoidance because of their complexity, multi-territoriality, and 
general scale and scope. With these regards, it seems that the property-based taxation is 
performing well. According to HMRC (2017), the UK tax gap fell from 2015 to 2016 to its 
lowest-ever level of 6 %. However, just 5% (£1.7bn) of this 6 % is assigned to avoidance. In 
their estimate, they did not include these controversial transfer pricing structures. 
Introduction and Background  
21 
 
 
Figure 1:10 Tax on property in OECD countries with UK (blue) and OECD average 
(red) highlighted. Total, % of GDP, 1965 – 2015. Source: OECD (2017). 
 
Figure 1:11 Tax on goods and 
services in OECD countries with UK 
(light blue), OECD average (black) 
and Hungary (red) highlighted; Total, 
% of GDP, 2000 – 2015. Source: OECD 
(2017). 
 
Figure 1:12 Tax on income in OECD 
countries with UK (dark red), OECD 
average (black), US (blue) and 
Denmark (lighter red) highlighted.; 
Total, % of GDP, 2000 – 2015; Total, 
% of GDP, 2000 – 2015. Source: OECD 
(2017). 
 
Figure 1:13 Tax on corporate profits 
in OECD countries with UK (red), 
OECD average (black), Norway (blue) 
and US (purple) highlighted; Total, % 
of GDP, 2000 – 2015. Source: OECD 
(2017). 
 
Figure 1:14 Tax on property in OECD 
countries with UK (red), OECD 
average (black), US (blue) and 
Norway (purple) highlighted; Total, 
% of GDP, 2000 – 2015. Source: OECD 
(2017). 
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1.3.1 Non-domestic property taxation 
The existing theories formed for other countries (e.g. traditional, new and benefit 
views as introduced in the Theory Review, Section 2.1.2) may not be directly applicable to 
the UK system because countries use different definitions and systems and they cause 
different issues. However, almost every country in the world raises substantial funds from 
the property taxation. Although there are many different perspectives on commercial 
property, the International Property Tax Institute (IPTI), which provides up to date 
information on various commercial taxes, highlights three critical questions that are very 
similar to all countries (p. 14):  
• What should be taxed? 
• How much tax should they pay? 
• Who should pay the tax? 
Different countries have different definitions of non-domestic property. It may 
consist of land, buildings, fixtures, fittings, plant and even machinery. In the UK, BRs 
combine two taxes: a tax on the value of the commercial property and a tax on land values. 
Authors such as Vickrey (1996) named these as a bad and good tax, respectively. The bad 
tax refers to the debate against levying a tax on buildings used for business purposes. A 
fundamental concept of the taxation, according to Diamond and Mirrles (1971), is that 
intermediate inputs to production such as buildings should not be taxed. The main effect of 
non-domestic taxation could be that economic activity is artificially moved away from 
property-intensive production activities. Land, as Adam and Miller (2014) argue, is not the 
result of a manufacturing process: its supply is necessarily fixed and taxing it would make 
it less valuable to its owners without discouraging any desirable activity.  
The amount of tax that should be collected is often controversial. The fundamental 
thought is that a country should raise sufficient revenue to pay for the costs of public 
service, but these costs are difficult to define. That is why rates vary significantly. For 
instance, UK has ~50% business rates, while Hong Kong asks property owners to pay only 
~5% (IPTI data, 2017) and local councils in Norway removed these taxes (Borge and 
Rattsø, 2014).  
Furthermore, even the basis of valuation is a debatable issue. While it is relatively 
easy to look at corporate gains and tax them with a corporate tax, it is more complicated 
with property taxation. The clear majority of countries define their basis of valuation as a 
market value, which could be either capital or rental value. These and other differences are 
presented in Table 1:2 (p. 23). For instance, in the UK the tax is based on the rental value, 
but in the US, it is on capital value. Also, there are inconsistencies in the bodies that set the 
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tax. In the UK from 1990, the tax base is assessed centrally, while in the US, it is set by 
jurisdiction. Revaluations would add rigour to the taxation but are often costly. Some places 
like Hong Kong or British Columbia have annual revaluations, while the UK supposed to 
have them each five years. Ireland ‘solves’ this problem by using self-assessment. However, 
it is uncertain whether the Irish solution would be suitable for the UK economy because of 
its more substantial receipts from property taxation.  
Table 1:2 Non-domestic property taxation in the UK vs US. Based on Kenyon’s et 
al. (2012). 
This thesis attempts to increase our understanding of the third question: Who 
should pay the tax?  Firstly, there are some differences between parties that pay the bill. 
For instance, legal incidence in the UK falls on the building occupier, while in the US it falls 
on the building owner. One of the issues in this thesis is whether a small business should 
receive preferential treatment given an array of incentives that are already available15 and 
pay no or lower non-domestic property tax. IPTI highlights this debate and question 
whether everyone should be paying the equal tax.  
1.4 FUNDAMENTALS OF UK TAX SYSTEM 
The previous section showed that the UK relies on the property taxation more than 
any other country. This section demonstrates how the major tax receipts are distributed. It 
is important to discuss the tax system as a whole as it funds the relief (at least in Wales) 
and may influence business performance. Figure 1:15 provides insight into the distribution 
of the tax receipts in the UK. Income tax and national insurance accounted for around 15% 
GDP in 2015-16. The second tax with the most substantial contribution is value added tax 
(VAT) with 6.2% of GDP. Property taxes (business rates and council tax) account for 3% of 
GDP. The fourth largest tax is corporation tax accounting for 2.4% of GDP.  
                                                             
15  See Section 1.5 (p. 36) for more detail. 
 The UK The US 
Tax base Rental values Capital values 
Tax base is set by Local authorities Central government 
Assessment 
Periodically and 
national 
By jurisdiction, unusual for 
wholesale reassessment of the tax 
base in any particular  
administrative area 
Formal (legal) incidence Occupier Owner 
Local authorities amount <500 (OECD, 1997) >39,000 (OECD, 1997) 
Overlapping jurisdictions Not possible Possible 
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Figure 1:15 Major receipts as a percent of GDP in 2015-16. Business rates 
highlighted in red. Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (2017). 
It is worth noting that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is the central 
government agency responsible for tax collection. However, local councils collect a tax 
called business rates from businesses and council tax from households. 
The Value Added Tax Act 1994 is the primary act regulating VAT. However, other 
acts such as the Finance Act setting the annual VAT rates are also applicable. Before passing 
the revenue on to HMRC, firms may deduct any VAT they paid on inputs into their products. 
Thus, it is a tax on the value added at each stage of the production process but not merely 
on all expenditure. There are three rates of VAT: standard rate (20%), reduced rate (5%) 
and zero rates (0%). Also, some goods and services are exempt from VAT or outside the 
VAT system. Since April 2002, small firms (defined as those with sales of no more than 
£230,000 including VAT, in 2016–17) have had the option of using a simplified flat-rate 
scheme. 
Income tax dates back to the Napoleonic wars when it was first introduced and later 
in 1942 re-introduced permanently. Substantial changes came with the 1979-2007 
governments that reduced the personal income tax basic rate from 44% to 20%. This was 
done by the Thatcher’s government, who favoured reduced government spending. They 
shifted taxation more to taxes on consumption rather than earnings. The Income Tax Act 
2007 is the primary act regulating this tax. The rate of income tax depends on their 
allowance and how much of their earned income is above the allowance in the tax year.  
In the UK, corporation tax was introduced in 1965. The Corporation Tax Act 2010 
is the primary act regulating corporation tax. Limited companies and foreign companies 
with a UK branch or office must pay corporation tax on taxable profits. Taxable profits 
include chargeable gains from selling assets, investments and trading profits. A UK limited 
Income tax and 
NICs
Value added tax
Other taxes
Other receipts
Onshore 
corporation tax
Council tax
Business rates
Fuel dutiesCapital taxes
Excise duties
Interest and 
dividend receipts
2015-16
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company pays corporation tax on all its profits from the UK and abroad. Since 1st April 
2015, the corporation tax rate is 20%, but government plans to cut corporation tax to 17% 
by 2020. However, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility (2017), collections 
from corporation tax is still forecasted to grow. 
 
Figure 1:16 Comparison of actual (2015-16) and forecasted tax receipts (between 
2016-17 and 2021-22). Source: Office for Budget Responsibility (2017). 
Finally, the Local Government Finance Act 2012 and the Local Government Finance 
Act 1988 is the primary act regulating BRs, also called non-domestic rates, a property tax 
introduced in England and Wales in 1990. BRs are a tax on the occupation of non-domestic 
property. Non-domestic property is defined by the Local Government Finance Act “if it is 
wholly or mainly used in the course of a business for the provision to individuals whose 
sole or main residence is elsewhere of accommodation for short periods together with 
domestic or other services or other benefits or facilities” (p. 40). The receipt from BRs have 
been increased by 7% since 2010 and are planned to further rise as according to the Figure 
1:16. BRs are charged on most non-domestic properties. Local councils send a BRs bill in 
February or March each year to either the occupier of the property or the party who has 
the right to occupy the premises should it be vacant. An example of the bill from one of the 
councils with a detail explanation is presented in Appendix 10.1.1.  
1.4.1 Estimation of the Business Rates 
The website Gov.uk 16provides a guide on how BRs are estimated. One should 
multiply a rateable value by a multiplier. These components are described in the following 
paragraphs. 
                                                             
16  https://www.gov.uk/introduction-to-business-rates (Accessed 10/06/18). 
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The rateable value (RV) is assessed by the Valuation Office Agency (VOA), which is 
an agency of HM Revenue and Customs. The VOA regularly reassesses and updates the RVs 
of all business properties, usually every five years. This is called a revaluation. Until 31 
March 2017, the RVs are based on a valuation date of 1 April 2008 but from 1 April 2017, 
the RVs will be based on the valuation date of 1 April 2015. RV is a value ascribed to a 
domestic or commercial building based on its size, location, and other factors used to 
determine the rates payable by its owner.  
The British and Scottish governments set two multipliers: the Small Business Non-
Domestic Rate Multiplier for small businesses and the Non-Domestic Rate Multiplier for 
other businesses. The Welsh government sets just one multiplier. For 2017/18 the 
multiplier is £0.479, and the small business rate multiplier is £0.466 in the UK. Local 
councils can set a special levy (business rate supplement or BRS) on top of the national 
rates. In the Greater London area, it is 2% meaning that BRs in London are 2% higher than 
the rest of the UK. A more extensive discussion on the differences between countries is 
presented in Section 1.4.3. 
1.4.2 Major Business Rates Reforms 
Figure 1:17 (p. 27) outlines the development of BRs and proposed reforms (in 
pink). The property-based tax formation dates back to 1572 with the Elizabethan Poor Law 
Act. The Justice of the Peace for each parish was allowed to collect a tax from those who 
owned land in the parish to distribute it to those in need. Later, land tax was imposed in 
Scotland from 1667 and in England, Ireland and Wales from 1692. This was followed by 
extensive reforms and changes but the rates were always decentralised meaning that local 
councils set and collect the receipts. In 1990, Margaret Thatcher’s government centralised 
the national business rate in 1990. In 2003, the Scottish government introduced substantial 
reliefs to the small businesses. England, Wales and Northern Ireland followed them and 
introduced similar reforms in 2005, 2007 and 2010, respectively. More recently, the 
government policies became less centralised. On the 5th October 2015, George Osborne 
announced plans, allowing councils to retain all BRs collected. The Chancellor stated that it 
is the ‘biggest transfer of power to our local government in living memory’ (BBC, 
2015:online). This signals the start of the reverse reforms introduced in 1990. The power 
of setting and keeping the BR receipts is back to national governments. 
A principal element of this policy was to further local flexibility to reduce rates set 
nationally for specific projects or types of businesses and stimulate local growth. 
Nonetheless, in the March 2017 Budget, this flexibility was undermined by the same 
national Government. The Government significantly expanded and made permanent the 
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current policy of National (English) reductions in the property tax for small businesses 
called Small Business Rate Relief17. The following paragraphs will show the extent to which 
the reliefs were increased between 2003 and 2017. 
 
Figure 1:17 The development of BRs. The timeline shows the key reforms (black) 
and proposed further reductions (red). Based on HM Treasury, 2016 and 2015. 
1.4.3 Small Business Rate Relief (SBRR) 
1.4.3.1 Scotland 
Table 1:3 (p. 28) provides an overview of Scottish small business non-domestic 
property reliefs. The first to introduce Small Business Rate Relief was Scotland in April 
2003 with the Non-Domestic Rate (Scotland) Order 2003 and supplemented with the Non-
Domestic Rates (Levying) (Scotland) Regulations 2003 Act which ended in March 2008. 
During this period, there were relatively marginal changes. RV was increased by £500 - 
£1,000. For instance, properties with RV up to £3,500 were granted 40% reliefs between 
2003 April – 2005 March and 50% between April 2005 and March 2008.  
From 1 April 2008, the Small Business Rate Relief Scheme was replaced by the Small 
Business Bonus Scheme. Businesses had to apply for the Small Business Bonus Scheme but 
did not need to reapply as long as their circumstances stayed the same. Relief can be 
awarded for a maximum period of five years without a review being undertaken.  
The Scottish government announced a substantial increase in the Non-Domestic 
Rates (Levying) (Scotland) Regulations 2008. Properties with RV of up to £8,000 were 
granted 80% relief. Other properties were granted either 40% (8,000<RV≤10,000) or 
20% (10,000<RV≤15,000). This was further increased in 2009 when some properties 
                                                             
17 In Scotland, it is called Small Business Bonus Scheme. 
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were granted 100% SBRR (RV≤8,000). The SBRR for other categories were increased by 
either 10% (8,000<RV≤10,000) or 5% (10,000<RV≤15,000).  
Finally, in 2010, the SBRR reached its peak. Properties with RV of up to £10,000 
were granted 100% reliefs. Twice lower (50%) relief was given to properties with RV 
between £10,000 and £12,000. Moreover, 25% reliefs were available for properties with 
RV of £12,000-£15,000. There was a further increase from £25,000 (2010) to £35,000 
(2014) in available cumulative value when several properties have RV of up to £18,000. 
Thus, the reliefs were substantially increased over years. 
 
SCOTLAND 
Year 
 
RV 
Until 
2003 
April 
2003 
April-
2005 
March 
2005 
April – 
2008 
March 
2008 
April-
2009 
March 
2009 
April-
2010 
March 
2010 
April-
2017 
March 
(planned) 
0≤RV≤3,000 
 
50% 
50% 
80% 100% 
100% 
3,000<RV≤3,500 
40% 
3,500<RV≤4,000 
 
40% 
4,000<RV≤4,500 
30% 
4,500<RV≤5,000 
30% 
5,000<RV≤5,750 
20% 
5,750<RV≤6,000 
20% 
6,000<RV≤7,000 10% 
7,000<RV≤8,000 
lower 
multiplier 
10% 
8,000<RV≤10,000 
lower 
multiplier 
40% 50% 
10,000<RV≤12,000 
20% 25% 
50% 
12,000<RV≤15,000 25% (for 
each 
property) 
15,000<RV≤18,000 
lower 
multiplier 
lower 
multiplier 
18,000<RV≤25,000 
lower 
multiplier 
25,000<RV≤28,000   
28,000<RV≤29,000   
29,000<RV≤35,000      
RV>35,000       
Table 1:3 Changes of the SBRR in Scotland. Based on various Non-Domestic Rate 
(Scotland) Orders. 
1.4.3.2 England  
Similarly, once introduced, the reliefs were continuously increased by the English 
government. In England, SBRR was announced in 2004 with the Non-Domestic Rating 
(Small Business Rate Relief) (England) Order as a temporary relief. Later, it was updated 
in 2008, further revised in April 2010 and then updated in October 2010. There were no 
objectives identified in these policy papers. Also, annual extensions of the relief were 
published each year. All of them are publicly available in electronic format at 
legislation.gov.uk.  
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Table 1:4 illustrates the main changes of SBRR in England (and Wales after 2010) 
between 2005 and 2017. Until 2005, there were no reliefs. In between January 2005 and 
March 2010, properties with RV of £5,000 or less were able to claim 50% reduction. Firms 
that had the second property with RV of £2,199 (increased to £2,599 in 2010) were still 
able to claim SBRR. Properties with RV of between £5,001 and £10,000 were subject to a 
tapering discount ranging from 0% to 49.99%, on the basis of 1% relief for every £100 of 
RV. Properties with RV between £10,000 and £12,000 were entitled to a lower multiplier.  
ENGLAND (including London) & WALES (after 2010) 
 
Table 1:4 Changes of the SBRR within England and Wales (after 2010). Based on 
various Non-Domestic Rate Orders. 
In 2008, the Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Rate Relief) (England) Order 
was amended by doubling SBRR. From 2010 April, properties with RV up to 6,000 were 
entitled to 100% reliefs. Properties with RV of between £6,001 and £12,000 were subject 
to a tapering discount ranging from 0% to 100%, on the basis of 1% relief for every £60 of 
RV. However, properties with higher RVs were still able to use a lower multiplier up until 
the RV of 18,000. Additionally, businesses situated in Greater London had increased RV 
thresholds to accommodate greater commercial property prices. London businesses with 
RVs of up to either 21,499 (2005-2010 March) or 25,499 (after 2010 March) were eligible 
to use a small business multiplier. 
Later, the government increases reliefs of up to 100%, which existed from 2010 
onwards, for a property with RV of up to £12,000. It is a significant increase in reliefs in 
comparison with 50% applied in 2005 (RV<£5,000) and no SBRR until 2005. Furthermore, 
 including London) & WALES (after 201 ) 
Year 
RV (£) 
before  
2005 
2005 January –  
2010 March 
2010  
April – 2017 
2017 and after 
(planned) 
RV≤5,000  50% 100% 100% 
5,000<RV≤6,000  0% - 49.99% 
6,000<RV≤10,000 0% - 99.99% 
10,000<RV≤12,000 lower  
multiplier 12,000<RV≤15,000  lower multiplier 
(not Wales) 
0% - 99.99% 
15,000<RV≤18,000   lower multiplier 
(not Wales) 18,000<RV≤£51,000    
51,000<RV     
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businesses with RV between £12,000 and £15,000 receive tapered relief from 2017. Also, 
the threshold for the standard BRs multiplier will increase to RV of £51,000.  
1.4.3.3 Wales  
The development of SBRR in Wales is outlined in Table 1:5. The Welsh government 
announced the scheme with the Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Relief) (Wales) 
Order 2006, which was first applied in 2007. Properties with RV of £2,000 or less were able 
to claim 50% relief. Other properties with RV between £2,000 and £5,000 were granted 
25% relief. However, post offices were granted either 100% (RV ≤ £9,000) or 50% (£9,000 
< RV ≤ £12,000).  
In 2008, the Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Relief) (Wales) Order 2008 
changed the upper limit for 25% relief to £6,500. In 2010, two other orders were issued by 
the Welsh government that made Welsh SBRR identical to the English SBRR system. 
Therefore, from 2010 (April) until 31 March 2017 business premises with RV up to £6,000 
will attract 100% relief. Ratepayers with RVs of between £6,000 and £12,000 will receive 
relief on a tapered basis from 100% to 0%. 
The primary difference to the UK past 2010 SBRR is that the Welsh Assembly 
Government finances the scheme. Therefore, it does not operate a small business 
multiplier. In fact, the Assembly had the power to set the multiplier since its establishment 
in 1999. Furthermore, there is no requirement, unlike in England, for eligible businesses 
not to occupy any other premises with RV over £2,600. Furthermore, Wales has not applied 
a transitional rate relief scheme to increases or decreases following the 2010 revaluation. 
The permanent Small Business Rates Relief scheme was introduced from 1 April 2018. It 
provides 100% relief for sites with a rateable value of £6,000 or less and then tapered relief 
for sites with a rateable value of between £6,000 and £12,000. 
WALES (before 2010) 
                Year 
RV 
until 2007 April 2007 April – 2008 March 2008 April – 2010 March 
RV≤2,000  50% 50% 
RV≤5,000 25% 
25% 
RV≤6,500  
RV>5,000   
Table 1:5 Changes of the SBRR within Wales (before 2010). Based on various Non-
Domestic Rate (Wales) Orders. 
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1.4.3.4 Comparison of the Three Countries 
BRs are for the most part a devolved policy matter, though the system works in very 
similar ways in England, Scotland and Wales. Valuation is the responsibility of the Scottish 
Assessors in Scotland and the Valuation Office Agency for England and Wales. Scotland 
provided the most substantial reliefs, while Wales was seen to have the lowest reliefs up 
until 2010. After 2010, Welsh SBRR became identical to English SBRR. Although even after 
2010 Scottish SBRR was substantially higher, Scottish SBRR may be lower than English 
SBRR after reforms. Also, Scotland and England operate separate multipliers for large and 
small businesses which should cover SBRR, while the Welsh government aims to cover the 
relief by their own financing.  
1.4.3.5 Other BR reliefs 
Besides the SBRR, businesses may be entitled to rural rate relief, charitable rate 
relief, exempted buildings and empty buildings relief, hardship relief, transitional relief and 
relief for pubs. Also, they can relocate to enterprise zones (EZ) with preferential taxation. 
These will not be covered in this thesis but are presented in Appendix 10.1.3 (p. 266). The 
reliefs are not covered in the thesis because they are much less frequently applied so less 
expensive, often targeted to very specific businesses (e.g. pubs in Appendix 10.1.3.7) or 
applied just for a few months (e.g. transitional relief in Appendix 10.1.3.3).  
1.5 TRENDS IN SUPPORT FOR BUSINESSES 
The chapter concludes with the debate on UK policies aimed at supporting 
businesses. Section 1.4.2 suggested that BRs policies shifted from decentralised to 
centralised and now it seems directed again towards decentralisation. This section shows 
that the decentralisation and enhanced support was not isolated to BRs but also affected 
many other policies. It also discusses the cost of the decentralisation to suggest that BR 
reforms together with enhanced SBRR may not be the “end of the national tax on local 
growth” (H.M. Treasury 2016:9) but rather the start of the expensive and inefficient system.  
 ‘Improving the economic performance of every country and region of the UK is an 
essential element’ (Treasury, 2001:v). Statements like this were standard because the 
government emphasised that its policies should be more concentrated on regional 
development. In line to the BR policy discussed in Section 1.4.2, regional policies with top-
down approaches attracting development to uncompetitive areas with policy instruments 
such as infrastructure (Acs and Szerb, 2007) were shifting to bottom-up approaches 
focusing on measures such as advice and training (Halkier and Danson, 1997) and fostering 
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entrepreneurship (Acs and Szerb, 2007). This concentration in deprived neighbourhoods 
may have increased the growth of the SMEs situated there. Simultaneously, it may have 
enhanced such issues as recruitment and skills shortage. For example, Stuetzer et al. (2015) 
revealed that British regions with large industries, such as textile mile in Manchester, in the 
19th century, had lower entrepreneurship rates and weaker entrepreneurship culture 
today. This may explain a possible mismatch between legislative goals and outcomes. 
Figure 1:18 outlines fundamental trends in small business policy development. 
Labour government came to power in 1997 and shifted policies to both start-ups and 
existing SMEs with emphasis on regions. However, the number of initiatives rapidly 
increased to 3,000 (DTI, 2007). The Labour government then aimed to simplify the 
programme. In 1999 regional development agencies (RDAs) were launched to improve the 
performance of the regions and reduce inequalities between them (McVittie and Swales, 
2007; Pearce and Ayres, 2009).  
Eight RDAs were created on 25 November 1998 following the Regional 
Development Agencies Act 1998. The ninth, in London, was established in 2000. The 
statutory objectives of the RDAs were: 
1. to further economic development and regeneration; 
2. to promote business efficiency and competitiveness; 
3. to promote employment; 
4. to enhance the development and application of skills relevant to 
employment, and 
5. to contribute to sustainable development. 
The core activities of RDAs were financed through single pooling money from all 
the contributing Government Departments. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) was 
appointed by the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform. One of their 
 
Figure 1:18 Enterprise policy timeline showing the key changes in the UK. 
Compiled from various UK Government Orders. 
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aims was to assess RDAs’ achievements against previously outlined objectives. They use 
the Impact Evaluation Framework (IEF) and data supplied by eight RDAs. Their start by 
explaining that between 1999/2000 and 2006/07, the RDAs have collectively spent around 
£15.1billion. They find that ‘across all interventions the annual impact on GVA resulting 
from jobs which have already been created or safeguarded is broadly equal to the cost, but 
if allowance is made for the expected persistence of these benefits, then every £1 of RDA 
spend will add £4.50 to regional GVA.’ (BERR, 2009:viii). However, it is arguable that the 
expenditure of £24,377 for each job created provides a value for money for the taxpayer. 
Other criticisms of RDAs were: little improvement in start-up environment (Huggins and 
Williams, 2009), lack of clarity how specific initiatives fit with the overall policy objectives 
(Huggins et al., 2015).  
£1.4 billion was spent (according to the 2010 Spending Review) in order to 
transform RDAs. RDAs were narrowed to the twenty four Local Enterprise Partnerships 
(LEPs) announced in the October 2010 White Paper Local Growth: Realising Every Place’s 
Potential. Several reports such as the Business, Innovation and Skills Select Committee 
(2010) claimed that the LEPs may be able to offer a higher focus on local economics needs 
and improve co-operation between local businesses and local government. LEPs had 
responsibility for Enterprise Zones and took various responsibilities of RDAs.  
LEPs were expected to meet their day-to-day administration costs (BIS, 2010). 
However, in 2011 £5 million start-up fund was made available to LEPs. From 2012, the 
amount of funding was introduced and increased significantly. Furthermore, in 2010, £1 
billion regional growth fund was introduced, and a further £2.7 billion was allocated to 
2011/12-2015/16. LEPs were able to bid for funding from the first four rounds of the 
Regional Growth Fund but banned from bidding in rounds 5 and 6, which were only open 
to private enterprises. 
There were various reactions to the LEPs. Lord Haseltine’s report (2012) made 
many recommendations for economic growth and wealth creation. These included a 
recommendation for a higher devolution of funding from central government to LEPs. In 
the beginning, LEPs had limited funding, so criticism was directed at the effectiveness of 
LEPs, their vision (Pike et al., 2013) and whether they would be capable of delivering the 
value for taxpayer’s money (British Academy, 2012). National Audit Office’s (NAO) 
(2013:41) report stated that Local Enterprise Partnerships are “not yet capable of 
delivering value for money.” Later NAO’s (2016) report further adds the lack of objectives, 
pressure to spend their funds at that year, lack of resources and established track record of 
delivery to the list of their drawbacks.  
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However, the widely accepted ‘fiscal decentralisation’ theorem further discussed in 
Theory Chapter (with works of Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Brennan and Buchanan, 1980) 
takes a different view. Local authorities should have an informational advantage. Therefore, 
local councils should be better at tailoring the provision of public goods and services to the 
need of their customers. The fiscal decentralisation should bring benefits for allocative and 
production efficiency and, eventually, economic growth. These benefits come with higher 
costs. The spending of other departments that have the nominal responsibility for SMEs 
increased from £2.5 billion (direct) in 2001/2 (HM Treasury, 2000) to £4.9 billion (direct) 
in 2014/15 (Cabinet Office, 2015). However, according to Richard (2008:10), these costs 
were about £12 billion from which £4 billion to tax incentives. This, as Bennett (2012) 
suggested, is because decentralised government costs more. He estimated that 
decentralised governance cost 10-12 times more than centralised.  
Thus, it seems evident that SBRR fits within the government’s devolution strategy 
because it should make cheap properties even cheaper and encourages business owners to 
move into more deprived neighbourhoods. However, as the Theory Review Chapter shows, 
it is not necessarily the case. If SBRR were to be capitalised into rents, the landlords would 
receive the relief and government spending would produce negative returns by enhancing 
market inefficiency. Further discussion of these theories is delivered in the Theory Review 
Chapter. 
1.6 SUMMARY AND OBJECTIVES 
The concerns relating to the effects of this high-profile policy on the tax base and 
local autonomy, coupled with the axioms of tax theory and broader applied evidence 
influenced in forming the primary aim of this thesis. The aim is to understand whether 
SBRR has any effects on business performance, in particular with regards to their 
productivity and survival.  
Employment, productivity and survival rates were reviewed through official 
statistics. Britain seems to outperform other nations with regards to maintaining the 
unemployment rate but performs slightly worse than other advanced economies 
concerning productivity. Manufacturing output per hour has been more unstable than 
service sectors and as total factor productivity (TFP) indicators show, the overall decrease 
in TFP may be explained by a decline in the service sector. When it comes to churn, births 
have started exceeding deaths since 2011. The ratio of births and deaths were more diverse 
through sectors than regions.  
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The devolution of SBRR and its enhancement might raise concerns about future 
revenue, greater reliance on a small number of large firms and restrictions on local 
autonomy to achieve local objectives. This is especially important because the UK collects 
more tax through property taxation than other OECD countries. However, it is difficult to 
compare the collection rates because countries have different tax systems. In a similar vein, 
foreign theories might not be adaptable to the UK environment. Instead of property tax, 
countries like Norway may base their system on corporate profits. Higher corporate tax 
rates may encourage companies to shift their profits elsewhere. On the other hand, the 
major disadvantage of property taxation is unknown incidence and lack of clear criteria 
(e.g. profits). The disadvantages of property taxation may be directly applied to SBRR.  
SBRR fits within the government’s devolution strategy and other policies 
administrated since 2000. It focuses on the cheaper properties and, subsequently, may 
encourage businesses to move into more deprived neighbourhoods. However, this is not 
confirmed by the evidence. The report on Northern Ireland (2014) showed no relation 
between deprivation and SBRR. Furthermore, if the incidence falls on owners, the 
government may be only supporting property owners instead of businesses, adding more 
expenditure to already extensive devolution bill. Given these insights, the following 
objectives are formed: 
• To create a theoretical framework which suggests whether SBRR may 
influence productivity and survival. The framework should be based on the 
existing theories of tax incidence and the UK business environment. 
• To find appropriate data and analytical technique which could be used to 
either support or disprove the framework. Simultaneously, to explore other 
fields for techniques that were not used previously in policy evaluation. 
• To acquire the knowledge through the theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence of the extent to which SBRR may influence productivity and 
survival. 
More specifically, this Introduction and Background Chapter defined the problem 
that is investigated within this thesis and provided the background. The more extensive 
discussion of theoretical issues that were touched upon Introduction Chapter are presented 
in the Theory Review Chapter, which is split into the central concepts of capitalisation and 
governmental intervention. Then, the Empirical Review Chapter looks how those theories 
were employed by other researchers. This literature is used to form a theoretical 
framework based on the existing theories of tax incidence and the UK business 
environment. This framework is presented in the Chapter Four. To find an appropriate 
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methodology for testing this framework, various approaches are reviewed in the 
Methodology Review Chapter. According to this, the Research Design Chapter starts by 
reviewing available datasets, so that a suitable dataset could be found. Once it is identified, 
the management of the data is discussed to provide assurance. The Research Design 
Chapter concludes by presenting the methodology, which is both suitable for data and is 
informed by the Methodology Review. The productivity is estimated using the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) and Regression Trees with Random Effect (REEM), and 
survival rates are estimated mainly with Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH) and REEM. The 
results from these models are presented and discussed in detail.  
The primary contribution of this thesis is the evaluation of the SBRR using rich 
sensitive data, which find no evidence that the often-expressed narrative underlying the 
policy of reductions introduced at the beginning of this chapter is accurate. The thesis 
highlights that the substantial reductions in tax revenue totalling up to £9 billion over five 
years only in England18 result in only marginal initial benefits in survival and no benefits to 
productivity. Simultaneously, the thesis gathers the literature, updates and adopts 
Duranton’s framework and applies not only improved19 standard econometric techniques 
but also the machine learning approaches that were not used previously in policy 
evaluation. 
  
                                                             
18 The most recent extension to reductions from April 2017 and 2018 will further reduce 
tax revenue across England by £9 billion over five years and remove 600,000 firms from liability 
(HM Treasury, 2017). 
19 Improved by CEM matching and more precise deflators. 
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2 THEORY REVIEW 
This chapter aims to discuss the theoretical foundations of the thesis. The overall 
aim of this thesis is to understand whether Small Business Rates Relief (SBRR) has any 
effects on firms, in particular with regards to their productivity and survival. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the inputs used in production. 
Whilst, survival analysis in this setting is a method for analysing the expected duration of 
time until closure. The chapter is divided into two major sections. As illustrated in Figure 
2:1, the chapter starts with Section 2.1 focusing on capitalisation. It is an essential element 
of property tax reliefs because the UK government may be supporting property owners 
instead of businesses. Once theories on capitalisation are discussed, the focus turns 
towards the reasons why the government might still use this instrument to support firms 
(Section 2.2).  
 
Figure 2:1 Content of the Theory Review Chapter. 
First and foremost, business rates (BRs) system might not comply with traditional 
taxation cannons. In 1776, Smith highlighted four cannons of taxation: certainty, 
convenience, efficiency and equity. However, the business environment has changed 
significantly, and it is arguable that any of these cannons could apply directly to the BRs 
system. The first two criteria seem to, at least partly, comply with property taxation 
because BRs are relatively easy to administrate and could be a convenient way to tax 
companies. This is approached in the Introduction and Background Chapter (Sections 1.3 
and 1.4).  
The equity part is the most challenging of all these cannons in the context of BRs. 
That is why the starting point in this thesis is the standard tax incidence debate - whether 
an occupier or property owner is a recipient of the relief. The equity part may be further 
split to the fairness and ownership of the tax. There are two fundamental approaches to 
investigate tax incidence, which will be detailed in Section 2.1. This is important when 
• Machanisms of tax incidence
• Theories of property tax incidence
• UK theory development
CAPITALISATION
• Fundamental mechanisms
• Standard theory
GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
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focussing on the SBRR because the government, could just increase profits to property 
owners instead of targeting help at small businesses to enhance economic activity. In fact, 
the government may also reduce the economic efficiency. The excess burden is the 
reduction in economic efficiency that is attributable to the tax system. It is also known as 
the deadweight loss (or loss of taxation) which is the financial loss that society suffers 
resulting from such government activities as taxation or reliefs. The concept is more 
formally introduced in Section 2.2.1.3.1 
The potential deadweight cost may be high, which is why distinguishing between 
two concepts, formal and economic incidence, is essential. Policymaking tends to ignore 
any divergence between the statutory and economic incidence of taxation (Oates and 
Fischel, 2016), yet this divergence is central to the effectiveness of SBRR and the support 
for the policy. BR is levied on property occupiers and this makes it particularly salient to 
businesses and puts policymakers on the defensive. Yet the relative inelasticity in the 
supply of business properties to the flexibility of demand would see the economic incidence 
transfer to property owners, i.e. capitalised into the rental price. Then, in response to a 
reduction in taxation property owners would be increasing rents in line with the decrease 
in tax. The degree and time it takes for SBRR and other changes to capitalise provide space 
in which the tax, and policy, could influence production and survival decisions. More 
specifically, the formal tax incidence refers to the entity on which the law says that the tax 
obligation falls. This is the occupier in the SBRR context. The economic incidence refers to 
the person on whom the actual tax obligation falls. The Section 10.1 and this thesis in 
general focus on the economic incidence, which highly depends on the capitalisation.  
Tax capitalisation refers to how asset value is changed when cash flow is changed 
by an increase or decrease in the tax liability for that asset. One of the costs that must be 
subtracted from a future income stream is the tax assessed on that asset. These concepts 
are important because if the tax were completely capitalised into rents, SBRR would be 
inefficient. 
2.1 CAPITALISATION 
This section looks into various theories related to capitalisation and the extent that 
capitalisation impacts any effects experienced by the firms receiving the relief. Two main 
versions of modern neoclassical incidence theory have been established - the capital (or 
traditional) view and the benefit (or new) view. The former, introduced by Harberger 
(1962), is based on the general equilibrium model showing that capital owners bear the 
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burden of property tax. Kotlikoff and Summers (2017) and Chetty et al. (2009) provide 
substantial coverage on tax incidence. These authors mainly speak about the taxation of 
goods, but their insights could be equally applicable to the property tax. More recently, 
Wildasin (2017) reviews recent theoretical models on property taxation. In this chapter, 
his review is extended and models are applied to the SBRR context. 
In general, modern incidence theory is an illustration of how capitalisation could 
occur. It is worth noting that it is formed on a slightly unreasonable formulation of how 
firms operate. For instance, marginal costs and rising average costs are often used instead 
of constant average costs in modelling. However, this basic supply and demand inspired 
insights suggests how property owners perceive SBRR.  
Thus, the mechanisms of the fundamental models are presented first (Section 
2.1.1), as illustrated in Figure 2:2. Once these are explained, a discussion on incidence 
theory development is offered (Section 2.1.2). This is supplemented with a review of UK 
literature (Sections 2.1.3-2.1.5). Finally, the chapter concludes with the insights from this 
discussion (Section 2.1.6) that will be included into the framework. 
 
Figure 2:2 Overview of the capitalisation debate discussed in Section 2.1. 
2.1.1 Mechanisms of the Fundamental Models in Tax Incidence 
Several fundamental models are presented to show how and why SBRR may 
influence the demand and supply of goods. The section starts with the partial equilibrium 
model that shows that demand and substitution elasticities should have an impact on 
whether and to what extent businesses receive the relief. This understanding helps explain 
how tax capitalisation into rents or property prices occurs. 
2.1.1.1 Partial Equilibrium 
In the partial equilibrium model, the division of the tax between occupiers and 
owners depends on the elasticity of demand and supply. The theory says that if there are 
many properties to choose from and supply is elastic (or demand is inelastic), occupiers 
Mechanisms 
within 
models
Incidence 
theory
UK literature
Implications 
to the 
Framemork
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would receive the whole SBRR. On the other hand, if there are no alternatives and the 
demand is inelastic then property owners would have all relief for themselves.  
Kotlikoff and Summers (2017) invite us to look at a partial equilibrium analysis 
which considers what happens to prices in the market with a tax change. The approach 
requires assumptions which may be unlikely to hold in applied settings. Some of these are 
that taxed commercial property should not be linked to other properties, so there should 
be no substitute/complement properties. Also, income effect is not considered, so BRs 
should not take a significant proportion of firm’s income, which may not be the case for the 
micro firms. Finally, the collected taxes are assumed to disappear from the economy, so 
they do not affect demand.  
Let’s assume that there is no relief and price is 𝑃 and supply is equal to demand, 
𝐷(𝑃) = 𝑆(𝑃). Once relief is introduced and received by occupiers, the new equilibrium 
would be satisfied by 𝐷(𝑃 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅) = 𝑆(𝑃). If landlords collect the tax, it becomes 𝐷(𝑃) =
𝑆(𝑃 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅). The resulting equilibrium is similar in both cases. This shows that neither 
quantity nor tax collected depend on the party that is taxed.  
Suppose occupiers receive the relief (𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅) per property they occupy. This means 
that occupiers pay, 𝑝 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅, when landlords obtain the price, 𝑃. The property owner’s 
function would still depend on the relief 𝑃(𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅) because the property owner receives 
part of the tax relief when 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 > 0. Therefore, the occupier price could be given by 
differentiating: 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝐷(𝑃)
𝑑𝑃⁄
𝑑𝑆(𝑃)
𝑑𝑃⁄ −
𝑑𝐷(𝑃)
𝑑𝑃⁄
=
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑆 − 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐷
 
2.1.1.1.1 Four Scenarios with Polar Demand and Supply 
The previous section showed that in the partial equilibrium, the division of the tax 
between occupiers and owners depends on the elasticity of demand and supply. Figure 2:3 
(p. 41) presents four scenarios with perfectly (in)elastic demand and supply. These 
extreme scenarios are going to be discussed, so that the succeeding section, which looks at 
more complicated mechanisms, can be more easily explained.  
In the top left of Figure 2:3 (p. 41), the world is represented with perfectly inelastic 
demand. In this scenario, consumption does not increase despite a decrease in price. SBRR 
shifts the supply curve and the price decrease, but quantity stays unchanged. Given that 
demand is not affected, occupiers pay the entire tax. For instance, if business properties are 
assumed to be in fixed supply for a few years because of the long time for building 
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permissions to be granted and buildings to be built. Then, once SBRR is introduced to an 
occupier, the landlord may just increase the rent.  
On the contrary to inelastic demand, when demand is perfectly elastic (the top right 
graph), owners pay the entire tax. The latter may be expected in a world where businesses 
are similar and can move without costs as well as locations are identical. Two spatial 
equilibrium models (Rosen, 1974, 1982) and the open monocentric city model (Brueckner, 
1987) assume such unrealistically perfectly elastic property demand. Other studies, such 
as Hilber and Mayer (2009) and Lutz (2015), have shown that demand is not perfectly 
elastic. Overall, the more inelastic the demand is, the larger proportion of the tax relief is 
received by occupiers. 
 
Figure 2:3 Demand and supply elasticity after SBRR introduction. Based on 
Parkin (2016) and Glenn (2013). 
In a scenario with downward sloping demand curves, assumptions on the slope of 
the supply curve are crucial for the response of businesses to demand shocks. Figure 2:3 
(lower graphs) illustrates that perfectly (in)elastic supply have the opposite trends. When 
the supply of properties is fixed and occupiers are willing to pay just the same amount of 
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money, the landlord effectively receives SBRR. However, when supply is perfectly elastic, 
occupants benefit from the relief. 
It is worth noting that the demand and supply conditions in Figure 2:3 (p. 41) are 
extremes. The combination of effects could follow from a relief in tax. A reduced price is 
payable by occupiers and an increased price is receivable by landlords. This is likely to be 
influenced by the time scale of the analysis because the respective elasticities are likely to 
vary between the short-run and the long-run supply and they also are likely to depend on 
the degree of factor substitution. Mechanisms behind these results are provided in the 
following section. 
If land were to be considered as unimproved, land situated in a jurisdiction with 
exogenously fixed boundaries would be perfectly inelastically supplied. Thus, the land tax 
should be neutral with no shifting and no efficiency loss (Vickrey, 1970). However, Bentick 
(1979) and Mills (1981) have studied the neutrality of land value taxation. They conclude 
that neutrality breaks down in a dynamic economy. Wildasin (2013:1157) explains this 
with a simple model. He asks to consider a case where a parcel of land can be developed in 
a way that will yield a constant return (R) per year in perpetuity. These returns are 
discounted at a rate 𝑟 and the market value of the property is taxed at rate t, then market 
value V should satisfy: 
𝑉 =
𝑅 − 𝑣𝑇
𝑟
=
𝑅
𝑟 + 𝑡
 
He compares the cases with no tax (𝑡 = 0) and tax (𝑡 > 0). It is evident that the 
taxation on land is identical to that of an increase in the discount rate. This case becomes 
even more complex when discount rates and tax are allowed to vary over the time but these 
did not change the conclusion. Bentick (1979) and Mills (1981) argue that land value 
taxation promotes the excessively rapid development of land because the market value of 
a parcel differs over time according to its use. If the tax on land were independent of the 
use of land, the tax would be neutral. However, this is not the case for the rateable value in 
BRs context because land may be used not only by businesses. When buildings or capital is 
included into the equation the situation becomes even more complex. 
2.1.1.1.2 Substitution and Output Effects 
The tax incidence depends on whether the output effect outweighs the induced 
substitution effect. It is difficult to find the right demand and substitution elasticities that 
Theory Review  
43 
 
should have an impact on the substitution and output that may be applied in the framework 
of this thesis.  
For the firm, the output effect demonstrates how the use of inputs changes when 
the firm takes a new profit-maximising output level. Whilst, the substitution effect indicates 
how the use of inputs is changed when the firm was to produce the same amount of output. 
If substitution is very extreme, the substitution effect dominates the output effect. Labour 
gets more expensive and capital cheaper. As a result, the firms are likely to select a different 
mix of inputs for the same amount of output. This is illustrated in Figure 2:4 showing the 
capital (𝐾1𝑎) and labour (𝐿1𝑎) shift to 𝐾1𝑏 and 𝐿1𝑏, respectively. Thus, the occupiers 
receive the relief. If the output effect dominates the substitution effect or no substitution is 
possible, the output effect would predominate. If the factor price decreases (all other 
variables being unchanged) because of SBRR, then marginal costs decrease and, 
simultaneously, output increases. This should cause the demand for both factors to 
increase and the output curve would shift to Output 2b. This new marginal cost curve is 
likely to require firms to change their volume of output to maximise their profits. Both - 
substitution and output - effects are likely to imply a downward-sloping input demand 
curve when a firm maximises profit without a fixed budget constraint. However, assuming 
that the land is fixed as well as total output and the price cannot change as shown in the 
previous equitation, the gross rental value of land will increase to keep the unit cost of 
production constant. In this case, none of the relief is shifted to businesses but all is 
capitalised, so the property owners profit from the relief.  
 
Figure 2:4 Substitution and output effects. Based on Parkin (2016) and Glenn 
(2013). 
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These substitution and output effects are shown in multiple studies and extensions 
(for an extensive review, see Wildasin, 2013:1149). For instance, LeRow (1976) looks at a 
monocentric city model with explicit spatial structure. Other studies (Sonstelie, 1979; Lin, 
1986) have studied the effects of differential taxation on capital between the housing and 
non-housing production. Mieszkowski (1972) introduces more than one immobile factor 
in the model. Richard et al. (1977) and Sullivan (1985) provide computable general 
equilibrium models, which may help to simulate the effects of taxation. It is worth noting 
that this literature assumes 𝐸𝑙 → ∞ for traded goods, so exporting of the property tax relief, 
in the form of lower output prices, is not allowed. 
This subsection emphasised that it is difficult to find the right demand and 
substitution elasticities that are likely to have an impact on the substitution and output. To 
control for these, the framework proposed in this thesis (Chapter 4) mimics both negative 
or positive shocks in demand with different scenarios depending on the relief. To at least 
partly control for these cases, the framework also includes various indexes to control for 
varying competition, which are presented in Section 4.6 (p. 89). 
2.1.2 Development of the Incidence theory – Old, New and Benefit Views 
The first part of this chapter was devoted to the mechanisms on capitalisation. This 
part provides more insight on how these models were applied to form theories. The 
development of the incidence theory is based mainly on the US property taxation that, as 
discussed in the Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.3), is different to the UK 
tax environment. Thus, the development of the incidence theory provides us just with an 
indication to whom UK tax incidence might fall. These developments are also compared to 
the UK scholars such as Fraser (Section 2.1.3), Duranton (Section 2.1.4) and Hilber (Section 
2.1.5). 
The previously discussed partial equilibrium model (Section 2.1.1.1) needs to be 
extended to include the whole view of the market. While general equilibrium refers to the 
whole economy, where demand is equal to the supply of every single good and service in 
every market, partial equilibrium takes into consideration only a part of the market. The 
general equalibrium is used for a traditional view in incidence theory. It claims that a tax 
on property is levied in part on land and in part on the structures that create the value of a 
parcel property. The traditional view is often associated with Simon (1943) but it dates 
back to Edgeworth (1897). Generally, scholars such as Musgrave et al. (1974) support this 
view by emphasising that some rental markets are likely to be imperfectly competitive. 
Since the land is fixed in supply, owners pay the tax in proportion to land’s share in the 
value of the property. Structures are assumed to be mobile in the long run. The net return 
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to capital is taken as given. Therefore, given the perfect mobility of capital, the gross cost of 
capital decreases with SBRR and the occupier supposedly receives part of the relief. 
This thesis supports Aaron (1974), who argues that this view is incomplete. Firstly, 
he stresses that housing and other consumption expenditures may have income elasticities 
not too far from unity. Then, he says that infrequent assessment may introduce regressive 
taxation. For instance, in Britain, the assessment should be undertaken every five years but 
the most recent valuation was delayed from 2015 to 2018. In some areas like Manchester, 
property values may have increased disproportionately as compared to those in Liverpool, 
for example. Thirdly, other factors are not incorporated into the model, which are available 
in the general equilibrium framework. GE mechanisms are used in the new view of tax 
incidence. Aaron also introduces several other observations that are not directly related to 
this study. For instance, he argues that tax increase may cause a capital outflow and, thus, 
this adverse effect may follow once SBRR relief is introduced. 
Aaron (1974) highlights the fundamental difference between traditional and new 
views. The incidence of property tax is now on owners rather than occupiers. GE analysis 
takes account the fact that markets operate together. Thus, a relief for some properties 
would change demand and prices for other properties. For instance, firms occupying 
premises with higher rateable value would have greater incentives to move to premises 
with lower rateable value assuming no capitalisation. Also, a relief on the indirect costs of 
some manufacturers or service providers would potentially reduce the demand for other 
providers. This argument is further extended in Section 2.2.1.3. The general equilibrium 
analysis is more complicated because it considers a two-factor, two-sector model which is 
developed by Harberger (1962) but applied directly to the property market by 
Mieszkowski (1972).  
Mieszkowski (1972) is the first to apply Harberger’s model to property taxation. 
This model carries all previously discussed GE assumptions. He decomposed property 
taxation (𝑃𝑇) into two components, average property tax rate over the entire country 
(𝐴𝑇) and the deviation of the local rate from the national average (𝐷𝑇). Simple 
mathematical expression would be 𝑃𝑇 = 𝐴𝑇 + 𝐷𝑇. The model fits the US case because the 
US has multiple jurisdictions that set their own non-domestic property tax rate. However, 
UK BRs have been uniform since 1990, so it is not directly applicable there. Mieszkowski’s 
(1972) analysis of property tax incidence deals with a model of an economy containing only 
one sector and three factors, in which labour is immobile. He argues that the uniform rate 
would impact capital income, which is progressive under the new view, whilst the later tax 
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increase would raise town’s cost of housing, so would be regressive under the traditional 
view.  
Mieszkowski’s (1972) paper offers an interpretation that applies under certain 
conditions. For instance, when supply is inelastic (a typical assumption in the GE 
framework), the burden of a local property tax falls ultimately on national capital (as well 
as having some local effects). The tax is progressive because capital income is distributed 
progressively with respect to total revenue. The opposing ideas are presented by Courant 
(1977), who shows that non-uniform taxation cannot produce the same total revenue as a 
uniform one.  
Another, often discussed scenario, is the benefit view described by Hamilton 
(1976), Chaudry-Shah (1988) and Ross and Yinger (1999). It is based on Tiebout (1956), 
who apply Musgrave (1939) and Samuelson’s (1954) ideas to their new framework. 
Hamilton, inspired by Tiebout, argues that the taxpayer would not live in a territory that 
taxes businesses higher than the value of services provided to them. The implications of 
this theory to British SBRR would be that house prices would increase by the capitalised 
value of any positive stream of fiscal surpluses, when local service exceeds taxes. This 
model suggests that rational consumers measure (to some extent at least) the cost of their 
tax and the benefits from local public services.  
The benefit view has more validity in the US context, where many jurisdictions with 
varying BRs and service quality exist. The ideas from this theory are unlikely to be 
applicable in this theses because the UK is one of the most centralised countries in the 
world. The UK tax system until recently cannot be considered anywhere close to benefit 
view because the central government is responsible for the collection, valuation and 
distribution of the relief. Furthermore, all these studies have followed Tiebout, so they 
assume high mobility between local jurisdictions, replace lump-sum taxes with property 
tax and introduce an assumption of zoning ordinances, which may be inefficient. The 
burden would be shifted from the below average property owners to the above average 
value owners. In this case, zoning or other regulation should be introduced to limit this. 
Hamilton concludes that tax incidence is unknown until there is a framework to understand 
political forces influencing land-use policy (for more extensive discussion see Hamilton, 
1976; Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989). This is also further discussed with Hilber’s (2017) 
discussion on the unintended consequences of SBRR (Section 2.1.5.1.2). 
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2.1.3 Fraser’s British Theory 
In the previous section, the main theories mainly originating from the US were 
introduced. In 1984, Fraser provides a descriptive analysis of UK property tax incidence. 
Fraser (1985) delivers a valid theoretical analysis of fiscal impacts that is both complete, is 
applied directly to the UK business property and serves well as an introduction to the issue 
from the UK perspective. However, it is worth noting that his theory was established before 
the uniform BRs were introduced. Thus, this theory, in hand with all three previously 
introduced views, assumes a decentralised system, where jurisdictions can set their own 
rates, which is not the case for current UK BRs. 
As Figure 2:5 (p. 47) illustrates, Fraser argues that in the short run, SBRR (1 in 
Figure 2:5, p. 47) would be received by the occupiers because of the lag in rent review, 
which may have the effect of shifting the tax relief. In this case, lower death rates and higher 
productivity should be expected. In the medium run (2 in Figure 2:5, p. 47), the owners 
would receive SBRR through increased rents and capital gains, which should increase the 
mortality rates. While in the long run (3 in Figure 2:5, p. 47), the supply of new properties 
should be increased by the relief, in line with the decrease in demand so that property 
values would return to their previous values, and the SBRR would be received by occupiers 
 
Figure 2:5 Author’s interpretation of Fraser’s survival (productivity) cycle: 1. 
Receiving SBRR lowers the probability of closure (production costs). 2. After a 
few years, because of increased competition death probability (production 
costs) is increased. 3. In the long run, survival rate (production costs) is 
stabilised. 
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meaning some improvements in productivity and survival rates. However, it is worth 
noting that the theory was based on the situation before the 1990s. Thus, there was no 
uniform taxation. Although this theory provided a clear explanation of BRs, it did not 
include the exact mechanisms. 
2.1.4 Duranton’s et al. Theory 
In 2011, Duranton with colleagues published their paper ‘Assessing the Effects of 
Local Taxation Using Macrogeographic Data’ in the Economic Journal. This, according to 
this review, is the most recent and theoretically challenging study on the UK BRs. Their 
model is based on Britain (unlike previous studies) and provides more rigour than Fraser 
by developing a detailed theoretical framework. This novel theoretical framework is used 
as a starting point in the theoretical framework for this thesis (Chapter 4). 
Broadly, their reasoning is similar to that of Fraser’s, but they quantify the 
mechanisms to which BRs should behave. Previously discussed Fraser’s framework looked 
only at capitalisation, but Duranton et al. (2011) study the impact of local taxation on the 
location and growth of firms. They start the article by acknowledging the primary issues 
that, according to them, were failed to be resolved by the existing literature: many 
heterogeneous locations, heterogeneous firms and tax system being endogenous to firm 
decisions.  
Duranton et al. (2011) in hand with Bond’s et al. (1996) theoretical framework 
(discussed with all empirical studies in Section 3.2) suggest that BRs should be capitalised 
into property values. This standard conclusion from the neoclassical frameworks helps 
them to reason that rental prices for commercial properties should not be affected. The only 
possible effect, assuming standard neoclassical assumptions, is on the 
construction/improvement of new buildings. However, once the authors incorporate 
moving costs and the proportion of total expenditure to BRs, they conclude that the taxation 
would not have a sizable effect on employment. However, they add two more realistic 
assumptions. They further theorise that the overall rental costs of properties are affected 
by property taxes, and property valuations occur in case of building improvements. They 
magnify the effects of an increase in property tax. The rest of this section will describe the 
details of this theoretical model, while estimation techniques used with empirical data is 
discussed with all empirical studies in Section 3.2.  
They start by assuming that businesses use labour and building space to produce a 
final good. These two products are assumed to be perfect complements. Occupiers pay the 
tax. Given that the model is based on the data before 1990, they assume that the tax varies 
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between jurisdictions, times and historical value of the building. A jurisdiction is capable of 
setting its BRs. The unit rental cost of buildings in jurisdiction 𝑎 comprises two elements: 
the building rent, 𝑏𝑎 and the local tax, referred to in the UK as BRs, 𝑟𝑎. They further assume 
that the price for final good is exogenous, common in all councils and equals to 1+p, 
establishments could live up to 2 periods and new starters may join at any time. During the 
first period demand for their good is normalised to utility. Therefore, profit is given by: 
 𝜋𝑎𝑡
1 (𝑖) = 𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 
Then, Duranton et al. (2011) assume that the firm experiences both a shock in 
demand for final goods, 𝜌 and an increase in their BRs bill in their second period. The 
second-period tax, 𝑟𝑎𝑡+1, is the realisation of a random draw, ?̃?𝑎𝑡+1from a distribution 𝑓(. ) 
over [?̃?, 𝑟] at the beginning of period 𝑡 + 1. They disregard that firms can renegotiate rents 
downwards in response to either tax or demand shock. In their framework, an 
establishment faces five possible choices: exit (𝜋𝐸 ), downsize (𝜋𝐷 ), grow (𝜋𝐺 ), stay put 
(𝜋𝑆 ) or relocate (𝜋𝑅 ). 
They consider two scenarios for the firm experiencing a negative shock: downsizing 
and exiting. They assume that relocation would be costly and firms would not want to 
relocate. The exit leads to the second-period profit being equal to 0 because firm stops to 
operate: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐸 (𝑖) ≤ 0 
If a firm experiences a smaller negative shock, it stays in business but downsizes. 
Duranton et al. (2011) explain that downsizing can occur by subletting some part of the 
original building unit. They cite Crosby et al. (1998:3) to emphasise that it is a common 
practice. They assume that the firm cannot get a higher return than rent paid to the owner, 
so that 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1). Then, a profit function would be: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐷 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)( p − 𝑏) − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 
Authors do not consider a relocation because they assume that the relocation costs 
would be extremely high.  
Duranton et al. (2011) continue explaining firms’ decisions to a positive demand 
shock. Firstly, they consider expanding building space and hiring more employers. The unit 
rent for extra building space is 𝑏𝑎. The main issue, as according to Duranton et al. (2011) is 
that the firm expanding its building space has to to reevaluate their property. Thus, BRs 
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increase proportionately with rent, so 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)𝛿 , where 𝛿 > 1 is the premium to 
the existing BRs. Then, profit is: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐺 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡+1𝛿) 
Alternatively, they consider the scenario where a firm may stay the same size. Then, 
profit is:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑆 (𝑖) = 𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) 
Finally, a firm may incur relocation cost, m, and relocate where the unit rental cost 
of building equals to 𝑏 such that in equilibrium 𝑏 < 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)𝛿. Then, the profit is: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑅 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑏) − 𝑚 
Then, the researchers define four thresholds: 𝜌𝐸𝐷 , 𝜌𝐷𝑆, 𝜌𝑆𝐺 , 𝜌𝐺𝑅 which correspond 
to cases where an establishment is indifferent between exit (𝜋𝐸 ) and downsize (𝜋𝐷 ), 
downsize (𝜋𝐷  and stay put (𝜋𝑆 ) and grow (𝜋𝐺 ), and relocate (𝜋𝑅 ). Thus, provided that 
the tax, 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1), is not too high and relocation costs, m, are large enough: 
 −1 ≤ 𝜌𝐸𝐷 < 𝜌𝐷𝑆 < 𝜌𝑆𝐺 < 𝜌𝐺𝑅 
They then discuss each of these scenarios. Given that firms cannot achieve higher 
returns by subletting and are stuck with their lease, they would be more likely to downsize 
than exit. They also show that 
𝜕𝜌𝐸𝐷(𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1))
𝜕𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)
> 0 meaning that higher tax in t+1 induces more 
exits. Thus, surviving establishments are those that experienced less negative shocks.  
Next, they show that 𝜌𝐷𝑆(𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)) = 0. A small negative shock would result in more 
subletting. Whilst establishments that have a positive demand shock (but not large enough 
to offset the increase in BRs due to revaluation) would prefer to keep their original size 
instead of expanding, 𝜌𝑆𝐺(𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)) > 0 with 
𝜕𝜌𝑆𝐺(𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1))
𝜕𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)
> 0 meaning that higher tax would 
lead to lower employment growth. 
Finally, establishments facing substantial positive demand shock would prefer to 
relocate because the higher tax would imply a more significant gain from relocation, 
𝜕𝜌𝐺𝑅(𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1))
𝜕𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)
< 0. 
They assume a competitive land market for new establishments. Thus, firms would 
keep entering until profit would become zero: 𝐸(𝜋𝑎𝑡) = 𝜋𝑎𝑡
1 + 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1
2 ) = 0 and 𝑏𝑎𝑡 adjust 
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to ensure that it holds in all jurisdictions. From these assumptions come the full 
capitalisation in the long term because of the new contracts from new entrants and 
revisited contracts but taxes would not be capitalised in the short term. Thus, this theory 
removes Fraser’s long-term perspective and replaces it with the medium run.  
To sum up, for a small positive shock - retains original size, for an intermediate 
positive shock- it grows, for a sizeable positive shock- relocates. Therefore, they conclude 
that the tax rate affects the use of building space. They show that higher taxes lead to both 
a growth slow-down and a selection effect.  
They acknowledge that enterprises are heterogeneous. Thus they capture time-
varying establishment-specific variables and unobservable time-invariant establishment 
characteristics.  
Estimation techniques used with empirical data is discussed with all empirical 
studies in Section 3.2. This model forms a basis of the framework, which is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
2.1.5 Hilber’s Theory Development 
Duranton et al. (2011) provided an easy to understand but a simplified framework. 
For a more complex discussion, this thesis uses Hilber’s (2017) review on property 
capitalisation. Although Hilber (2017) bases his theoretical discussion primarily on the 
residential property market, his discussion on housing demand price elasticity, local supply 
constraints and the extent of house price capitalisation may be applied to the commercial 
real estate market. Some of his insights are valuable and will be applied to the theoretical 
framework developed here. Hilber’s study is on the forefront. There have been published 
just a few other British theoretical studies related to property tax incentives (Mehdi, 2003). 
As according to Mehdi (2003), these were mainly not contributing to the theory; rather 
they are designed for an empirical test. This is evident also with more recent literature, 
which is presented in the Empirical Review Chapter. 
An extension of Brueckner’s (1979, 1982 and 1983) framework, which is briefly 
discussed in Section 2.1.2 (p. 44) is proposed by Hilber (2017). He theorises about the case 
where spending on public services is below the level where it maximises aggregate housing 
stock. The willingness to pay for a rise in the expenses of local councils would be higher 
than the capitalised tax. Therefore, the increase in spending would overcapitalise into 
house prices. Likewise, he suggests that overspending on local public services would result 
in less than full capitalisation. Within his framework, total capitalisation of British 
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government support implies an adequate level of local authorities spending (Barrow and 
Rouse, 2004 and Hilber et al., 2011). 
This thesis further separates two directions from Hilber’s reasoning. One further 
focuses on the UK literature on the supply and demand in the property market, whilst 
another reviews the adverse effects of the relief.  
2.1.5.1.1 The Further Debate around Supply and Demand in the Property Market 
Hilber (2017) highlights that researchers often make the explicit assumption of 
uniform capitalisation as in Duranton’s et al. (2011) study (discussed above in Section 
2.1.4.) This is also discussed by Capozza et al. (1996) in the tax subsidies context. Hilber 
(2017) argues that house price capitalisation estimates are unlikely to be a willingness to 
pay for amenities as in the benefit view introduced in Section 2.1.2 or fiscal variables when 
the long-run supply of land for development is quite elastic. He gives many examples of 
empirical studies assuming that demand for housing is perfectly elastic everywhere. This 
assumption implies that the elasticity of the long-run housing supply curve is, essentially, 
irrelevant. Whilst, another stream of the literature, as suggested by Hilber, separates 
underdeveloped land. They argue that local demand curves are generally downward 
sloping, but the supply of undeveloped land is similar across locations and inelastic. All 
previously discussed frameworks use one of these scenarios as well.  
Hilber’s (2017) discussion should have a few implications for local supply 
constraints for commercial property. He argues that it should depend on the degree of 
substitutability of locations, relocation costs and the preference of business owners. The 
latter is explained by Gibbons et al. (2012) who argue that some locations might be more 
desirable than others just because of some irrational preference of an owner. This is lacking 
in such economic frameworks as by Duranton et al. (2011) (Section 2.1.4) because it is 
often difficult to quantify those scenarios. 
More specifically, they argue that a less elastic housing supply should lead to more 
substantial capitalisation. Departing from the literature on business rates, Hilber (2017) 
mentions many American empirical studies (e.g. Saiz, 2010 and Hilber and Robert-Nicoud, 
2013) and one British study (Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). The British study identifies the 
independent causal effects of three kinds of local supply constraints. They, in line with 
mainly US studies, show that more regulatory and physically constrained places have a 
more substantial degree of house price capitalisation because they have less elastic housing 
supply. Therefore, the magnitude of house price capitalisation is higher in locations that are 
constrained by either regulations or physical barriers to housing development. He 
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highlights a few scenarios, firstly, that desired areas may be fully build-up, so supply is 
inelastic. If it is not the case, he turns to the shape of the curve. In case of a linear curve, it 
would generate a positive association between the price inelasticity of supply and scarcity 
of developable land. Further, lobbying and voting may distort a supply curve (Hilber and 
Robert-Nicoud, 2013). As a product, desirable locations are likely to be more developed 
and, thus, more regulated, so supply is less elastic.  
2.1.5.1.2 Welfare Economics 
Finally, Hilber (2017) discusses the unintended effects of capitalisation. He starts 
by reminding that David Ricardo already in 1817 proposes that government policies may 
be capitalised into land values and could have unintended consequences. He does so by 
looking at the Corn Laws passed in England. He argues that taxing imports would increase 
wheat land. Therefore, benefits would fall into landowners.  
Hilber (2011) argues that “Capitalization … may also have important unintended 
redistributive consequences and other unintended effects: they may offset the positive 
incentive effects of certain policy measures.” (p.11). He explains findings from such 
residential studies as Hamilton (1976) and Wyckoff (1995), who have shown that 
government support might have adverse consequences to intended recipients. For 
instance, Wyckoff (1995) uses two-community and three-income model to show that in 
metropolitan areas with small towns the effect of intergovernmental aid on poor voters 
should be offset by higher residential housing costs. The other papers reviewed by Hilber 
(2017) support these conclusions. An important argument on unintended consequences is 
supplemented with the mechanisms of negative externalities introduced in Section 2.2.1. 
These are important because the government instead of enhancing small business 
performance may introduce some barriers for small businesses. 
2.1.6 Implications for the Framework 
Since 1950s various academics, especially in the US, have been attempting to 
quantify the tax incidence. This chapter discovered multiple issues with tax incidence and 
capitalisation. It seems evident that at least some part of the taxpayer’s money is likely to 
be handed to property owners through the relief. However, the extensive theoretical 
literature may not help to suggest the extent of the issue and the theories are often not 
suitable for the UK environment. Evans (1985) makes an important observation that 
theories developed for the US market do not necessarily apply to other countries. He notes 
that there are significantly more local authorities within the US and highlights greater 
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mobility in the US between local jurisdictions. Therefore, the fundamental assumptions or 
issues within models on capitalisation can be misleading if applied directly to the UK BRs.  
As a starting point, this thesis takes the new view of the property capitalisation 
discussed in Section 2.1.2 and incorporates the extent of capitalisation. It extends this view 
with British ideas in Sections 2.1.3-2.1.5. The UK view is introduced by Fraser (1984). From 
this theory, some generalisations could be made. The new entrants have to sign new 
contracts. Older companies that are renewing their existing tenancy agreements are likely 
to take the scenario of overcapitalisation in the medium term. On the other hand, the firms 
that have existing contracts are not likely to be hit by the increase in rents in the short term. 
These observations are further extended with Duranton’s et al. (2011) by looking at various 
scenarios with an aim to predict possible effects. 
Very relevant to this thesis is Hilber’s (2017) discussion. He maintains that there is 
no uniform capitalisation. This is supported by the empirical evidence in the Empirical 
Review Chapter. Local supply constraints for commercial property may impact the 
capitalisation. The amount of capitalisation should also depend on the degree of 
substitutability of locations, relocation costs and the preference of business owners. The 
latter is also evident in the dynamic capabilities theory (Section 2.2.2.3, p. 64). As a result, 
the thesis leans towards an approach that is capable of controlling for the extent of 
capitalisation in various areas. In fact, the thesis suggests controlling for these issues by 
employing indexes on competition as presented in the Framework with Hypotheses 
Chapter (Section 4.6). 
Furthermore, although demand and supply are essential factors for tax incidence, 
it is difficult to find the right demand and substitution elasticities that should have an 
impact on the substitution and output (Section 2.1.1). To control for these, the framework 
proposed in this thesis, inspired by Duranton et al. (2011) mimics either a negative or 
positive shock in demand with different scenarios depending on the relief as well as 
controls for competition. Furthermore, the proposed framework explores several scenarios 
where the firm may be influenced to adjust its use of inputs when it chooses a new profit-
maximising output level. As defined by Duranton et al. (2011) and described in Section 
2.1.4, the firm may face five possible choices: exit, downsize, grow, stay put or relocate.  
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2.2 GOVERNMENTAL INTERVENTION  
The previous part of this chapter showed that capitalisation is a substantial issue in 
property taxation. This issue, together with the lack of well-defined policy objectives, 
resulted in this thesis questioning why the government chose this instrument. Thus, this 
section aims to understand the primary reasons why the government chooses tax 
incentives instead of other alternatives, such as capital or labour subsidies. This is mainly 
done by looking at theoretical lenses as there are not many empirical papers directly 
related to either BRs or SBRR. Following the same pattern as in the first part of this chapter, 
the simplified models, based on the standard neoclassical assumptions, are initially 
presented (Section 2.2.1). Then, a discussion of theories based on those mechanisms is 
offered (Section 2.2.2). Empirical papers related to these theoretical frameworks are 
reviewed in Methodology Review Chapter ( Sections 5.1.4, 5.2.3 and 5.3.2). 
2.2.1 Fundamental Mechanisms in Standard Neoclassical Theory 
This subsection starts with the underlying mechanisms used in the economics 
related to governmental intervention. It introduces Solow’s technological progress and 
Romer’s externalities and further looks at cross-price elasticities. These are essential to 
understanding the fundamental theories, mainly shaped by the neoclassical thought, that 
will be introduced in Section 2.2.2.  
2.2.1.1 Solow’s Exogenous Technological Progress 
Romer (2004) defines properties of the growth accounting models in his book 
‘Advanced Macroeconomics.’ These help to understand the relationship between taxation 
and growth of the company. To understand the key mechanisms, the most basic framework 
derived by Solow in 1956 is introduced. Solow’s model is a pioneering study that leads to a 
large body of the literature. A more advanced version of the model introduced by Romer 
has also been well received. There have been numerous different extensions or 
modifications of the model (e.g. Jones, 1995; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992).  
The simplest version of the growth accounting framework is where Output, 𝑌, to 
capital, 𝐾 ,and labour, 𝐿, is constant over time: 
 𝑌 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿) 
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If SBRR is not fully capitalised into rents, and capital and labour are increased by 
∆𝐾 and ∆𝐿 units, respectively, the low of marginal product of capital20 illustrates how much 
output increases if capital is increased by one unit:  
 𝑀𝑃𝐾 = 𝐹(𝐾 + 1, 𝐿) − 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿)  
 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿 + 1) − 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿)  
Combining both equations and if the production function has constant returns to 
scale (Euler’s theorem) results to: 
∆𝑌 = 𝑀𝑃𝐾 ∗ ∆𝐾 +𝑀𝑃𝐿 ∗ ∆𝐿 →
∆𝑌
𝑦
=
𝑀𝑃𝐾 ∗ 𝐾
𝑌
∗
∆𝐾
𝐾
+
𝑀𝑃𝐿 ∗ 𝐿
𝑌
∗
∆𝐿
𝐿
→ 
∆𝑌
𝑌
= 𝛽
∆𝐾
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛽) 
∆𝐿
𝐿
   
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛽 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑛𝑑 1 − 𝛽 𝑖𝑠 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 
Solow (1956) develops a model including another factor, 𝐴, which corresponds to 
the effects of changing technology and often called total factor productivity (TFP): 
∆𝑌
𝑌
= 𝛽
∆𝐾
𝐾
+ (1 − 𝛽) 
∆𝐿
𝐿
 +
∆𝐴
𝐴
  
∆𝐴
𝐴
 is the change in output that cannot be explained by changes in inputs. Therefore, 
total factor productivity is estimated as the amount of remaining output growth after 
accounting for the measured determinants of the growth: 
∆𝐴
𝐴
=
∆𝑌
𝑌
− 𝛽
∆𝐾
𝐾
− (1 − 𝛽) 
∆𝐿
𝐿
   
Assuming that the technology takes Cobb-Douglas form: 
 𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾(𝑡)𝛽𝐿1−𝛽  
The alteration in the capital stock of the economy (?̇? =
𝑑𝐾
𝑑𝑡
) is assumed to be a 
difference between net investment and depreciation of capital stock, 𝛿,. If labour is fixed 
and the initial capital stock is 𝐾0, capital evolves as a function of investment:  
 ?̇? = 𝐼 − 𝛿𝐾 
Further, it is assumed that households choose the amount of total output they 
consume. Thus, the remainder might be used for consumption. Saving choices of the 
                                                             
20 For the more extensive introduction of these concepts, see Appendix 10.3.1.1. 
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households suggest an aggregate investment of 𝐼 = 𝑠𝑌. If all variables are constant, the 
combination of the three previous equations result in the evolution of capital taking the 
following form: 
 ?̇? = 𝑠𝐴𝐾(𝑡)𝛽𝐿1−𝛽 − 𝛿𝐾 
The more prolonged growth of capital, the nearer the economy is to the steady state, 
𝐾. The capital stock is described with depreciation and gross investment: 
 ?̇? = 0 → 𝑠𝐴(
𝐿
𝐾∗
)1−𝛽 = 𝛿 
When taxation and later relief are introduced, there are further implications. To 
simplify equations, it is assumed that 𝐾 and 𝐿 are taxed at the same rate 𝜓 which is already 
after SBRR. Therefore, the disposable income is reduced by 1 − 𝜓. The new investment 
equation is: 
 𝐼 = 𝑠𝑌 → 𝐼 = 𝑠(1 − 𝜓)𝑌 
The state uses tax revenue to provide a public good. This public good is assumed to 
have no direct effect. The previous assumption is followed that labour supply is fixed, so 
the tax does not affect labour but capital: 
 ?̇? = 𝑠(1 − 𝜓)𝐴𝐾(𝑡)𝛽𝐿1−𝛽 − 𝛿𝐾 
Implying that the steady-state (?̇? = 0 → 𝑠𝐴 (
𝐿
𝐾∗
)
1−𝛽
= 𝛿) level reduces to:  
 𝑠(1 − 𝜓)𝐴(
𝐿
𝐾
)1−𝛽 = 𝛿 
Therefore, in this theoretical framework, growth is not affected by taxation and by 
relief in the long run, but taxation/SBRR has a level effect. Figure 2:6 (p. 58) explains the 
results. Although gross domestic product (GDP) per worker, 𝑌/𝐿, is likely to increase at a 
constant rate (straight line in Figure 2:6), the introduction of the SBRR may lead to a 
reduction of a tax, thus increasing GDP per worker. 
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Figure 2:6 Growth and level effects in the Solow’s growth accounting model 
applied to the SBRR case. The model implies that SBRR is associated with 
increased GDP per worker. Source: author’s interpretation. 
2.2.1.2 Romer’s Externalities 
In 1986, Romer introduced his model. He includes, unlike Solow, the external effect 
of capital. In his framework, capital is believed to include the knowledge required to run 
the production unit. In Solow's model, it is just the physical production unit.  
Therefore, the increase in capital does not only increase capital stock, but also 
knowledge of this firm and economy. Given that 𝐾 = ∑𝑘, this idea can be captured as: 
𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑘𝛽𝑙1−𝛽𝑓 (∑𝑘) 
Each firm has their effect on the capital stock on their knowledge. Therefore, the 
externality 𝑓(∑ 𝑘) is considered as exogenous and treated just like TFP (or 𝐴). Production 
is characterised by constant returns to scale as well as the fact that firms are likely to 
continue producing under perfect competition. Then, the economy-wide production 
function is: 
 𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐴𝐾𝛽𝐿1−𝛽𝑓(𝐾) 
The model can be finalised by using the general equation, ?̇? = 𝑠𝑌 − 𝛿𝐾. To simplify 
the model, a fundamental expression for externality is assumed, 𝑓(𝐾) = 𝐾𝛼 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛼 > 0. 
This results in: 
 ?̇? = 𝑠𝐴𝐾𝛼+𝛽𝐿1−𝛽 − 𝛿𝐾 
The higher the externality 𝛼, the greater the growth rate. When 𝛼 = 1 − 𝛽, the 
growth rate is constant. This is an assumption taken by Solow’s model, which is why the 
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resultant suggestion is that no convergence takes place. Another difference from Solow’s 
model is the endogeneity of the growth rate. Despite constant TFP and the size of the 
population, the capital stock is likely to grow in the long term, but only if externality is 
sufficiently large. Higher saving rates could be caused by the SBRR and would imply a 
higher growth rate. 
Once the same taxes are introduced in Solow’s model, the equation for capital 
accumulation becomes: 
 ?̇? = 𝑠(1 − 𝜓)𝐴𝐾(𝑡)𝛽+𝛼𝐿1−𝛽 − 𝛿𝐾 
The higher the parameter β would result in a higher growth rate. The growth rate 
for an economy where 𝛼 = 1 − 𝛽 becomes: 
 𝑔 = 𝑠(1 − 𝜓)𝐴𝐿1−𝛽 − 𝛿 
Thus, this framework accompanies Hilber’s view, introduced in Section 2.1.5.1.2, 
that not only positive, but also negative externalities are lowering 𝛼. It suggests that the 
economy with lower taxes grows faster. Thus, the introduction of a greater multiplier for 
larger and potentially more productive firms, as carried out to cover the expense of SBRR21, 
might reduce the overall growth.  
2.2.1.3 The Cross-price Elasticity of Demand 
Previous sections introduced the fundamental mechanisms of how externalities 
arise. Building on these models, the cross-price elasticity of demand is explained. In a 
similar way to the price elasticity of demand introduced in Section 2.1.1.1.1, a graphical 
explanation is provided in Figure 2:7. In this case, the scenario of domestic firms receiving 
subsidies and gaining competitive advantage in their domestic market, clarifies the cross-
price elasticity. Given the standard assumptions on competitive markets, a standard theory 
advises that possibly less efficient smaller firms may take a share of possibly more efficient 
larger businesses. Those smaller supported firms may bring less macro benefits to the 
society.  
Figure 2:7 illustrates these relationships. Before SBRR, small firms supplied Q1, and 
large firms supplied Q3-Q1. Now, at the price of P, recipients of SBRR trade Q2, meaning 
large firms can sell only Q3-Q2 assuming fixed demand. Therefore, it is possible that more 
efficient, and larger firms suffer at the expense of potentially less efficient smaller firms. 
The triangle, DWL, represents the deadweight loss to society because possibly more 
                                                             
21 Wales do not operate separate multipliers for small and large businesses, see Section 1.4.3 
(Introduction and Background Chapter) for more details. 
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efficient producers are disadvantaged. It shows the over-allocation of resources by small 
producers owing to governmental intervention. Consumers still pay the same price (P) but 
the taxpayer's money is used for the relief, so the taxpayer pays more for the goods. 
Furthermore, non-subsidised firms partly finance the subsidies through taxation 
(Bergstrom, 2000) and it is possible that they experience negative general equilibrium 
effects such as an increase in the price of capital (Bronzini and de Blasio, 2006). In addition 
to this, low ability entrepreneurs might reduce economic growth as they might be less 
productive and earn lower salaries. These low skilled entrepreneurs might also take the 
place of more productive entrepreneurs or even cause the entry of even more low-ability 
entrepreneurs (Ghatak et al., 2007:2). 
2.2.1.3.1 Deadweight Loss (DWL) 
The previous section, 2.2.1.3, showed the importance of the deadweight loss. It is 
often called a Harberger triangle, in honour of Arnold Harberger, who used similar triangles 
to measure such inefficiencies as in distortionary taxation. The line between 𝑄1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑄 in 
Figure 2:7 (p. 60) is noted as 𝑄1𝑄 and is the change of quantity as a result of the SBRR. 
 
Figure 2:7 Cross price elasticity of demand and Deadweight Loss (DWL). Based 
on Parkin (2016) and Glenn (2013). 
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Elasticity of the demand is the percentage change in quantity because of a 1% change in 
price, thus:  
𝐸𝑙𝐷 =
∆𝑄
𝑄
∆𝑝
𝑝
, 
where ∆𝑄 is the change in quantity and ∆𝑝 is the change in price.  
Rearranging this equation results in: 
∆𝑄 =
∆𝑝
𝑝
𝑄𝐸𝐿𝐷 
Thus, the higher the change in price, the larger the elasticity of demand. However, 
the change in price is only per unit of SBRR: 
𝑄1𝑄 =
∆𝑝
𝑝
𝑄𝐸𝐿𝐷 
As a result, all area under DWL in Figure 2:7 (p. 60) is:  
𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 ∗ 𝑄1𝑄
2
=
1
2
∗ 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅2𝑝𝐸𝐿𝐷 , 
where SBRR is assumed to be the relief rate, the ratio of the tax to the price. 
Thus, the size of DWL depends on the SBRR amount and the elasticity of the 
compensated demand curve, 𝐸𝐿𝐷. SBRR is likely to introduce the DWL to the society, 
limiting its effectiveness and, therefore, limiting effects on business performance. 
Unfortunately, the effect is difficult to estimate and may not be isolated in the framework. 
However, the elasticity of demand is highly affected by various factors. These are discussed 
in the Framework with Hypotheses Chapter (Section 4.6) and controlled for in the analysis. 
2.2.2 Theories Based on Neoclassical Economics 
Previous sections uncovered the underlying mechanisms in neoclassical theories 
around governmental intervention so that it would be easier to discuss the theories based 
on these mechanisms. Fraser22 (1984:359) together with other neoclassical economists, 
divide governmental intervention to the property market into four areas: planning control, 
rent control, tax shelter and land taxation. The latter has often been used by governments 
to help small businesses (Wolkoff, 1985; Baldock, 1998). Taxes on land and property are 
                                                             
22 His contribution to the literature is highlighted in Section 2.1.3. 
Theory Review  
62 
 
particularly attractive owing to relatively easy administration and a rough approximation 
of ability to pay principle.  
In line with the official releases (the Green Book of HM Treasury, 2013) inspired by 
mainly neoclassical economists such as Stiglitz and Rosengard (2015), this chapter 
discusses SBRR as any other governmental intervention. They are usually justified either 
by market failure (Section 2.2.2.1) or equity (Section 2.2.2.2) considerations. The former 
defines the situation where the unregulated market fails to deliver a Pareto efficient 
market. The efficiency in the market is perceptible when nobody can be made better off 
without somebody being worse off. The Green Book (HM Treasury, 2013) adds that the 
intervention may incur costs and economic distortions. These should be taken in account 
to access whether intervention is desirable.  
2.2.2.1 Market failure 
It is unlikely that the primary aim of the government is to reduce market failure 
with SBRR. In fact, it seems that SBRR enhances some situations when markets fail. The 
Green Book of HM Treasury (2013) defines four situations where markets fail: 
externalities, goods have characteristics of public goods, imperfect information and 
monopolies. It is important to mention that, as the previously simplified model in Section 
2.2.1 (p. 55) showed, the researchers, inspired by such neoclassical economists as Solow, 
take slightly idealistic assumptions that were introduced in almost every step of the model. 
However, the policy might introduce at least some positive externalities. The 
mechanism as to how they arise is shown in Section 2.2.1.2. Myles (1995:313) defines them 
as “real variables whose values are chosen by others without particular attention to the 
effect upon the welfare of the other agents they affect.” In the SBRR context, following 
Duranton’s et al. (2011) specification introduced in Section 2.1.4 and assuming a positive 
shock in demand and marginal moving costs. An example of positive externality may be an 
increase in investment in productivity since firms are unlikely to expand concerning 
employment due to increased costs connected to the loss of relief applied in the previous 
year. In fact, De Long and Summers (1991) show that investment in equipment should 
increase the growth of a firm. In 1998, Keuschingg formalises this idea with his equilibrium 
model, which includes monopolistic competition, product differentiation and free entry. 
The level of capital accumulation is less than the optimum level because agents take the 
investment level of competing agents before making investments. Increased investment 
from all agents should increase welfare in terms of costs and efficiency assuming a 
competitive market, whereas in an imperfect market, it would create a possible reduction 
in mark up. Therefore, it would be unprofitable to make the marginal investment. For this 
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externality to arise, SBRR should be creating new jobs and products. However, it may be 
arguable whether SBRR is sufficiently large. Even if it is large enough, it is uncertain 
whether firms would buy capital from the money received. This discussion will be further 
extended in Section 2.2.2.3 and approached in the Framework. 
On the other hand, as the mechanisms show, some negative externalities may also 
arise. One of the negative externalities is approached in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Increased capital may enhance Schumpeterian innovative companies that would improve 
the market with their new ideas. As Schumpeterian pioneering creative destruction 
suggests (Schumpeter, 1908 and 1939), adaptation to market fluctuations makes the 
crucial difference between firms that fail and those which survive. The economic rationale 
in support of the entrepreneurial role of business entry is that new entrants should displace 
obsolescent and less efficient companies in the process of creative destruction. The ability 
to adapt to market may increase the chances of survival. Unfortunately, governmental 
support may reduce the need for adapting to the market fluctuations. This may impede the 
Schumpeterian creative destruction and enhance the dynamic inefficiency. For instance, 
Lee (1996) and Harris and Trainor (2005) show that targeting some underperforming 
firms might make supported firms over-reliant on subsidies, causing a failure in 
reorganising their activities and improving their performances to the same extent as other 
companies facing the same competitive market pressures. This relief could be explained by 
Bergstrom (2000), who state that policy-makers may be focused on maximising political 
objectives rather than economic efficiency. Moffat (2015) extends the explanation of this 
problem, suggesting that prolonging the life of plants that are about to close may increase 
dynamic inefficiency. 
In addition to externalities, one of the reasons for failure may be monopolies. In line 
with the previously described mechanisms around externalities, monopolies would make 
higher profits at the expense of a loss of allocative efficiency (see Romer, 2012). This would 
result in higher prices to users and, thus, underconsumed products. SBRR may help to 
reduce the likelihood of monopolies by lowering start-up and maintenance costs 
(Felsenstein et al., 1998) and, hence, by enhancing more small firms to enter the market. 
When markets are complete, firms should be able to borrow the money they need at the 
interest rate decided by the lender. In a less idealistic world, small companies may be 
incapable of securing loans from a private sector as they may be considered too risky or 
their outgoings may be too high. Therefore, the relief may reduce the costs of small business 
and make them more creditworthy, resulting in the further development and enhanced 
market efficiency. However, it is worth noting that the government, amongst other support 
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incentives discussed in Section 1.5 (Introduction and Background Chapter), also provides 
subsidised loans for businesses through the Enterprise Finance Guarantee which should be 
more effective in reducing incomplete markets.  
2.2.2.2 Equity 
In a similar vein, governmental intervention may be justified by equity 
considerations (the Green Book of HM Treasury, 2013). One of the ways to measure tax 
equity is the ability-to-pay principle (Pigou, 1906). As defined in Appendix 10.2.1 (p. 267), 
this states that people should pay taxes in proportion to their ability to pay. However, this 
might be difficult to measure owing to the heterogeneity of firms. As discussed with other 
empirical literature in the Empirical Review Chapter, the overall conclusion of official 
studies such as the Department of Environment (1987 and 1995) is that BRs do not burden 
businesses. The recent evidence on SBRR (Peck et al., 2014) points out that only a handful 
of businesses owning small properties complain about the high BRs.  
However, it is worth noting that distributional effects discussed in Section 2.1.5 
show that vulnerable firms may have even more difficulties when their property receives 
the relief, (as pointed by Hilber, 2017) in case of overcapitalisation or other negative 
externalities. By trying to consider their ability to pay, the government may force them to 
move elsewhere because landlords would increase the rents and they may be unable to 
sustain their businesses. Also, as according to the mechanisms in Section 2.2.1.3, firms that 
may be unable to pay the market rate may take the market share from more efficient firms. 
Furthermore, others argue that targeting some underperforming firms might make 
supported firms over-reliant on subsidies (Lee, 1996 and Harris and Trainor, 2005) thus 
their ability to pay would get only reduce over time.  
2.2.2.3 Alternatives to Economic Theory (Dynamic Capabilities) 
One of the alternatives to the standard theory limited by typical neoclassical 
assumptions comes from the strategic management literature suggesting a different way to 
support small businesses. The primary approach to strategic management in the 1980s was 
Porter’s (1980) competitive forces focusing on the defensive position of firms against 
competitive forces. Later, Shapiro (1989) extends this by looking at market imperfections, 
entry deterrence and strategic interactions. On the side of this, others (Penrose, 1959; 
Rumelt, 1984; Teece et al., 1995) have introduced resource-based perspective, claiming 
that the firm’s capabilities, assets, and mechanisms create competitive advantage. 
A new stream of the literature has emerged starting with Teece (Teece and Pisano, 
1994; TEECE et al., 2008; Teece, 2014). It is defined by Helfat et al. (2007:4) as “the capacity 
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of an organisation to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base.” The main 
idea of this stream of the literature is that many firms operate in dynamic environments 
where entrepreneurship, technological innovation and global competition are likely to 
occur (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). To overcome this environment, firms develop 
dynamic capabilities. Strategic management is studied to explain how firms evolve in 
changing environments and how they sustain a competitive advantage. Researchers often 
take Teece’s et al. (1997) view that dynamic capabilities comprise of the following routines: 
sensing, coordinating, learning, integrating, and reconfiguring. The alternative is proposed 
by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), who argue that dynamic capabilities are “best practice” 
across the industry. This will be not considered in this thesis as it is unlikely that SBRR 
could have any influence on the best practice within the industry as it is given irrespective 
of the industry involved.  
Many academics have published various literature reviews on dynamic capabilities 
that form a basis for this discussion. Wang and Ahmed (2007) provide an overview of 
general dynamic capabilities theory. Inan and Bititci (2015) focus on the context of micro 
enterprises. Wilson and Kevill (2017) look at dynamic capabilities theory from the rural 
microenterprise perspective. Using literature from these and other reviews, the following 
paragraphs discuss organisational and dynamic capabilities. 
The primary definition of organisational capabilities is a capacity to organise its 
resources, intangible or tangible, to complete an activity or task to improve performance 
(Grant, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Teece and Pisano, 1994; Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003). Operational capabilities literature contains an array of management tools and 
practices which are applied at larger firms and adapted to SMEs, such as customer 
relationships management (CRM), Just-In-Time (JIT), total quality management (TQM), 
continues improvement (CI), lean production (LP) and totally productive management 
(TPM). 
However, these theories may differ for the micro firms (Devins et al., 2005; Kelliher 
and Reinl, 2009; Matlay, 1999) or businesses in rural areas (Wilson and Kevill, 2017) that 
are expected to be the greatest proportion of SBRR recipients. Due to their size and 
resources, the firms may be incapable of implementing previously mentioned practices. 
Teece (2014) guides that organisational routines are at the heart of dynamic capabilities. 
However, when focusing on small enterprises, the standard framework (Teece et al., 1997; 
Teece, 2007) may not be applicable because in such a setting, decisions are often not taken 
by the group of managers but by owners (Blackburn et al., 2013). The attitude of the owners 
should have a far greater impact on the firm’s performance than for the larger organisations 
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(Faherty and Stephens, 2016). A study by Jayawarna et al. (2014:282) shows that there are 
two ways to increased entrepreneurship. One results from a lack of job opportunities or 
insufficient skills to secure a job. Arguably, these individuals would not always be capable 
of improving their operational capabilities.  
ONS (2013) estimates that over 85% of UK land is considered to be rural (ONS, 
2013). It is important to consider this because rural commercial buildings tend to have 
lower values, thus are more likely to receive the reliefs. Wilson and Kevill (2017) suggest 
that rural entrepreneurs face more challenges than their urban counterparts. These 
comprise, but are not limited to, poor access to broadband, weak transport infrastructure, 
lengthy commuting for workers, a lack of specialist access to finance and business support 
(Galloway, 2007; Steinerowski and Steinerowska-Streb, 2012; Warren-Smith, 2014). It is 
reasonable to question whether unqualified entrepreneurs experiencing so many barriers 
would be capable of employing its resources, intangible or tangible, to perform an activity 
or task to enhance performance. 
On the other hand, Wilson and Kevill (2017) speculate that firms would be investing 
the money from the relief in developing dynamic capabilities even in the rural economy. 
They argue that it is profitable for companies to invest in dynamic capabilities. This seems 
to complement the theory for larger organisations driven by competition, globalisation and 
technological development (Helfat and Peteraf, 2009). Thus, firms receiving SBRR would 
be likely to increase their investment to gain a competitive advantage. 
From the discussion above, it is evident that management is a key within the small 
firm. The general theory would imply that government should directly help to enhance their 
dynamic capabilities, for example, by supporting broadband or infrastructure projects 
instead of SBRR. The direct capital gained through the relief could help to overcome 
liquidity constraints but not increase the dynamic capabilities because building and land 
are generic rather than a source of dynamic capabilities. However, it may be a resource that 
businesses command - so dynamic capability may lead them to use their space more 
efficiently by enhancing productivity. Even though this may be the case, due to the high 
likelihood of SBRR capitalisation into rents, programmes such as innovation grant schemes 
would be more beneficial. More specifically, in the context of micro firms, it seems evident 
that the primary focus should be on the decision maker, therefore a business owner. Then, 
incentives to undergo training would be a slighly better way to enhance dynamic 
capabilities within a small firm. 
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2.2.3 Implications for the Framework 
Governments can introduce shocks and distortions to the flat tax through the 
introduction of loosely targeted reductions, like SBRR. The SBRR23, depending on the nation 
and period, reduces the tax obligation in either steps by a given per cent or by setting a 
maximum tax reduction, which then tapers linearly. For example, in England, for the period 
2010-17 the 100% threshold was up to £6,000 rateable value, after which it tapered to zero 
at £12,000. All these frictions may reduce the proportion and increase the time over which 
shocks capitalise, consequently creating a period in which SBRR could influence 
productivity and survival decisions.  
More broadly, the macro economic models suggest that SBRR should not impact the 
economy as it just redistributes the tax. However, they also advise that market share may 
be taken by potentially less efficient firms receiving SBRR at least in the short term. This 
section also explained the most fundamental reasons why government would want to 
support businesses occupying small premises. These are mainly related to the market 
failure, equity and externalities introduced either by the tax or the relief. If there were some 
negative externalities introduced by BRs, these would hopefully be offset by the positive 
externalities from SBRR, but it is unlikely because of mistargeting. 
The discussion revealed that SBRR might not be an ideal way to achieve the 
government’s aim “to target help at genuinely small businesses” (Scottish Executive, 
2004:1)24. It is apparent that some aspects of the possible market failure may be reduced 
by the relief, such as monopolies or negative externalities. It is unclear whether this relief 
addresses the ability-to-pay principle or supports underperforming firms. Although 
evidence has shown that small firms contribute to employment, GDP and wealth (Section 
4.7.2), the standard economic theory suggests that by targeting small businesses without 
any rationale, the government might further reduce market efficiency (Section 2.2.2). It 
seems apparent that alternative support incentives could provide better value to the UK 
government (Section 2.2.2.3). 
The macro economic literature in this section helps to further enhance the 
framework in several directions. It asks to extend the debate introduced in the previous 
                                                             
23 The Scottish systems does not taper, but has specific, more generous and increasing 
reliefs within bands. Wales used a simpler framework before 2010 when it aligned with the English 
SBRR. In England between 2005 and 2010 the relief was 50% for firms with rateable values below 
£5,000, tapering to zero by £10,000. See the Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.4.3) 
for more detail. 
24 This aim was not included in the policy papers but written in a booklet describing SBRR 
published by Scottish Executive (2004:1). 
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section on demand. Markets operate together, so both recipients and non-recipients are 
inter-related and can be affected by the SBRR. The distributional effects discussed in 
Section 10.1 show that vulnerable firms may have even more difficulties when their 
property receives the relief, as pointed by Hilber (2017) in case of overcapitalisation or 
other negative externalities. These mechanisms are introduced in Section 2.2.1.2. By 
considering their ability to pay and providing relief, the government may push landlords to 
increase rents. However, in the short term, the market is unlikely to be fully competitive.  
Thus, Section 2.2 has not merely explored the primary reasons why the government 
may consider supporting small firms with tax reliefs, but also further strengthened the 
framework by suggesting possible scenarios during short, medium and long terms that 
were adopted in the Framework. 
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3 EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
This chapter aims to uncover the previous research on UK business rates (BRs) and, 
more specifically, Small Business Rates Relief (SBRR). The overall aim of this thesis is to 
understand whether SBRR has any effect on firms, in particular with regards to their 
productivity and survival. Total factor productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not 
explained by the amount of inputs used in production. Whilst, survival analysis in this 
setting is a method for analysing the expected duration of time until closure. As illustrated 
in Figure 3:1, this section extends the theoretical debate on capitalisation produced in the 
Theory Review Chapter (Section 2.1) by summarising empirical evidence on UK BRs. The 
chapter starts with the methodology of the literature review (Section 3.1). It then argues 
that studies with more advanced approaches tended to lean towards full capitalisation in 
the long term (Section 3.2). However, the chapter also uncovers several research projects 
which found partial or no capitalisation (Section 3.3). These were, however, mainly either 
cross-sectional or qualitative studies. Finally, the chapter concludes with the key 
implications for the framework (Section 3.4). 
 
Figure 3:1 Overview of the Empirical Review Chapter. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
This empirical literature review adopted some features of a systematic literature 
review (SLR) method. SLR is known to be ‘a detailed technology, that aims to minimise bias 
through exhaustive literature searches of published and unpublished studies and by 
providing an audit trail of the reviewer’s decisions, procedures and conclusions’ (Tranfield 
et al., 2003:209). The SLR methodology has been discussed in detail in the previous 
literature (see Tranfield et al., 2003; Pittaway et al., 2004; Denyer and Neely, 2004; Denyer 
and Tranfield, 2008). However, many limitations, such as missing articles with poorly 
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written abstracts are found (Pittaway et al., 2004). Therefore, it was reasonable to follow 
Rashman et al. (2009) and regard SLR as a guide rather than a strict methodology. As a 
result, the goal was to achieve the SLR as being ‘replicable, scientific and transparent’ 
(Tranfield et al., 2003:209), but the emphasis was not on the quantitative analysis of 
articles. The aim was to provide conceptual clarity by reviewing theoretical frameworks, 
empirical findings and methodologies and identifying the areas lacking investigation. In 
this sense, the approach built on other literature reviews (such as Chandler and Lyon, 2001 
and Ferreira et al., 2015) with greater critical analysis of the literature, and also recorded 
its searches including citations and co-citations. This methodology also enabled the 
implementation of varying approaches for different sections. This methodology should 
increase transparency and validity of the sources of material and their evaluation.  
Before conducting a study, it is necessary to be aware of what has been already 
discovered in the discipline’s body of knowledge (Hart, 1998; Levy and Ellis, 2006). 
Initially, the literature review focused on the other literature reviews in the field. Several 
broad Business Source Premier searches were performed with such keywords as 
capitalisation, non-domestic property taxation, commercial property taxation, 
governmental intervention and subsidy. The search was limited to peer-reviewed articles 
owing to their representation of validated knowledge and high impact (Podsakoff et al., 
2005).  
Two other approaches were then applied to this literature review. To review the 
significant papers on the theoretical development of debates on capitalisation (Section 2.1, 
p. 37) and governmental intervention (Section 2.2, p. 55), a traditional approach, built on 
already established books or book chapters on urban economics, labour economics and 
econometrics was adopted. It reviewed the citations and co-citations with the central 
papers within the field. These were continuously supplemented with various searches in 
both EBSCO Business Source Premier and Science Direct. 
Only several empirical articles on BRs were identified. A search in EBSCO of the 
term “business rates” was conducted on 2nd August 2017. The search was limited to peer-
review articles. Only 15 peer-reviewed articles were found on this topic, and just eight of 
them were in one way or another related to this study. These were supplemented with 
other empirical articles co-citing these, all of which were analysed in NVivo.  
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3.2 FULL CAPITALISATION 
In the same vein to the standard literature on capitalisation as discussed in Section 
10.1, the vast majority of scholars looking at BRs found full or close to full capitalisation, 
meaning that the property owners would, in fact, receive the relief. In hand with their 
findings, this section uncovers the methods used and the issues they encountered.  
A substantial British contribution comes from Bond et al. (1996). They investigate 
the effects of changes to BRs on a sample of some 2,964 institutionally-owned commercial 
properties in Wales and England from 1987 to 1992. Their BRs are measured with data 
from Investment Property Databank and Valuation Office Agency. In their theoretical 
setting, they mainly used the mechanisms of demand and supply elasticities discussed in 
Section 2.1.1.1.1 and provide similar reasoning to Fraser’s (Section 2.1.3). Their theoretical 
framework suggests that some part of BRs will be lifted to the property owners. They argue 
that the demand for non-domestic properties would be sensitive to price. Whilst, the supply 
is not likely to be elastic. Their empirical part of the paper estimates this amount.  
Their dependent variable is rental values, and independent variables are once and 
twice lagged BRs. They control for unemployment rates, vacancy rates and year effects, 
disregarding industrial and office properties since their approach does not provide 
satisfactory results. They use ordinary least squares (OLS) with instrumental variables (as 
described in Appendix 4.6) for 1726 retail properties. The instruments are current values 
of the local economic variables and lagged values of the property-specific variables dated 
t–2 and earlier. This instrumental variable estimation method does not make use of all the 
available moments conditions (instruments) and does not take into account the differenced 
structure on the residual disturbance. Their results imply that a £1 increase in BRs bills 
could decrease property rents by as much as £1 in the long term. In some areas (such as 
London and the south-east), the authors indicate that the point estimate of this effect is 
greater than £1, but cannot be estimated precisely. In the short term, they agree that 
capitalisation exists, 85% in London, 67% in the south-east and 45% in other places. The 
researchers do not report whether their data satisfied OLS assumptions and ignore such 
issues as simultaneity as discussed in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1.1).  
Later, Mehdi (2003) publishes his PhD thesis on the capitalisation of BRs. He 
provides a literature review and theories around capitalisation existing before 2003. 
According to these, he forms the main hypothesis ‘that property values will gradually adjust 
so that total occupation costs between matched pairs of properties will be equalised over 
time.’ (p. 2) To test this hypothesis, he collects data for business properties in six London 
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boroughs. He considers two properties in close proximity which should provide equal 
attraction to prospective occupiers, despite being located in different boroughs. The main 
approach in this thesis is experimental, with matched pairs during two periods, 1973 and 
1988 and then once uniform taxation was introduced between 1988 and-1998. He matches 
properties according to size, location, physical characteristics, building and planning use 
and technical criteria such as service charge. For the primary analysis 35, 21 and 21 pairs 
are used and for the secondary, 85, 87 and 32 pairs of industrial, retail and office premises 
are used. Additionally, for the primary analysis, he uses t-tests and descriptive statistics, 
while for the secondary data, he uses the internal rate of return. The overall conclusion of 
the thesis is that the hypothesis is confirmed. The property tax is fully capitalised into 
property values for all property types. His primary approach using cross-sectional data has 
a relatively small sample size and instead of real rents, it exploits rateable values. This may 
not be the best choice owing to infrequent, and at that time, decentralised valuations. 
In 2013, Bond et al. inspired by the new enterprise zones announced in 2011, 
conduct a further study with the British data. One of the main features of these zones is the 
relief of BRs. Bond et al. (2013) adopt a hedonic regression approach. Although their 
approach is very similar to McDonald (1993) and Wheaton’s (1984), Bond’s et al. (2013) 
study introduces two significant changes. The tax rate can deviate from year to year, and 
the data covers a broad range of time periods. They suggest that a significant amount of tax 
savings is captured in more substantial rents charged by property owners. Their dependent 
variable is rental payment per leased area deflated by a retail price index. They also 
construct the independent variable by estimating their possible BRs bill per m2. They use 
OLS to estimate their model. They find the BRs variable significant with 2214 observations. 
However, once the focus is moved to the leases originating during the enterprise zones 
(1990-1993), the incidence reduces from 0.82 (p=0.09) to 0.59 (p=0.9).  
The researchers do not report whether their data satisfies OLS assumptions. This is 
concerning given endogeneity issues as discussed in Appendix 4.6. Unfortunately, neither 
do the authors acknowledge selection issues, which are discussed in a series of papers by 
Rubin (1977) and the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1.2). They seem to limit the 
lease term to between 12 months and 360 months, which while seeming reasonable, is not 
necessary valid exclusion criteria since leases may be longer than three years. The authors 
suggest that the average capitalisation effects should be close to 100%, so all tax incentives 
from the enterprise zones are received by the property owners. Other scholars looking at 
enterprise zones find them having a positive impact on employment (Billings, 2009; 
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Hanson, 2009) but reducing employment in surrounding areas (Bondonio and Engberg, 
2000).  
A few more recently published studies are in line with Oates’ (1969) methodology. 
For instance, Hilber et al. (2011) access the impact of central government grants on local 
house prices in England by using a panel dataset of 350 local councils between 2001 and 
2008. They produce a macro model and estimate it with fixed effects and instrumenting. 
The outcome variable in the regressions is a local house price index based on data from the 
Land Registry. Here the main criticism around the methodology is likely to be with regard 
to their instruments. They do not report testing whether random or fixed effect estimator 
is more efficient, for instance, with Hausman test. They maintain that the Labour party may 
have used the grant system to allocate more money to areas where it dominates the local 
council even by a narrow margin. Such variables as region-year fixed effects, the labour 
share of seats and authority type year fixed effects may contribute to productivity and 
income shocks may be questionable. A counter argument may be the recently published 
data on UK government debt by Office for Budget Responsibility (2017). They found that 
actual government debt increased significantly under the Conservative ruling. The finding 
suggests that government grants are fully capitalised into the residential property values. 
Also, they acknowledge “that the British grant system has substantial unintended 
consequences in that it generates a massive redistribution of resources without helping the 
most disadvantaged individuals as well as the less fortunate in the most disadvantaged 
places.”(p.404) Therefore, they support Hilber’s (2017) previously discussed view on 
unintended consequences in Section 2.1.5.1.2 (p. 53).  
Similar to these studies, a vast amount of literature (Heinberg and Oates, 1970; 
Church, 1974; McDougal, 1976; Reinhard, 1981; Richardson and Thalheimer, 1981; 
Johnson and Lea, 1982; Yinger et al., 1988; Palmon and Smith, 1998; Barrow and Rouse 
2004; Hilber and Mayer, 2009) have reported full (or over) capitalisation. However, these 
are mainly American studies focused on the residential market. Also, they have generally 
used either OLS or 2SLS, assumed incorrect functional form, and ignored simultaneity. 
These, and other issues, especially in the research before 2000, are discussed by Yinger et 
al. (1998). For instance, Reinhard (1981) replicates Oates’ (1969 and 1973) studies and 
chooses a more appropriate functional form. Assuming a 3% discount rate, he implies that 
the capitalisation is 107% (Oates’ estimation is around 61%). 
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3.3 LESS THAN FULL CAPITALISATION 
Studies that use macro modelling tend to find partial capitalisation. For instance, 
the Department of Environment (DOE) (1987 and 1995) analyse annual monitoring data 
provided by the DOE and survey 1,000 businesses to find some 40%-50% of the benefits of 
the rate relief goes to occupiers, with the rest being eroded by incorporation into rents. The 
methodology might be questionable because they do not account for property prices 
varying depending on the location, infrastructure and other factors. It may be arbitrary to 
compare one property to another even if this is taken into account. Later, Bennet (2000) 
concludes that capital allowances on investment in buildings in enterprise zones resulted 
in a rise in the rate of return to investors of 7.7-8.7% relative to the base case. 
More recently, Regeneris Consulting (2015) explores the evidence on the economic 
effects of non-domestic rates with aggregate data between 1990 and 2014. They choose 
only core cities and London markets. They stratify their sample according to the location 
and type of property (office, retail and warehouse). Only data for the top 50 properties with 
the highest rateable value for each class, core city and rateable value per year is extracted. 
They report that to obtain significant results they have to experiment. They replicate Bond 
et al. (1996), which is discussed in Section 3.1. They support Bond et al. (1996) with their 
initial findings with OLS. They find negative coefficients between rents and rates only in the 
retail sector for Year 2 and three times lagged values. As shown in the dynamic panel data 
model, Section 4.6 (p. 89) this approach is biased. Unfortunately, they do not test whether 
they should choose a fixed and random effect model but decide to implement generalised 
least squares (GLS) estimator. They find statistically significant results only for a subset of 
the office property sector. It is evident that sampling and the use of techniques are central 
limitations of this study and results may be biased. 
There have been two published studies which directly focus on SBRR. Pieda 
Consulting (2004) surveys 30 Scottish businesses. They acknowledge that capitalisation 
may persist and reliefs may be shifted to increased rents. They point out that at least 10% 
relief (from £300 per annum to £650) may have an impact on a firm, while 5% (from £30 
per annum to £200) is too low to contribute to the firm’s performance. It is worth noting 
that just 16 (out of 30) firms were aware of SBRR. Also, the authors show that BRs are not 
a substantial issue for larger businesses, but a lesser one. However, there are some inherent 
limitations. It does question businesses directly about the contribution of the extra income 
and whether it is needed. It would be irrational for a business which receives 50% off their 
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bill to claim that SBRR is unnecessary. Moreover, they do not consider long-term 
capitalisation. 
Furthermore, qualitative studies tend to disregard capitalisation and question 
business owners directly. One of the most recent studies directly applicable to SBRR is by 
Peck et al. (2014) who consider Wales. The study takes a qualitative methodology and 
provides valuable insights into small businesses. Their 2010 study primarily looks at the 
business perception of the impact of rates relief, generating 391 survey responses from 
Welsh firms. They also conduct five in-depth interviews across 15 businesses. The authors 
find that over a third of the micro firms (0-2 employees) on average spend over 10% of 
their turnover on BRs, while the mean is 18% across all categories. A further critical 
question surrounds business survival. As Figure 3:2 (p. 76) suggests, the smallest 
businesses tend to find SBRR contributing to their survival more than larger firms. 
However, on average, 80% of all businesses conclude that SBRR has been a significant 
factor in their survival over the last year. 
The authors also report responses to the open questions. According to the replies 
provided in the paper, respondents are positive about the relief. They acknowledge that 
multiple owners find SBRR to be vital to their businesses’ survival: “In the last 12 months 
it has been crucial for us to remain in business.” (p.995). Similarly, many commented on 
their ability to retain more employees. Furthermore, authors report that the relief has a 
positive psychological impact: “government is thinking about us” and helps in competition 
with bigger firms: “It is very important and helps where larger competitors can bully you 
out of business, anything to keep the smaller independent trader going is a good thing.”  
It seems evident that reliefs are not so vital for some businesses. Therefore, Peck et 
al. (2014) ask for better targeting. Also, the relief, according to the author, is often seen as 
a reminder that the tax rate is high: “Rate relief helps but the basic business rate has gone 
up enormously for the business. The system is flawed. Small businesses are being overtaxed 
and high BRs do not help the local economy.” 
It is an important study because it takes and identifies the perspective of business 
owners. However, the businesses are only observed once, it is unknown who is replying on 
behalf of the company, and authors do not provide any statistical analysis except 
descriptive statistics. 
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Figure 3:2 Significance of rates for business survival (Peck et al., 2014:992) 
Far more substantial methodology is offered by Duranton et al. (2011) who look at 
the impact of BRs on employment and entrants. The latter is not so important for this 
analysis. Therefore, this summary focuses on the former. The theoretical lens of this study 
has been discussed in Section 2.1.4. They use a two-factor model. Labour and building space 
are assumed to be perfect complements. Firms cannot renegotiate rents downwards. Their 
dependent variable is lagged employment, while independent variables are tax rate, age, 
industry-year dummies. They solve the main econometric issues by using spatial 
differencing, time differencing and instrumenting to solve for unobserved time-varying site 
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characteristics and the endogeneity of local taxation. More specifically, they use within 
estimator and three sets of instruments; the share of local politicians afﬁliated with the 
three largest political parties, the proportion of the three biggest parties if they control the 
local authority and dummies indicating whether it is controlled by one of the three top 
parties. As they suggest, the only dataset available in the UK that satisfies their assumptions 
is the Annual Respondents Database. They merge this dataset with The Ordnance Survey 
Code-Point data and achieve precise postcode allocation. Starting with 21,813 firms, they 
reduce their sample to only 4,414 (report employment twice at the same year and 
establishments have pairs located within 1 km). Thus, the sample may have selection issues 
as discussed in the Research Design Chapter. In the model, they argue that there is 
imperfect capitalisation because of the combination of expensive relocation, uncertainty 
about future taxes and rigid rents. They show an adverse signiﬁcant relationship between 
taxes and employment but no effect on the entry of new firms. The main criticism of their 
piece may be that they look at data from 1984–9 before reforms were introduced. Although 
this enables them to use their more advanced methodology and test their model, it may not 
explain the current business rate system.  
Generally, the majority of not discussed empirical evidence suggests that some 
amount of BR is partly capitalised into rents, King (1973 and 1977), Edel and Sclar (1974), 
Gustely (1976), Rosen and Fullerton (1977), Richardson and Thalheimer (1981), Ihlanfeldt 
and Jackson (1982), Lea (1982), Goodman (1983), de Bartolome and Rosenthal (1999), 
Oktem and Huang (2011), and Stadelmann and Billon (2012). While others (Wales and 
Wiens, 1974; Chinloy, 1978; Gronberg, 1979) have found little or no capitalisation. Older 
studies often ignore simultaneity, it has too few control variables, uses inappropriate 
estimation procedure and incorrect functional form. The most common issue with these 
studies is the misspecification of the tax capitalisation equation. For instance, Chinloy 
(1978) studies tax capitalisation in Canada. He makes two specification errors. Firstly, he 
assumes that property taxes apply to the before-tax asset price housing but not market 
value. Also, he assumes that capitalisation for tax payments and tax credits are similar. 
3.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK 
The empirical literature confirmed the importance of tax incidence, introduced in 
the Theory Review (Section 2.1). It is evident that at least some amount of capitalisation 
should be expected. Thus, the effects of SBRR on business performance may be relatively 
marginal. Hilber’s (2017) theoretical reasoning suggests that there is no uniform 
capitalisation since local supply constraints for commercial property may impact the 
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capitalisation, the amount of capitalisation should also depend on the degree of 
substitutability of locations, relocation costs and the preference of business owners. The 
latter is also evident in the dynamic capabilities theory (see Section 2.2.2.3). It seems to be 
difficult to model without assumptions of substitutability of locations, relocation costs and 
the preference of business owners. Thus, the framework will not do that; rather it will 
control for the forces defined in Section 4.6 with examples from Chapter 5. 
All British studies dealing with BRs were discussed in this chapter. No studies have 
been identified that investigate how non-domestic property taxation relates to either 
survival or productivity. Even though there may be some degree of capitalisation, an 
interesting insight departing from the standard literature is offered by Peck et al. (2014), 
discussed in Section 3.3. They find that owners may consider SBRR to be an emotional 
support. Thus, they may feel encouraged to perform better, enhance their productivity and 
keep their business open. The previous literature on BRs focuses on capitalisation or 
qualitative cross-sectional policy evaluation and does not go further than employment.  
Thus, the thesis so far shows that the government might consider SBRR to be the 
“second best” (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956) approach. The rationale to use tax reliefs to 
enhance market efficiency is based on market failure through the lack of knowledge 
spillovers or financing constraints (discussed in Section 2.2.2.1) and the ability-to-pay 
principle (Section 2.2.2.2). It is possible that policy would support high growth firms which 
create the vast majority of jobs and are the driving force of change (as defined in Section 
4.7.2). However, more probable is that the incorrectly targeted policy would, in the short 
term, help a firm to stay afloat, but would have marginal impact in the long run.   
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4 FRAMEWORK WITH HYPOTHESES 
This chapter aims to introduce the framework leading to the hypotheses that will 
be tested to achieve the overall aim of this thesis; to understand whether Small Business 
Rates Relief (SBRR) has any effects on firms, in particular with regards to their productivity 
and survival. Total factor productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the 
amount of inputs used in production. Whilst, survival analysis is a method for analysing 
data where the outcome variable is the time until the closure.  
The thesis adopts and adapts Duranton’s et al. (2011) BR model in order to 
establish how tax reductions for small businesses could influence decisions on survival, 
production and investment. The model is simple, but importantly enables the incorporation 
of relevant empirical peculiarities of the British tax framework. Duranton’s et al. (2011) 
study is discussed in Sections 2.1.4 and 3.1. Changes to their framework are developed 
throughout theoretical and empirical reviews with particular emphasis on Sections 2.1.6, 
2.2.2.3 and 3.4.  
Several assumptions are adopted from Duranton’s et al. (2011) study. The unit 
rental cost of buildings in jurisdiction 𝑎 comprises two elements: the building rent, 𝑏𝑎 and 
the local tax, or business rates, 𝑟𝑎. Occupiers pay the tax and SBRR is applied to the property 
rather than to the businesses. The price, 𝑝, for final goods is exogenous, common 
throughout the country. These are simplified but reasonable assumptions to make for the 
current business rate environment.  
They also assume that establishments could exist for up to two periods and new 
starters may join at any time. During the first period demand for their goods is normalised 
to the utility. Therefore, a profit of an establishment 𝑖 in period one is given by: 
𝜋𝑎𝑡
1 (𝑖) = 𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 
Duranton’s et al. (2011) attention is to employment, while this study focuses on 
productivity. Therefore, the main inputs in a typical productivity function (as defined in 
Section 5.1.2) are also included in this model 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡 = 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡  + 𝑐, where 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is 
labour, 𝐾𝑖𝑡 is capital and 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is investment. Period one profit is given by;  
𝜋𝑎𝑡
1 (𝑖) = 𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡 
Furthermore, some differing assumptions to Duranton’s et al. (2011) are imposed 
as being more suitable for the current environment. They assumed the perfect competition 
of the land market. Therefore, establishments keep entering the market until their expected 
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profit is equal to zero, 𝐸(𝜋𝑎𝑡) = 𝜋𝑎𝑡
1 + 𝐸(𝜋𝑎(𝑡+1)
2 ) = 0, and 𝑏𝑎𝑡 adjusts to ensure that this 
holds for all properties and areas. As described in a debate on capitalisation in Section 10.1, 
a perfectly competitive market would mean that the SBRR is capitalised into rents in both 
the short and long terms. This is not a reasonable assumption in a BR context.  
The Theory Review Chapter showed that uniform capitalisation may not be evident 
across the country. The capitalisation is likely to be impacted by local supply constraints 
for commercial property as discussed throughout the Theory Review. Thus, it is assumed 
that property taxes and expected increments are fully capitalised only into new rental 
contracts. Otherwise, tax shocks take time to be (possibly partially) capitalised due to 
heterogeneous levels and type of competition, and market rigidities. From the empirical 
studies discussed in the Empirical Review Chapter some generalisations were made. 
Researchers tend to find partial or no capitalisation in the short term and full capitalisation 
in the long term. Similarly, Fraser (1984) explains in his book that the new entrants have 
to sign new contracts. Older companies that are renewing their existing tenancy 
agreements are likely to take the scenario of overcapitalisation in the long term. 
On the other hand, the firms that have existing contracts are not likely to be hit by 
the increase in rents in the short term. Thus, as summarised in Section 2.2.2.3, this 
framework separates effects in short, medium and long terms so that the model would be 
more representative to the real market. In Section 4.6, this thesis proposes to control for 
the heterogeneous capitalisation due to levels of concentration or diversity in small areas.  
In general, rigidities include standard contracts, in which rent reviews usually occur 
at time intervals and are only upward. The annual national tax adjustments are reasonably 
predictable as they are revenue neutral and reflect inflation. Shocks are likely following the 
implementation of BR revaluations, which should take place every five years and can both 
lower and raise the obligation. The new establishments are assumed to sign a lease in 𝑡 
which sets building rent for both 𝑡 and 𝑡 +  1.  
Furthermore, according to Harris (2017), capitalisation should depend on the 
degree of substitutability of locations, relocation costs and the preference of business 
owners. Arguably, the first three criteria should not vary significantly across the country. 
However, the preference of the business owner may be attached to the particular area. 
Thus, it is assumed that the relocation costs, 𝑚, are substantial and exceed the relief, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 >
𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡.  
A further differentiator in this model than that of Duranton’s et al. (2011) is that 
business rates do not vary across jurisdictions, but varies across times and the rateable 
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value of the building. Contrary to Duranton’s et al. (2011), jurisdiction is not assumed to be 
capable of setting its business rates. These are essential conditions to make the modelling 
fit for the post-1990s UK environment. 
In order to focus more on property taxes, this thesis makes a number of simplifying 
further assumptions. The supply is conceptualised as; 
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 = [𝛽𝑣𝑓𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑜𝑓𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡] + 𝛽𝑟𝑠𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
where 𝑄is the output of firm i in nation j at time t, 𝑉𝐹 are the general variable inputs, 
(such as labour and materials) OF are other fixed factors (such as machinery, installations 
or overheads) excluding rented space (RS) which is considered separately. The 𝛽′𝑠 
represent their relative weights in output. All variable and other fixed inputs are taken 
together as numeraire. Firms exist for up to two periods and can enter at any point. During 
the firm’s first period, demand is normalised to unitary.  
Rent and tax are expressed in units of output to relate them directly to price and 
unit profits. These values represent the input value divided by total output value and as 
such can reflect changes in productivity. The rents are fixed in both periods to reflect 
rigidities in the contractual norms. In period two, a demand shock is observed;  
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝜌𝑖, 
where 𝜌𝑖 is a realisation from a random draw over a continuous distribution at the 
beginning of the period. The draw can be positive or negative. This modelling considers 
responses to the shock and the influence of reliefs. 
Additionally, the firm is assumed to experience a shock in their second period. The 
second-period tax, 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1), consists of a previous tax and any relief if it is available; 
𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑟𝑎𝑡 −/+𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1), where 𝑟𝑎𝑡 > 0 and 𝑟𝑎𝑡 ≥ 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1).  
This is undertaken in order to simplify the equation. The reasoning is that business 
rates do not increase much from year to year. To further simplify, it is assumed that the 
relief is given according to the building value during the valuation, 𝑏𝑎 and is not affected by 
the demand.  
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4.1 NEGATIVE SHOCK IN DEMAND 
Given that between 2007 and 2008 companies experienced an economic downturn, 
the modelling starts with scenarios as to how a rational firm may behave when it starts 
receiving SBRR, but is currently experiencing low demand. After a negative shock in 
demand, 𝜌𝑖 > 𝜌𝑖+𝑡, as derived in Section 2.1.6, a firm may want to either exit, downsize, 
relocate or reduce costs of production inputs.  
In extremis, a negative shock (𝜌𝑖 < 0) will lead to firm exit (E)regardless of SBRR:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐸 (𝑖) ≤ 0 
The level of reliefs could affect exit thresholds, with greater relief adding greater 
resilience. In terms of total costs, falling demand and output means the fixed BR and reliefs 
become more salient to firm decisions as the unit fixed costs increase and variable costs 
change little if a typical flat cost curve is assumed. In which case, firms with reliefs may 
survive, where counterfactually they would not. This reflects the source of political 
pressure from small business groups, which in the period since the great recession have 
put the question of business rates at the top of their list of concerns (Adam and Miller, 2014 
and Cabinet Office, 2014). 
Another option may be downsizing. This may occur by subletting a part of the 
original building unit. However, it is assumed that the firm cannot receive a higher return 
than the rent paid to the owner, so that 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1). Then, a profit function would be: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐷 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)( p − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) + 𝑏 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡) 
The firm that started receiving SBRR and is experiencing a negative demand shock 
would be incapable of increasing its total revenue, even by lowering its price. It may still 
choose to sublet their building space, but it could probably do that for less than their rent. 
However, some reduced overheads from the SBRR may keep profits sufficient to sustain the 
business. Following the same condition but including SBBR, the new profit function is:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐷 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(p − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) + 𝑏 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1)), 
where 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1) is the proportionate reduction in the tax for small firms within a 
given nation and period. 
If a company does not reduce its building space but rather reconsiders its 
production inputs, it is likely to reduce its investment in productivity by 𝜅%, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝜅 =
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𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1), where 𝜅 is the reduction of the current costs in production inputs. This is likely 
to reduce the output costs. The new profit function becomes:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑃 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑡𝜅 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎𝑡 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑡) 
Relocation may be an option for existing firms. As discussed in the Introduction and 
Background Chapter (Section 1.4.3), UK business rates do not vary between councils. 
However, property rateable values and rents vary significantly. Also, as defined at the 
beginning of this theoretical modelling, it is reasonable to relax the assumption about the 
perfectly competitive real estate market in the short term. The framework looks at two 
scenarios: when a firm already receives a relief and when relief is just introduced in the 
land.  
If the firm is already receiving the relief, it is unlikely to obtain a better deal 
elsewhere. The firm would incur relocation cost, m, and relocate where the unit rental cost 
of building equals to 𝑏 such that in equilibrium 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)𝛿 < 𝑏. Thus, the relocation 
would not just mean an increase in their rent and business rates but also a loss of SBRR: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑅 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) − 𝑏 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1) −𝑚) 
If the relief is unavailable for the current premises, it is possible that a firm could 
find a cheaper property and pay lower rent somewhere else. In this scenario, the profit 
could be defined as: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑅 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) − 𝑏 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1) −𝑚) 
Assuming that just some amount of the SBRR is capitalised into rents and a firm has 
to increase its indirect expenses, price increases and demand for the goods further 
decreases. A firm would be likely not just to receive lower rent but also start receiving 
larger SBRR. Thus, the demand for properties receiving SBRR would increase until perfect 
market competition. As a result, landlords would potentially increase rents for their more 
popular premises as discussed in Section 2.1.3. 
4.2 POSITIVE SHOCK IN DEMAND 
Firms, in essential sectors might experience a positive shock in demand during pre-
recession, recession and post-recession periods. If a firm faces a positive shock (𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 ≥
0), it has four choices. It may want to either grow by investing in building space and 
employing more people, stay the same or relocate. This depends on the increase in demand. 
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If a firm wants to expand their building space, it may need to reevaluate their 
property. They would need larger and potentially more expensive property, which 
potentially would not receive SBRR. For this reason business rates do not just increase 
proportionately because the value is larger but also by the relief, which is granted for the 
previous property, so 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝛿 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑡 , where 𝛿 is the premium to the existing 
business rates. This means reliefs would reduce this gain from lower unit costs, given they 
neutralise the tax costs. Moreover, tighter capacity constraints for small firms and limited 
scale effects in some industries, would see constraints bite more quickly and may result in 
increases in variable unit costs which offset the fixed factor or any productivity gains. Thus, 
the business rates would increase with rent, so that 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝛿 , where 𝛿 is the premium 
to the existing business rates and 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝛿 < 𝑏. Also, firms may lose their SBRR (if 
previously received). Then, the profit is: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐺 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) − 𝑏 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑡) 
A company may not expand its building space but rather employ more individuals. 
Then they would cost the premium, 𝜗, which is between 1 and 2, to the existing investment 
in either labour or capital. This results in:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝐼 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1)𝜗 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)) 
If the demand shock is sufficiently positive, a firm may decide to relocate (R) to 
larger premises. Unit rental and taxation per unit are assumed to be the same or lower than 
staying in the current premises and producing at the same level or intensifying production. 
However, such relocation would lead to lower or no reliefs, given the firm will probably 
now face a higher total initial tax. Hence, in addition to relocation costs (m) there would be 
extra tax costs for growing small firms. The unit rental cost of the building is lower than the 
previous rent and equals to 𝑏, so that in equilibrium, 𝑏 < 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1)𝛿. It would not just 
lead to the increase in rent and business rates in real terms (reduction in per unit terms) 
but also in a possible loss of SBRR: 
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑅 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑎(𝑡+1) − 𝑏 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1) −𝑚) 
Finally, a firm may stay the same:  
 𝜋𝑡+1
2 (𝑖) = 𝜋𝑆 (𝑖) = (1 + 𝜌𝑖)(𝑝 − 𝑏𝑎𝑡 − 𝑟𝑎(𝑡+1) + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑡) 
Hence, depending on 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑡 and its induced demand shock, 𝜌, a firm faces seven 
possible choices: exit (𝜋𝐸 ), downsize (𝜋𝐷 ), reduce productivity inputs (𝜋𝑃 ), improve the 
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current building (𝜋𝐺 ), increase investment in productivity (𝜋𝐼 ), stay the same (𝜋𝑆 ) or 
relocate (𝜋𝑅 ). 
4.3 NO CAPITALISATION (SHORT TERM) 
It is assumed that firms are indifferent between any of these options. Also, SBRR is 
substantial in their budget and, thus, is significant enough to increase or reduce the profits. 
The relocation is sufficiently costly. Then profit functions can be sorted according to the 
preference of the firm.  
The positive demand shock for firms with no relief would result in: 
𝜋𝑅 = 𝜋𝐺 = 𝜋𝐼 < 𝜋𝑆  
However, firms receiving the relief would have these preferences: 
𝜋𝑅 ≤  𝜋𝐺 < 𝜋𝐼 < 𝜋𝑆  
This shows that theoretically, SBRR recipients may be more likely to invest in TFP 
in the short term. If a firm focuses just on its short-term profit, it is likely to invest in neither 
property nor TFP but just increase their profit by the amount of the relief. If demand is large 
and SBRR is substantial, a small rational establishment receiving SBRR would be more 
incentivised to invest in TFP growth than other firms.  
In the case of the decrease in demand, firms that do not receive the relief would 
have these preferences: 
𝜋𝐸 < 𝜋𝑃 = 𝜋𝐷 ≤ 𝜋𝑅  
However, once the relief is introduced (enhanced), firms that receive the relief 
would change their preferences to: 
𝜋𝑅 < 𝜋𝐸 < 𝜋𝑃 = 𝜋𝐷  
If the relief is introduced and the enterprise is the first recipient of SBRR for those 
premises, there should not be any premises which would be much cheaper. This would 
make enterprises dependent upon the relief and they would be more likely to exit than 
relocate when compared with non-recipients. Simultaneously, they should be able to 
increase their cash flow, so immediate recipients are likely to experience higher survival 
rates. Thus, the rational recipient of SBRR would choose between subletting part of their 
property and reducing investment in productivity to survive during the downtime. 
Framework with Hypotheses  
86 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that a possibly higher expense in t+1 because of 
capitalisation reduces short-term profits and induces more exits. A greater number of exits 
also implies that surviving establishments are those that have experienced a less negative 
demand shock.  
On the other hand, non-recipients that have to pay both higher rents and BR would 
be more likely to relocate than to cut their investment in TFP or downsize. Furthermore, 
they would be less likely to exit than recipients. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are formed: 
H1a: During downtime, firms receiving a relief, awarded upon its either 
introduction or enhancement, are more likely to survive than those that are not receiving 
the relief in the short-term. 
H2a: During downtime, TFP of firms receiving a relief, awarded upon either its 
introduction or enhancement, is lower than firms that are not receiving the relief in the 
short-term. 
4.4 PARTIAL CAPITALISATION (MEDIUM TERM) 
Preferences related to smaller firms receiving SBRR would be valid if a firm is the 
first recipient or SBRR is yet to be capitalised into rents. As Fraser (1984) suggested, 
because of the increased demand for SBRR on a recipient’s premises, firms may be made to 
relocate or suffer increased rents. These rents may be even overcapitalised in the medium 
term, meaning that they may be disproportionately increased (higher than available SBRR) 
and companies would suddenly be affected by the increase. As discussed in Section 2.1, a 
full capitalisation is a more likely scenario in the long term. It is reasonable to assume a 
partly competitive property market with diverse moving costs in the medium term. 
 In the medium term, firms experiencing a positive shock in demand would have the 
following preferences: 
𝜋𝐺 < 𝜋𝐼 < 𝜋𝑆 < 𝜋𝑅  
In the medium term, non-recipients experiencing a negative shock in demand 
would have the following preferences: 
𝜋𝐸 < 𝜋𝑃 = 𝜋𝐷 < 𝜋𝑅  
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However, the SBRR recipients would be likely to suffer a loss because of both 
relocation expense, 𝑚, and increase rents, unlike non-recipients that were more likely to be 
unaffected by the relief or may be even capable of lowering their rents. On the contrary, if 
𝑚 is very high and the rent is being increased gradually, the effect to recipients would be 
indifferent to non-recipients. However, if these are very high, the 𝜋𝑃 = 𝜋𝐷  might become 
even lower than 0. Thus, this uncertainty causes to create the following preferences for 
SBRR recipients: 
𝜋𝐸 ≤ 𝜋𝑃 = 𝜋𝐷 ≤ 𝜋𝑅  
Thus, the following hypotheses are formed: 
H1b: During downtime, survival probability of firms receiving SBRR is lower than 
firms that are not receiving the relief in the medium-term. 
H2b: During downtime, TFP of firms receiving SBRR is lower than firms that are not 
receiving the relief in the medium-term. 
4.5 FULL CAPITALISATION (LONG TERM) 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, a full capitalisation is a more likely scenario in the 
long term. Thus, it is reasonable to assume the perfectly competitive market with small 
moving costs in the long term. Let us disregard both 𝜋𝑃 and 𝜋𝐷  scenarios as non-
substantial for the long-term recession because both are based on the reduction of either 
building space or investment. If a firm continues to do that, it would have to exit in the long 
term.  
There would be no benefit of 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 because firms would be changing locations 
and demand of properties would increase until the equilibrium where SBRR is fully 
capitalised into rents. Thus, 𝑏𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑏𝑎𝑡 + 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑎(𝑡+1) = 𝑏𝑎𝑡. As a result, smaller firms 
experiencing recession would be more severely pushed to relocate owing to increased 
rents by the landlord and more severe competition for their property. This would result in 
the following priorities: 
 𝜋𝐸 < 𝜋𝑅  
 
 
Framework with Hypotheses  
88 
 
However, if relocation costs exceed the relief, firms would be more likely to exit. It 
is also worth noting that a possible overcapitalisation in the medium term may imply a 
greater number of exits owing to the increase in demand for properties that may be entitled 
to claim SBRR: 
 𝜋𝑅 < 𝜋𝐸  
The perfectly competitive real estate market would make firms indifferent between 
investing in property and equipment with the positive shock in demand, 𝛿 →  𝜗. Given that 
property and investments in productivity are perfect substitutes, firms want to expand 
their business to increase their long-term profit, so 𝜋𝑆  is also removed from the 
consideration:  
 𝜋𝑅 < 𝜋𝐺 = 𝜋𝐼  
Although SBRR may not cause firms to invest more into TFP, their previous 
investment in TFP (e.g. R&D or equipment) may still enhance their productivity. This 
suggests that first recipients upon introduction (or enhancement) of SBRR during a positive 
shock in demand or non-recipients during a negative shock in demand may be more likely 
to receive higher TFP than other firms. Given that many more firms suffered from the 
recession than had an increase in demand, the overall effect should imply that SBRR 
reduces TFP in the long term.  
Finally, it would be reasonable to assume that they would invest in an appropriate 
mix, thus maximising their profits to enhance their productivity. Relaxing the assumption 
that production inputs and building improvements are perfect substitutes, firms may be 
investing more rationally and improve their productivity in the long term. However, it is 
worth noting that this highly depends on strategic management as discussed Section 2.2.2.3 
(p. 64) rather than the relief. 
Thus, the following hypotheses are formed: 
H1c: SBRR has no significant impact on survival rates in the long term. 
H2c: SBRR has little or no significant impact on productivity in the long term. 
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4.6 COMPETITION – SHORT, MEDIUM AND LONG TERMS 
The framework defined how firms are likely to behave. However, it intentionally 
did not define the duration of the short, medium and long terms. Standard theoretical 
models on capitalisation (Section 10.1) and 
the empirical UK literature (Empirical 
Review Chapter) often assume uniform 
capitalisation across the country. This 
thesis joins Hilber (discussed in Section 
2.1.5) and challenges this perception. The 
thesis argues that the exact time frame of 
short, medium and long-term effects highly 
depends on the region and industry.  
More broadly, the study by Ross et 
al. (2015) partly applies Bosma’s et al. 
(2008) methodology to explain variation in 
small growing firms across Scottish regions 
by demand, supply, culture, agglomeration 
externalities and policy. This is covered in 
the Theory Review Chapter in how 
externalities arise (Section 2.2.1.2) and how 
they may influence businesses (Section 
2.2.2). The factors affecting small businesses 
are reasonable and consistent with previous 
theories mentioned throughout the thesis (Krugman, 1990; Rittenberg and Tregarthen, 
2009) and empirical findings. For example, the entrepreneurial activity across geographic 
space is illustrated according to the historical perspective (see Figure 4:1, p. 89) and in 
connection with variations in spatial characteristics, such as knowledge (Obschonka et al., 
2015). Such variations might be partly explained by differences in regions. For example, 
Stuetzer et al. (2015) reveal that UK regions with large industries, such as 19th century 
textile mills in Manchester, have lower entrepreneurship rates and weaker 
entrepreneurship culture today.  
In 1992, Glaeser with colleagues distinguished three types of spillovers that are 
likely to influence the analysis: specialisation spillovers (Marshall-Arrow-Romer, 1890; 
1962; 1986); competition spillovers (Porter externalities, 1990); and diversity spillovers 
Figure 4:1 Spatial variations in new 
firm formation rates. 1994-2007 
averages. The colour is shaded by the 
firm formation rates. Where dark  
black is higher formation rates and 
white is lower. Source: Fotopoulos 
(2014:671) 
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(Jacobian externalities, 1969). These are often included in many recent studies. For 
instance, Harris and Moffat discussed in Sections 5.1.4.5.3 (p. 111) and 5.2.3.2 (p. 117), 
include these indexes that may be used to control the business environment and 
externalities.  
This thesis argues that these indexes will (to some extent) capture the degree of 
competition across firms for premises and, thus, it is likely to capture the capitalisation at 
least partly. In other words, it suggests that firms in less competitive areas or industries 
would have lower capitalisation. For instance, in a case of a rural entity, the property owner 
would be unlikely to quickly increase rent for those premises because of the demand 
elasticity in the less competitive areas. The business owner may have a few other options 
to relocate and the property owner may have no demand for their premises. Thus, the firm 
would be likely to experience extended short-term effects, as defined in Section 4.3. 
On the other hand, those occupying premises in either very urban areas or very 
competitive areas would be more likely to experience the capitalisation effects much faster 
because they are likely to experience high demand for their premises. For instance, a tiny 
corner shop in central London is likely to have their rent increased almost immediately 
once SBRR is introduced. Thus, the firm would not experience the short-term effects, as 
defined in Section 4.3. 
4.6.1 Marshallian Externalities (Specialisation) 
The previous examples suggest that one should separate the effects of rural and 
urban firms. Thus, to account for the market concentration, this thesis controls for 
Marshallian externalities. Agglomeration externalities, dating back to Marshall’s (1890) 
’Industrial District-argument,’ are based on asset-sharing, such as the provision of specific 
goods and services by specialised suppliers and the creation of a local labour market pool 
sustained by a local concentration of TFP, which may influence production. Spillovers arise 
from knowledge sharing of firms in the same sector. Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and 
Paci and Usai (1999) suggested using the production structure specialisation index (PS) to 
measure Marshallian specialisation externalities. These are simply a proportion of industry 
employment or output located within local authority related to national industry 
employment or output: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐸𝑖,𝑗
∑ 𝐸𝑖,𝑗𝑖
⁄
∑ 𝐸𝑖,𝑗𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝐸𝑖,𝑗𝑗𝑖
⁄
,  
where i is sector, j is industry and E is employment  
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4.6.2 Jacobian Externalities (Diversity) 
Essentially, small firms in different industries may compete for the same premises. 
In the previous example, the rural entity and urban entity are unlikely to compete for the 
same premises and this should be controlled for. To control for this effect, Jacobian 
externalities are estimated. Jacobs (1969) initially argued that knowledge might spill over 
between complementary rather than analogous industries as ideas established for once 
sector can be applied in other sectors. Hence, diversity is estimated by summing some 
different sic codes within the region. Paci and Usai (1999) measured it with their 
productivity diversification index: 
𝑃𝐷𝑗 =
2
(𝑛 −1)𝑄𝑛
∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 ,  
where 𝑛 is the number of regionally residing industries, 𝑄 is cumulative 
employment in sector 𝑖, ordered ascendingly by size.  
4.6.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (Diversity) 
Finally, some firms, especially in more specialist areas, might compete for the same 
premises nationwide. Some premises might be industry-specific and firms across the UK 
might compete for these premises. The Herfindahl- Hirschman Index named after 
economists Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman is a widely accepted measure of 
market concentration. Since 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade 
Commission, and state attorneys in general have used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. It 
is usually estimated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market. 
Then, summing the resulting numbers up. 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑𝑠𝑖
2,
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
where 𝑠𝑖 is the market share of firm 𝑖 in the market, and 𝑁 is the number of firms. 
4.7 OTHER FIRM-SPECIFIC FACTORS 
As a product of this theoretical modelling, the following equation should estimate 
the productivity: 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝛿 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
Likewise, the following function should predict survival: 
𝑆𝑃 = ℎ𝑜(𝑡)𝑒
∝𝐿𝐿∗∝𝐾𝐾∗∝𝑟𝑟∗∝𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 
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However, other issues were identified in the Methodology Review that may bias 
estimators. The theoretical debate around capitalisation in Section 2.1 started with partial 
equilibrium analysis emphasising the importance of the elasticity of demand and supply. 
The vast majority of models presented in this thesis also acknowledges their importance. It 
is evident that some factors may influence the demand and its elasticity more than others. 
Similarly, some firms would be more productive than others because of their inherent 
characteristics. Although the identification of these characteristics is not the primary aim 
of this thesis, this section aims at reviewing the fundamental forces within the environment 
of the firms together with inside forces within them, such that these powers could be 
controlled for during the analysis. 
4.7.1 Business Characteristics 
From the Methodology Review Chapter, it is apparent that one of the primary 
reasons for any changes to business performance is its characteristics. The vast majority of 
studies in the Journal of Productivity Analysis, in one way or another, control for size. 
However, this is not discussed in this section; rather discussion is on a large stream of 
literature directly addressing characteristics that should be controlled for. 
One of the most popular methodologies employed with microdata is Gibrat’s Law 
of Proportionate Effect (Gibrat, 1931) claiming that firm size and growth should be 
independent, which is partly supported even by recent studies (Lotti et al., 2009). However, 
either British (Konings, 1995; Hart and Oulton, 1996) or foreign (Lotti et al., 2009) studies 
have concluded that Gilbrat’s Law is not necessarily valid. The more sophisticated method 
is introduced by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). This method relies on descriptive analysis 
and includes growth and death rates to show that new firms create more dynamic jobs than 
older firms. It is followed by such studies as Baldwin and Picot (1995). Although more 
advanced techniques have been employed, further studies (Aterido et al., 2009; de Kok et 
al., 2011; Neumark et al., 2011) have very similar conclusions. This may be explained by 
Jovanovic’s (1982) passive learning model, which claims that entrepreneurs learn most 
when they enter the market. In contrast, Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) maintain that neither 
the employment size nor age explains job growth. They believe that the only explanation is 
a small number of rapidly growing micro firms (see Section 4.7.2, p. 92 for an extensive 
discussion). 
4.7.2 High Growth Firms - Entrepreneurship literature 
A phenomenon of high growth firms (HGFs) is defined by OECD (2008:61): ‘All 
enterprises with average annualised growth greater than 20% per annum, over a three-
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year period should be considered as high-growth businesses. Growth can be measured by 
the number of employees’. This definition has been used in multiple studies (Anyadike-
Danes et al., 2015; Brown and Mawson, 2015; Bravo-Biosca, 2011; Teruel and De Wit, 
2011) and it seems to replace the high-growth metric invented by Birch (1987). 
Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) empirical findings are based on Birch’s (1979:8) 
pioneering idea that ‘small firms (those with 20 or fewer employees) generated 66% of all 
new jobs generated in the U.S.’ Although Birch’s theories (1979; 1987) are criticised by 
such studies as Dennis and Phillips (1994), small firms are recognised as the main creators 
of jobs (Anyadike-Danes et al., 2014, 2015; Coad et al., 2014; Cowling et al., 2015; Du and 
Temouri, 2015). Recently, Anyadike-Danes et al. (2009:4) estimate the contribution of HGF 
to job creation in the UK economy. They show that ‘11,530 high growth firms were 
responsible for 1.3 million out of the increase in 2.4 million new jobs in established 
businesses employing ten or more people between 2005 and 2008’. According to their 
study, around 6% of all firms create 54% new jobs in the UK. Later, these statistics are 
confirmed by Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015): around 6% of all firms added about 40% of net 
jobs by 15-year survivors. However, Butcher and Bursnall (2013) show that job creation is 
evenly spread across different size bands, which contradict Anyadike-Danes’s et al. (2015) 
results. These studies provide useful understanding about national HGF populations. 
However, as Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015:22) acknowledge, those firms ‘require further 
analysis … to understand the process of small business growth.’ 
The government’s policy aimed at small businesses may be discouraging high 
growth firms, which according to recent evidence are drivers of employment and growth. 
Firms may be less likely to expand due to even more significant costs associated with a loss 
of SBRR in case they either improve the existing premises or relocate. Therefore, they have 
to restrict themselves to existing premises which may limit their investment in equipment 
and employment. However, it could be argued that firms receiving SBRR may be 
encouraged to invest more in technology, which should result in higher total factor 
productivity. On the other hand, recent British evidence points out that there is little 
evidence of the correlation between investment in R&D and both TFP growth (Harris and 
Moffat, 2017) and survival (Harris and Moffat, 2016). 
4.7.3 Research and Development (R&D) 
Researchers tend to assume that investment in R&D is vital for a business to 
succeed. They often use the Schumpeterian theory of creative destruction where firms have 
to continuously innovate to sustain their market share (the debate on Schumpeterian 
creative destruction is presented in Section 2.2.2.1). However, the evidence is diverse. As 
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shown in the following paragraphs, it is unclear whether investments in R&D would have 
any effect on productivity and survival. We suggest that this might be because not all R&D 
projects are successful (e.g. NOKIA’s example). 
Since the pioneering work of Griliches (1979), productivity studies have considered 
the technological spillovers to be a side product of R&D activities. The endogenous growth 
models of Romer (1990) and the quality ladder models of Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
and Aghion and Howitt (1992) theorise that innovations drive long-term economic growth 
and aggregate productivity. Many scholars (Medda and Piga, 2014; Ulku and Pamukcu, 
2015; Franco et al., 2016) have found R&D to be very influential in the process of 
productivity. For instance, Franco et al. (2016) discover that service regulation reduces 
R&D efﬁciency in the manufacturing sector with knowledge production function on OECD 
industries with a stochastic frontier analysis. An Italian study (Medda and Piga, 2014) 
results in a very similar conclusion through the use of Tobit and logit regressions. They 
suggest that a ﬁrm’s investment in R&D results in productivity gains. However, the 
approach utilised in this thesis is similar to Ulku and Pamukcu’s (2015) study, which 
considers Turkey with a GMM estimator over the five-year period. They discover that a rise 
in both the foreign ownership share and technology licensing increases ﬁrms’ productivity. 
It is worth noting that the conditional effect of the latter is signiﬁcant only above a threshold 
of technological capability. It is questionable whether these results could be applied to the 
context of Britain because of the different economic conditions.  
On the contrary, another stream of the literature (Ilmakunnas and Piekkola, 2014; 
Chen and Inklaar, 2016; Goya et al., 2016) found that R&D has little or no influence on 
productivity. For instance, Goya et al. (2016) applies Olley and Pakes (1996) estimator to 
Spanish firms over the period 2004–2009 and finds that R&D expenditures do not have a 
direct impact on ﬁrm performance but spillovers do. Moreover, US study (Chen and Inklaar, 
2016) by using a variation of Cobb-Douglas productivity function estimated by FE and GMM 
fails to find any evidence that knowledge spillovers within the same industry exist within 
the US. The similar, but more sophisticated approach of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), is 
used by Ilmakunnas and Piekkola (2014) on Finnish ﬁrm-level data from 1998 to 2008. 
They find that organisational activity tends to increase TFP, but R&D returns tend to be low.  
More macro studies comparing different countries found similar conclusions. For 
instance, Luintel et al. (2014) used various estimates of R&D. They find that human capital, 
international knowledge spillovers and domestic knowledge stocks are the determinants 
of domestic productivity across nations. Another study by Cincera and Ravet (2014) looks 
at subsidies of large EU firms. They find a positive effect of globalisation on ﬁrms’ 
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productivity with R&D investment, especially in the US, while an adverse effect of industrial 
diversiﬁcation is identified. However, they used pooled-OLS estimates and the sample 
consisted of mainly large companies. Therefore, it may not be applicable for this research 
project. 
4.7.4 Foreign Ownership and Foreign Direct Investment  
Another commonly included variable related to R&D is a foreign direct investment 
or foreign ownership. These are most often found to be influential by emerging countries 
as these are likely to adopt a better practice than the more developed economies. Most 
emerging countries like India (Malik, 2015), Indonesia (Sari et al., 2016), China (Huang and 
Fu, 2013; Baltagi et al., 2015) report positive effects of foreign direct investment on their 
productivity. Similarly, several studies in emerging markets such as Turkey (Ulku and 
Pamukcu, 2015) and India (Girma and Vencappa, 2014) show that foreign ownership 
increases productivity.  
In general, advanced economies tend to have lower effects. One UK study (Harris 
and Moffat, 2015) fits their GMM model into plant-level-panel data from the Annual 
Respondents Database covering 1997–2008. They find that most foreign ownership groups 
have higher than average TFP, but the effect is marginal. They argue that it is because of 
law number of the foreign firms, which is also expected in the sample used in this thesis as 
discussed in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.1.3). 
4.7.5 Employees characteristics 
Building on the dynamic capabilities theory introduced in Section 2.2.2.3, it is clear 
that employees and employers may be the driving force behind any increases in TFP and 
survival. The previous researchers were using several angles and methods to at least partly 
account for them, more often than controlling for these, they focused on one of the 
characteristics. Several studies have investigated whether employees’ bonuses, nationality 
and age have any effect on productivity. For instance, Akay and Dogan (2013:123) partly 
extend Jones (1971:3–21) theory, who suggests that an increase in the volume of labour in 
the economy will raise the output in all industries. Akay and Dogan add that ‘the 
magnitudes of the increases in some industries are more than others depending on the 
value of the elasticity of substitution along with factor intensities between industries.’ They 
use a generalised form of the standard speciﬁc factors model using 25 US industries. More 
advanced economies such as the Spanish (Gómez-Déniz and Pérez-Rodríguez, 2015) and 
the Italian (Bettin et al., 2014) are investigating migrant workers. For instance, the Spanish 
study (Gómez-Déniz and Pérez-Rodríguez, 2015), observing labour productivity, shows 
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that immigrants increase Spanish labour productivity significantly. Arguably, this 
methodology may not be the most appropriate because it does not consider such inputs as 
materials and capital forming total factor productivity.  
4.7.6 Implications for the Analysis 
These two Subsections (4.6 and 4.7) attached to the framework suggested that the 
analysis should control for some key characteristics to not over(under)estimate the causal 
relationships between the variables. It is evident that some factors may influence the 
demand and its elasticity more than others. Similarly, some firms would be more 
productive than others owing to their inherent characteristics. Although identification of 
these characteristics is not the primary aim of this thesis, this section reviewed the 
fundamental forces within the environment of the firms together with inside forces, so that 
these powers could be controlled for during the analysis. The discussion found that the 
accuracy of the framework is likely to depend on the competition. Furthermore, it 
emphasised the importance of controlling the key business characteristics, their growth 
patterns, R&D investment, foreign ownership and foreign investment as well as employees’ 
characteristics.   
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5 METHODOLOGY REVIEW 
The theoretical framework was introduced in the previous chapter. This chapter 
aims to uncover how this thesis could employ the empirical analysis shaped by the 
framework. More specifically, to investigate how other researchers approached the 
productivity and survival analyses so that the approach applied in this thesis would not just 
be appropriate for the data but also forward-looking. It is worth recalling that the overall 
aim of this thesis is to understand whether Small Business Rates Relief (SBRR) has any 
effects on firms, in particular with regard to their productivity and survival. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used in 
production. Whilst, survival analysis in this setting is a method for analysing the expected 
duration of time until closure. 
As illustrated in Figure 5:1, this chapter is divided into three major sections. The 
first (Section 5.1) is devoted to productivity and its estimation. It starts by reporting the 
results from the systematic literature review on methodologies (Section 5.1.1). It then 
attempts to find an appropriate functional form for productivity (Section 5.1.2) and 
discusses how these functions were estimated by other researchers (Section 5.1.3) as well 
as showing empirical examples appropriate for the microdata (Section 5.1.4). As a result, 
the chapter establishes that an appropriate functional form is a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas 
productivity function and it should be estimated with control functions and system-GMM 
approaches. Then, the focus turns to survival analysis (Section 5.2). This subsection is 
divided into basic mechanisms (Section 5.2.1), definitions (Section 5.2.2) and some 
recently applied techniques (Section 5.2.3.1). The preferred method is selected to be the 
Cox proportional hazard model (Section 5.2.3.2). Finally, the chapter develops into machine 
learning extensions (Section 5.3). It defines, introduces (Section 5.3.1) and gives examples 
(Section 5.3.2) of how these approaches were applied in previous studies.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5:1 Overview of the Methodology Review Chapter 
TFP is estimated with 
Wooldridge one-step 
estimator and then 
affects are measured 
with unbiassed REEM 
trees. The results are 
supplemented with the 
dynamic estimator 
Survival is estimated 
with both CPH and ST 
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5.1 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY - SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
Origins of productivity measurement can be traced back to seminal papers of 
Tinbergen (1942), Fabricant (1954), Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) who have 
decomposed output growth to input growth and productivity residuals. These early studies 
have mainly focused on aggregate TFP and its role in economic growth. Many textbooks 
have explained various productivity functions and forms (Besanko et al., 2015). To extend 
our knowledge of the recent techniques within the productivity estimation, the following 
section focuses entirely on productivity and how it is estimated in the recent literature. It 
does not aim to look at established estimators; rather the focus is on the pioneering 
approaches applied within the field so that either an appropriate extension to the existing 
method could be chosen or an alternative proposed.  
Several articles (Van Biesebroeck, 2007; Eberhardt and Helmers, 2010; Del Gatto et 
al., 2011; van Beveren, 2012a) are used as a starting point. They provide an overview of the 
methodological issues when estimating TFP at an establishment level. To look at the most 
recent techniques applied in productivity estimation, this part of the literature review 
focuses on publications in the Journal of Productivity Analysis (JPA). This journal publishes 
theoretical and applied research addressing the measurement, analysis, and improvement 
of productivity. Given that the aim is to look for pioneering studies departing from the 
established disciplines, the journal seems to be an appropriate choice. To further our 
understanding, all articles from this journal published in a period between 2014 and 2017 
were coded with NVivo. This analysis is used to estimate statistics and look for forward-
looking methodologies. The findings from this analysis are combined with studies from 
other journals and are also presented in Section 5.1.4. 
5.1.1 General Trends in the Journal of Productivity Analysis 
First and foremost, an overview of findings is provided to inform about the 
underlying trends in the JPA. A variation of the parametric Stochastic Frontier approach is 
the most popular in the Journal of Productivity Analysis. Several empirical and many 
theoretical papers have discussed many estimation issues like heterogeneity, measurement 
error in capital and endogeneity, which are detailed in the Research Design Chapter (esp. 
Section 6.3.1.1). Also, it is evident that authors are choosing techniques according to the 
assumptions of technology and technical change. All papers have been looking at diverse 
areas. Thus, their results are not directly applicable to this analysis, rather they indicate the 
best practice and recent techniques used to estimate and define productivity. 
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The most popular industry being investigated is manufacturing, with 54 published 
articles during 2014-2017. Other popular industries are agriculture, finance, education and 
hospitality. Although productivity analysis stays popular in more output-input 
manufacturing firms, it seems that a large number of authors are considering the service 
sector. Furthermore, productivity studies come from emerging, developing and developed 
countries. The vast majority of studies are from European countries; however, the US, Japan 
and China also remain popular. There were only very few UK studies published in this 
journal. 
5.1.2 Functional Form 
To estimate TFP, first and foremost a functional form should be defined. The Cobb-
Douglas functional form has been the most popular among the researchers in the Journal 
of Productivity Estimation. The 94 articles from this literature review explicitly stated that 
they were using Cobb-Douglas functional form, while most others were using a variation of 
Cobb-Douglas functional form, such as the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) which is 
sometimes used to access the elasticity of substitution. For instance, US researchers (Akay 
and Dogan, 2013) estimate the elasticity of substitution by using CES production function 
(as described in Appendix 10.3.1.5) with one mobile factor (labour) and 25 industries of 
the US to suggest how these estimates describe the general equilibrium of production.  
On the other hand, the nested production functions could also be applied to 
question a relationship between some factors and the critical productivity elements 
(capital and labour) which may experience different substitution effects. For example, 
Shankar and Quiggin (2013) use the stochastic frontier approach with a CES specification 
of technology. Various functional forms are defined in Appendix 10.3.1. Given the nature of 
the data, namely micro level longitudinal data25, only methods that can deal with microdata 
will be discussed in order to find an appropriate approach for this thesis. 
Usually, an establishment-level production function is a mathematical expression 
that describes a systematic relationship between inputs and output in an economy 
(Katayama et al., 2009). The fundamental mechanisms in standard theories based on 
neoclassical school of thought are discussed in the Theory Review Chapter (Section 2.2.1). 
In hand with these models, Del Gatto et al. (2010) start by quantifying productivity: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹(𝑍𝑖𝑡) →  𝑇𝐹𝑃 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐹(𝑍𝑖𝑡)
, 
                                                             
25 For further detail, see the Research Design Chapter, Section 6.1.3. 
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where Y is the output of a unit (country/industry/firm) i at time t to a (1 × N) 
vector of inputs Z and the term 𝐴 defines how much output a unit can produce from a 
certain volume of inputs, given the technological level. The state of technology, embodied 
by the function F(.), is given and common to all enterprises.  
Thus, the TFP index at time t is the ratio of produced output and total inputs 
employed. 
5.1.2.1 Cobb-Douglas 
The most commonly applied is the Cobb-Douglas productivity function named after 
C. W. Cobb and P. H. Douglas (1934). The mathematical form of the Cobb-Douglas 
production function can be given by 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = A𝐾
𝛽𝐾𝐿𝛽𝐿  → 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝐿, 𝑡𝐾) = A(t𝐾)
𝛽𝐾(𝑡𝐿)𝛽𝐿 = 𝑡𝛽𝐾+𝛽𝐿𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) 
This is a preferable choice because Cobb-Douglas productivity function can exhibit 
any degree of returns to scale: constant (𝛽𝐾+𝛽𝐿=1), increasing (𝛽𝐾+𝛽𝐿>1) and decreasing 
(𝛽𝐾+𝛽𝐿<1).  
It is quite straightforward to show that the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1: 
𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆 =
𝛽𝐿A𝐾
𝛽𝐾𝐿𝛽𝐿−1
𝛽𝐾A𝐾𝛽𝐾−1𝐿𝛽𝐿
=
𝛽𝐿
𝛽𝐾
𝑘
𝑙
→ ln(𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆) = ln (
𝛽𝐿
𝛽𝐾
) + ln (
𝑘
𝑙
) 
𝑆𝐸 =
%∆ ln (
𝑘
𝑙 )
%∆ ln(𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆)
= 1 
This has influenced scholars to apply the constant returns-to-scale version to 
estimate the aggregate productivity in numerous countries. The constant 𝛽𝐾 is then the 
elasticity of output with regards to capital input, and 𝛽𝐿 is the elasticity of output with 
regards to labour input.  
In the case of multiple inputs, the function takes the following form: 
𝑌 =∏𝑥𝑖
𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
If ∑ 𝛽𝑖 = 1
𝑛
𝑖=1 , then the equation exhibits constant returns to scale. In the constant-
returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas function, β is the elasticity of Y with respect to input x. If 𝛽 
is in the range of 0 and 1, each x should exhibit diminishing marginal productivity. However, 
any degree of increasing returns to scale can now be incorporated. 
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With regards to the elasticity of substitution, this could be expressed similarly as 
with one input (as shown in Appendix 10.3.1) and result in:  
𝑆𝐸 =
%∆ ln (
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑗
)
%∆ ln(𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆)
= 1 
This constraint is the primary limitation of Cobb-Douglas productivity function. 
5.1.2.1.1 Technical Progress in Cobb-Douglas Productivity Function 
Let’s assume constant returns to scale and technological progress occurring at a 
steady exponential, then a production function with technological progress becomes: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = Ae
𝜃𝑡𝐾𝛽 𝐿1−𝛽  
To study the properties of this function, a logarithmic differentiation is often 
applied: 
 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
𝜕𝑌
∗
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑡
=
𝜕[𝑙𝑛𝐴+𝜃𝑡+𝛽𝑙𝑛𝐾+(1−𝛽)𝑙𝑛𝐿]
𝜕𝑡
= 𝜃 + 𝛽
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐾
𝜕𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛽) ∗
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐿
𝜕𝑡
 
The technical change feature is explicitly modelled, and the output elasticities are 
specified with the exponents in the Cobb-Douglas. 
The Cobb-Douglas functional form cannot include annual improvements directly. If 
the annual improvement in capital (e𝜑𝑡) and labour (e𝜌𝑡) is added, the Cobb Douglas 
function would still convert to its previous form: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = A(e
𝜑𝑡𝐾)𝛽 (e𝜌𝑡𝐿)1−𝛽 = Ae[𝛽𝜑+(1−𝛽)𝜌]𝑡𝐾𝛽 𝐿1−𝛽 = Ae𝜃𝑡𝐾𝛽 𝐿1−𝛽 , 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜃 =  𝛽𝜑 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜌 
However, it is questionable whether the annual improvement in capital and labour 
could be precisely estimated. 
5.1.2.1.2 Trans log Form Cobb-Douglas Productivity Function 
Taking logarithmic function from Cobb Douglas productivity function and adding 
varying intercept as well as further condition (𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗) produces translog function: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+∑∑𝛽𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝛽𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑗𝑖 
The trans log production function incorporates many substitution possibilities 
among various inputs and can take any degree of returns to scale. 
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The logarithmic Cobb-Douglas functional form seemed to be an appropriate 
method to further our understanding since it includes the key inputs and different 
variations which may help to achieve better estimates. More specifically, the trans log 
production function seems to be the most appropriate as it can incorporate many 
substitution possibilities among various inputs and can take any degree of returns to scale. 
5.1.3 Estimation Techniques 
Once this thesis selected how the productivity function is likely to look, the focus 
now turns towards the estimation techniques. Figure 5:2 provides a broad classification of 
the techniques approached in this literature survey. The shape and underlying assumptions 
of the productivity function influence the choice of estimation techniques. Authors have 
differing preferences and arguments for using different techniques, implying that none of 
the estimation techniques are significantly better than others. 
 
Figure 5:2 Classification of the estimation techniques. Based on publications in the 
JPA between 2014 and 2017. 
Broadly, Del Gatto et al. (2011) highlight the main difference between non-frontier 
and frontier models. The primary reason leading to the implementation of frontier models 
is their ability to disentangle the main sources of productivity growth, which are technical 
efficiency and technological change. Technical progress measures the shift of the frontier 
over time and the change in technical efficiency measures the movement of an economy 
away from (or towards) the production frontier. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and 
Kumbhakar et al. (2015) have provided an overview of stochastic frontier models. The 
Methodology Review  
103 
 
primary issue with such models is the degree to which variables are included in the 
deterministic part of the model (to set the frontier) and to what degree these same 
variables explain inefficiency and, hence, enter a determinant of the one-sided inefficiency 
term (Battese and Coelli, 1995). These models do not control for endogeneity and selection 
biases, which are detailed in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1, p. 158). 
Van Biesebroeck (2007) publishes one of the most cited articles in productivity 
estimation after Cobb Douglas. He uses the Monte Carlo approach to investigate the 
sensitivity of the most widely used methods, which are data envelopment analysis, index 
numbers, instrumental variables, stochastic frontiers and semi-parametric estimation. He 
explores three different scenarios concerning measurement error and simultaneity bias, 
which is described in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1) and examines their 
credibility with Monte Carlo.  
Van Biesebroeck (2007) suggests using index numbers for cases with small 
measurement error. GMM estimators are useful for estimating productivity levels. DEA is 
suitable when returns to scale are not constant and technology is heterogeneous. 
Parametric approaches are suitable when optimisation or measurement errors are minor. 
The authors ranked these techniques by the persistence of the productivity differentials 
between firms (in decreasing order). This is the order they proposed: the stochastic 
frontiers, GMM, or semiparametric estimation methods.  
With the data proposed for this study (see Chapter 6), it seems counterintuitive to 
assume that variables could have little or no measurement error because of the survey 
nature and some variables like capital as it may be defined and estimated in various ways. 
Similarly, some technological heterogeneity should be assumed since all firms may not 
share the same technology. In this scenario, the author suggested using system GMM 
estimator.  
The technological differences are arguably not too diverse in the UK. Technological 
change and technical efficiency change in Britain varies. However, the frontier approach 
may be more applicable to several countries where technology variation within companies 
is more apparent. Arguably, companies within the same sector can possess similar 
technology. If the technology is immutable, it does not contribute to productivity 
improvements. The same effects are present with technical inefficiency. If it does not vary 
over time, it also does not have any effect on the rate of change of productivity. 
The review of techniques showed that frontier approaches are becoming less 
popular, while the usage of non-frontier approaches seems to be increasing. It appears that 
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researchers are looking into new ways to employ non-parametric approaches. This 
literature review did not identify any other paper that used decision trees to explain 
productivity. Thus, it seems reasonable to complement standard econometric techniques, 
which are also presented with other empirical examples in the following section, with such 
machine learning alternatives as Classification and Regression Trees described in Section 
5.3. This could not only contribute to the literature on productivity estimation, but also 
assure the results estimated by one of the econometric techniques. 
More specifically, summary statistics presented in Figure 5:3 (p. 104) shows that 
there were 87 empirical and 35 theoretical papers published between 2014 and 2017 (up 
to May). Theoretical papers mainly focused on either comparisons or improvements of 
methodology, which is the reason why they were excluded from further comparisons. 
Overall, more than two-thirds of these papers were looking at frontier analysis. However, 
this data shows that non-frontier approaches are becoming increasingly more popular, 
while frontier techniques seem to lose their popularity. With regards to underlying 
assumptions of data distribution, non-parametric approaches were most often used, while 
the popularity of parametric techniques decreased. Furthermore, semi-parametric studies 
seem to be increasingly more popular. However, none of the 2017 studies were published 
using this methodology. It is worth mentioning that this review indicates the most used and 
appropriate methods, rather than the exact figures since just one journal is included in the 
analysis.  
 
Figure 5:3 Count of articles published in different years by their approach between 
2014 and 2017. Counts for 2017 were partly imputed for comparability. Source 
author’s calculation. 
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5.1.4 Empirical Examples 
All studies directly related to UK business rates (BRs) fit within the empirical 
debate on capitalisation, and are therefore discussed in the Empirical Review Chapter. For 
this reason, in this section, SBRR is assumed to be merely a cash inflow and greater 
attention is paid to the approach rather than results. As a result of the data and previous 
comparison, the focus naturally turns towards the econometric approaches. The underlying 
mechanisms of these estimators were discussed in Appendix 10.2.2. This section provides 
several examples of Difference in Difference (Section 5.1.4.1), Ordinary Least Squares 
(Section 5.1.4.2), Fixed Effects (section 5.1.4.3), Ordinary Least Squares with Matching 
(section 5.1.4.4) and Instrumental Variable (Section 5.1.4.5) estimation techniques.  
The focus is on the approaches rather than findings since no studies have been 
identified to investigate how non-domestic property taxation relates to either survival or 
productivity. Other findings are too diverse and do not add much value towards the 
analysis. For instance, Irwin and Klenow (1996) find no impact on labour productivity of 
R&D subsidies for U.S. high-tech companies. Whilst, for Japanese forestry, Managi (2010) 
finds a negative relationship between grants and TFP; Einio (2014) reports no immediate 
impacts of R&D support programmes in Finland on productivity (although there is evidence 
of long-term gains). Huang (2015) shows that tax credit use among Taiwanese firms 
enhances their productivity. Koski and Pajarinen (2015) report that R&D subsidies have no 
statistically significant impact on labour productivity in Finnish firms during 2003-2010. 
Given the differing environments of the firms and various issues within the tax setting and 
estimation, these papers are not reviewed in this section.  
5.1.4.1 Difference-in-Difference (DiD) estimator 
One of the most fundamental methods to analyse BRs is the Difference-in-
Difference estimator. This has been employed in various studies, such as Bronzini and de 
Blasio (2006) which evaluates the income of Italian investment incentives. This is a 
standard case described in Appendix 10.2.2. They use simple DiD to compare subsidised 
firms with the rejected applications. They find subsidies to be positive for the recipients. 
The problem with these analyses is the assumption that the differentials in growth for 
companies that experienced support would have remained the same to non-supported 
firms’ differentials.  
Earlier studies have consisted of simulations with macro data before and after the 
implementation of policies. For instance, Moore and Rhodes (1974) use the shift-share 
approach to find the effect of a policy change on investment and employment between 1960 
and 1963. They construct a series to simulate what investment and employment would 
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have been after 1963 without any policy change. This is done by comparing the overall 
British industry growth rates to the investment and employment levels of each industry. 
This approach assumes a similar limiting assumption to the DiD estimator. The underlying 
assumption of this study is that growth rates in the development areas should be the same 
in the other regions. Canning et al. (1987) control for these. They investigate the differences 
between expected and actual values by exploiting data from before the change in policy. 
They claim that regional policy in Northern Ireland created 33,000 new manufacturing jobs. 
However, they also unrealistically assume that the expected and actual values would have 
continued to rise to the same degree, had there been no change. Thus, the self-selection 
issue, which will be defined in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1.2) is apparent. 
Furthermore, estimates are sensitive to the period used to investigate actual and expected 
values. 
5.1.4.2 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
To control for these differences in observed characteristics between control and 
treatment groups, the DiD may be performed with OLS. Bergstroem (2000) analyses the 
effect on TFP by selective capital subsidies in Sweden. His treatment group consists of firms 
that were grant recipients in 1989 and the control group is a random sample. Whilst, the 
growth in output between 1989 and 1990/1993 is a dependent variable in his primary 
regression. The treatment variable is recorded as the amount of subsidy received in 1989. 
They estimate their equation with bounded OLS estimator to minimise the influence of 
outliers. They show that subsidies increase TFP in the short run, but are associated with 
reduced TFP in the long-term. However, they do not discuss the correlation between the 
error term and grant. The former comes from differences in unobserved characteristics 
across control and treatment groups. Furthermore, the correlation between the growth of 
factor inputs and error term is ignored and endogeneity of control variables is not 
accounted for, as it should be according to Froelich (2008) or the econometric issues in 
Section 4.6 (p. 89). 
Additionally, Irwin and Klenow (1996) investigate whether R&D subsidies affect US 
high-tech companies’ labour productivity. Their sample consists of 71 firms with annual 
observations between 1970 and 1993. They compare R&D of companies receiving support 
with unsupported companies. They acknowledge that businesses may have expected R&D 
intensity and that is why they received the support. To control for the differences between 
observations, they include age dummies and estimate their regression with OLS and 
weighted-least-squares (WLS). It is worth noting that they include the lagged dependent 
variable. As discussed in Section 4.6, neither OLS nor WLS provides an unbiased estimate 
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for an equation with a dependent lagged variable. They should include IVs. They find no 
effect on productivity. 
Various simulations with US macro data indicates that capital subsidies are likely 
to cause lower consumption and lower employment. For instance, Lee (1996) uses 
multivariate regressions to investigate the effect of industrial policy on gross value added, 
capital growth and TFP with the data from South Korea. He allows for time and fixed effects. 
His model is estimated with three-stage-least-squares in order to control for the 
endogeneity of the treatment variables. Furthermore, weighted least squares are also 
employed to correct for cross-equation heteroscedasticity in this model. Nevertheless, as 
Bond (2002) shows, if the error term is autoregressive, the once lagged policy variables are 
not valid instruments since they are likely to be correlated with the error term. Similarly, 
Harris (1991) uses simulation to look at the effect of capital subsidies on employment 
within the manufacturing sector in Northern Ireland. This model includes production, 
factor demand and industry demand equations. The maximum likelihood is used to 
estimate the parameters. He uses these parameters to generate estimates of output, labour 
and capital and finds that although production has increased, employment has decreased 
significantly. This could be a product of substitution between labour and capital as 
discussed in Section 2.1.1.1.2. Whilst, Fuest and Huber (2000) suggest that governments 
should support areas with substantial unemployment by using investment subsidies 
instead of employment subsidies. Fuest and Huber use a model where businesses have 
different exogenously determined, productivity shocks or random output. The results 
indicate that the capital subsidy causes profits to rise. This attracts new businesses and, 
subsequently, increases aggregate employment. It also indicates the possible effects which 
SBRR might produce.  
More related to this study is Restuccia and Rogerson’s (2008) who look at how US 
policy distortions impact aggregate TFP with heterogeneous plants. It is related to this 
study as SBRR might increase capital. They use a neoclassical growth model. This model 
consists of the equal number of the plants that are subsidised and taxed. They find that 
policies, which create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers, might 
reduce TFP and output by 30-50%. The major criticism of their approach is that in their 
setting the technology cannot vary over time. 
However, Samaniego (2006) uses a relatively similar technique but allows 
technology to vary over time. He uses a general equilibrium model with establishment 
dynamics somewhat similar to the one presented in the Theory Review Chapter (Section 
2.1.1.1.2) to quantify the relationship between the rate of embodied technical change and 
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the rate of entry and exit across industries. This is again relevant to the SBRR because, as 
discussed in the Introduction and Background Chapter, some politicians with SBRR aimed 
to target genuinely small or underperforming firms, especially during the recession. His 
productivity function consists of a capital, exogenous productivity growth factor, labour 
and idiosyncratic productivity shock, which follows a random walk. It takes the Cobb-
Douglas form. He includes several restrictive assumptions such as costly entry depending 
on the technology acquired. He argues that support may help businesses to sustain their 
operations only if they are of sufficient value. SBRR may be too small to have a measurable 
impact. They also conclude that support for underperforming plants may increase the 
circulation of innovative technologies and increase productivity but reduce their labour 
productivity, employment and income. 
5.1.4.3 Fixed effects 
A possible correlation between the error term and the regressor is a problem for 
the OLS estimator; it is both biased and inconsistent in this setting. This is where the FE-
estimator comes in. It provides a way of solving endogeneity problem and does so by using 
the fact that the individual effect/fixed effect is constant over time26. Kangasharju and 
Venetoklis (2002) use a standard fixed effect estimator to understand whether Finish 
subsidies affect employment between 1995 and 1998. Their model includes control 
variables as well as two-digit level industry and time dummies to remove self-selection and 
simultaneity issues, which are discussed in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.1). 
The dependent variable is estimated by subtracting the subsidy from the payroll to avoid a 
correlation between the amount of the grant and the outcome variable. It shows that firms 
receiving employment subsidies increase payroll by 11% on average. This paper allows 
subsidies to impact businesses for two successive years; the year they receive support and 
the following one. The method controls for simultaneity provided the firm’s productivity is 
time invariant. However, productivity is unlikely to be constant over time. Therefore, 
treatment effect may be underestimated. Also, no attempt is made to overcome issues 
concerning the endogeneity of covariates. As discussed in Section 4.6 (p. 89), the inclusion 
of sales is likely to result in endogeneity problems.  
5.1.4.4 OLS with matching 
Ankarhem et al. (2010) used DiD estimator for firms sampled with propensity score 
matching. No statistically significant returns to equity are found. However, a significant 
positive impact is evident for a few employment estimates. Recently, King et al. (2011 and 
                                                             
26 For further detail, see Appendix 10.2.2.1. 
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2016) have published such papers as “Why Propensity Scores Should Not Be Used for 
Matching” and “Comparative Effectiveness of Matching Methods for Causal Inference.” They 
argue that PSM just increases imbalance, model dependence, and bias. They show in several 
ways that random pruning applied in PSM increases the level of imbalance. They prove 
their theoretical point with 100 simulated datasets. The authors recommend using CEM 
method for larger datasets because of its speed and very natural setting. This is used and 
further defined in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.2.3). 
5.1.4.5 Instruments 
5.1.4.5.1 Control functions 
Olley and Pakes (OP) (1996) inspired by Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Hopenhayn 
and Rogerson (1993) formulate their model to investigate the dynamics of productivity in 
the US telecommunications equipment industry between 1972 and 1987. To achieve this, 
they form a two-stage approach. In the first stage, they obtain estimates of TFP by using a 
high-order polynomial. They estimate the effect on output from labour, capital and a 
polynomial function of investment and capital. They then use these estimates in the second 
stage as the dependent variable to estimate the treatment variable. They find that 
deregulation resulted in an increase in productivity and an increase in entry and exit. The 
primary limitations of this model are a monotonic relationship between a firm-level 
decision variable and the unobserved firm-level state variable productivity. The exit is also 
conditioned on the unobserved productivity. For further information on the OP estimator, 
see the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.2). 
Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) (2003) improve Olley and Pakes’ (1996) approach by 
including intermediate inputs instead of investment. This makes assumptions checking 
easier and, most importantly, intermediate inputs need only to affect current productivity, 
unlike investment that may be correlated to future productivity. For further information on 
the LP estimator, see the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.2). 
However, neither OP nor LP allows serial correlation, unobserved heterogeneity 
(across firms) in prices of labour or intermediate inputs, while only OP rules out 
unobserved heterogeneity (across firms) in the price of investment or capital adjustment 
costs. This methodology has been applied in the recent studies (Maiti, 2013; Ilmakunnas 
and Piekkola, 2014; Malik, 2015; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2016). For instance, Goya et 
al. (2016) investigate innovation spillovers in Spain between 2004 and 2009. They apply a 
very similar framework as developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). They do not acknowledge 
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price endogeneity and instead of materials, as suggested by LP, they include investment. 
They conclude that R&D has no effect to TFP but spillovers do have.  
5.1.4.5.2 Other instrumental variable approaches 
A more mathematical introduction to instrumental variable approaches is provided 
in Appendix 10.2.2. Wright (1928) is the first to apply instrumental variables to overcome 
the endogeneity that arises when estimating simultaneous equations. An advanced model 
which allows inclusion of more than one model is developed by Theil (1953). This is called 
the two-stage-least squares method. More recently, Criscuolo et al. (2007) investigate how 
firms are affected by investment subsidies. They use within estimator for matched data 
from Assistance Management Information System (SAMIS) database, the 
Interdepartmental Business Register (IDBR) and the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). 
As an instrument for treatment status, they use dummies representing the different levels 
of support to which plants are entitled. They call these “synthetic instrumental variables” 
as they are constructed based on the rule changes and not changes in the area. However, 
they have to estimate weights as these are not provided by the EU. Additionally, subsidy 
levels differ among regions. Therefore, they perform ordered probit regression to estimate 
expected subsidy level. They find that areas eligible for business support create 
significantly more jobs but have no effect on productivity. Also, the treatment effect exists 
solely for small firms, but not big businesses. 
Finally, Bournakis and Mallick (2018) employ an unbalanced panel of 7,400 
manufacturing UK firms during 2004 and 2011. They compare five methodologies: 
Superlative Index Numbers, System-GMM, OP, LP and Ackerberg et al. (2015). The 
mechanisms of the last three approaches will be discussed in detail in the Research Design 
Chapter (Section 6.3.1.2) but essentially Ackerberg et al. (2015) critique OP and LP’s 
assumption on labour being perfectly adjustable and suggest that it should depend on 
labour productivity. Wooldridge (2009) accommodates their assumption by proposing one 
stage GMM estimator. It avoids potential correlation between errors in two steps and can 
produce robust standard errors, unlike other semi-parametric techniques that rely on 
bootstrapped standard errors. Bournakis and Mallick measure the dependent variable as 
value added (total sales minus materials/inventories). They use imputation only to 
employment variable and loose data for other observations. Figure 5:4 shows the estimates 
produced by all estimators. The first column refers to system GMM dynamic model. Its 
Sargan test suggests that the instruments were valid. 2-4 columns correspond to OP, LP and 
ACF. Wald test shows the decreasing returns. Capital is insignificant in OP estimator and 
ranges between 0.01 to 0.13, whilst labour from 0.33 to 0.56. The authors suggest that ACF 
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is superior because of its assumption of labour input being dynamic, whilst system GMM is 
the second-best approach. Bournakis and Mallick later turn to the impact of corporate 
taxation on productivity within a TFP catch-up framework. They find that higher rates of 
corporate taxation slow down the rate of TFP growth. 
 
Figure 5:4 Results of various estimators by Bournakis and Mallick (2018:582); the 
upper table compares coefficients of capital (k), labour (l), lagged output (y) in 
GMM, OP, LP and ACF methods; the bottom part defines the key characteristics 
and tests of those models. Source: Bournakis and Mallick (2018:583). 
5.1.4.5.3 Generalised Method of Moments 
One of the most recent analyses on UK productivity comes from various research 
papers from Harris and Moffat. They work with Annual Respondents Database and apply 
GMM-system estimator. They have published recent studies on both Britain’s (Harris and 
Moffat, 2017 and 2015) and Scotland’s productivity puzzle (Harris and Moffat, 2016). 
Furthermore, they look how various factors impact TFP: export and import on the 
productivity (Harris and Moffat, 2015), Local Enterprise Partnership regions (Harris and 
Moffat, 2015), FDI (Harris and Moffat, 2013), urban location (Harris and Moffat, 2012), 
higher education institution-firm knowledge links (Harris et al., 2011) and probably the 
most importantly, regional selective assistance (Moffat, 2015). All these studies provide an 
important contribution to a productivity analysis directly related to the UK.  
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Recently, Harris and Moffat (2017) update their paper on productivity 
determinants between 1997 and 2008 with data between 2008 and 2012. They investigate 
plant-level determinants of TFP in the UK between 1997 and 2008 with data from ARD. As 
in all previously mentioned studies conducted by them, they choose Cobb-Douglas 
functional form and estimate their model with two-step system GMM introduced by 
Wooldrige (2009) which correct for serial correlation by using lags, thus, it does now have 
to impose any functional form. Further discussion of this method is provided in the 
Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.2). Their dependent variable is real gross output 
deflated by two-digit ONS producer price indices. Their independent variables are real 
intermediate inputs (deflated by two-digit ONS producer price input indices), employment, 
capital (where real value of plant and machinery hires is deflated by producer price index), 
age, Herfindahl index, industry agglomeration externalities, diversification externalities 
and many different dummies: single-plant, multi-region enterprise, Greenfield/Brownfield 
US-owned, Greenfield/Brownfield EU-owned, Greenfield/Brownfield other foreign-owned, 
outwarded FDI, R&D, assisted area, region, city, industry (two-digit level). These seem to 
be appropriate and consistent with forces identified in Chapter 4.6. 
They explain that the service sector has accounted for the entire decline during the 
recession. Existing plants in both sectors experienced a decrease in TFP. However, the 
manufacturing sector has many entrants which offset the total decline. The smallest plants 
were hit by the recession the most. These results are similar to Field and Franklin (2013), 
who emphasise the need to include sectoral variations to estimate productivity.  
Harris and Moffat’s (2017) supplementary material provides estimates of these 
with data between 1997 and 2012. They separate the service sector and manufacturing to 
deliver estimates of the effects of other variables. For manufacturing plants, they provide 
coefficients for plants according to their technical development. All enterprises seem to 
have the three key variables significant; only high-tech firms are not influenced by 
employment and med-high technology firms are unaffected by capital. R&D does not seem 
to matter for highly technological firms, as opposed to the others. On the other hand, single 
plant enterprises tend to increase productivity for all, just not high technology companies. 
Thus, it should be apparent that other factors, not just SBRR may be causing growth in 
SMEs. Additionally, our study may contribute to explaining this result because single-plant 
enterprises mainly receive SBRR. There are little other benefits that may be causing an 
improvement in productivity. Foreign ownership dummies and outward FDI investments 
are mostly insignificant in their model.  
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Service sectors are grouped according to their knowledge intensity and follow a 
similar pattern to manufacturing plants. However, they have a few differences. Unlike in 
manufacturing industries, firms with high knowledge intensity do not experience different 
patterns. Also, Herfindahl index, agglomeration and diversification externalities are more 
apparent. They are somewhat more affected by foreign ownership. When it comes to single-
plant dummy, firms with average-low knowledge intensity (KI) seem to be less productive, 
while high KI and other low KI seem to have increased productivity. 
Although relaxing some limitations of LP and OP approaches, this methodology 
brings further restrictions. The DP approach does not need the assumptions that generate 
invertibility of the variable input demand function; it seems to rely on the linearity of the 
TFP process, unlike LP. 
It is worth noting that numerous attempts have been put forward to solve the UK’s 
productivity puzzle (e.g. Disney et al., 2013; Goodridge et al., 2013; Sargent, 2013; Barnett 
et al., 2014 Blundell et al., 2014; Riley et al, 2015; Patterson et al., 2016 and Oulton, 2018). 
However, Harris and Moffat’s (2017) seem to address the main issues with their estimator, 
using more appropriate estimation techniques working with the endogeneity of 
unobservable variables with more recent data. 
5.2 SURVIVAL ANALYSIS (SA) 
The previous part of the chapter focused on the productivity. This section discusses 
survival approaches with an aim to explain survival analysis. To achieve this, the section 
discusses the most popular tool for studying the dependence of survival time on predictor 
variables. By concentrating on rates, SA handles different follow-up times, increases 
statistical power and permits the use of time-changing predictor variables. Multiple articles 
such as Sainani (2016), Kartsonaki (2016) and Flynn (2012) are devoted entirely to the 
methodology of SA, which are reviewed in the following paragraphs. The fundamental 
methods are generally more widely accepted and used. For this reason, rather than 
conducting the literature survey on survival analysis, this section focuses on the most 
established method, which is the Cox based regression. 
5.2.1 Fundamentals of SA  
The description starts with the basics of SA, so that advancements in the approach 
could be introduced. The advancements made it possible to reduce the amount of limiting 
assumptions and correct for various estimation flows.  
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Broadly, SA is the analysis of time-to-event data. The objectives of SA include:  
• Analysis of event time patterns  
• Comparison of survival time distributions in different groups of subjects  
• Judgement as to the degree that specific factors may affect the risk of an 
event of interest.  
Thus, SA examines and models the time it takes for events to occur. These are often 
called survival times. Time-to-event variables record both whether firms have a binary 
outcome (died/survived) and when events occurred. This helps to estimate rates rather 
than just proportions. 
When considering the likelihood of survival, an intuitive approach might be to 
calculate the risk of an event occurring by measuring the proportion of surviving firms after 
a fixed time. For instance, the percentage of deaths after one year of introduction of SBRR. 
However, there are fundamental issues with this approach. For example, the period of 
observation expires, or a firm is removed from the study before the event occurs. Then, 
these companies cannot be included in the analysis even though these enterprises could 
have been observed for 10 or more years. These incomplete observations cannot be 
ignored, but need to be handled differently.  
This is called censoring, particularly this example and our data takes the most 
common form called right-censoring. Alternatively, observations are left-censored if their 
original time at risk is unknown. Observations that are both right and left-censored are 
called interval-censored. Censoring complicates the likelihood function and the estimation 
of survival models and is conditional on the value of any covariates in a survival model. 
Another feature of survival data is that distributions are asymmetric and thus simple 
techniques based on the normal distribution like OLS cannot be used. We choose the 
technique depending on the censoring. 
Furthermore, one of the primary conditions for the survival functions is that 
covariates in a survival model and on an individual firm's survival to a particular time must 
be independent of the future value of the hazard for the individual company. Violating this 
condition would result in biased estimates. This condition is not violated in this study since 
the survey is ongoing and data is available until 2016, while the main changes took place 
around 2005 and 2010. 
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5.2.2 Main Definitions of SA 
Kartsonaki (2016) revisits the definitions of survival functions in clinical studies. 
These can be easily applied for the business studies. The hazard function is often defined 
as the probability of closure (or death) in period t, having survived until period t: 
 𝑠(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝑡 < ∞ 
While the probability density function ℎ(𝑡) is the occurrence of events per unit 
time: 
ℎ(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑠(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 
Then, the cumulative hazard function is the rate at which actions occur for firms 
that are surviving at the time 𝑡: 
𝐻(𝑡) = ∫ ( lim
𝛿𝑢→0+
𝑃(𝑢 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑢 + 𝛿𝑡|𝑇 ≥ 𝑢)
𝛿𝑢
)
𝑡
0
𝑑𝑢 
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑖 is the time of survival (censoring)and 𝛿𝑖  is a censoring indicator and 
Furthermore, Kartsonaki shows the relationship between cumulative hazard 
function to the survival function. The higher hazard function usually results in the lower 
the survival probability: 
 𝑆(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝐻(𝑡) 
Finally, she explains that each firm with an observed event time ti contributes the 
hazard rate at ti multiplied by the survival to ti. Furthermore, each company that is censored 
at ti contributes the survival to ti. To quantify, she assumes that 𝛿𝑖  = 1 for the event that 
occurred like closure and 𝛿𝑖  = 0 if information about firms is just partly known (censored). 
Then, for right-censored data, the data for firm, 𝑖, can be represented with (𝛿𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) , where 
xi are the covariates holding other information on that firm. The likelihood function 
becomes: 
𝐿 = ∏ 𝑓(𝑡𝑗)
𝑗 ℎ𝑎𝑑 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡
∏ 𝑆(𝑡𝑘)
𝑘 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑
=∏ℎ(𝑡𝑖)
𝛿𝑡𝑆(𝑡𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
In general, SA aims to estimate and plot the survival function so that either the 
survival rates of one group could be investigated or two groups could be compared. The 
often used estimator is Kaplan-Meier’s product limit estimator (Sainani, 2016; Kartsonaki, 
2016 and Flynn, 2011). It includes the number of firms remaining in the cohort at different 
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points and the cumulative number of events that have occurred up to that point. Assuming 
that 𝑡1  <  𝑡2  <  …  <  𝑡𝑘 is the observed event times, 𝑛 = 𝑛0 is the sample size, 𝑑𝑗 is the 
number of firms who have an event at time 𝑡𝑗, where 𝑛𝑗 = (𝑚𝑗 + 𝑑𝑗) +⋯+ (𝑚𝑘 + 𝑑𝑘) is 
the number of firms before 𝑡𝑗: 
𝑆∗(𝑡) = ∏
𝑛𝑗 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑛𝑗
j: tj≤t
 
Another common practice is to use parametric methods by assuming that survival 
function takes some shape. Probably the most commonly applied distributions are the 
exponential, Weibull and log-logistic. However, when the focus is on the death and the 
origin time is a firm’s birth, then using an exponential model is an invalid option as it 
assumes a constant hazard such as ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑣, which implies an exponential distribution of 
survival times with density function 𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑣𝑒−𝑣𝑡. However, the death probability (hazard) 
is unlikely to be constant with age, which makes this distribution unreasonable for the 
analysis. Other commonly applied models are logarithmic log(ℎ(𝑡)) = 𝑣 + 𝑝𝑡 leading to 
Gompertz distribution of survival times and log(ℎ(𝑡)) = 𝑣 + 𝑝 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡) leading to the 
Weibull distribution of survival times. These distributions allow a monotonic (either 
continuously decreasing or increasing) hazard.  
However, it is also problematic to argue that the data exactly follows these shapes. 
Cox (1972) reveals that it is unnecessary to identify a functional form. However, if one 
wants to assume a functional form for the baseline hazard, one may lose efficiency which is 
a common sacrifice to take (Moffan, 2015) when the distribution is unknown.  
A Cox (1972) proportional hazards model takes the following shape: 
 ℎ(𝑡; 𝑥) = ℎ𝑜(𝑡)𝑒
𝛽𝑥 
where ℎ(𝑡)is the baseline hazard, 𝑥 is a covariate and 𝛽 is a parameter to be 
estimated. This variable represents the effect of the covariate on the outcome. 
5.2.3 Empirical Examples 
Many studies have considered various aspects of business survival. In the same vein 
to productivity, these studies will only be mentioned (Section 5.2.3.1) rather than detailed 
since they do not contribute to the theoretical development of the question which this 
thesis is investigating. No studies looking at BRs or SBRR were identified. Thus, Section 
5.2.3.2 will discuss recent empirical studies using preferable approaches described in 
Section 5.2.1.  
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5.2.3.1 Overview of Recent Empirical Studies on Survival 
There have been many literature reviews published on methodological issues 
associated with corporate failure prediction models. These include, but are not limited to, 
Dimitras et al. (1996), O’Leary (1998), Tay and Shen (2002), Balcaen and Ooghe (2006), 
Aziz and Dar (2006), and Ravi and Ravi (2007). More recent micro studies focusing on firm 
survival (Carr et al., 2010; Coeurderoy et al. 2012; Colombelli et al. 2013) show the 
importance of the following conditions: firm size, sector, and innovation intensity. 
Furthermore, many studies looking at specific factors that impact on firms’ performance 
have been identified. Some look at firm-specific characteristics, such as firm size and age 
(Evans and Leighton, 1990; Dunne and Hughes, 1994) or founders’ individual traits, such 
as human capital (Colombo and Grilli 2005, and 2009). Others focus on such industry-
specific characteristics as the nature of technology (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1999) or entry 
barriers (Geroski, 1995).  
5.2.3.2 Cox Proportional Hazard (CPH) Model 
More related to this study is Girma’s et al. (2007), who employ Irish data in a Cox 
proportional hazard model to investigate the effect of grants on survival. The control group 
was matched to the treatment group by using propensity score matching. They conclude 
that a subsidy lowers the likelihood of closing. However, they did not follow CPH 
methodology as described by Gelman and Hill (2007). Their probit model lacks consistency 
with the CHM methodology. Some variables are included in the probit model that are 
excluded in the CHM model and vice versa. If there were any unobserved determinants of 
both the outcome and treatment variables that correlate with the treatment and outcome 
variables, the estimated treatment effect would be biased. Harris and Trainor (2007) use 
the same Irish data and CPH. They find that treated plants had a 24% lower probability to 
close. Having used predicted values from a Tobit regression, they find 15% lower 
probability. However, the treatment variable may be replaced with the predicted values 
from the Tobit model only if the model is linear (see Bijwaard, 2008) and it is not the case.  
More recently, Harris and Moffat (2016) look at plant closure in Britain with 
particular emphasis on TFP with ARD data between 2002 and 2012. They include their 
productivity estimation into CPHM (discussed in Section 5.2.1). Other variables they 
control for are a capital-labour ratio, age, employment, relative plant/employment size, 
region and dummies of FDI, outward FDI R&D and location. To satisfy the primary hazards 
assumption, they stratify this model on age, employment, relative employment size and 
relative plant size. 
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In a similar manner as productivity estimates (see Section 5.1.4.5.3, p. 111), they 
provide their regression results for all variables in supplementary material. They produce 
multiple regressions for manufacturing and service sector. Also, they differentiate between 
technology in the manufacturing sector and knowledge intensity in the service sector. The 
main focus is on the firms that have medium to low technology or knowledge intensity as 
the government aims to provide SBRR for underperforming companies. R&D seems to 
influence very low and very high technology firms positively, but do not influence the 
service sector. A more urban location is necessary for medium low technology businesses 
and high/low knowledge intensity service providers. Unlike in manufacturing industries, 
FDI and outward FDI seem to predict the probability of survival for the service sector.  
The only criticism in this methodology is that the authors used longitudinal data 
but did not cluster according to the firm’s ID. This potentially creates problems because 
each observation is treated independently from other observations of that firm. 
Additionally, their productivity is estimated with all variables later included in the CPH 
model which may introduce bias on the effect of TFP on the survival. Their regression 
coefficients may be larger than the actual values. 
5.3 MACHINE LEARNING APPROACHES  
As computing power has grown, complex regression techniques have emerged to 
analyse data. While this growing set of techniques has proved useful in modelling certain 
data, it has also enlarged the burden on statisticians in selecting suitable techniques as, for 
instance, detailed in Section 5.1.3. In response to this growth in complexity, a simple tree 
system, the Classification and Regression Tree (CART) analysis, has become increasingly 
popular and is particularly valuable for this interdisciplinary study. None of the studies 
identified used tree approaches for the questions related to productivity (Section 5.1.3). 
However, there have been some studies that used CART for survival analyses. Throughout 
this section, it is argued that these approaches could provide valuable insights by grouping 
the data and extracting where the effects are the most present. This chapter aims to define 
CART and provide reasoning as to why this technique may supplement both productivity 
and survival estimation. 
There have been several literature reviews conducted on the development of 
decision trees (Loh, 2008; 2011, 2014; Merkle & Shaffer, 2009; Strobl et al., 2011). Leblanc 
and Crowley (1995) review survival trees up to 1995, while Hamad et al. (2011) presents 
a more updated non-technical account of the developments in tree-based methods for the 
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analysis of survival data with censoring. They acknowledge that the research on survival 
trees has taken three directions: multivariate and correlated survival data (Fan et al., 2005 
and 2006), ensemble methods with survival trees (Ishwaran et al., 2004 and 2008) and 
time-varying covariates and time–to–event variables measured on a discrete scale (starting 
with Hamad et al., 2011). The latter is central to this study (see Sections 5.3.1.2.1 and 
5.3.1.2.1). 
This literature is used for the basis of this section, which aims to describe 
fundamental CART techniques and their appropriate extensions for this study. To achieve 
this aim, the section starts with the fundamental concepts. Once they are introduced, it 
continues with the main mechanisms used with decision trees (Section 5.3.1) and survival 
trees (Section 5.3.1.2). Simultaneously, these are compared with usual regression 
techniques (Section 5.3.1.1). Finally, the section develops into examples where these trees 
were implemented. 
5.3.1 Introduction to decision trees 
The underlying approach depends on the structure of the outcome variable. The 
more straightforward version of the tree is classification, where the outcome variable might 
be classified (e.g. binary outcome) would be organised (or classified) into groups by the 
outcome variable. On the other hand, when the outcome variable is continuous, the data 
will be exploited to predict the outcome, so employing the regression trees. Thus, the basis 
of the split in classification trees is homogeneity by categorising based on similar data and, 
then, filtering out the extreme values to make it more consistent. In the second case with 
continuous variable, a regression model is fitted to each of the independent variables, 
isolating these variables as nodes where their inclusion decreases error. A visualisation of 
this process is presented in the Figure 5:5 (p. 119). 
 
Figure 5:5 Structure of the CART. Source: Majid (2014:4). 
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5.3.1.1 Comparison with the Regression and Definitions 
The trees are proposed to be used instead of the more usual regression style 
approaches because of how it splits the data. In the regression approaches, one equation is 
usually developed to represent the whole data (see Sections 5.1.4 and 5.2.3). In the CART 
setting, recursive partitioning is the method by which CART operates. Broadly, it operates 
by subsequently dividing the data into smaller portions to isolate the most important 
variables. The data is partitioned into sections where variable interactions are evident with 
some significance level. More specifically, the CART algorithm uses the recursive 
partitioning to generate a tree where each node (T in Figure 5:5) represents a cell of the 
partition. A node represents a single input variable (in Figure 5:5, it is noted as T) and a 
split point on that variable, assuming the variable is numeric. A simplified model that is 
applied to that cell is only attached to each cell.  
This is relatively similar to conditional modelling. Once we go down the nodes that 
a particular variable is conditioning on, the final split or node is referred to as a leaf. Leaf 
nodes (also called terminal nodes) of the tree contain an output variable (y) which is used 
to make a prediction. In Figure 5:5, A , B, and C are each terminal nodes (leaves), implying 
that this is the final split. Any further splitting does not clarify an adequate amount of the 
variance in describing the outcome variable. Finally, The Gini Impurity is an impurity-based 
criterion that measures the deviations between the probability distributions of the target 
attribute’s values. This has been used in various works such as Breiman et al. (1984). 
5.3.1.1.1 Mathematical explanation 
Morgan and Sonquist (1963) were the first to publish a regression tree algorithm. 
Their approach uses binary splits with a single covariate. As mentioned in Section 5.3.1.1, 
ordered continuous covariates are split with a constant, while categorical per their values. 
For continues variable, there are (n − 1) such splits on X. For categorical variable having m 
distinct observed values, there are (2m − 1 − 1) splits of the form X ∈ A, where A is a subset 
of the X values.  
Let the parent node be split as 𝑆 and the left, 𝐿, and right, 𝑅, be subnotes as well as 
y be a response value in node 𝑆 and ?̅? is the average response values in node 𝑆. For 
regression trees, the sum of squared errors (SSE) is used to measure the heterogeneity of 
a node 𝑆: 
𝐼𝑆 =∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?
𝑖𝜖𝑆
)2 
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Then, after splitting into 𝐿 and 𝑅, the decrease of heterogeneity of 𝑆 is: 
 Δ𝐼(𝑆, 𝐿, 𝑅) = 𝐼𝑆 − (𝐼𝐿 + 𝐼𝑅) 
It selects the split that minimises the sum of the impurities in the two children 
nodes. Splitting stops when the decrease in impurity is lesser than a fraction of the impurity 
at the root node. The node sample mean is the predicted outcome variable value in each 
terminal node. The result is a constant estimate of the regression function. 
Messenger and Mandell (1972) apply these ideas to classification trees, in which 
the outcome variable becomes categorical. They choose splits to maximise the sum of the 
number of observations in each category. The Gini index of diversity or entropy is often 
used to reflect the impurity of a node, which defines the node splits where each split 
maximises the decrease in impurity. Let G be categories in the data, 𝜋𝑆(𝑔) be the proportion 
of the observations from the Gth category in node S and 𝑛𝑆 be the number of cases in node 
S. Then, the Gini index is  
𝐼𝑆 = ∑𝜋𝑠(𝑔)[1 − 𝜋𝑠(𝑔)]
𝐺
𝑔=1
 
and the entropy is: 
𝐼𝑆 = ∑𝜋𝑠(𝑔)[− ln(𝜋𝑠(𝑔))]
𝐺
𝑔=1
 
Taking any of these 𝐼𝑆, the decrease of impurity of node S after the split is defined 
by Δ𝐼(𝑆, 𝐿, 𝑅) = 𝐼𝑆 − (𝐼𝐿 + 𝐼𝑅). The chosen split for each node is the maximising Δ𝐼(𝑆, 𝐿, 𝑅). 
This process is repeated until the largest possible tree is obtained and no more nodes can 
be split. 
5.3.1.1.2 Random forests 
A large decision tree may lead to large prediction variance. Breiman (1996), 
Buhlmann and Yu (2002) and Friedman and Hall (2000) use the bootstrap aggregation 
method to solve the overfitting problem. This is called bagging and is a basis for random 
forests. By averaging results from bootstrap samples, bagging smooths the response 
surface and hence reduces the prediction variance. However, a straightforward 
interpretation is impossible as there is now no single decision or regression tree. Instead 
of the tree, the variable importance is often estimated. The method is used for sensitivity 
analysis and is further discussed in the Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.3).  
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5.3.1.2 Survival trees 
The chief issue with applying statistical techniques like CPM to closure 
prediction(as detailed in Section 5.2.3.2), is that such assumptions like the similar baseline 
hazard function for the whole model, are often invalid in practice, which makes these 
techniques theoretically invalid (Nishitani et al., 2014). On the other hand, there are many 
improvements in these methodologies such as stratification to avoid the violation of the 
previously mentioned assumption. 
More recently, several studies have shown that more creative techniques, such as 
Decision Tree (DT), Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and 
Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) can be applied for closure prediction (Olson et al., 2012; Tsai 
and Wu, 2008). The principal advantages of these techniques are the ability to extract 
knowledge from training samples automatically and to estimate without assuming certain 
data distributions. 
The concept of using tree-structured data analysis for censored data has been 
established around the 1980s with Ciampi et al. (1981) and Marubini et al. (1983). Gordon 
and Olshen (1985) are known to publish the pioneering paper comprising the primary 
elements of survival trees. They used impurity reduction based on KM curves as their 
splitting rule, cost-complexity pruning and cross-validation as their pruning rule and 
implemented the estimation with STREE. 
Inspired by Gordon and Olshen’s (1985) ideas on the log-rank statistic, Ciampi et 
al. (1986) employed the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for choosing the tree size. AIC 
is related to the log-likelihood by adding a penalty built on the number of parameters. The 
algorithm begins at the root node with all observations. It searches through all possible 
binary splits with the covariates to select the most accurate one with regards to splitting 
criteria (usually an impurity measure). In the CART, the procedure is constantly repeated 
on the children nodes until a stopping criterion is met. Then, to find a suitable subtree, a 
pruning and selection method is employed.  
In the survival setting, the predictor is an ensemble shaped by joining many survival 
trees. Ishwaran et al. (2008) term the typical method to analyse survival with random 
forests as random survival forests (RSF). These extensions of the random forest approach 
to SA offer an appropriate technique to shape risk prediction models. In this method, a 
group of survival trees is grown and the splitting is executed by maximising the log-rank 
statistic in each node. The predictions are estimated by averaging the cumulative hazard 
estimates in the leaves, as estimated by the Nelson–Aalen estimator. This bypasses the need 
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to impose constraints on the distributions (e.g. parametric or semi-parametric). It allows 
for accurate prediction as well as helps to deal with high-level interactions and higher-
order terms in variables (Ishwaran et al., 2008).  
5.3.1.2.1 Survival trees with longitudinal data 
Returning to the Cox proportionate hazards model: 𝛼(𝑡|𝑥) − 𝛼0(𝑡)𝑠(𝑥) with 𝑠(𝑥) ≥
0, where 𝛼0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard, Leblanc and Crowley (1992) construct a tree 
representing the relative risk function, 𝑠(𝑥). Their algorithm splits the covariate space 
based on a rule that maximises the reduction in the one-step deviance realised by the split, 
which is defined as the difference between the log-likelihood of the saturated model and 
the maximised log-likelihood. The baseline cumulative hazard function is estimated by the 
Nelson-Aalen estimator.  
None of the previous methods (Bacchetti and Segal, 1995; Huang et al., 1998; Xu 
and Adak, 2002; Bertolet, et a., 2012) dealing with time-varying indicators can be 
implemented in the secure lab (Fu and Simonoff, 2015) and are not based on the two 
established and widely used survival tree methods. Thus, they are not discussed here. Fu 
and Simonoff (2016) have proposed an extension of Leblanc and Crowley’s (1992) model 
with new survival trees for left-truncated and right-censored(LTRC) data with time-
varying covariates. These are modifications of Cox Regression.  
As previously described, the Cox proportionate hazards model can be defined as: 
𝜆(𝑡|𝑥) = 𝜆0(𝑡)𝑠(𝑥) , where 𝑡 is the observed event/censored time, 𝑥 is the vector of 
covariates, 𝑠(𝑥) ≥ 0 and 𝜆0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard.  
Leblanc and Crowley (1992) construct a tree representing the relative risk function, 
𝑠(𝑥). Fu and Simonoff (2016) introduced survival trees for left-truncated and right-
censored data. One of the proposed trees is based on previously defined CPH. The following 
definitions are based on their notations.  
Assuming that 𝑇∗ is the set of leaves (or terminal nodes), 𝑆ℎ is the set of 
observation labels, {𝑖: 𝑥𝑖𝜖𝑥ℎ} for observations in the region 𝑥ℎ corresponding to node 
h. 𝜆0(𝑡) is the baseline hazard and Λ0(𝑡𝑖) cumulative hazard functions. Furthermore, the 
hazard function, 𝜆ℎ(𝑡) = 𝜃ℎ𝜆0(𝑡) , is assumed to be true and 𝜃ℎ is the nonnegative 
relative risk of node h. As a result, the full likelihood function could be written:  
 𝐿 = Πℎ∈𝑇∗Π𝑖∈𝑆ℎ(𝜃ℎ𝜆0(𝑡𝑖))
𝛿𝑖𝑒−Λ0(𝑡𝑖)𝜃ℎ 
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Then, Leblanc and Crowley (1992) estimate 𝜃ℎ by: 
𝜃ℎ
∗ =
∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑖𝜖𝑆ℎ
∑ Λ0(𝑡𝑖)𝑖𝜖𝑆ℎ
 
where Λ0 is estimated using all data at the root node by the Nelson-Aalen estimator. 
Thus, the observed number of events divided by the expected number of events in node ℎ 
assuming observations in node ℎ are randomly sampled from the root node. 
Let 𝐿ℎ(𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) be the log-likelihood of the saturated model and 𝐿ℎ(𝜃ℎ
∗) is 
maximised log-likelihood with Λ0(𝑡 ) known. Then, the deviance for node h is 𝑅(ℎ) −
2[𝐿ℎ(𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) − 𝐿ℎ(𝜃ℎ
∗)]. The splitting criteria is to reduce the deviance residual: 
𝐷𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 − {𝐷𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 + 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒} where 𝐷ℎ = ∑ 𝑑𝑖𝑖𝜖ℎ  with the 
contribution of the ith observation is: 
𝑑𝑖 = 2 [𝛿𝑖 ln (
𝛿𝑖
𝛬0(𝑡𝑖)𝜃ℎ
∗) − 𝛿𝑖 + Λ0(𝑡𝑖)𝜃ℎ
∗] 
It is similar to Poisson regression which is used to fit trees with popular method 
called rpart trees in R. The Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.2.2) will further show how 
this approach was used for this analysis. 
5.3.1.3 CART with longitudinal data 
There have been no methods or articles identified dealing with productivity by 
using machine learning approaches. It is likely that this is because until recently the 
machine learning data has been incapable of accommodating longitudinal data. Recently a 
few scholars have provided some regression (Sela and Simonoff, 2012) and boosting 
(Pande et al., 2017) extensions to the decision trees. These seem to be a useful supplement 
for productivity estimators.  
CPH model, as discussed in Section 5.2.3.2 (p. 117) can cluster on ID so that 
dependence of the observations could be established to estimate more precise standard 
errors. However, this is not possible with tree-based methods. Hamad et al. (2011) and Sela 
and Simonoff (2012) have provided an overview of the developments within machine 
learning methods that allow better estimates to be achieved with longitudinal data. Segal 
(1992) and De’Ath (2002) are the first to attempt to apply a regression tree methodology 
for longitudinal data. As Sela and Simonoff (2012) point out, these trees are not suitable for 
the estimation of forthcoming periods because they use a single set of attributes for all 
observational periods, thus removes the capability of observing time-varying attributes 
Methodology Review  
125 
 
after the initial period. A few further extensions of this model have been proposed (Larsen 
and Speckman, 2004, Hsiao and Shih, 2007) with one or more limitations. 
Other methodologies have emerged throughout the years. Lee (2005 and 2006) and 
Lee et al. (2005) partition by estimating a parametric model with maximum likelihood at 
each node. Once estimated, they partition on the residuals from estimation. Their method 
is unable to predict forthcoming observations and is dependent on a single set of 
characteristics for all periods. Abdolell et al. (2002) use a longitudinal outcome variable to 
identify clusters grounded on a single attribute. Ritschard and Oris (2005) employ 
classification trees for such data. They consider lagged response values as potential 
predictors, but they do not consider them to be inherently multidimensional.  
More recently, two different random forests extensions dealing with longitudinal 
data have been identified: The Random Effects Expectation Maximization (REEM) trees 
introduced by Hajjem et al. (2011) and Sela and Simonoff (2012) and advanced by Fu and 
Simonoff (2016). They use longitudinal and cluster unbalanced data with time-varying 
features. While Pande et al. (2017) and Miller et al. (2017) have introduced boost 
multivariate trees to fit a flexible semi-nonparametric marginal model for longitudinal data, 
both methods seem to provide more efficient results. However, the REEM methodology is 
easier to implement in the Secure Lab. Thus, it is further discussed in the Research Design 
Chapter (Section 6.3.1.3). 
5.3.2 Empirical examples 
Jabeur and Fahmi (2014) compare three approaches: Discriminant Analysis, Logit 
model and Random Forest to predict corporate financial distress. They look at three years 
(2006-2008) of 800 French SMEs, consisting of 50% healthy and 50% defaulting firms. 
Unfortunately, they do not extend the analysis and use rather basic models. However, they 
suggest that the random forests technique is better than the alternatives. In general, 
machine learning approaches are becoming increasingly more popular in many fields, but 
the literature review could not identify any studies dealing with either firm survival after 
governmental intervention or taxation in general. The clear majority of literature comes 
from the environmental science journals.  
Weinblat (2017) uses data from nine EU countries, including the UK, to ascertain 
which firms become high growth firms as defined in Section 4.7.2. They apply standard 
random forest estimation. They use a confusion matrix, ROC curve to validate their results 
and variable importance rankings to see which variables are thought to be the most 
influential. Surprisingly, their results suggest that high growth firms are larger and older 
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than other companies, which are contra-intuitive given the previous literature as discussed 
in Section 4.7.2. The central criticism of this study is that it does not exploit the longitudinal 
nature of the data. It treats each year’s observations as separate. Thus, the resulting 
estimate may be biased.  
During the co-citation analysis of the REEM approach, there have been six articles 
identified. These articles are mainly related to biology (Rudolph et al., 2012; Jones et al., 
2014; La Sorte et al., 2015) but also other fields such as healthcare (Ali et al., 2018) and 
politics (Bassetti et al., 2018). None of the published studies are related to the research 
question this thesis is investigating. For instance, Bessetti et al. (2017) show that some 
economic correlates of Islamist political violence matter differently when they are 
considered in a particular path. They use a similar methodology to the one described in the 
Research Design Chapter (Section 6.3.1.3). They have three dependent variables for 
separate models and eight independent variables. They use two tests to access both the 
stability and predictive capacity of the REEM. Firstly, they exclude one observation and fit 
the model using the remaining data. Ideally, the data should stay stable. Also, they 
implement a k-fold validation method to compare the predictive capacity of the trees with 
OLS.  
5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS 
An advancement in data analytics has drawn researchers to more and more 
sophisticated approaches that do not require limiting assumptions and correct for various 
estimation flows. This chapter provided some examples of how these approaches were 
employed in various settings. From both of these, it seems evident that the OP- LP approach 
and GMM estimator should provide an appropriate estimate of TFP.  
Similarly, the long-lasting non-parametric Cox Proportionate Hazards (CPH) 
approach is being gradually improved with various extensions. An advancement in survival 
analysis made it possible to reduce the amount of limiting assumptions and correct for 
various estimation flows. Various extensions help to satisfy assumptions and use it with 
longitudinal data. This section provided an overview of how CPH is derived. It is one of the 
most frequently applied techniques for the survival analysis due to its non-parametric 
nature and theoretical foundations discussed in this section.  
Finally, in order to test the Framework and thoroughly capture the complex 
clustered nature of the data, the empirical methodology is to employ the Sela and Simonoff 
(2012) and Fu and Simonoff (2015) Random Effects Expectation Maximisation (REEM) 
Methodology Review  
127 
 
decision tree algorithm for productivity analysis and the Fu and Simonoff (2017) Survival 
Tree (ST) algorithm, which accounts for left truncated and right censored observations, for 
the survival analysis. These allow the data to define non-parametrically the interaction of 
effects, whilst also controlling for firm-level differences.  
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6 RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter presents the chosen methodology to achieve the primary aim of the 
thesis, which is to understand whether Small Business Rates Relief (SBRR) has any effects 
on firms, in particular with regards to their productivity and survival. Total factor 
productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used in 
production. Whilst, survival analysis in this setting is a method for analysing the expected 
duration of time until closure. The chapter builds on the Methodology Review, which 
provided an overview of various techniques applied to productivity and survival analysis 
to select the most appropriate approaches. For the productivity analysis, control functions, 
system GMM and unbiased REEM trees seemed to be the most appropriate. The survival 
analysis was suggested to be performed with Stratified Cox Regression and Survival Trees. 
In both cases, more traditional approaches are combined with some machine learning 
alternatives which provide further insights into both productivity and survival. Various 
extensions of these models help to satisfy assumptions and are used with longitudinal data. 
More specifically, to explain how this analysis was conducted, the chapter is split 
into three broad areas. The first is devoted to epistemological considerations (6.1). The 
second part (6.1.3) describes datasets, data management and matching. This matched data 
is used in models and estimation techniques that are presented in the third part (6.3), 
which starts by reviewing established and more recent issues with control estimators and 
derives a model to estimate total factor productivity (6.3.1) that deals with simultaneity, 
selection and omitted price biases. As a result, TFP is estimated with Wooldridge’s (2009) 
approach, which is supplemented by unbiased REEM trees (Section 6.3.1.3) to identify any 
effects of SBRR on TFP. To strengthen these results, an alternative approach is also 
employed. The dynamic form of productivity with not just standard variables, but also 
previously discussed additional variables are estimated with a system GMM estimator 
(Section 6.3.1.4). Finally, the chapter also reviews the survival estimation (Section 6.3.2). 
It discusses the Stratified Cox Proportional Model (6.3.2.1) and survival tree (6.3.2.2) 
methodologies. They were chosen because of the left-truncated and right censored data. 
6.1 PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 
The purpose of this section is to reflect upon ontological and epistemological issues 
relevant to the research on business rates. To achieve this purpose, this chapter begins with 
an overview of how big data has shifted paradigms (Section 6.1.1). This is followed by a 
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review of issues within economics so that the relative merits of post-positivism and 
positivism can be weighted (Section 6.1.2) to choose the most suitable epistemological 
stance for this research project. 
6.1.1 Big Data  
Economics and other social sciences have experienced a significant shift in 
computational nature. As a result, there have been continued discussions about the change 
in paradigms. Kuhn (1962) emphasises that the worldview and knowledge exist at one 
moment in time. In contrast to Kuhn’s perception that paradigms are evolving because of 
particular phenomena, Hey et al. (2009), inspired by Jim Gray, demonstrate that paradigms 
advance because of data. They classify four paradigms according to the period and term the 
fourth exploratory science. They establish that data-intensive statistical exploration and 
data mining are today’s science. Similarly, others (Kelling et al., 2009; Miller, 2010) have 
argued that data-driven science should form a new paradigm because this type of 
epistemology could help to extract new knowledge. Furthermore, an increasing number of 
researchers (Bollier, 2010; Floridi, 2012; Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier, 2013) have 
claimed that big data should affect how business is conducted, knowledge shaped, and 
governance enacted. For instance, Kitchin (2014) highlights the opinions of several 
professionals (Anderson, Prenky, Dyche, and Clark) who have claimed that big data could 
solve challenges even without theories. They reason that big data could create more 
comprehensive and extensive interdisciplinary studies that would be less limited to 
theories.  
6.1.2 Positivism versus Post-positivism 
In the period from Comte, through logical positivism and the Vienna Circle, to 
critical rationalism and operationalism, philosophy of knowledge in economics has 
experienced numerous variations and modifications. Post-positivism has become 
increasingly popular in economics. It has incorporated ideas of Feyerabend’s 
methodological pluralism, falsificationism (Popper), and fallibilism (Hetherington, 2000). 
The central practical implication would be an assumption that sophisticated statistical 
methods are not sufficient to create scientific knowledge. Post-positivists have maintained 
that social sciences need more deliberative and integrated methods. On the other hand, the 
advantage of abundant information could create some valuable knowledge. For instance, 
Duranton’s et al. (2011) methodology relies on secondary data and improves the 
understanding of business rates. This understanding could be as equally significant as 
interviews, for example, from Mehdi’s (2003) study, or theoretical discussions about the 
possible effects on business rates such as those by Williams (2011) or Smith (2015). It may 
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be further questioned whether the compound understanding which could not be 
incorporated in today’s relatively sophisticated statistical modelling with big data (Kitchin, 
2014) is required to answer the calls for evidence concerning business rates (Bond et al., 
2013; HM Treasury, 2015 and 2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015).  
A critique of positivism could be valuable since it is often oriented towards a more 
comprehensive and elaborate description of a phenomenon and the relationships within it. 
Some of these issues were discussed by von Mises. In 1933, a period when the social 
sciences and economic policy were experiencing confusion, von Mises argued that the core 
intellectual errors of protectionism, socialism, statism, racism and irrationalism were 
against economic logic. This was also identified by other scholars who criticised the 
reductionist nature of positivism owing to such factors as an absence of neutral knowledge, 
dualistic thinking (Henriques et al., 1998), ethical aspects (Schratz and Walker, 1995) and 
a focus on statistical approaches (Cradwell, 1980). This implies that the easy to understand 
deductionist models similar to those presented in the Theory Review Chapter should be 
looked at with caution. They provide a good indication for the majority of cases, but might 
not be accurate for all cases. 
6.1.3 Theory-driven versus Data-driven 
As computing power and the amount of information have grown, complex 
techniques focusing on data-driven modelling can provide an alternative to predetermined 
and reductionist models. The contradiction that could potentially arise is that data 
evaluation provides legitimate results without them being subjected to theory restrictions 
and is applied with less explicit criteria. Whilst in the theory-driven standard positivist 
modelling, data evaluation is legitimised in the context of a well-formed theory. The data-
driven techniques, such as REEM trees, do not require a theory base and can deal with the 
previously mentioned shortcomings and methodological errors inherent in neoclassical 
economics (Adam and Westlund, 2013). Thus, the results are expected to be more dynamic, 
complex and sophisticated (Kitchin, 2014:3). 
However, it could be erroneous to focus only on data. Although data-driven 
modelling does not impose additional assumptions, it still requires contextualisation on 
existing knowledge; it may be limited in scope and may produce only one kind of knowledge 
(Crampton et al., 2012). While these algorithms enable rich representations of complex 
economic systems and advanced reasoning capabilities, a key challenge is finding the right 
balance between leveraging computational resources and applying theory because the data 
may capture interactions that do not necessarily provide meaningful insights into the 
questions addressed. Having said that, the whole data about a phenomenon can be included 
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in the modelling and even those irrational, according to our current understanding, 
interactions may be worth acknowledging.   
As a result, this research project follows the paradigm of positivism but employs 
both data-driven  and theory-driven modelling in an attempt to gather a complete 
understanding of the phenomenon. Given all criticism of positivism, it may seem reasonable 
to suggest that data-driven modelling could at least partly reduce the drawbacks of 
positivism. The availability of both larger datasets and more sophisticated techniques 
should result in greater complexity. Athough Hutchison's (1941) positivist seeks to reduce 
a phenomenon to universal and abstract principles and tends to fragment human 
behaviour, data-driven reasoning may help to act against this reductionist nature by 
including unpredetermined relationships within the analysis.  
Overall, as a researcher, I adopt the belief that the world of social interactions exists 
independently of what I perceive it to be; it is a broadly rational, external entity and 
responsive to scientific modes of inquiry. Also, I believe that data analysis may be useful 
both before and after theory development. The combination of both could not only advance 
the knowledge of Small Business Rate Relief but also answer recent calls for evidence 
concerning this topic. 
6.2 DATA 
This section aims to describe how the data was chosen, modified and cleaned when 
appropriate. It starts by reviewing the datasets used by UK researchers on topics related to 
BRs since the methodology depends on the available data sources. This review influenced 
the choice of the datasets which are described in Section 6.2.1. The section then expands on 
the key variables that were used in both survival and productivity analyses and how such 
issues as missingness and computation errors were solved (Section 6.2.2.4).  
6.2.1 Datasets 
Previous studies suggested that macro-level analyses, particularly in TFP 
estimation, is being replaced by the micro-level analyses. The Empirical Review discussed 
several UK papers dealing with issues related to BRs. These studies used various secondary 
data sources. These included the Census of Production (Mair, 1987), the Department of 
Environment floor-space data, Central Statistics Office estimates from county national and 
level gross domestic product (GDP) components (Bennett and Krebs, 1988), Inland 
Revenue Survey of Personal Incomes and Return of Rates (Blair, 1989; Mair, 1990), Ireland 
Revenue Valuation Agency and Investment Property Databank (Bond et al., 1996), 
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Valuation Office Agency data (Bond et al., 2013), Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accounting data (Hilber et al, 2011) and a variety of local government financial statistics. 
Throughout time, aggregate data was replaced by the more extensive micro datasets. This 
shift is due to the benefits of estimating TFP with micro-level data. It permits the direct 
comparison of an outcome variable across treated and control groups and, therefore, 
facilitates the estimation of treatment effects. More specifically, Del Gatto et al. (2011) 
argue that aggregate analysis plays a significant role in comparative, cross-country studies 
but micro analysis permits the investigation of TFP patterns at a deeper level, controlling 
for issues like not perfectly competitive markets, increasing returns, and different firms. 
This analysis directed towards using the Annual Respondents Database (ARD). 
Most recent papers related to both BRs and TFP often employed the ARD. One of the most 
theoretically and empirically sophisticated studies uncovered in the Empirical Review 
Chapter was by Duranton et al. (2011) which employed the ARD. Likewise, the recent and 
extensive estimates of TFP prepared by Harris, Moffat and their co-authors in various 
papers reviewed in the Methodology Review were based on the ARD.  
Given the longitudinal structure and breadth of the ARD dataset, this would enable 
the estimation of TFP and survival at the micro level but only until 2008. In fact, the Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) Virtual Microdata Laboratory (VML) and the University of the 
West of England extended this dataset by combining several other datasets to achieve 
better coverage and a better fit for productivity analysis. The new dataset called Annual 
Respondents Database X (ARDx) now contains harmonised variables from 1998 to 2015 
with 42,000-65,000 annual observations. Thus, the following paragraphs will describe 
ARDx by focusing on its structure and introduce other two data sources27 that were used to 
supplement ARDx. The correct procedures required by the UK Data Service to access and 
report on this data were undertaken owing to the sensitive nature of the data.  
6.2.1.1 Annual Respondents Database x (ARDx) 
Not only the coverage, but also the variable base made ARDx the preferable dataset. 
As an extension of the ARD, the ARDx has a rich variable base (289-402 variables). It 
includes such chief variables in TFP estimation as labour, estimated capital, investment, 
materials and, most importantly, BRs expense. The surveys also cover diverse sectors; 
construction; retail; motor trades; catering and allied trades; wholesale; property; service 
trade sectors and from 2000 agriculture (partly), hunting, forestry and fishing. From an 
                                                             
27 Sections 6.2.1.3 Business Structure Database (BSD) and 6.2.1.4 Prices Survey Microdata 
(PSM). 
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administrative perspective, the ARDx is created by combining two datasets, Annual 
Respondent Database with data from 1998 to 2008 and the Annual Business Survey (ABS) 
supplemented with employment data from the Business Register and Employment Survey 
with data from 2009. These datasets are described in the following paragraphs to 
understand the ARDx dataset better and to highlight some possible mismatch between pre 
and post-2008 data. 
The pre-2008 data in ARDx mainly comes from ARD. ARD28 consists of two surveys, 
employment (ABI1) and financial information (ABI2). These were standardised into a 
single consistent format and linked by the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). 
ARDx starts in 1998 because ABI’s (1998-2008) structure was more similar to ABS (2008-
2016). These two datasets can be combined because they have similar sampling 
procedures, structure and questions as well as the ability to be linked with IDBR, which 
have only existed since 1997.  
More recent (post-2008) data in ARDx comes from the Annual Business Survey 
(ABS). The Office for National Statistics (ONS) sends this postal survey to around 62,000 
businesses in Great Britain each year. It is the most extensive business survey currently 
conducted by the ONS in terms of the combined number of respondents and variables it 
covers from around 600 different questions asked. The details of these businesses, 
registered for Value Added Tax (VAT) and/or Pay As You Earn (PAYE), are obtained from 
the ONS’s Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). In a similar manner to ARD, the 
ABS’s population of legal units is stratified by SIC (2007), employment, and country using 
the information from the IDBR.  
With regard to the sample procedures, both ARD and ABS include all large 
businesses and smaller businesses are sampled. The estimation might suffer some bias as 
smaller firms may receive a shorter form, which may not necessarily require detailed 
breakdowns of totals. Thus, for specific variables, the values may be acquired from third-
party sources (e.g. HMRC) or estimated rather than returned by respondents. 
Approximately 60,000 - 75,000 businesses were surveyed each year between 1998 and 
2008 (and ~15,000 between 1973 and 1997) by using a postal survey method.  
Although the survey provides substantial coverage, there are some inaccuracies. 
For instance, linking datasets brought several different variables reporting similar or 
closely linked figures. One of them is employment. The employment figures are present 
from all three sources. The ONS produces many different measures of employment, 
                                                             
28 Also called Annual Business Inquiry (ABI). 
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including the Workforce Jobs and Annual Population Survey/Labour Force Survey. 
However, ONS recommends using the Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES) 
for the information on employment by detailed geography and industry (ONS, 2017). The 
most reliable recent (2009-2015) employment data in ARDx comes from the BREST, which 
is aimed at updating local unit information and business structures on the IDBR. This postal 
survey has approximately 80,000 sampled businesses covering approximately 500,000 
sampled local units each year. 
Overall, the data owners have used variable names from the ABS. They advise that 
names may not be the same, but the survey is mainly consistent with the ARD. The variables 
may be divided into three types according to their information source: 
• IDBR-based information about the reporting unit 
• Respondent’s answers to the ARD and ABS surveys 
• Employment data from BRES. 
6.2.1.2 Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) 
ARDx is preferable because it is cross-checked with administrative data. There are 
larger and more up to date data sources, but these cannot be accessed by non-civil servants 
without special permission. All ONS datasets consist of IDBR reference numbers. These are 
anonymous but unique reference numbers assigned to business organisations. Their 
inclusion helped to combine various datasets required to achieve the objectives. For 
merging purposes that will be described in Section 6.2.2, it is important to define different 
identifier levels at IDBR to merge ONS datasets. The IDBR can be grouped into three types: 
administrative, statistical and observation units. Figure 6:1 illustrates the principal 
relationships. The reporting and statistical units can be used for matching since they have 
unique identifiers. To estimate more precise effects, the data in this analysis was limited to 
firms having only one local unit. Thus, although there would be unique identifiers for each 
of the groups (reporting unit, enterprise group, enterprise and local unit), they would refer 
to the same information.  
If this limitation was not imposed, as Figure 6:1 illustrates, the reporting unit would 
provide information on behalf of the company and have its identifier (ruref). This 
information would be assigned to statistical units. They are a group of legal units under 
joint ownership which is called an Enterprise Group (Entref). An Enterprise can be defined 
as the smallest combination of legal units (based on VAT and PAYE records), whilst, a local 
unit is an enterprise or part of a company situated in a geographically identified place. 
Research Design  
135 
 
Finally, administrative units refer to VAT trader and PAYE employer information 
supplemented with incorporated business data from Companies House. 
 
Figure 6:1 Relationships amongst reporting units, enterprise groups, enterprise 
and local units. Source: ONS (2017:3). 
6.2.1.3 Business Structure Database (BSD) 
The ARD/ABS sampling scheme involves selecting all largest businesses with a 
progressively reducing fraction of smaller firms. Thus, ARDx would often consist of several 
small business observations. To obtain precise values for the years when those firms were 
not included in the ARD/ABS scope, ARDx data was combined with the Business Structure 
Database (BSD). BSD seemed to be an appropriate dataset to fill those gaps as it covers 
almost the entire UK business population. It includes up to four million enterprises and up 
to 5.5 million local units. However, only several variables are available: employment, 
turnover, standard industrial classification, legal status, foreign ownership, birth, death. 
Employment includes business owners, whereas 'employees' measures the number of staff, 
excluding owners. The birth and death variables are particularly useful for the survival 
analysis, although it should be noted that for businesses which commenced trading before 
1973, their birth date would be set to 1973. Furthermore, the extensive coverage was used 
to derive competition indexes (Marshallian externalities, Herfindahl index, Jacobian 
externalities) described in Section 6.2.2.6.  
In addition, unlike in the IDBR, BSD only consists of enterprise and local unit 
identifiers. There is no reporting unit reference number. Thus, instead of reporting unit 
level, the enterprise unit level had to be used in Section 6.2.2.  
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6.2.1.4 Prices Survey Microdata (PSM) 
ARDx provided primary variables and BSD was employed to extend the coverage of 
the characteristics of firms. However, these datasets did not include any means of 
controlling for the price increases and decreases within the estimators. The usual way to 
solve these issues would be to deflate values with GDP estimator. This thesis proposed a 
more sensible way to deflate with the Prices Survey Microdata (PSM) which is used to 
estimate the exact values for the specific firms as described in Section 6.2.2.3.  
In general, the PSM is used to produce the Retail Prices Index, the Consumer Prices 
Index and associated price indices. All other previously described datasets were mainly 
derived by the postal survey, but to gather information on the PSM, the ONS uses two basic 
price collection methods. One of them is a local collection, which is implemented in about 
150 locations around the country with around 110,000 collections. Collectors must visit the 
outlet, but prices for some items may be collected by telephone. Another type of collection, 
called the central collection, is when the prices are collected centrally. 
6.2.1.5 Summary of the Datasets – ARDx, PSM and BSD 
Table 6:1 provides the summary of the datasets discussed in this section. The 
analysis is based on the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) Annual Respondents 
Database X (ARDx) first released in July 2016 combined with Business Structure Database 
(BSD) and Prices Survey Microdata (PSM). The ARDx combines two existing surveys, the 
Annual Business Inquiry (1998-2008) and the subsequent Annual Business Survey (2009-
2015) which representatives of businesses are legally required to complete, and produces 
high response rates. It is a census of firms with 250 plus employees and a complex stratified 
sample across size, sector and region of smaller firms. The sample framework is 
constructed using administrative data on employment and turnover from PAYE and VAT 
registrations. Importantly, for the purpose of this theses, it captures information at both 
the enterprise and local unit levels. However, Small Business Relief and several indexes 
needed to be derived as described in Section 6.2.2.6. 
This data source was combined with the BSD to acquire the annual observations of 
smaller firms that were not included in the ARDx sample in some years, and as such fills in 
some missing variables. The BSD contains an annual release of a small number of critical 
variables on all VAT registered UK firms or those which employ at least one worker and are 
complementary to the above business surveys. 
The ARDx and BSD do not directly provide controls for input price changes, 
required for the estimates of TFP. To control for omitted price bias (as defined by Van 
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Beveren, 2010), the PSM data is used to deflate values with detailed information on regional 
and sector level prices rather than deflating using the inherently biased national GDP. 
It is worth noting that the first column in Table 6:1 reveals that different datasets 
have varying reference levels. For instance, PSM data has only an enterprise level identifier 
(entref), but PSM holds only reporting unit identifier (ruref). These identifiers would be 
different for the same firm and cannot be merged directly with each other. Thus, both 
datasets had to be merged firstly to ARDx. The merging procedures are described in the 
following Section 6.2.2. 
Dataset Levels 
Number of annual 
observations 
Number of 
variables 
Years 
covered Sampling 
ARDx LUREF, 
RUREF, 
ENTREF 
42-65k 289-402 at 
RUREF 
level 
1998-2014 
Stratified 
ARD 60-75k 1973-2008 
ABS 47-49K 2008-2015 
BSD ENTREF ~4mln ~20 1997-2016 Total 
PSM RUREF Confidential ~10 1996-2016 Stratified 
 
Table 6:1 Summary of the datasets used in the thesis. Source: ONS(2017). 
6.2.2 Data Management 
This subsection starts by describing the primary processes of merging within and 
across datasets. This is followed by a description of data techniques implemented to 
prepare the data for analysis. All cleansing was done in R with such packages as data table, 
tidyr, dplyr and feather. The latter was used to quickly save large datasets and then read 
them in, while the former three packages helped to investigate, modify and fill the gaps in 
the data. They were seen to be superior for big datasets because of their higher speed, 
efficiency and accuracy over other available software in Secure Lab, for example, STATA or 
SPSS. 
6.2.2.1 Business Structure Database (BSD) 
The data processing started with BSD as it had the most extensive coverage of the 
administrative level variables. As discussed in Section 6.2.1, the administrative data was 
always preferable as the data was crosschecked with other sources. The following variables 
were taken from the BSD: turnover, employment, region29, postcode, number of local units, 
                                                             
29 Indicating whether a firm is based in North East, North West, Merseyside, Yorkshire & 
Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales 
and Scotland. 
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sic codes, enterprise zone codes, birth and death years. BSD consisted of too much data to 
work with at once. Thus, a few strategies were employed to reduce the amount of data. 
BSD had separate datasets for each year. These were merged and a year variable 
was introduced according to the file name. A similar procedure was employed for local unit 
level data at BSD to extract postcodes and, simultaneously, administrative districts that 
were used in the analysis. Having done this, these two extracts were merged by entref and 
year. Also, all values that consisted of either a space or dot within those identifiers were 
marked as not available (NA) or missing. All duplicate entries were then removed. These 
were not substantial and were duplicated because of marginal differences in values. This 
resulted in the final sample of 6,795,298 observations (547,917 individual firms). As Figure 
6:2 (1st step, p. 139) reports, the number of firms were steadily increasing. However, owing 
to the possible increase in deaths and decrease in births during the post-recession period 
(as described in the Introduction Chapter, Section 1.2), the number of observations 
decreased since 2010. This is not the final dataset and was only used to estimate indexes 
described in Section 6.2.2.6 as well as to fill annual observations of firms that had some 
unreported data for the years in which they were not included in the ARDx scope.  
The data was then limited to companies comprising of only one local unit. This is a 
slightly different approach than that employed by such academics as Harris and Moffat 
(2017) or Duranton et al. (2011), who approximated productivity inputs by proxying them 
on employment. One unit was an appropriate choice for this analysis because SBRR is 
granted mainly to businesses which have just one building, with some exceptions of several 
buildings with a very low rateable value (RV) as defined in the Introduction and 
Background Chapter (Section 1.4.1), RV weakly corresponds to the rental value. This also 
reduced the need to work at the local unit level. Thus, the real values can be used instead 
of approximated variables based on either employment or turnover, while tracing back 
data to local units as undertaken in such studies as Duranton et al. (2011) or Harris and 
Moffat (2017). This resulted in the reduction of the sample size to 6,230,916 observations 
(530,923 individual firms). As Figure 6:2 (2nd step, p. 139) shows, the data was 
proportionately reduced over the years.  
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Figure 6:2 Spread of observations over 17 years in BSD. 1st step refers to the 
numer of observations after initial cleaning, 2nd step refers to the numer of 
observations when the data was limited to companies comprising of only one local 
unit. Source: BSD data. 
6.2.2.2 Annual Respondent Database – X (ARDx) 
Only some variables were extracted from BSD (as described in Section 6.2.2.6). The 
clear majority of variables were extracted from the ARDx dataset (described in Section 
6.2.1.1). To exploit longitudinal data and control for the time-varying effects, annual 
observations from both enterprise, reporting and local unit levels (see Section 6.2.1.2 for 
the definition) were combined into three separate files. 
The key variables were taken from ARDx: year, reporting unit identifier (ruref), 
enterprise group identifier (entref), region30, legal status31, turnover, sector, gross product, 
intermediate consumption, wage expense x2, gross salaries x2, gross value added (GVA) at 
market, factor and basic prices, acquisitions, disposals, R&D, direct investment, subsidies 
x2, total net taxes, sales of own production. Some variables (employment, wage expense, 
gross salaries and subsidies) were available in several formats as they were included in 
several different surveys, as discussed in Section 6.2.1. 
                                                             
30 Indicating whether a firm is based in North East, North West, Merseyside, Yorkshire & 
Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales 
and Scotland. 
31 Indicating whether a firm is company, sole proprietor, partnership, public 
corporation/nationalised body, central government, local authority or non-profit body or mutual 
association. 
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The ARDx’s primary identification is reporting unit identifier (ruref). Thus, 
enterprise group identifier (entref) was sometimes either empty or consisted of a dot. 
These were believed unreasonable and set as not available (NA) values. Similar steps were 
performed for SIC and region variables. After inspection of the sample of these variables, it 
was assumed that they were most probably a transcription error because non-matching 
entref would only appear once and similar enterprise level identifier (entref) would have 
matching values in the following and previous years. It is unlikely that a firm would sell its 
single unit and repurchase it only a year after. These identifiers were believed to be 
unreasonable and replaced by the most frequently entered value of that company from 
2000 to 2015. Also, several duplicate observations were removed. 
After these modifications, the initial ARDx sample consisted of 2,247,152 
observations (396,172 unique entrefs). Observations were not evenly distributed 
throughout years and a large proportion of observations were from 2015 as shown in 
Figure 6:3 (p. 141). As expected, the sample was significantly smaller than from BSD data. 
6.2.2.3 Prices Survey Microdata (PSM) 
PSM was used to estimate the deflators employed in the TFP estimation. The dataset 
was used to propose a novel approach dealing with bias introduced by omitted prices which 
will be more extensively discussed in Section 6.3.1.1.3. The approach is novel because 
instead of using GDP or sector deflators, it estimated more precise and more individual 
deflators. 
The survey was provided in three different files which were merged into one file. 
Annual observations were then estimated by obtaining an average of all supplied monthly 
observations according to the company and index numbers. These were further averaged 
according to the company and year, so that one annual deflator per company could be 
estimated and applied to ARDx data. This resulted in 95,171 observations (17,728 unique 
entrefs). Figure 6:3 (p. 141) compares the sample size of PSM to ARDx (after cleaning) over 
the time. It is evident that the sample size of PSM is much smaller and fluctuates more than 
ARDx.  
PSM holds only reporting unit identifiers. Thus, PSM had to be firstly merged to the 
ARDx before any modifications (e.g. still keeping firms with two or more local units) to 
obtain more precise estimates. If unavailable in ARDx, those observations were removed. 
Given that it was a relatively small number of observations, further estimations took place 
that were believed to provide more accurate results than the industry deflators or GDP.  
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Several groupings were used to estimate the deflators if they were not available for 
that particular firm in PSM sample. Firstly, firms were grouped according to year, SIC and 
region and deflators to approximate missing deflators within those groups. Firms were 
then grouped again, but instead of full SIC classification, just two-digit SIC classification was 
used together with year and region to approximate still missing deflators. For those firms 
that the previous groups were still unable to approximate the deflators, another grouping 
just according to the full SIC classification and year was performed. Finally, two other 
groupings were made with regards to region and year as well as just year to approximate 
the deflators. There were still several values within the sample for which GDP was used as 
a deflator.  
 
Figure 6:3 The number of observations in ARDx (scale on the left) versus PSM 
(scale on the right). Source: PSM and ARDx data. 
6.2.2.4 Missing Values 
The three datasets used in the analysis were described in the previous sections. It 
was evident that ARDx had variables that were needed for the analysis, but did not survey 
small firms each year. To acquire annual observations, ARDx was merged with BSD 
resulting in many missing values. To deal with these missing values, both manual and 
automated imputation techniques were employed. The following paragraphs describe the 
key variables and how they were modified to reduce not available (NA) values and ensure 
that the data was appropriate. 
6.2.2.4.1 Sector 
SEC 78200, 78300 were excluded because these classifiers referred to employment 
agencies. They were likely to distort the analysis by providing too large employment 
numbers. Also, there were several missing sector variables. These were looked at manually 
Research Design  
142 
 
and either erased or set to the most relevant sector by looking at previous observations. As 
Figure 6:4 (p. 143) indicates, the sample was reduced by 51,142 observations. 
6.2.2.4.2 Legal Status 
As discussed in the Introduction and Background Chapter, some sectors were 
entitled to different reliefs or unentitled to any reliefs at all. Only companies classified as a 
company (including Building Society), sole proprietor and partnership were entitled to 
receive SBRR. Companies that at least one year were classified as public corporation, 
nationalised body, central government, local authority, non-profit body or mutual 
association were disregarded from the survey. As Figure 6:4 (p. 143) shows, restrictions 
imposed on legal status removed 51,142 observations. 
6.2.2.4.3 Birth Year 
If unavailable in BSD, the birth year was considered to be the first recorded entry 
year in BSD so it can date back to 1970s.  
6.2.2.4.4 Postcodes 
A few postcodes were missing. It was assumed that if the postcode is missing, a 
company stayed in the same location. Thus, the previous postcode was used. 
6.2.2.4.5 Death Year 
For purposes of survival analysis, another variable, death_imp, was created to show 
the last year enterprise was observed on BSD. Also, given that SBRR was introduced in 
200332 and the analysis focuses on the firms that were alive at any period between 2002 
and 2015, the other firms that failed before or during 2002 were removed. As Figure 6:4 (p. 
143) shows, the sample was reduced by 14,725 observations. 
6.2.2.4.6 Employment and Turnover 
Variables were highly populated and seemed to be reasonable. When turnover was 
equal to 0, the values were inspected and either kept as 0 or replaced with a mean of the 
previous and leading values. 
6.2.2.4.7 Region 
If the region variable was missing, but the postcode has not changed from the 
previous year, the same region was assigned.  
                                                             
32 Business Rate Reliefs were first introduced in Scotland in 2003, England in 2005 and 
Wales in 2007. 
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6.2.2.4.8 Business Rates 
Firstly, observations of firms that reported their BRs bill as 0 up until 2009 were 
investigated because before 2009 there were no 100% reliefs. These 110,483 observations 
were suspected to be inaccurate. Thus, these values were changed to NAs. Having done this, 
the firms that did not have at least two observations of BRs were removed. At least two 
observations had to be filled to estimate any change or causalities. As Figure 6:4 (p. 143) 
shows, this limitation reduced the sample size by 5,036,819 observations. The resulting 
sample size consisted of 840,037 observations with 60,109 individual firms. Several 
conditions then had to be satisfied for the BRs to be imputed. These conditions were made 
according to periods of revaluation and rules defined in the Introduction and Background 
Chapter (Section 1.4.3). 
Average business rate expense was imputed for those firms that did not relocate or 
invest anything in their buildings and were within revaluation periods because their 
business rate expense was unlikely to be changed. More specifically, the data was divided 
into three periods according to revaluations: up to 2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-onwards. 
The average BRs were estimated for each company over those periods. Then, for those 
firms that did not invest in the acquisitions or disposals of buildings and did not change 
their addresses, NAs in the initial figures were replaced with previously estimated averages 
from the data between revaluations. If there were still some NAs for the period of 2002-
2015, these companies were excluded from the analysis. As Figure 6:4 (p. 143) shows, this 
significantly reduced the sample to 125,434 observations (removed 715,055 observations) 
or 11,418 individual firms. However, this was believed to be an essential reduction to 
estimate the precise effects. 
 
Figure 6:4 Sample size after reductions: sector, legal status, death, and business 
rates. Source: ARDx, PSM and BSD data. 
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6.2.2.4.9 Foreign Ownership 
A dummy variable taking a value of one when the ultimate ownership was not 
British and 0 otherwise was created. Missing values were replaced by 0 because it was 
assumed that companies which were based in the UK and did not report their ultimate 
foreign ownership, were more likely to be British since the vast majority of small firms 
comprising of only one local unit were likely to be British owned. The missing values were 
less than 1% of the data.  
6.2.2.4.10 GVA after Salaries and Intermediate Consumption 
There were multiple missing observations in materials. ONS has already derived 
intermediate consumption (or materials as in productivity function). However, almost half 
of the values were still missing. This could be explained by investigating how ONS derived 
this variable. It was derived by deducting total purchases by the increase in the value of 
materials, stores and fuel stocks, the value of insurance claims received and goods bought 
for resale without further processing. This analysis was different because it assumed that 
when any of these three variables were unavailable, they would be equal to zero. This 
resulted in a substantial reduction of unavailable values. It seemed reasonable that when a 
firm did not report its insurance claims, for example, but did report its increase in materials, 
it should be recorded as materials. 
6.2.2.4.11 Intermediate Consumption, Rent, Investments, Capital, GVA 
To estimate causalities, at least two values needed to be non-missing. Thus, 
companies that had just one observation were removed. This reduced the sample size by 
the amount given in Figure 6:5. Overall, the vast majority of observations were removed 
due to NAs in intermediate consumption. 
 
Figure 6:5 Deducted observations because of only one available observation. 
Note that some modifications may remove the same values. Source: author’s 
calculations. 
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6.2.2.5 Imputation of Missing Annual Observations  
Merging BSD with ARDx created many not available values within the datasets as 
presented in the Results Chapter (Section 7.1) as some smaller firms were not included in 
the scope of ARDx each year. To estimate values for missing years, multiple methods were 
available, such as EMB algorithm or predictive mean matching method. Secure Lab did limit 
the capacity to compute NAs with the most sophisticated methods. Therefore, rather than 
focusing on methods, this chapter will consider packages available in R to implement these 
methods, so that the most appropriate approach could be selected.  
The bootstrapped predictive mean matching approach was used for both 
Wooldridge’s TFP and dynamic TFP estimation and Cox Regression, but simpler time series 
imputation was employed for the unbiased REEM and survival trees. It is worth 
acknowledging that the automated imputation was attempted to be kept to a minimum and 
applied only to variables that were unlikely to be very important. The key variables on firm 
characteristics (location, size with regards to employment and turnover) from BSD and 
SBRR were not imputed in this manner. 
6.2.2.5.1 Basics of Imputation 
The methodology depends on the missing data mechanism. There are three types 
of mechanisms: missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random (MAR), and not 
missing at random (NMAR). ARDx sampling procedure discussed in Section 6.2.1.1 implies 
that the data should follow MAR mechanisms. One-stage stratified or systematic random 
sampling was used for all large businesses surveyed, whilst a subset of medium and small 
businesses sampled. In other words, selecting all the largest businesses each year with a 
progressively reducing fraction of smaller businesses.  
Another assumption to make when imputing data is its distribution. Some 
techniques (parametric) require to define the distribution (usually normal distribution) 
before the analysis; other techniques may not have this limiting assumption about the 
distribution and they are classed as non-parametric. For methods that use linear 
regression, dependencies are assumed to follow a linear pattern. Rubin (1987) proposes 
how to impute values with MAR patterns: 
• Use many variables, including dependent and any other variables that may 
help to explain the values 
• Create several imputed datasets 
• Run analysis on several imputed datasets 
• Combine and weight estimates to take uncertainty into account. 
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This thesis used Rubin’s (1987) advice when coefficients were found inconsistent 
during dynamic productivity estimation discussed in Section 6.3.1.4. The approach was to 
firstly estimate a thousand samples by imputation and then perform the estimation with all 
thousand samples. Finally, the coefficients and standard errors were averaged to find the 
final estimates. This was believed to reduce the measurement error significantly.  
6.2.2.5.2 Imputation in R with Advanced Methods 
It was challenging to identify an appropriate MAR imputation technique. Moritz et 
al. (2015) acknowledged several different methods of data imputation in R. They classified 
these into imputation based on random forests (missForest), maximum likelihood 
estimation (mvnmle), expectation maximization (mtsdi), nearest neighbourhood 
observation (yaImpute), predictive mean matching (BaBooN), conditional copula 
specifications (CoImp), and finally the sophisticated multiple imputation methods with 
such packages as MICE, missForest, Hmisc and mi. These were preferable for this analysis 
and are discussed in further detail in the following paragraphs. 
One of the most popular methods is Buuren and Groothuis-Oudshoorn’s (2011) 
Multivariate Imputation via Chained Equations (MICE). MICE generates multiple 
imputations. As the authors define, it ”imputes an incomplete column (the target column) 
by generating ’plausible’ synthetic values given other columns in the data.” It individually 
processes each column, predicting it from all the others and, in hand, reducing uncertainty 
in missing values. Suppose one has variables:x1, x2, x3, …, xk. If x1 has NA values, then it will 
be regressed on other variables x2 to xk. The missing values in x1 will be then replaced by 
predictive values obtained. Therefore, it does not assume normal distribution like Amelia 
but rather can include multiple types of variables. More specifically, numerical variables 
are estimated with predictive mean matching, binary variables with logistic regression, 
factor variables with Bayesian polytomous regression and ordered with the proportional 
odds model. In practice, the method may be difficult to implement because it does require 
the inclusion of all variables likely to impact the variables being imputed. It does assume 
the probability that a value is missing depends only on observed value and can be predicted 
using them. Unfortunately, this approach was too data intensive for the capacity within the 
ONS Secure Lab. 
A slightly different methodology was adopted. The package, mi, or multiple 
imputations with diagnostics builds numerous imputation models to predict NA values by 
using the predictive mean matching approach. For each observation in a variable with NA 
value, an observation with the closest predictive mean to that variable is found. The 
observed value from this “match” is then used as the imputed value. A more advanced 
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package using a similar technique is Hmisc. It has two functions, impute and aregImpute. 
The former imputes values using a simple statistical method such as mean, max, median or 
mean. Whereas aregImpute() uses bootstrapping to additive regression and predictive 
mean matching to impute values. In Frank H. E.’s (2013) words 
“[the] R package version 3.6-3. ‘aregImpute’ takes all aspects of uncertainty in the 
imputations into account by using the bootstrap to approximate the process of drawing 
predicted values from a full Bayesian predictive distribution. Different bootstrap resamples 
are used for each of the multiple imputations, i.e., for the ‘i’th imputation of a sometimes 
missing variable, ‘i=1,2,... n.impute’, a flexible additive model is fitted on a sample with 
replacement from the original data and this model is used to predict all of the original 
missing and non-missing values for the target variable.”  
Given the discussion above, the mice and aregImpute functions are compared. The 
data was divided into 75% and 25%. For the group with 75% of data, values were imputed 
and compared the accuracy with real values for the 25% of data. AregImpute provided 15% 
more accurate estimates than the MICE package and, as a result, was a preferable approach 
for imputation. As a result, this imputation approach was used to estimate missing values 
for matching purposes. To accommodate time and enterprises identifiers, some variations 
were exploited within the imputation formula. Firstly, imputation was run by looping 
through separate enterprises and including all variables discussed in Section 6.2.2.4. 
However, it seemed reasonable that changes in inputs and outputs of other firms may help 
to predict the missing values. Thus, the imputation was performed on all cleaned data but 
only with the inclusion of variables that were likely to have an impact on the missing values. 
The key variables, following ONS suggestions, were taken from BSD. They had sufficient 
coverage and were likely to be precise predictors: turnover, employment, region, sector, 
legal status. A separate function was run for each variable that has NAs.  
Without bootstrapping, this method seemed to be inappropriate to be used after 
matching since estimated variables essentially included some effects from the other 
covariates. More specifically, those imputed values were likely to account for some of the 
variances in the more causality based approaches discussed in Section 6.3. Thus, by not 
estimating multiple samples, the serial correlation could not be controlled. Instead, Steffen 
Moritz’s (2016) more simplistic imputeTS package was used as this is especially designed 
for univariate time series imputation. It offers several different algorithm implementations 
depending on several distances: linear, spline, stineman or kalman. To isolate firms, the 
imputation was run separately for each firm. All methods (linear, spline, stineman or 
kalman) provided very similar imputations. The fastest to impute these large datasets was 
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with automated imputation, which is the reasoning for its use for tree estimation. The 
bootstrapping for the trees with longitudinal data was not performed since the new 
approaches were not equipped to use bootstrapping. Nevertheless, the bootstrapped 
multiple imputations was employed with all other methods (Wooldridge's TFP estimation, 
dynamic TFP estimation, Cox Regression).  
6.2.2.6 Deriving variables 
The theoretical framework suggested that various factors including externalities 
may influence the small businesses. Some of these factors may not be quantified directly. 
To account for these, some variables had to be derived by using other variables. These 
essentially are related to competition and high growth firms as defined in the Framework 
with Hypotheses Chapter (Sections 4.6-4.7). 
6.2.2.6.1 Marshallian externalities (specialisation) 
Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and Paci and Usai (1999) suggested employing the 
production structure specialisation index (PS) to measure Marshallian specialisation 
externalities. Marshallian externalities (described in the Framework with Hypotheses 
Chapter, Section 4.6.1) are a proportion of industry output located within local authority 
related to the output of the national industry. Employment is often used to estimate PS. 
However, this study is unique as it uses turnover in estimation. This is more appropriate 
owing to several factors. Firstly, highly populated (non zero) turnover and very low 
employment by the firms. Furthermore, the focus of the study was to find relationships 
between SBRR and TFP and productivity is related more to output and turnover than 
employment. It is of course in line with the conception of the index: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑖
⁄
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
⁄
,  
where 𝑖 is region, 𝑗 is industry and 𝑇 is turnover  
6.2.2.6.2 Herfindahl- Hirschman Index (diversity) 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was described in the Framework with 
Hypotheses Chapter (Section 4.6.3). It was calculated by squaring the market share of each 
firm competing in a market and then summing the resulting numbers. The HHI is then: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖=1 ,  
where 𝑠𝑖 is the market share of firm 𝑖 in the market, and 𝑁 is the number of firms. 
Research Design  
149 
 
6.2.2.6.3 Jacobian externalities (diversity) 
Jacobian externalities were also described in the Framework with Hypotheses 
Chapter (Section 4.6.2). Instead of market concentration, the focus now centres on the 
different market players. The diversity is estimated by summing different SIC codes within 
the region. Paci and Usai (1999) measured it with their productivity diversification index 
(PD): 
𝑃𝐷𝑗 =
2
(𝑛 −1)𝑄𝑛
∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1 ,  
where 𝑛 is the number of industries in region j, 𝑄𝑖  is the cumulative turnover up to 
industry 𝑖, when ordered by ascending size.  
The index, bounded by zero and one, increases with variety. As opposed to PS, 
location rather than the industry is the focus for analysis. Incremental firm-level innovation 
is aided by access to examples from a diverse set of industries within a small area. The index 
is positively linked to urban areas with their greater density of firms, although at the two-
digit postcode level it will show a reasonable degree of variation within given urban areas. 
Urban areas naturally tend to be more diverse and as such, SBRR may have less of an effect 
as wider competition for locations sees any relief rapidly capitalised. 
6.2.2.6.4 High Growth Firms (HGF) 
The Framework with Hypotheses Chapter (Section 4.7.2) suggested that recent 
evidence points out to a small number of firms outperforming others. Thus, following the 
OECD (2007:61) definition, HGFs are those firms that had average annualised growth by 
employment greater than 20% per annum, over a three-year period for firms with more 
than ten employees. A dummy variable was created taking the value of 1 if a firm 
experienced employment growth higher than 20% per annum, over a three-year period 
between 2003 and 2016 and had at least ten employees, and 0 otherwise. 
6.2.2.6.5 SBRR 
The variables were derived according to rules imposed by English, Scottish and 
Welsh governments that are reviewed in the Introduction and Background Chapter 
(Section 1.4.3). 
6.2.2.6.5.1 SBRR in England 
ARDx provides neither rateable value nor SBRR. ARDx includes the amount paid on 
BRs. The reported BRs figure was combined with the descriptions in Non-Domestic Rating 
(Small Business Rate Relief) Orders issued by the Scottish, Welsh and British governments 
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and its multiple amended versions that were detailed in the Introduction Chapter. BRs are 
estimated by multiplying rateable value (RV) with the multiplier. If a property is eligible, 
then, reliefs should be deducted from the BRs bill:  
𝐵𝑅 = 𝑅𝑉 ×𝑚 × (1 − 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅),  
where BR is business rates paid, RV is rateable value and m is a multiplier 
It is coplex to estimate SBRR from BRs since the relief is shifting according to RV. 
The first step is to deduct a possible interval, which is the range over which the relief is paid 
(either £5,000 or £6,000), from RV. The result is then divided by the decrease of relief 
related to an increase in RV. This number is estimated by dividing interval value by 
maximum relief available in a percentage form (
𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥×100
):  
1 −  𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 = (1 − (max − 
𝑅𝑉 − 𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥
) ) = 1 − 2 ×𝑚𝑎𝑥 +
𝑅𝑉 ×𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖𝑛𝑡
 
𝑖𝑓 𝐵𝑅 > £0 &  𝑅𝑉 ≤ £12,000 and where max is a maximal relief available and the 
int is the range over which the relief is paid (either £5,000 or £6,000).  
Combining both equations yields: 
 𝑅𝑉2 + 𝑅𝑉 ×
𝑖𝑛𝑡(1−2×max)
𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑚
= 0 
Given that maximal relief during 2005-2010 in England is equal to 0.5 (𝑠𝑜 1 −
2 ×𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 0), the equation becomes relatively straightforward to estimate: 
 𝑅𝑉 =  √
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
0.5×𝑚
 
By combining the first and last equations, SBRR in England between 2005 and 2010 
can be estimated by solving the following function: 
 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 = 1 −
𝐵𝑅
𝑚×√
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑚
 
During 2010-2014, there were further changes and maximum relief was increased 
up to 1, so another quadratic equation for this period has to be expressed: 
 0 = 𝑅𝑉2 + 𝑅𝑉 ×
𝑖𝑛𝑡(1−2×max)
𝑚𝑎𝑥
−
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑚
= 𝑅𝑉2 − 𝑅𝑉 × 𝑖𝑛𝑡 −
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚
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The solution to this quadratic function is: 
 𝑅𝑉 =  
𝑖𝑛𝑡 ∓ √𝑖𝑛𝑡2+4×
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚
2
 
Given that the minus provides a negative result, there is only one solution for this 
function. This combined with the first equation, results in the following function: 
 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 = 1 −
2×𝐵𝑅
𝑚×(𝑖𝑛𝑡+ √𝑖𝑛𝑡2+4×
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚
)
 
Given the reforms discussed in the Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 
1.4.3), Table 5:3 was established to show how SBRR was estimated from BRs. The small 
business multiplier was created to cover SBRR costs. Therefore, the difference between 
these two was not regarded as a relief. The questionnaires were asked to be returned either 
by May or within two months of business year end. Thus, it seems reasonable that relief 
that took place, for instance, the period between April 2005 and March 2006 would be 
recorded in the 2005 survey. 
Table 6:2 (p. 152) summarises how the SBRR has been estimated for each year in 
the UK and Wales after 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, properties with RV of £5,000 or less 
were able to claim 50% (or 0.5 in Table 6:2) reduction. Properties with RV of between 
£5,001 and £10,000 were subject to a tapering discount ranging from 0% to 49.99%, on the 
basis of 1% relief for every £100 of RV. The following formula was derived at the beginning 
of this section to estimate the relief: 1 −
𝐵𝑅
𝑚×√
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥×𝑚
. More recently (between 2010 and 
2015), properties with RV up to 6,000 were entitled to 100% (or 1 in Table 6:2) reliefs. 
Properties with RV of between £6,001 and £12,000 were subject to a tapering discount 
ranging from 0% to 100%, on the basis of 1% relief for every £60 of RV. The following 
formula was derived in the beginning of this section to estimate the relief 1 −
2×𝐵𝑅
𝑚×(𝑖𝑛𝑡+ √𝑖𝑛𝑡2+4×
𝐵𝑅×𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚
)
. 
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                Year 
RV 
2005-2009 2010-2015 
RV≤5,000 0.5 
1 
5,000<RV≤6,000 1
−
𝐵𝑅
𝑚 ×√
𝐵𝑅 × 𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ×𝑚
 
6,000<RV≤10,000 
1
−
2 × 𝐵𝑅
𝑚 × (𝑖𝑛𝑡 + √𝑖𝑛𝑡2 + 4 ×
𝐵𝑅 × 𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑚 )
 
10,000<RV≤12,000  
12,000<RV   
Table 6:2 Summary of the SBRR estimation. Values are in a numeric expression, 
e.g. 0.5 corresponds to 50%. Source: Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Rate 
Relief) Orders 
6.2.2.6.5.2 SBRR in Scotland and Wales  
SBBR for other years and countries of the UK were far easier to estimate as reliefs 
were fixed for some groups of rateable values. In Wales (up to 2010), the reliefs were 
retrieved in straightforward steps (see Table 6:3). For instance, properties for which the 
RV is lower than 6,500 but higher than 5000, would not receive any relief in 2007 and then 
25% (or 0.25 in the Table 6:2) SBRR in 2008-2009. 
                Year 
RV 
2007 2008-2009 
RV≤2,000 0.5 0.5 
RV≤5,000 0.25 
0.25 
RV≤6,500  
RV>5,000   
Table 6:3 SBRR in Wales before 2010. Values are in a numeric expression, e.g. 0.5 
corresponds to 50%. Source: Non-Domestic Rating (Small Business Relief) 
(Wales) Orders. 
Scotland applied a similar approach to Wales (up to 2010) as illustrated in Table 
6:4 (p. 153). However, Scottish reliefs were far higher than in the rest of the UK and were 
introduced in 2003. 
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Year 
 
RV 
2003-
2004 
2005 – 
2007 
2008 2009 
2010-
2014 
0≤RV≤3,000 0.5 
0.5 
0.8 1 
1 
3,000<RV≤3,500 
0.4 
3,500<RV≤4,000 
0.4 
4,000<RV≤4,500 
0.3 
4,500<RV≤5,000 
0.3 
5,000<RV≤5,750 
0.2 
5,750<RV≤6,000 
0.2 
6,000<RV≤7,000 0.1 
7,000<RV≤8,000 
0.05 
0.1 
8,000<RV≤10,000 
0.05 
0.4 0.5 
10,00<RV≤11,500  
0.2 0.25 
0.5 
10,000<RV≤12,000 
  
12,000<RV≤15,000 
0.25 
15,000<RV≤18,000 
 
18,000<RV  
Table 6:4 SBRR in Scotland. Values are in numeric expression, e.g. 0.5 
corresponds to 50%. Source: Non-Domestic Rate (Scotland) Orders. 
6.2.2.6.5.3 SBRR Dummy - First Recipients 
The Framework with Hypotheses emphasised the need to introduce a dummy 
variable to isolate firms that were the first recipients of the enhanced or introduced relief. 
This should help to isolate the short-term effects with no capitalisation. It takes the value 
of 1 when a firm was the first recipient of the relief and it continued being in the same 
premises (excluding new enterprises and those that relocated). The relief became available 
in 2003 in Scotland, 2005 in England and 2007 in Wales. 
Furthermore, another dummy variable was introduced, taking the value of 1 when 
a firm was the first recipient of the enhanced relief and it continued being in the same 
premises (excluding new enterprises and those that relocated). Thus, as according to the 
Introduction and Background Chapter, 2010 in England and Wales, 2008 in Wales and 
2003, 2005, 2008, 2009, and 2010 in Scotland.  
6.2.2.6.5.3.1 SBRR Dummy - Matching 
For CEM matching, described in Section 6.2.3, a new variable was created. This 
dummy variable is equal to 1 when a firm received the relief at least twice between 2005 
and 2015 and 0 otherwise. Firms had to receive SBRR at least two years as several issues 
were identified with firms receiving the relief only for one year. Companies that were 
suddenly receiving the relief just for one year between 2005 and 2015 were perceived 
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likely to misreport their BRs. Usually, a single zero was reported in one year, but in the year 
before and after substantial BR expenses were reported. 
After a more careful investigation, an exemption from this rule was introduced for 
the firms reporting different postcodes before and after the year they received the relief, 
providing they received the relief once. This applied to 15 firms and were also included in 
the recipients' group during matching.  
6.2.3 Coarsened Exact Matching  
It was evident from the Methodology Review Chapter that to deal with selection 
issues defined in Section 6.3.1.1.2, matching should be performed. As Ho et al. (2007) and 
Iacus et al. (2008) advised, the primary goal of matching is to make data less model 
dependent, biased and inefficient. In productivity analysis, it is often a preferable method 
to reduce selection bias. Matching involves pruning observations that have no close 
matches on pre-treatment covariates in both the treated and control groups.  
As discussed in the Methodology Review Chapter, the preferable method is 
Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). It was preferable not only as a result of its speed, 
flexibility and natural setting, but also because it overcomes the recent criticism of 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM), which is introduced in Methodology Review Chapter 
(Section 5.1.4.4). CEM does not use random pruning applied in PSM which was proved to 
increase the level of imbalance.  
CEM was discussed in detail by Iacus et al. (2009) who also published a package 
called CEM that will be used for the matching in R. This is a monotonic imbalance bounding 
matching method (or maximum imbalance between the control and treated groups). The 
broad mechanism behind CEM is to group each variable by recoding so that practically 
similar values are assigned the same value. The problem dictates the size of groups. The 
machining algorithm is then applied to these groups to find the matches and to remove 
unmatched units. Finally, the pooled data is removed and the original values of the matched 
data are retained. Iacus et al. (2009) explain the method in statistical terms. They show that 
the sample average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) could take the following shape: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑇𝑇 =  
1
𝑛𝑇
∑ 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑖∈(𝑇𝑖=1) , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 1) − 𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 0)  
This is derived if 𝑌𝑖  is the dependent variable for unit i, Ti is a treatment variable (to 
simplify initially assuming that it is dichotomous), and Xi is a vector of pre-treatment 
control variables, TE is the treatment effect; while 𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 1) is always observed and 
𝑌𝑖(𝑇𝑖 = 0) is always unobserved. The latter is estimated with Yj from matched controls 
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(which Xi ≈ Xj), either directly, 𝑌𝑖
∗(𝑇𝑖 = 0) = 𝑌𝑗(𝑇𝑗 = 0), or via a model 𝑌𝑖
∗(𝑇𝑖 = 0) = 𝑔(𝑋𝑗). 
It is important to note that this method requires the assumption of no confounding effects 
(or no omitted variable bias) (Iacus et al., 2011). Although it is an important assumption to 
make, the vast majority of matching methods used for analysing observational data 
including previously discussed PSM and other methods of causal inference do require the 
same assumption. 
6.2.3.1 Variables 
Some may argue that SBRR may be considered to be assigned to the firm in an "as 
good as random" manner since there is randomness in the assignment variable and the 
firms cannot perfectly manipulate their treatment status especially if relocation costs are 
high. However, as the framework suggests, they may base their decisions according to BRs. 
Thus, it is assumed that the SBRR is not entirely randomly assigned but is based on BRs 
which are estimated according to the building and land value as described in the 
Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.4.1). Thus, one should control for pre-
treatment variables.  
As discussed in the Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.4.3), reliefs for 
small firms were given in different years for individual UK countries. Thus, matching was 
performed on one year before the introduction of SBRR in each country. All matching was 
performed on imputed datasets to ensure that firms that did not report some variables at 
that year (e.g. 2002 in Scotland) but reported in other years could also be matched to other 
firms. The imputation process is described in Section 6.2.2.5. 
However, several enterprises were born once SBRR was introduced. They may not 
have any observations without reliefs. The framework suggests that new enterprises would 
not receive any benefits from receiving the relief because they would have to sign new 
contracts, which most probably would include increased rents because of capitalisation. As 
discussed in the Theory Review (Section 2.1) and Framework with Hypotheses Chapters, 
this would imply that higher rents may offset the increase in SBRR. Also, given that the 
reliefs were applied after the year, the first year’s performance was unlikely to be affected 
by the relief. Thus, for firms that were born after SBRR introduction, their first year was 
used for matching. Similar variables and approaches as in general matching were applied. 
Given that the matching was performed before the SBRR was available, the key 
variables defined in the Framework with Hypotheses Chapter were included. That is, age, 
employment, sector, legal status, labour productivity, turnover (nominal), materials 
deflated, GVA deflated, investment deflated, rent paid were included in CEM. The key 
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variable used for matching was defined as a dummy variable taking the value of one if a 
firm receives at least some relief during 2003 and 2015, and 0 if a firm receives no relief at 
all. In statistical terms, the CEM equation takes the following shape: 
  𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾1𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑡, 
where t is the starting year of the relief (which is taken as 2003), SBRR takes the 
value of 1 if the firm received reliefs between 2003 and 2015 and 0 if the firm received no 
reliefs during that time. A vector of variables X includes age, employment, sector, status, 
turnover/employment, turnover, materials, GVA, investment, rent.  
6.2.3.2 Implementation 
Iacus et al. (2009) define a three-step procedure to implement a CEM algorithm: 
coarsening, control variables, sorting units into strata, pruning groups. These will be 
detailed in the following paragraphs. They highlight that “following these three steps, the 
researcher can apply any method to the matched data that they might have to the raw data 
to estimate the causal effect, with the addition of weight that equalises the number of 
treated and control units within each stratum.” Therefore, having implemented these three 
steps, the causal effects will be computed with models explained in the following chapters.  
The coarsening is an inherently substantive act, almost similar to the measurement 
of the original variables (Iacus et al., 2009). Coarsening helps to set the maximum level of 
imbalance based on forecasts rather than actual results and set a bound on the degree of 
model dependence and the SATT estimation error. Multiple temporary datasets are created 
according to automated or manual criteria. This was carried out manually for some numeric 
variables which were included in the matching so that indistinguishable values are grouped 
and assigned the same numerical value. Levels should be ordered in the original dataset. 
Therefore, some variables were ordered by using the command ‘ordered’ in R. Other 
dummy variables and sector variable were kept unchanged.  
For numerical variables, the ‘cutpoints’ option was added for the command ‘cem.’ 
For example, turnover and employment cut points were chosen according to the EU SME 
definition (as in Table 6:5, p. 157). Slightly more complicated was the work with other 
continues variables. Therefore, these were cut in two parts by looking to their third 
quartile. The slightly different approach was taken for age variables. The population of 
ARDx has more larger firms than smaller ones. The previously imposed limitation of at least 
two observations further enlarged a probability of choosing the larger firms. Thus, instead 
of the third quantile, the first quantile was chosen for the age variable since younger firms 
are expected to outperform older ones. All coarsening at this stage is employed only during 
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matching to find the closest matches of recipients and non-recipients. The final dataset 
from matching does not include intermediate values. 
SME 
defined as Employees 
Turnover (in 
millions) 
Micro ≤ 10 ≤ €2 (£1.72) 
Small ≤ 50 ≤ €10 (£8.6) 
Medium ≤ 250 ≤ €50 (£43.01) 
Big >250 > €50 (£43.01) 
Table 6:5 SME definition by EU (Commission Recommendations, 2003) 
6.3 MODELS AND ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
The previous section described the data, variables and matching. This section aims 
to derive models and explain the estimation techniques that were applied to that data. 
Subsection 6.3.1 starts by reviewing established and newer issues with control estimators 
and derives a relatively standard model to estimate productivity (Section 6.3.1.2) that deals 
with simultaneity, selection and omitted price biases (defined in Section 6.3.1.1). To 
identify any relationships between TFP and SBRR, the estimated productivity is further 
analysed with unbiased REEM trees (Section 6.3.1.3). The GMM estimator is also employed, 
which includes not just standard variables (GVA, labour, capital and either materials or 
investment) but also previously discussed additional variables on the characteristics of a 
firm (Section 6.3.1.4) to control for the effects discussed in the Theoretical Framework such 
as competition, HGF dummy and investments in R&D. Finally, the chapter also reviews the 
survival estimation (Section 6.3.2). This discussion shows that the more established 
Stratified Cox Proportional Model (Section 6.3.2.1) should be employed, supplemented by 
survival trees for left-truncated and right censored data (Section 6.3.2.2). The first 
approach is taken due to its semi-parametric nature and ability to control for serial 
correlation between firm’s observations as well as to stratify on variables not satisfying the 
proportionate hazard’s assumptions, while the latter was used because of its ability to 
partition the data space into smaller sections where variable interactions are more explicit. 
6.3.1 Productivity Estimation 
The Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.1) directed towards using a control 
function approach to estimate TFP as it deals with simultaneity and selection biases, 
discussed at the start of this subsection 6.3.1.1. This section then develops with how these 
issues are overcome with Olley-Pakes’ (OP) approach and its extensions (Section 6.3.1.2). 
The Wooldridge’s GMM estimator should solve these issues and provide an appropriate 
estimator. Once it is clear how TFP is estimated, unbiased REEM trees are discussed in 
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Section 6.3.1.3. This is followed by the dynamic estimator introduced to supplement the 
results by providing broader insight. 
6.3.1.1 Issues in Productivity Estimation 
6.3.1.1.1 Endogeneity of Input Choice or Simultaneity Bias 
Marschak and Andrews (1944) raised the issue of simultaneity bias more than 70 
years ago. They suggested that characteristics of the firm determine inputs in production. 
If a firm has prior knowledge of its productivity, then inputs may be determined by previous 
beliefs about the expression of its productivity (Olley and Pakes, 1996). This will 
encompass unobservable information on management capacity to planned production 
interruptions for repairs, upgrades or training. Econometricians cannot have reliable 
estimates of these inputs because firms might adjust them, which creates endogeneity of 
inputs (Griliches and Mairesse, 1995) or correlation between the level of inputs 
determined and unobserved productivity shocks. As suggested by De Loecker (2007), a 
positive productivity shock could increase variable inputs as they can capture a greater 
market share, so the equation becomes: 
 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜔𝑖𝑡) > 0 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜔𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑠 𝑇𝐹𝑃  
If uncontrolled, the impacts of the bias may differ according to parts of the equation. 
Beveren (2012) discusses a situation where coefficients for variable inputs are biased 
upward, and the capital coefficient is biased downward. Also, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
look at two-input production function with labour being variable and capital – quasi-fixed. 
They conclude that there is a positive correlation between labour and capital, with the 
capital coefficient biased downward.  
OLS cannot be used since it asks for inputs to be exogenous, i.e. independent of the 
company’s efficiency. Academics such as Griliches and Mairesse (1995) have suggested 
dealing with this issue with fixed effects and instrumental variables which are introduced 
in Appendix 10.2.2. The more recent semi-parametric models directly address this issue. 
These are mostly based on Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinson and Petrin (2003) or either 
extensions or modifications of De Loecker (2007), Van Biesebroeck (2007), Wooldridge 
(2009) and Katayama et al. (2009) and Ackerberg et al. (2015). The Methodology Review 
suggested that the vast majority of studies, which acknowledge simultaneity bias (e.g. Maiti, 
2013; Goya et al., 2016) have used semi-parametric approaches. For instance, Goya et al. 
(2016) adopt Olley and Pakes to account for both selection and simultaneity biases. They 
look at the impact that R&D and intra- and inter-industry externalities have on the 
performance of Spanish ﬁrms. 
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6.3.1.1.2 Endogeneity of Attrition or Selection Bias 
Another substantial issue is endogeneity of attrition. In statistics, self-selection 
bias arises when subjects select themselves into a group, causing a biased 
sample with nonprobability sampling. This highly depends on the data available. There are 
two standard ways to show issues within self-selection into the treatment group. One of 
them is the standard econometric approach (discussed by Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and 
another is Rubin’s (1973, 1974 and 1977) potential outcomes approach.  
If one wants to estimate the average effect of treatment on treated (ATT), one could 
estimate: 
 𝑦 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷 + 𝜀, 
where 𝑦 is the outcome variable, α is an intercept that should equal to the mean of 
outcome variable for the firms that did not receive the SBRR (or treatment). 𝛽 measures 
ATT and 𝜀 is an error term. 
If 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) = 0, then OLS would estimate an unbiased estimate of ATT. However, 
this assumption does not hold if there are any omitted variables (Heckman, 1979) which 
would result in 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) ≠ 0. For this reason, in order to be sure that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) = 0, one 
has to control for all observable variables that may cause improvements. Therefore, OLS 
entirely depends on the specification of these variables. However, these missing variables 
are not usually known before the treatment.  
Another problem is unobservable variables that determine outcome variables and 
treatment status. This would impose that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) ≠ 0. 
Relaxing the assumption that the impact of treatment on the dependent variable is 
similar across observations. Heckman et al. (1997) are followed so that 𝛽 can be: 
 β = E[b(X) + b|D = 1], 
where 𝑏 is the observation returns to treatment.  
If this holds, then 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) = 0. 
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The simplest method to find the ATT is the difference in difference (DiD) estimator. 
This is determined by deducting the difference in the mean of the dependent variable 
between the start year and end year for the treatment group. The following condition 
should be satisfied for DiD be appropriate technique: 
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡
0 |𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡∗
0 |𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1] = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡
0 |𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡∗
0 |𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0],  
where 𝑡 is a period of time later than t∗.  
It states that the difference between t and t∗ for the control group is similar to the 
difference in the treatment group if they did not receive SBRR. 
Another possible approach is the fixed effect estimator. As described in Appendix 
10.2.2.1, within estimator removes the time-invariant effects, so that OLS would provide 
unbiased estimates. However, the issue with this approach is that 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐷, 𝜀) = 0 should 
hold. If SBRR is awarded when firms are performing better or worse, this assumption is not 
satisfied. It is likely that firms which occupy premises with a lower rateable value may be 
performing worse than their counterparts. 
One of the ways to solve this issue is to employ a matching estimator. In other 
words, to create an almost identical control group to the treatment group. To achieve this, 
several assumptions have to be satisfied (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Firstly, the 
following assumption should hold: 
 𝑦0 ⊥ 𝐷|𝑋 
Having created 𝑦0 condition upon X, the distribution of the dependent variable 
across control and treatment groups with no treatment should be independent. If this 
holds, the results should be entirely attributable to the treatment. However, as previously 
suggested, it is impossible to include all variables to achieve this outcome. Therefore, given 
that the values before the treatment are available, they were used for matching in this 
thesis.  
Another assumption is that X should not be a perfect predictor of treatment: 
 𝑃(𝐷 = 1|𝑋) < 1 
Thus, there should be some observations that received and did not get the relief for 
all Xs.  
These assumptions are satisfied with CEM matching approach, described in Section 
6.2.3. 
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This bias is especially extreme with balanced panels. Although the problem has 
been identified already around 1965 by Wedervang. Until Olley and Pakes (1996), TFP is 
still being estimated by ignoring all firms that exit or enter over the same period to 
construct a balanced panel. However, many theoretical (Jovanovic, 1982; Hopenhayn, 
1992) and empirical (Dunne et al., 1988, Farinas and Ruano, 2005) studies have shown that 
firms’ exit patterns reflect their initial productivity. Even though unbalanced samples may 
consider entry and exit, fundamentally inputs are made conditional on firms’ survival 
(Olley and Pakes, 1996). Thus, if a firm has previous knowledge about their productivity 
before exit, this would possibly create a correlation between capital and the residual. 
Furthermore, larger firms (e.g. monopolies) with a larger capital base may require less 
efficient production processes to survive than smaller companies.  
This could cause a biased estimation of all key production function variables. As 
Beveren (2012) describes, the capital coefficient may be biased downwards because of a 
negative correlation between error term and capital. Thus, using a balanced panel and 
overlooking exits could result in firm-level TFP estimates being biased upwards. As 
discussed in the Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.1.4.5.1), Olley and Pakes (1996) 
are the first to include this into their model explicitly. 
6.3.1.1.3 Omitted-price Bias 
The vast majority of studies have used industry deflators to estimate firm-level 
prices. This is widespread practice as firm-level prices of inputs and outputs are usually 
unavailable to the researcher (Van Beveren, 2010; De Loecker, 2007). To use industry level 
deflators, researchers have to assume that firm-level price variation does not depend on 
the input coefficients. This assumption often does not hold in reality. As Van Beveren 
(2012) explains: 
 𝑟𝑖?̃?  =  𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑦𝑖𝑡  –  𝑝𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  =  𝛽0  +  𝛽𝑘  𝑘𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑙  𝑙𝑖𝑡  +  𝛽𝑚 𝑚𝑖𝑡  +  (𝑝𝑖𝑡  –  𝑝𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  ) + 𝜔𝑖𝑡  +
 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑞 , 
where 𝑟𝑖?̃? is deflated sales, 𝑝𝑖𝑡  is firm level prices and  𝑝𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  industry level price 
deflator. All variables are in logarithmic form. It is evident in the equation that: 
 𝐸(𝑥𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡  −   𝑝𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  ))  ≠ 0, where 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = (𝑙𝑖𝑡 ,𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡)  
In other words, a bias is introduced in the input coefficients because unobserved 
firm-level price differences are likely to be correlated with input choice. 
From the Theory Review Chapter, it is evident that how demand and supply 
frameworks assume that inputs and output are likely to be positively correlated, and prices 
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are likely to be negatively correlated. For this reason, as Beveren (2010) explains, the bias 
for the coefficients of labour and materials are negative. He draws attention to Foster’s et 
al. (2008) article. Foster starts by supposing that an efficient producer is capable of 
lowering its prices. If this producer’s output is deflated by industry average, TFP would be 
underestimated. Likewise, the firm that charges a price such that 𝑝𝑖𝑡 >  𝑝𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ , the TFP would 
be overestimated because higher output prices would wrongly suggest a higher output for 
a given amount of inputs. This is supported by Foster’s et al. (2008) with data on the 
manufacturing sector. The omitted price bias may be controlled by using quantities of 
output rather than sale price if data is available as it is done by Foster et al. (2008). 
Van Beveren (2010) further shows that input prices could be firm-specific because 
of the imperfect competition in the input market. Thus, if a firm can get lower prices than 
the industry average, industry level deflators will lead to underestimate its inputs so that 
TFP would be biased upwards. Therefore, the bias introduced by using industry deflators 
is the opposite to the simultaneity of input choice. 
In a similar vein, De Loecker (2007) suggests that input prices are reflected in 
higher output prices. This highly depends on the firm’s markup. Katayama et al. (2009) 
oppose De Loecker’s position by pointing out that adjustment costs will lead to different 
prices across firms included with varying levels of capital. 
As Van Beveren (2010) and De Loecker (2007) highlight, industry price indexes or 
inflation are most often applied as deflators as the researcher does not have access to firm 
level prices. 
The solution proposed in this thesis is to deflate the price on company purchase 
price growth rather than inflation. ONS data from the PSM survey helped to approximate 
deflators more precisely. Although the sample size of PSM is far smaller than ARD-X and 
significantly smaller than BSD, it is still believed to approximate deflators more accurately 
than the gross domestic product (GDP), for example. The exact steps undertaken to merge 
and estimate deflators are described with other datasets in Section 6.2.2.3. 
6.3.1.2 Control Functions 
The empirical examples related to control functions were already reviewed in the 
Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.1.4.5). This section describes the mechanisms 
behind those models. It bases its discussion on pioneering papers by Olley and Pakes (OP), 
Levinsohn and Petrin (LP), Ackerberg et al. (ACK) and Wooldridge’s developments. The 
equations are adopted from Rovigatti (2018), who also published ‘Prodest,’ a package 
which was used to estimate productivity.  
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The discussion of control functions is based on the Methodology Review Chapter 
providing insights into a preferable functional form (Section 5.1.2) and estimation 
techniques (Sections 5.1.3, 5.1.4 and 5.3). The logarithmic Cobb-Douglas functional form 
was identified as a suitable choice as it includes the key inputs and different variations 
which can improve estimates. The translog production function can incorporate many 
substitution possibilities among various inputs and can take any degree of returns to scale. 
Thus, modelling starts with the following productivity function: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 +ω𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 is logarithmic GVA, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 is logarithmic capital, 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 is logarithmic 
employment and ω𝑖𝑡 is total factor productivity. Thus, the first step is to approximate ω𝑖𝑡 
which can also be expressed as: 
 ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 
Firstly, it is essential to introduce the pivotal Olley-Pakes (OP) estimator because it 
deals with the correlation between inputs and productivity term (ω𝑖𝑡). Firm investment 
levels are exploited as a proxy variable for ω𝑖𝑡. One must make several assumptions, as in 
the clear majority of control function-based estimators. 
The first assumption is that the investment function (𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡) is determined by the 
dynamic inputs (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) and observed TFP (ω𝑖𝑡). It is invertible in ω𝑖𝑡 and monotonically 
increasing in ω𝑖𝑡 . 
The second assumption is that the state variables such as capital (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) at the time 
(𝑡) is predetermined at a period before (t-1) but labour (𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡) is non-dynamic. Their choice 
at the time (t) does not influence future or after the firm productivity shock realisation. 
Under the first two assumptions, the investment is orthogonal to capital in t such 
that 𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡|𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡] = 0, forming the following production function: 
 ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓
−1(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝐾) 
Under the monotonicity assumption, the control function may be specified by 
inverting the investment function: 
 ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓
−1(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝐾) = ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
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Combining this function with Logarithmic Cob Douglas productivity function yields: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 +
𝜑(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝜑(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 +ω𝑖𝑡  
This equation is a partially linear model identified only in 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 . It could be found 
by estimating by a linear regression ot 𝑛𝑡ℎ order polynomial 𝜑∗.  
The third assumption is that the time-varying part of the TFP follows a first-order 
Markov process: 
 𝜔𝑖𝑡  =  𝐸(𝜔𝑖𝑡  |Ω𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝜉𝑖𝑡  =  𝐸(𝜔𝑖𝑡  |𝜔𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝜉𝑖𝑡  =  𝑔(𝜔𝑖𝑡−1)  + 𝜉𝑖𝑡, 
where Ω𝑖𝑡−1 is the information set at the period before (𝑡 − 1) and ξit is the shock 
in productivity. 𝜉𝑖𝑡 is uncorrelated with productivity 𝜔𝑡 and with . 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡. 
Given the third assumption, 𝛽𝑘 is estimated by reshaping the model for 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 −
𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡  conditional on 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 +ω𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸[ ω𝑖𝑡|ω𝑖(𝑡−1)] +
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(ω𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡.  
Being ω𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡, the previous equation becomes: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑔(. ) can be left unspecified and estimated non-parametrically. Also, 𝑔(. ) may be 
assumed to follow a random walk, then the equation can change to: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
and 
 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘
∗𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔(𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)) 
And the true 𝛽𝑘
∗ value.  
OP further discusses selection bias arising due to participants dropping out of the 
sample in a rather systematic way (non-random). Less productive firms may be more likely 
to close than more productive firms. Thus, they suggest a firm is likely to continue operating 
when its productivity level surpasses the lower bound 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 ↔ ω𝑖𝑡 ≥ ω𝑖𝑡
∗ , where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a 
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survival variable and ω𝑖𝑡
∗  is industry variable. They suggest accounting for it by including 
not just the state variable but also 𝑋𝑖𝑡: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸[ ω𝑖𝑡|ω𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑋𝑖𝑡] + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
OP suggests correcting for this bias by adding to 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +
 𝛽𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ + 𝑒𝑖𝑡an estimate of the unconditional probability of 
remaining active in the market: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔(𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) − 𝑃𝑡𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗ ) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 ,  
where 𝑃𝑡𝑖(𝑡−1)
∗  is the fitted surviving probability that could be found with such 
estimators as a discrete choice model on a polynomial of the 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡. 
For this study, it is useful to discuss some extensions of Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) 
(2003) because their extension of the OP model reduces the likelihood of violating the 
second assumption. The presence of capital adjustment costs could violate the 
monotonicity, making the investment function non-invertible. Investments are often not 
decided at each point in time, but accumulated for several years before being made all at 
once. Therefore, they included intermediate materials instead of investment in production 
function: 
 ω𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
Now, the first two assumptions change to: 
First assumption. Firms know their productivity shock and according to the 
demand they adjust the level of intermediate inputs. 𝑙𝑛𝑀 = 𝑓(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , ω𝑖𝑡) is the 
intermediate input function. It is invertible in ω𝑖𝑡 and monotonically increasing in ω𝑖𝑡. 
Second assumption. Capital (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) at the time (𝑡) is predetermined at a period 
before (t-1) but labour (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) is static, so their choice at t does not impact future and after 
the firm productivity shock realizes. 
Now, the intermediate input demand is orthogonal to capital in t such that 
𝐸[𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡] = 0 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡 can be invertible, thus the productivity is: 
 ω𝑖𝑡 = ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
Adding this to the general Cobb-Douglas function: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, where 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡.  
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This equation can be non-parametrically approximated by estimating 
𝜑(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) with nth order polynomial or by local linear regression. The residual 
function 𝑒𝑖𝑡 can be defined: 
 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘
∗𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝑔(𝜑𝑖(𝑡−1)(𝛽𝑚
∗ ) − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1)) 
Given firm’s response to the technology efficiency shock, 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is not a combination of 
pure errors anymore because intermediate input variable is likely to be correlated with the 
error term.  
The GMM estimator may then be built by using the residuals 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and the matrix of 
moment conditions 𝐸[𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ] = 0, ∀𝑘, where k is the index of the instrument vector 𝑧 =
[𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1)]. Then, 𝛽𝑘
∗, 𝛽𝑚
∗  may be consistently estimated with: 
[𝛽𝑘
∗, 𝛽𝑚
∗ ] = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 {∑(∑∑𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑡𝑖
)
2
𝑘
} 
Building on this, Ackerberg et al. (ACF) propose that the labour coefficient can be 
estimated in the first stage only when the free variables display variability autonomously 
of the proxy variable. This being false may cause collinearity in the 1st stage estimator. As a 
result, the function may not be identifiable. In the LP setting intermediate inputs and labour 
are allocated at 𝑡 implying that materials and labour are both chosen as a function of 
productivity and labour: 
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚(ω𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = 𝑙(ω𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) 
Given the monotonicity condition, it could be rewritten as: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐿 = 𝑙[ℎ(𝑚𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡] 
First assumption. The proxy variable policy function, 𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , ω𝑖𝑡), is 
determined by the dynamic inputs (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) and observed TFP (ω𝑖𝑡) and static inputs (𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡). 
It is monotonically increasing in ω𝑖𝑡. 
Second assumption. Capital (𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) at the time (𝑡) is chosen at time 𝑡 − 𝑏. The 
labour input (𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡) is selected at time 𝑡 − 𝜁, where 𝑜 < 𝜁 < 1. Whilst, the free variables are 
decided at time t when the firm productivity shock is realised. 
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Under these assumptions, the shock (𝜀𝑖𝑡) is removed from the output 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 in the 
first estimation, so the policy function can be merged to the CD productivity function: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝜑𝑖𝑡(𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽𝑘 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑝𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡) 
Once 𝜑𝑖𝑡is recovered for any candidate vector (𝛽𝑙
∗, 𝛽𝑘
∗), the residuals can be 
obtained: 
 ω𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜑𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝛽𝑘
∗𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙
∗𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 
Exploiting Markov chain assumption obtain residuals, 𝜉𝑖𝑡with the moment 
conditions, 𝐸[𝜉𝑖𝑡 , 𝑧𝑖𝑡
∗ ]  = 0, ∀𝑘, where k is the index of the instrument 𝑧 =
[𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1)]. 
Wooldridge (2009) replaces the two-step estimator by employing Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. It overcomes the identification issue in the first 
stage as featured by ACF with a problem of labour input being dynamic. Wooldridge’s 
(2009) method is preferable for this estimation because of its simplicity. It is possible with 
this method to estimate all coefficients in one stage by using GMM estimator. Additionally, 
this one-step method made it easier to obtain standard errors with no bootstrapping. 
The estimation of (𝛽𝐿, 𝛽𝑘) is addressed in the first stage by OP/LP under the 
assumption: 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), . . . , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖1, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖1, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖1)  =  0 
Taking back to 𝜑(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) ≡ 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡), then h(.) can be 
estimated with those moment conditions with no functional form.  
The second stage assumption uses previously defined Markovian distribution. 
Assuming that there is no correlation between productivity shocks and current values of 
both, labour and intermediate inputs, as well as following LP’s approach, the functional 
form becomes: 
 𝐸(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), . . . , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖1, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖1, 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖1) =  𝐸(𝜔𝑖𝑡|𝜔𝑖(𝑡−1)) =
𝑓[ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1))], 
where similarly as it was for h(.) no functional form is imposed for f(.).  
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It leads to two functions to identify (𝛽𝐿 , 𝛽𝑘): 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑓[ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1))] + 𝜂𝑖𝑡, 
where 𝜂𝑖𝑡 = 𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
Using nth polynomials again and 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 may be estimated. Assuming 
linearity, the functional form would be: ℎ(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1. 
Implying 𝑓(𝜔𝑖𝑡) = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1[𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1] + 𝛿2[𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1]
2 +⋯+
𝛿𝐺[𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1]
𝐺.  
Then, to simplify for illustration purposes, it may be assumed that G=1 and 𝛿1 = 1. 
Thus, substituting equations yields: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1))𝛼1 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 
The choice of instruments for these equations reflects the orthogonality conditions 
listed above: 𝛿𝑖𝑡1 = (1, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)),  
 𝛿𝑖𝑡2 = (1, 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1))) and   𝑍𝑖𝑡 = (
𝛿𝑖𝑡1
𝛿𝑖𝑡2
) 
Then, for each 𝑡 > 1, the GMM with IV setup applies and the moment conditions are 
derived from residuals: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝜃) = (
𝑟𝑖𝑡1(𝜃)
𝑟𝑖𝑡2(𝜃)
)
= (
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼0 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡)𝛼1
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 − 𝑘(𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1), 𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1))𝛼1
) 
Wooldridge’s system estimator builds a matrix of regressors for the system of 
equation to avoid collinearity. Let X be a matrix of regressors for this system, d be a number 
of common regressors (𝑒. 𝑔.  𝛼0, 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖𝑡) and r1 and r2 be the number of 
regressors in the first and second equations respectively. Then, the matrix is: 
𝑋 =
{
  
 
  
 
 
𝑋11
1 ⋯ 𝑋11
𝑑
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑋1𝑁
1 ⋯ 𝑋1𝑁
𝑑
           
𝑋11
𝑑+1 ⋯ 𝑋11
𝑟1
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑋1𝑁
𝑑+1 ⋯ 𝑋1𝑁
𝑟1
          
0      0   0
0      0   0
0      0   0
 
𝑋21
1 ⋯ 𝑋21
𝑑
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑋2𝑁
1 ⋯ 𝑋2𝑁
𝑑
             
  0   0   0
  0   0   0
  0   0   0
           
𝑋21
𝑑+1 ⋯ 𝑋21
𝑟2
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑋2𝑁
𝑑+1 ⋯ 𝑋2𝑁
𝑟2}
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Then, as in Wooldridge (2002), the overidentified linear model is given by 
𝛽0́ = ((𝑋′𝑍)𝑊0(𝑍′𝑋))
−1
(𝑋′𝑍)𝑊0(𝑍′𝑌), where 𝑊0 is independent weighting matrix. Then, 
using 𝛽0́  to find 𝑊∗ = 𝜎𝑅𝑆𝑍′𝑍. Thus, the parameters can now be estimated in the second 
step with: 
 𝛽∗́ = ((𝑋′𝑍)𝑊∗(𝑍′𝑋))
−1
(𝑋′𝑍)𝑊∗(𝑍′𝑌) 
Then, variance-covariance matrix is 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽∗́ ) =
1
𝑁
((𝑋′𝑍)𝑊∗(𝑍′𝑋))
−1
 
When all variables are estimated, one can come back to the logarithmic TFP form 
(𝜔𝑖𝑡) and approximate TFP just with:  
 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 
The following section, 6.3.1.3, will explain how the effects on productivity 𝜔𝑖𝑡 were 
measured with the Random Effects Expectation Maximization algorithm. 
6.3.1.3 The Random Effects Expectation Maximisation (REEM) 
The Classification and Regression Tree approach was defined and its fundamental 
mechanisms explained in the Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.3). This section aims 
to explain mechanisms in REEM trees as these were found to be the most appropriate and 
feasible machine learning technique that could identify the relationship between 
previously estimated TFP, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , and independent variables that were built throughout the 
thesis (Chapters 1-3), summarised in the Framework with Hypotheses Chapter as well as 
cleansed and derived in Sections 6.2.2.4 and 6.2.2.6. 
As previously stated in the Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.3), REEM trees 
were introduced by Hajjem et al. (2011) and Sela and Simonoff (2012) and advanced by Fu 
and Simonoff (2015). They use longitudinal and cluster unbalanced data and time-varying 
features. These are the improvements that make the method suitable for this estimation.  
As reported by Sela and Simonoff’s (2012), there is one major difference between 
Hajjem et al. (2011) and Sela and Simonoff’s works. Hajjem et al. (2011) dissociate the fixed 
from the random effects. Fixed effects are modelled with the Classification and Regression 
Trees (CART) as the standard regression tree, but the random effects are modelled by using 
a node-invariant linear structure. Whilst, Sela and Simonoff (2012) alternate between two 
steps. One of the steps is to estimate the regression tree by assuming that estimates of the 
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random effects are correct. Another step is to estimate the random effects by assuming that 
the regression tree for the fixed effects is correct. Both authors employ the CART algorithm.  
The REEM model is: 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖 + 𝑓(. ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,       𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼    𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛 
(
𝜀𝑖1
:
:
𝜀𝑖𝑛
) ~𝑁(0, 𝑅𝑖), 𝑏𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,𝐷), 
𝑓(. ) = 𝑓 (∑(𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑡−𝑗),
4
𝑗=0
𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡)  
The dependent variable 𝜔𝑖𝑡, is the bootstrapped estimate of total factor 
productivity, as discussed in the previous section (6.3.1.2). For each firm i in period t. 𝑍 is 
a matrix of independent variables which may vary or be constant over time and firms and 
𝑏𝑖 is the vector of random effects. 𝑓(. ) contains the same variables as Z, but they can differ. 
These variables are used to estimate the fixed effects via the decision tree. SBRR and four 
lags are included in the model to capture medium term effects and account for the 
periodicity of the reliefs. These variables are complemented by the dummy variable 𝜌 to 
capture the initial33 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief, irrespective of level 
as derived in Section 6.2.2.6.5.3.  
Additionally, as according to the Framework with Hypotheses Chapter (Section 
4.7.1), basic classification variables of firm age (a), the regions and countries (r) of Wales, 
Scotland, London, North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, East Midlands, West 
Midlands, East of England, South East and South West were included. Furthermore, the 
firms were classified into the broad sectors (s) of wholesale, catering, construction, 
production, property, retail and other services. 
In order to account for the effects of industry structure and competition on 
investment and survival, the model includes indices of regional specialisation via the PS 
index of Marshall (production) Specialisation and an index for the counter regional Jacob 
Diversity (PD) defined in Section 4.6.2 and derived in Section 6.2.2.6.3. The industry 
competition at the national level is controlled via a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
defined in Section 4.6.3 and derived in Section 6.2.2.6.2. The Marshallian Specialisation (PS) 
externalities are captured by calculating the production structure specialisation index, as 
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suggested by Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and Paci and Usai (1999). As defined in 
Section 4.6.1 and derived in Section 6.2.2.6.1, this exploits the access to firm-level micro 
data to calculate the specialisation within small two-digit postcode areas, relative to 
national SIC (2003) two-digit industry output. To better capture this specialisation, 
extensive ONS data is exploited to use turnover rather than the more usual employment 
levels. This gives a far more accurate perspective on the concentration and value of the 
activity. Moreover, it should be a less noisy control for TFP than employment. In the same 
vein, Section 4.7.3 also suggests controlling for the choice to invest in Research and 
development with the variable R&D, which comes from the survey element of the ARDx 
dataset and questions whether a firm intends to invest in such activity within the next two 
years. 
As presented in Section 4.7.4, firms receiving foreign investment are likely to have 
higher productivity than firms which do not attract foreign investment, after controlling for 
firm characteristics. There are of course selection effects which bias these findings. 
Consequently, the dummy variable 𝐹𝑂 is included. It takes one for firms with a foreign 
majority owner. In this era of concerns about complex ownership structures and use of 
complex taxation schemes, variable 𝐼𝑂 is also included to denote a foreign country 
registration of the firm’s immediate parent firm and this is also the variable ONS used in 
their calculations. This can be different to 𝐹𝑂, which denotes the ultimate country of the 
owner. HGF controls for high growth firms, HGF is a dummy taking the value of 1 in the 
years it meets the Eurostat-OECD. (2007) definition, namely average annualised growth in 
employment greater than 20% per annum, over a three-year period with initial 
employment not lower than ten. These companies are believed to be performing better 
than the rest, as discussed in Section 4.7.2. 
The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be uncorrelated with the random effects and 
independent across observations. 𝑅𝑖 is a non-diagonal matrix to account for 
autocorrelation within firms. The algorithm proceeds by initially setting the random effects 
to zero and building a decision tree. The random effects are then estimated, given the 
decision tree and the process iterates until the random effects converge using a restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator. The decision tree values are then finally updated. Then, a 
Classification and Regression Trees (CART) algorithm is employed to build the trees. 
Sela and Simonoff (2012) explain that if 𝑓(. ) is a linear function and effects, 𝑏𝑖, are 
fixed (or correlated with covariates), the model becomes a linear fixed effects model. 
Likewise, if it is a linear function and effects are uncorrelated, 𝑓(. ) becomes a linear random 
effects model. 
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If the random effects, 𝑏𝑖, were known, a regression tree may be fit to 𝜔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑍𝑖𝑡  𝑏𝑖. On 
the other hand, if fixed effects, 𝑓(. ), were known, it may be estimated with a mixed effects 
linear model with fixed effects. However, both, 𝑏𝑖 and 𝑓(. ), are unknown. As a product, they 
alternate between estimating the fixed effects, assuming that the estimates of the random 
effects are correct, and estimating the random effects, assuming that the fixed effects is 
correct. 
Firstly, they adjust the estimated random effects, 𝑏𝑖, to zero. They then iterate 
through the subsequent steps until the variation in the restricted likelihood function is less 
than a tolerance value. The first step is to approximate 𝑓(. ), with a regression tree, based 
on the target variable, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖 , and covariates, 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The second step is to use this tree to 
produce indicator variables, 𝑙(𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝑔𝑝), where 𝑔𝑝 is the p-th group and ranges over all 
terminal nodes in the tree. The third step is to fit the linear random effects model. The 
function becomes: 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑙(𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∈ 𝑔𝑝)μp + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, where μp is the expected level of the 
outcome for group p. 𝑏?̂? can be extracted from the estimated model. The fourth step is to 
substitute the predicted response at each terminal node of the tree with the estimated 
population level predicted outcome μp̂ from the previously fitted linear mixed effects 
model. 
However, later Fu and Simonoff (2016) show that the CART algorithm tends to 
divide on variables with many more possible split points at the expense of variables with 
fewer points. They find that a conditional inference tree approach is superior. The core 
advantage of the conditional inference tree is that it takes into account the distributional 
properties of the variables. Thus, the results are more robust to the structure of the dataset. 
This method is used in the estimation. The linear random effects model is estimated using 
a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) technique. While to estimate regression tree, Fu 
and Simonoff’s (2015) extension of the Sela and Simonoff’s (2012) method is used by 
estimating the regression trees with Hothorn et al. (2006). This, according to the analysis 
of Fu and Simonoff’s (2015), should provide more precise estimates.  
6.3.1.4 Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) Estimators 
An alternative is provided by an array of papers by Harris and Moffat. They argue 
that if one estimates 𝜔𝑖𝑡 without other variables that potentially may derive a biased 
estimation because of an omitted variable problem. They tend to include all variables that 
may cause changes in productivity and estimate the lagoritmic Cobb Dauglas productivity 
estimation with system GMM estimator.  
Research Design  
173 
 
Given that the primary goal of this study is to investigate the effect of SBRR, other 
variables, which were defined in the previous section (6.3.1.3) are also included. Briefly, 
SBRR refers to the Small Business Rates Relief and its lags for each firm i in period t. The 
variables in vector X were defined in Section 6.3.1.3. Shortly, 𝜌 captures the initial34 effects 
of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief, irrespective of level. Other variables are firm 
age (a), the regions (r) and broad sectors (s), immediate foreign ownership (IO), ultimate 
foreign ownership (FO), high growth firm dummy (HGF). To at least partly control for the 
competition, the model includes Marshall Specialisation (PS), Jacob Diversity (PD) and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  
Hence, a logarithmic variable, 𝑋𝑖𝑡, is introduced: 
 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = ∑ (𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑡−𝑗),
4
𝑗=0 𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡  
Then, the model becomes: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝑀𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) +
 𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜇 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
To at least partly deal with unobserved heterogeneity, it is common to apply the 
within (demeaning) transformation, as in one-way fixed effects models, or to take first 
differences if the second dimension of the panel is a time series, as carried out by Harris 
and Moffat (2016) and Harris et al. (2015). Given the large observed time and relatively 
small number of firms, the lag feature was exploited within this analysis by converting the 
productivity function to a dynamic form. In other words, controlling for the lagged 
dependent variable and estimating the equation with GMM system estimator: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝜕𝑀𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜇 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
The unique feature of DPD models is their capability of first differencing to remove 
unobserved heterogeneity. Nickell (1981) shows that the demeaning process creates a 
correlation between the regressor and error because it subtracts the individual’s mean 
value of the outcome variable and each independent variable from the respective variable. 
This correlation makes coefficients of the lag dependent variable biased. In other words, 
the mean of the lagged dependent variable is likely to contain observations of 0 through the 
period before on y, and the mean error, which is being subtracted from each error term, 
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contains contemporaneous values of error. One of the solutions to this may be first 
differences of the original model. 
6.3.1.4.1 Anderson–Hsiao (AH) estimator 
However, there is still a correlation between the disturbance process (first-order 
moving average) and the differenced lagged dependent variable because the disturbance 
process contains lagged error term. At this point, the Anderson–Hsiao estimator could be 
used to remove individual fixed effects with instrumental variables estimator by 
constructing instruments for the lagged dependent variable with the second/third lags. 
Anderson and Hsiao’s (1982) approach is based on a different form of the original equation: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑗(𝐽𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  , where 𝐽 is all 
independent variables in the model and 𝛼𝑖 is individual specific fixed effects. This model in 
AH’s framework becomes: 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) = (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) − 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2)) + 𝛽𝑗(𝐽𝑖𝑡 −
𝐽𝑖(𝑡−1)) + +𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)  
This cancels individual effects assumed to correlate with exogenous variable, but 
the difference of lagged endogenous variable is correlated with the error term (𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)). 
AH suggest (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) − 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2)) instrumenting with lagged difference 
(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2) − 𝛽𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−3)) or level instruments (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2)) because these 
differences should not be correlated with the differenced error term:𝐸(𝑦𝑖,(𝑡−2)𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0 
and 𝐸(𝑑𝑦𝑖,(𝑡−2)𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0. 
Later, Holtz-Eakin et al. and Arellano (1989) found level instruments (𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2)) 
to be superior because they both had smaller variance and no points of singularities. 
Furthermore, when level instruments are used, one year less is lost because of lags.  
6.3.1.4.2 Arellano–Bond (AB) or Difference Estimator 
In empirical work looking at productivity after Wooldridge’s (2009) one-step 
estimation was introduced, Generalised Method of Moments firstly suggested by Holtz-
Eakin et al. and populated by Arellano and Bond (1991) has become increasingly popular. 
The main idea behind the estimator is that the instrumental variables approach does not 
use all available information, so by including more information, more efficient estimates 
may be found. They separate 𝐽𝑖𝑡 into two parts: 𝐽2𝑖𝑡 and 𝐽3𝑖𝑡 , where 𝐽2𝑖𝑡 consists of strictly 
exogenous regressors and 𝐽3𝑖𝑡 are predetermined regressors (could include lags of 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴 
as well) and endogenous regressors possibly correlated with the unobserved individual 
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effect. First differencing, as performed in AH estimator also removes individual effects and 
its associated omitted variable bias: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑗(𝐽2𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽2𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝛽𝑗(𝐽3𝑖𝑡 − 𝐽3𝑖(𝑡−1)) + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) 
In standard 2SLS, so as well as AH estimator, the first observation is lost by applying 
the twice-lagged level in the instrument matrix: 
(
.
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
⋮
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−𝑛)
), 
where n is all lagged periods. 
If the twice lagged instrument is included, two observations are lost: 
(
 
 
.
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖2
⋮
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2)
..
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
⋮
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−3)
)
 
 
 
To reduce the loss of degrees of freedom, AB constructs a set of instruments from 
the second lag of 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴 , one instrument pertaining to each time period: 
(
 
 
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
0
⋮
0
0
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖2
⋮
0
⋯
⋯
⋯
⋱
…
0
0
0
⋮
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2))
 
 
 
The columns of this instrument matrix are orthogonal to the transformed errors 
because the resulting moment conditions correspond to an expectation 
𝐸(𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−2), 𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑠) = 0. 
This solution implies that all available lags can be used as instruments, for 
endogenous variables twice lagged or higher and for predetermined variables that are not 
strictly exogenous once lagged variables are also valid because they are only correlated 
with errors dated t-2 or earlier. Therefore, the instrumental matrix becomes: 
(
 
 
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
0
0
⋮
0
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖2
0
⋮
0
0
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖3
⋮
0
0
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖2
⋮
0
0
0
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖1
⋮
……
……
⋱
)
 
 
 
6.3.1.4.3 Arellano–Bover and Blundell and Bond (ABBB) or system estimator 
Later, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) have shown that 
the lagged levels might be slightly wrong instruments for first differenced variables, 
particularly if they follow a random walk, so they provide a modification which includes 
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lagged levels and lagged differences. The chief drawback of the System GMM estimator is 
the additional restrictions on the initial conditions of the process generating. 
6.3.1.4.4 Instrumental variables in general 
The motivation to use instrumental variables is to isolate “as good as random” 
variation in the treatment variable, so that selection and unobservable problems could be 
solved. Revisiting the final equation of the dynamic model: 
 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝑀𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) +
 𝜕𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜇 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
Given that the capital was measured, it is directly related to investment: 
 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐼 → 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑋2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐼  
The main concern is that 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐼 ⃓ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, so the path diagram of the 
endogeneity problem is that 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 affects 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 but the error term (𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) influences 
both 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡. 
The typical instrumental variable approach is to find variables that belong to the 
second equation but not the first one. Therefore, the following assumptions should be kept: 
a valid, nontrivial, first stage coefficient (𝛽2) for observables that belong in the participation 
equation but not the outcome equation (𝑙𝑛𝑋2𝑖𝑡) and a valid exclusion restriction 
(𝐸[𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑋2𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐼 ⃓ 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑖𝑡] = 0) 
6.3.1.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis -Different Transformations, Steps and Ways 
One way, one step system GMM estimator will be compared to the two ways, two 
steps system GMM estimator and one way, one step difference estimator. As previously 
discussed at the beginning of this section, some of these are expected to reduce 
observations and possibly weaker relationships. For instance, the difference GMM 
approach transforms the data to remove the fixed effects deals to reduce the inherent 
endogeneity. More specifically, it uses the first difference transformation. This seems a 
better choice than the within transformation (discussed in Appendix 10.2.2.1), as that 
transformation is likely to make each observation in the transformed data endogenous for 
a firm. The one shortcoming of this transformation is that it increases gaps in unbalanced 
panels. If some values of a variable are not available, then both values around the value will 
be missing in the transformed data. This motivates an alternative transformation: the 
forward orthogonal deviations (FOD) transformation, proposed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995). 
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6.3.2 Survival Analysis 
Up until now, Section 6.3 focused on productivity. It defined the central issues in 
estimation (Subsection 6.3.1.1) and introduced two ways to estimate factors affecting 
productivity (6.3.1.2, 6.3.1.3 and 6.3.1.4). The other part of Section 6.3 is devoted to the 
survival analysis. It was defined and fundamental mechanisms were explained in the 
Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.2). The chapter concluded that Cox proportional 
hazards (CPH) model is the preferred approach to be applied to this study. An advancement 
in survival analysis made it possible to reduce the amount of limiting assumptions and 
correct for various estimation flows. It became one of the most frequently applied 
techniques for the survival analysis because of its semi-parametric nature and theoretical 
foundations. The first part of this section will focus on implementation and the tests that 
were employed to test the model.  
The Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.3.1.2) proposed to supplement more 
standard Cox Regression with survival trees (ST). It also introduced the key concepts of ST. 
Section 7.3.2 further supplements this by extending the description of the ST for left-
truncated and right-censored data which were found to be preferable for this analysis 
owing to the data structure and their ability to accommodate the longitudinal data. 
6.3.2.1 Cox Proportional Hazards (CPH) Model 
6.3.2.1.1 Differences between Parametric and Cox Proportional Hazards Models 
The exponential parametric model ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑣 could be specified in a linear 
logarithmic form. If one takes 𝑖 as a subscript of observation and 𝑥 as independent variables, 
then: 
 ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = e
𝛼+∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖=1  , where 𝛼 is a baseline hazard when all independent variables 
equal to zero.  
Opposing this, the CPH model becomes a semi-parametric model by leaving its 
baseline hazard 𝛼 = ℎ0(𝑡) unspecified: 
 ℎ𝑖(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)  × e
𝛼+∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖=1  
Then, to prove that CPH model is a proportional-hazards model (or independent on 
baseline function), Cox (1972) considers a hazard ratio for two observations different in 
their independent variables with their corresponding linear predictors: 
ℎ𝑖(𝑡)
ℎ𝑖∗(𝑡)
=
ℎ0(𝑡) × e
∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖=1  
ℎ0(𝑡) × e
∑ 𝛽𝑖∗𝑥𝑖∗𝑖∗=1  
=
e∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑖=1  
e∑ 𝛽𝑖∗𝑥𝑖∗𝑖∗=1  
= 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 
Research Design  
178 
 
By using the Cox’ method of partial likelihood (1972), estimates may not be as 
efficient as with maximum likelihood estimation. However, the model is better because it 
does not randomly select the shape of baseline hazard but estimates it. The use of the 
exponential function ensures that the hazard is positive.  
Proportional hazards models assume that all plants share the same baseline hazard. 
Unfortunately, this assumption may not be satisfied in an array of occasions. A stratified 
proportional hazards model should then be used since different groups of plants are 
allowed to have different baseline hazards, but parameters are the same for all plants. This 
also helps to avoid the main limitation implied in the proportional hazards assumption, 
which is that the hazard ratio, that is the ratio of the hazard function to the baseline hazard, 
is constant over time, which might not be satisfied with the data employed in this thesis. 
A test of the proportional hazards assumption is developed by Schoenfeld in 1982. 
This test of residuals is performed with a package survival in R to ensure that the 
assumption holds. Variables that do not satisfy this assumption were stratified. 
The stratified CPH model was estimated with the matched sample created during 
the productivity analysis to control for the self-selection into the treatment group. The 
hazard model takes the following shape: 
𝑥(𝑡) =∝𝑋 𝑋𝑡+∑ (∝𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 𝑡−𝑖 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 𝑡−𝑖),
5
𝑖=0   
where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡, 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡, 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡 
∝ ′𝑠 are the coefficients, SBRR refers to the Small Business Rates Relief and its lags 
for each firm i in period t. The variables in vector X were defined in Section 6.3.1.3. Briefly, 
𝜌 captures the initial35 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief, irrespective of 
level. Other variables are firm productivity (𝜔𝑖𝑡), age (a), the regions (r) and broad sectors 
(s), immediate foreign ownership (IO), ultimate foreign ownership (FO), high growth firm 
dummy (HGF). To at least partly control for the competition, the model includes Marshall 
Specialisation (PS), Jacob Diversity (PD) and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). 
6.3.2.1.2 Model Diagnostics 
Schoenfeld residuals were estimated to see whether proportional hazards 
assumption holds. The proportional hazards assumption for each covariate is estimated by 
correlating the corresponding set of scaled Schoenfeld residuals with a suitable 
transformation of time. The usual time is based on the Kaplan-Meier estimate. Influential 
                                                             
35 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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observations were then investigated to determine whether any of them are very influential 
and may be incorrectly biasing the model. Finally, an incorrectly specified functional form 
in the parametric part of the model (nonlinearity) is a problem in Cox Regression as in all 
generalised linear models. The martingale residuals were plotted against covariates to 
detect nonlinearity. 
6.3.2.2 Survival Trees  
The Fu and Simonoff (2017) Survival tree (ST) algorithm advances pervious work 
through its combination of controls for the typical left truncated right censored nature of 
panel data. Decision trees have traditionally struggled to cope with such structures when 
there are time variant repressors. The authors argue that this non-parametric approach is 
preferable to the standard Cox proportional hazards model as the required parametric 
assumptions are not met or unrealistic. 
Unlike the REEM, this algorithm does not control for firm-level intercepts, although 
clustering on firm is feasible with Huber-white standard errors. This thesis uses the 
author’s LTRCART extension of existing models, which control for left truncation. Given 
space limitations, see their paper for the full details. The thesis employs the same 
independent variables as in the REEM algorithm (see Section 7.2.2) with the addition of 
TFP.  
To introduce the tree, it is worth recalling the Poisson regression tree. The following 
definitions are taken directly from Fu and Simonoff (2017). Assuming that 𝜆 is an event 
rate, 𝑡𝑖 is exposure time for observation 𝑖, 𝑐𝑖 is the observed event count for observation 𝑖 
and 𝜆∗ =
∑𝑐𝑖
∑𝑡𝑖
. Then, the within node deviance residual for a Poisson regression tree may be 
presented as: 
𝐷 =∑[𝑐𝑖 ln (
𝑐𝑖
𝜆∗𝑡𝑖
) − 𝑐𝑖 +𝜆
∗𝑡𝑖 
The fundamental mechanisms of survival trees, including notations, that were 
extended by Fu and Simonoff (2016) were discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.2. They show that 
the full log-likelihood for right censored data (𝑡𝑖, 𝛿𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 = 1,2,… 𝑛 may be expressed 
as: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ [𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑛𝜆(𝑡𝑖) − Λ(𝑡𝑖)] = ∑ [𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑛𝜆(𝑡𝑖) − ∫ 𝜆(𝜇)𝑑𝜇
𝑡𝑖
0
]𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1 .  
Let 𝐿𝑖 be the left truncation time and 𝑅𝑖 be the right-censored time for observation 
i. Fu and Simonoff (2016) extend the model by replacing Λ(𝑡𝑖) with Λ(𝑅𝑖) − Λ(𝐿𝑖). Now, the 
Research Design  
180 
 
log likelihood for left-truncated and right-censored data (𝐿𝑖, 𝑅𝑖, 𝛿𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 
is 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 =∑[𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑛𝜆(𝑅𝑖) − Λ(𝑅𝑖) + Λ(𝐿𝑖)] =∑[𝛿𝑖𝑙𝑛𝜆(𝑅𝑖) − ∫ 𝜆(𝜇)𝑑𝜇
𝑡𝑖
0
]
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
The implementation of this method is done in three steps. The cumulative hazards 
function Λ0(𝑡) is based on all LTRC data. Observations (𝐿𝑖, 𝑅𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) are counted in the risk 
set for time 𝑡 when 𝐿𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑖 . On the second stage, exposure time is estimated with 
Λ0
∗  (𝑅𝑖) − Λ0
∗ (𝐿𝑖) based on the estimated cumulative function Λ0
∗ (𝑡). Then, the Poisson 
regression tree is fitted by assigning estimated Λ0
∗  (𝑅𝑖) − Λ0
∗ (𝐿𝑖) to 𝑡𝑖 and 𝛿𝑖  as the new 𝑐𝑖. 
It is worth noting that a different survival object needs to be created. Each row 
would then represent a time interval, where within each interval all covariates are assumed 
to have constant values.  
Similar variables to those in the Cox Regression (Section 6.3.2.1) were used. 
6.3.3 Sensitivity: K-fold & Importance Scores 
The thesis employs two standard approaches to test the stability and validity of the 
REEM and survival trees. Firstly, the k-fold validation method, which compares the 
predictive capacity of trees to OLS. This first splits the sample into ten random subsamples 
and then uses each subsample as a validation subset for the estimates coming from the 
remaining nine subsamples.  
More importantly, to test the stability of the results, the thesis employs the random 
forests algorithm, which does not include the longitudinal aspect of the tree but gives 
guidance as to which are the most influential variables. The Classification and Regression 
Tree approach was defined, and fundamental mechanisms were explained in the 
Methodology Review Chapter (Section 5.3.1.1.2). This section aims to look at random 
forests as these were found to be the most feasible for sensitivity analysis throughout this 
thesis. More specifically, this section will extend that by defining the general steps in 
constructing a general random forest and a conditional inference forest. This will be 
supplemented by the description of how importance scores are estimated. These scores 
were estimated throughout the analysis as a sensitivity analysis.  
Let a training set be 𝐶 = {𝐶1, … , 𝐶𝑛} with 𝐶𝑖 ≡ (𝑥𝑖, 𝑦𝑖), an independent test case is 
𝐶0 and predictor is 𝑥0, the importance scores can be estimated with several steps. First step 
is to generate bootstrap resamples, Β1, … , Β𝑀 by sampling the training set C with 
replacement. Second step is to develop a regression or classification tree 𝑇𝑚 for each 
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resample Β𝑚, 𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑀 in the similar manner as was described in the Methodology 
Review Chapter (section 5.3.1.1.2). At each split, only predictors in a randomly chosen 
subset of predictors are taken into account. Assuming that 𝑝 denotes to the total number of 
predictor variables in 𝐶, each tree is grown until all nodes contain observations no more 
than the maximal terminal node size, which is a pre-specified parameter. Thirdly, for 
predicting the test case, 𝐶0, with covariate 𝑥0, the predicted value of the final RF is obtained 
by combining the results given by individual trees. If 𝑓𝑚
∗̂ (𝑥0) is the prediction of 𝐶0 by mth 
tree, the RF prediction for regression: 
1
𝑀
∑ 𝑓𝑚
∗̂ (𝑥0) 
𝑀
𝑚=1
 
and for classification: 
𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑔 {∑ 𝐼[𝑓𝑚
∗̂(𝑥0) = 𝑔] 
𝑀
𝑚=1
} 
The interpretation of the results is more difficult as there is no one tree now. 
However, the RD can estimate importance scores. There is no commonly-known measure 
of variable importance. The accepted concept is that a predictor variable is important when 
prediction performance is increased by using the predictor and decreased by not including 
the variable (Olshen and Brajaratnam, 2010:1644) 
6.4 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL MODELLING 
The Introduction and Background Chapter presented the aim of this thesis, which 
is to understand whether SBRR has any effects on firms’ productivity and survival. This 
chapter detailed the techniques proposed in the Methodology Review Chapter in order to 
further show how the second objective was achieved and to make it possible to test the 
hypotheses. The second objective was to find appropriate data and analytical technique 
which could be used to either support or disprove the framework. Simultaneously, to 
explore other fields for techniques that were not used in policy evaluation before. 
It is also worth recalling the hypotheses derived in the Framework: 
• Productivity 
o H2a: There is no difference in productivity between firms receiving the relief 
and not in the service sector in the short-term.  
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o H2b: Productivity of manufacturing firms receiving a relief is higher than firms 
that are not receiving the relief in the short-term. 
o H2c: SBRR has no significant impact on productivity in the long term. 
 
• Survival 
o H1a: Survival probability of service firms receiving a relief, awarded upon its 
introduction, is higher than firms that are not receiving the relief in the short-
term. 
o H1b: There is no difference in survival rates between firms receiving the relief, 
awarded upon its introduction, and not in the manufacturing sector in the 
short-term. 
o H1c: SBRR has no significant impact on survival rates in the long term. 
In a similar vein to the whole chapter, the summary section is divided into the data 
and its management (6.4.1) and empirical methodology (6.4.2).  
6.4.1 Data 
The analysis is based on the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) Annual 
Respondents Database X (ARDx) first released in July 2016 combined with Business 
Structure Database (BSD) and Prices Survey Microdata (PSM).  
The ARDx combines two existing surveys, the Annual Business Inquiry (1998-
2008) and the subsequent Annual Business Survey (2009-14) which firms’ representatives 
are legally required to complete, producing high response rates. It is a census of firms with 
250 plus employees and complex stratified sample across size, sector and region of smaller 
firms. The sample framework is constructed using administrative data on employment and 
turnover from PAYE and VAT registrations. Importantly, for the purposes of this study, it 
captures information at both the enterprise and local unit levels.  
This data source is combined with the BSD to acquire the annual observations of 
smaller firms that were not included in the ARDx sample in some years and as such fills in 
some missing variables. The BSD contains an annual release of a small number of critical 
variables36 on all UK firms that are VAT registered or employ at least one worker and is 
complementary to the above business surveys. 
                                                             
36 The variables are; employment, turnover, foreign ownership, and industrial activity based 
on Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 92, 2003 or 2007. Year of 'birth' (company start-up date) 
and 'death' (termination date), as well as postcodes for both enterprises and their local units. 
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There are nevertheless still many missing observations, particularly on the smaller 
firms, which would tend to attract SBRR. To ensure a representative sample, the data is 
cleaned and imputed where appropriate. The imputation is performed either with 
simplified approaches or predictive mean matching, with the key variables of turnover, 
employment, region, sector and legal status that had almost no missing data from the ARDx 
or BSD data sources. The approach is to bootstrap over a thousand samples and average 
their coefficients and standard errors in order to reduce serial correlation. 
The ARDx and BSD do not directly provide controls for input price changes, 
required for the estimates of TFP. To control for omitted price bias (as defined by Van 
Beveren, 2010), the PSM is used to deflate values with detailed information on regional and 
sector level prices rather than deflating using the inherently biased national GDP. 
Finally, the large dataset is exploited to recreate the conditions of a social 
experiment in which firms that receive SBRR are matched to similar firms which did not. 
This should make the results less model dependent. The large dataset enables the 
production of good matches by using a wide range of observable characteristics, namely, 
employment, sector, legal status, deflated turnover, deflated intermediate consumption, 
deflated GVA, age, size at birth, deflated capital, deflated wage expense, R&D dummy, 
foreign direct investment dummy. The dependent variable is a dummy, taking a value of 
one for those firms that received the relief at least twice between 2003-2016 and zero 
otherwise.  
The matching is performed with the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) technique. 
CEM does not use the random pruning applied in Propensity Score Matching, which is 
shown to increase the level of imbalance (King et al., 2011 and 2016). The broad 
mechanism behind CEM is to group each variable by recoding so that nearly similar values 
are assigned the same value (Iacus et al., 2009). The firms were matched one year prior to 
the SBRR introduction or for youthful firms, their first observable year. This produced a 
final dataset for the years 2000 to 2015 of 15,042 observations for 1,092 firms. 546 SBRR 
recipients matched to 546 firms that never received the relief but had similar 
characteristics.  
6.4.2 Empirical Methodology 
The modelling draws out some of the nuanced implications SBRR could have on 
survival and the boundaries on TFP. The method also observes other firm characteristics 
such as age and clusters by wider regional or sector conditions will influence decisions. 
These factors are not solely additive but interact such that the path along which any effects 
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of the universal policy operate on survival or productivity will be difficult to identify a 
priori.  
These considerations led this thesis to adopt the recently developed Random 
Effects Expectation Maximisation (REEM) decision tree approach of Sela and Simonoff 
(2012) and subsequently Fu and Simonoff (2015), rather than a parametric multilevel 
estimator. The Random effects element accounts for the constant differential firm-level 
factors whilst the decision tree allows the data to discover the complex groupings of firms 
and their different levels of productivity or survival without imposing a complex 
parametric structure. 
The REEM model is: 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖 + 𝑓(. ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,       𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼    𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛 
(
𝜀𝑖1
:
:
𝜀𝑖𝑛
) ~𝑁(0, 𝑅𝑖), 𝑏𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,𝐷), 
𝑓(. ) = 𝑓 (∑(𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑡−𝑗),
4
𝑗=0
𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡)  
The dependent variable 𝜔𝑖𝑡, is the bootstrapped estimate of TFP, for each firm i in 
period t. 𝑍 is a matrix of independent variables and 𝑏𝑖 is the vector of random effects. f(.) 
contains the same variables as Z, but they can differ. SBRR refers to the Small Business Rates 
Relief and its lags, 𝜌 captures the initial37 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief, 
irrespective of level. Other variables are firm age (a), the regions (r) and broad sectors (s), 
immediate foreign ownership (IO), ultimate foreign ownership (FO), high growth firm 
dummy (HGF). To at least partly control for the competition, the model includes indices of 
regional specialisation via the PS index of Marshall Specialisation and an index for the 
counter regional Jacob Diversity (𝐽𝐷) as well as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (𝐻𝐻𝐼) to 
control for industry competition at the national level. The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the random effects and independent across observations. 𝑅𝑖 is a non-
diagonal matrix to account for autocorrelation within firms.  
                                                             
37 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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6.4.2.1 Dependent Variable for REEM Trees and Independent for Survival: Total 
Factor Productivity 
The total factor productivity (𝜔𝑖𝑡) dependent variable is not directly observable 
from production functions and as such needs to be extracted once the weighted sum of 
inputs have been estimated with controls for simultaneity and selection biases. It is 
estimated by using Wooldridge’s (2009) one-step GMM estimator, which was introduced 
in Section 6.3.1.2. Wooldridge builds on the influential work of Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn, and Petrin (2003) and overcomes the identification issues of variable inputs 
such as labour. This thesis estimates TFP assuming a Cobb Douglas functional form:  
 𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 , 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is TFP of the ith firm in period t, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s logarithmic gross 
value added in order to simplify the model and eliminate intermediate inputs , 𝐾 is 
logarithmic capital and 𝐿 is logarithmic labour. 
 
6.4.2.2 Dynamic Model 
An alternative approach was also employed. The dynamic form of productivity with 
not only standard variables but all variables related to TFP was estimated with system 
GMM estimator (notations in Section 6.3.1.4): 
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐿𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜕𝐾𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝜕𝑀𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑖(𝑡−1) + 𝜕𝑋𝑙𝑛𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑧𝑖𝑡𝜇 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   
6.4.2.3 Survival Analysis 
In a similar vein to TFP, the thesis first estimates the hazard of exit using the well-
established semi-parametric Stratified Cox Proportionate model: 
𝑥(𝑡) =∝𝑋 𝑋𝑡+∑ (∝𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 𝑡−𝑖 𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅 𝑡−𝑖)
4
𝑖=0 , where ∝ ′𝑠 are the coefficients. 
,𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖𝑡 , 𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡  
This thesis also employs Fu and Simonoff’s (2017) survival trees to account for the 
left-truncated and right censored data. This technique was chosen because, in a similar way 
to REEM trees, it partitions the data space into smaller sections where variable interactions 
are more explicit. 
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7  RESULTS 
This chapter aims to report the results of the thesis. The overall aim of this thesis is 
to understand whether Small Business Rate Relief (SBRR) has any effects on firms, in 
particular with regards to their productivity and survival38. This chapter focuses on the 
matched and imputed data, but other variations of data are presented in Appendix 10.4. 
The chapter starts with the descriptive statistics of data, which are supplemented by 
decision trees to draw further insights (Sections 7.1.1.2 and 7.1.2.1). Once data is described, 
the chapter provides an extensive discussion of results from productivity (Section 7.2) and 
survival (Section 7.3) analyses. Finally, Section 7.4 combines all findings and discusses 
them with hypotheses formed in the Framework. The methodology and data sources upon 
which the results are based were described in the Research Design Chapter. 
More specifically, Subsection 7.1 uncovers multiple issues with missing variables. 
It shows that higher BRs are most likely to be paid by larger firms. However, the smaller 
the company, the higher dependence on the sector, region and labour productivity is 
evident. Cleaned and matched data shows that larger firms are more likely to be included 
in the analysis. As expected, decision trees suggest that SBRR mainly depends on the year. 
The trees captured that the relief was introduced in 2005 (in the UK) and significantly 
increased in 2010. Some variables such as sectors and regions are highly related to SBRR 
as well. 
Subsection 7.2 describes the results from TFP estimation. The unbiased REEM tree 
uncovers specific examples when the relief may affect TFP negatively or positively. It 
identifies critical variables related to SBRR in splitting this tree. Other factors such as 
region, rent, sector, HHI and PD indexes and foreign ownership are also found to be 
influential. The system GMM estimator identifies the positive relationship between the 
initial39 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief and TFP, but only significant at 
90%.  
Subsection 7.3 shows the results of survival analysis. CPH also finds firms that were 
granted the relief during the first year of SBRR existence (or enhancement) to be far more 
likely to survive. Although survival trees do not identify this relationship, there is a level 
effect indicating that recipients are slightly more likely to survive.  
                                                             
38 This thesis defines total factor productivity (TFP) is the portion of output not explained 
by the amount of inputs used in production. Whilst, survival analysis in this setting is a method for 
analysing the expected duration of time until closure. 
39 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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Finally, Subsection 7.4 uses all findings from other sections to discuss the 
hypotheses. It shows that the relief is likely to be mistargeted. This subsection then expands 
on the effects of SBRR, separated into three periods similar to those used in forming the 
hypotheses. It broadly confirms all hypotheses. The wide findings are that property tax 
reductions are associated with consistently lower productivity and only a very marginal 
initial improvement in survival. 
7.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 
Two methods are used to describe the data. Firstly, the usual statistics such as 
mean, median, standard deviation as well as 25th and 75th percentiles are reported. This is 
supplemented by decision and classification trees to uncover which firms are more likely 
to pay lower BR or receive higher SBRR. 
7.1.1 ARDx Data with no Modifications 
The first part of this section focuses on the data before any major modifications in 
Table 7:1 (p. 189). It is worth noting that the data was already merged and limited to one 
local unit. As discussed in the Research Design Chapter, this made the datasets manageable 
and analysis could be executed with fewer assumptions and imputations of the critical 
variables (including BR) because they were not available at the local unit level.  
7.1.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
As according to Table 7:1 (p. 189), there were 530,923 unique companies with 
6,230,916 observations identified. On average, firms had approximately 14 employees and 
a turnover of £2,624,310. However, standard deviations and percentiles suggested that 
multiple outliers were present. For instance, BR expense was reported to be £35,709 on 
average, but the 75th percentile revealed that most of the businesses were paying £12,863.  
The radar chart in Figure 7:1 (p. 188) defines the basic patterns around the not 
available values (NAs) within data. The administrative data and variables derived from the 
administrative data (Herfindahl Index, PS, PD, employment and turnover) seem to have 
little or no missing values. Some variables have a deficient proportion of non-missing 
values. For instance, the one indicating whether a company died during that period has 
around 0% of observations filled. It seems reasonable because each company has many 
observations and only the last one should be identified as death. However, just 0.16% of 
observations have reported foreign direct investment, which may be reasonable but cannot 
be included in the analysis owing to there being too few cases with non-missing values.  
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In the beginning, the exact inputs to productivity process were considered to be 
used in productivity analysis. However, the coverage was insufficient because some 
participants were asked only to answer the more extensive survey with those variables. 
This extensive survey consisted of details on their spending. For instance, just ~0.34% of 
the whole sample answered the question about water expenditure. Thus, coverage was 
found to be insufficient for the productivity estimation with the exact inputs. 
 
 
Figure 7:1 Missing values within the data. 0% indicates that variable has no 
missing values and 100% that all values are missing in that variable. 
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Variable N Mean SD Pctl(25) Media
n 
Pctl(75) 
Her index 6230916 0.012 0.03 0.002 0.005 0.014 
Jacobian 
externalities 
6230916 0.787 0.074 0.75 0.797 0.838 
PS 6229677 1.482 1.794 0.722 1.149 1.725 
Employment 6225925 14.154 149.276 1 3 10 
Turnover 6225925 2624.307 174971.5 72 187 708 
Active (dummy) 6225925 0.894 0.308 1 1 1 
Birth year 6225925 1992.859 10.388 1986 1994 2001 
Status 6225887 1-60%, 2-22%, 3-14%, 7-4% 
Sector 6230916 See Figure 7:3 
Region 6230916 See Figure 7:3 
Capex 4252279 0.432 28.363 0 0 0.023 
Capstock 4114287 1.737 130.291 0.00003 0.001 0.143 
Death year 623502 2006.5 3.896 2003 2006 2010 
Wage expense 581039 1323.538 11573.76 7 72 555 
Total production 
costs 
579151 9851.48 519811.1 22 150 1024 
Acquisitions 
(building) 
579151 363.659 8317.989 0 1 29 
Disposals 
(building) 
579151 79.534 3548.423 0 0 1 
Subsidies 
received 
576130 27.954 2425.88 0 0 0 
Business rate 
expense 
574887 35.709 575.047 0 1.771 12.86 
Insurance 
expense 
574867 6.714 711.13 0 0 0.08 
Rent expense 574404 72.899 2150.55 0.002 0.665 7 
GVA (market) 528763 2400.169 135547.1 34 158 915 
GVA (factor) 528763 2243.601 134879.1 32 152 887 
GVA (basic) 528763 2282.482 134916.8 34 157 909 
Total net taxes 356643 221.829 14444.63 0 1 17 
Material expense 341127 2.999 443.318 0 0 0 
Gross 310188 7047.105 85203.6 63 301 2048 
Intermediate 
consumption 
283205 2780.526 30392 0 0 353 
Sales of own 
production 
96536 9616.415 56410.41 248 1327 
Foreign direct 
investment 
9024 846.161 8836.406 0 0 1 
Other production 
expense 
4393 338.75 7541.275 0 0 0 
Water expense 3473 3.601 103.393 0 0 0 
       
Table 7:1 Descriptive statistics of data after minor cleaning; for continues 
variables, count (N), mean, median, standard deviation (SD), 25th and 75th 
percentiles are provided. 
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7.1.1.2 Decision trees - turnover and employment 
The lack of targeting was often mentioned as a drawback of SBRR and BRs in 
general. Thus, the focus of this section is on employment, turnover, sector, region and 
labour productivity. 
Figure 10:4 and Figure 10:5 (Appendix 10.4.1, p. 276-278) broadly illustrate how 
these variables influenced the amount of BR paid by firms. It shows complex interactions. 
The node shows that the size was the most important factor out of size, sector, year and 
labour productivity. Large and medium sized firms (with regards to turnover and 
employment) were separated from firms with micro and small firms. The larger ones 
operating in catering, production, retail and property sectors were often related to higher 
reliefs than firms operating in other sectors.  
Much more complex groupings were evident for small and micro firms. Small firms 
in London were associated with higher BR bills. Also, those with lower labour productivity 
seemed to receive higher bills than those with higher labour productivity. However, the 
highest business bills were received by the micro firms in construction and other services 
sectors based in London. Furthermore, higher labour productivity was related to higher 
bills. 
 To supplement this tree, 500 trees were estimated with random forest algorithm 
with no restrictions, which sorted the importance of the variables in the following order: 
turnover, sector, employment, region, labour productivity and year. The model suggested 
that these variables explain ~9% of the variance.  
7.1.2 After Imputation and Matching 
Once imputed, the overall statistics seemed to consist of lower values. As according 
to Figure 7:2 (p. 192) all key variables had a lower mean except investment with 1% higher 
mean than before imputations (£5,130 to £5,220). This increase may relate to the time 
trend. Investment in the most recent year (2015) was missing. Lower means on average 
seemed to be reasonable because of the sampling procedure. Smaller firms which possibly 
had lower values likely to be imputed were not always surveyed. The overall variance (SD) 
did not deviate much before and after imputation. It was reduced for GVA and rent (by 19% 
and 10%, respectively) but increased for materials and investment (28% and 1%, 
respectively). The quantiles further explained that the overall imputed values were not 
extreme. However, for variables with many missing values, quantile values were far lower 
after imputation. For instance, 53,724 values were missing for rent. After imputation, the 
75th quantile was reduced by 72%. This seemed reasonable since many businesses owned 
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premises and would therefore not be paying any rent. Thus, more 0s should appear. 
Maximum and minimum values are not reported because of the disclosure controls, but 
they are similar before and after the imputation.  
546 firms that received SBRR at least twice (with some exceptions as defined in the 
Research Design Chapter, Section 6.2.2.6.5.3.1) were matched to other 546 firms which had 
not received the relief, but had similar characteristics on the year before the relief became 
available. Figure 7:3 compares the distribution before and after matching and imputation 
with regards to region and sector. 3% of cases (or 1,092 firms) were present in the final 
matched sample. Scotland had proportionately 5% fewer observations than before 
matching, London and South East 2% less and South West 1% less. Whilst, Wales (4%) and 
Yorkshire and Humberside (by 3%) had the largest proportionate increase followed by 
West Midlands (by 2%) and East Midlands (by 1%). With regards to the sectors, the largest 
number of firms were matched in the production sector, resulting in a proportionate 
increase of 29%. There was some increase also in wholesale (5%) and a marginal 
proportionate increase in construction (1%) sectors. This resulted in substantial decreases 
in observations in retail (9%) and other services (20%) sectors and a marginal decrease in 
the property (3%) sector. 
Table 7:2 (p. 192) compares the unmatched and uncleaned data with the matched 
sample after all corrections and imputation. The sample leans towards larger firms with 
employment and turnover increasing by ~6 times on average. Companies that reported 
larger investment, GVA and intermediate consumption were more likely to be included in 
this sample owing to how the surveys were conducted. All larger firms were surveyed, but 
smaller firms were just sampled, so they might not have at least two observations which 
were needed both to derive the SBRR variable and estimate the change. It is worth noting 
that other variables, such as investment and intermediate consumption also had higher 
values.  
Figure 7:2 (p. 192) illustrates how the values were imputed for the most 
complicated case, GVA. It supports the descriptive statistics. It was evident that the clear 
majority of the imputed data is around the middle of the range and only relatively several 
unique values were imputed. These unique values usually had other values that were 
closely related to the imputed values.  
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‘’’ Action Variable N Mean SD 
Before 
Employment 
6,225,925 14.15 149.28 
After 1 to 1 matching 15,952 82.92 168.17 
After imputation 15,043 81.99 166.07 
Before 
Turnover 
6,225,925 2,624.31 174,971.50 
After 1 to 1 matching 15,952 14,767.65 54,046.51 
After imputation 15,043 14,539.24 53,594.72 
Before 
Materials 
341,127 3.00 443.32 
After 1 to 1 matching 4,673 7,453.21 25,590.58 
After imputation 15,047 6,133.42 26,554.34 
Before 
GVA (basic) 
528,763 2,282.48 134,916.80 
After 1 to 1 matching 6,268 342,588.30 46,263.02 
After imputation 15,047 340,632.60 43,151.42 
Before 
Investment 
4,252,279 0.43 28.36 
After 1 to 1 matching 14,025 1.97 12.72 
After imputation 15,047 2.11 21.36 
Before 
Capital 
4,114,287 1.74 130.29 
After 1 to 1 matching 14,025 10.40 46.25 
After imputation 15,047 9.32 126.76 
Table 7:2 Key variables before matching and imputation, after matching and 
after imputation. 
 
Figure 7:2 GVA real values (green) combined with imputed values (red); The scale 
had to be removed so that the firms could not be identified.40 
                                                             
40 Several restrictions were imposed by the data owner. See Section 6.2.1 for more 
information. 
Results  Evaluating Small Business Rate Relief 
 
    
193 
 
Before matching 
 
 
After matching and imputation 
 
 
Figure 7:3 Distribution of the data with regards to regions and sectors before 
(upper graphs) and after matching and imputation (lower graphs), motors trade is 
excluded from the graphics due to security restrictions, see Research Design 
Chapter (Section 6.1.3) for more information. 
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7.1.2.1 Decision trees - SBRR  
Figure 10:6 and Figure 10:7 (Appendix 10.4.2, p. 278-279) and an extract of these 
in Figure 7:4 show a tree with SBRR instead of BRs because matching and cleansing of the 
data allowed to estimate SBRR. Instead of explaining the amount of the BR paid by the firms, 
the aim was to predict the amount of SBRR by investigating firms’ characteristics. It is worth 
noting that the matched sample disproportionately boosted the number of firms receiving 
the relief. Additionally, the illustration was limited to splits on 5% significance and the final 
node size was limited to a hundred or more cases. These limitations were not imposed 
during the random forest estimations. To estimate prediction error in random forests, the 
dataset was split into the train (75% firms) and test (25% firms) parts. The 17% and 36% 
classification errors were estimated with the train and test datasets, respectively. Also, 35% 
of 𝑅2 was achieved by random forests. The output of random forests is provided in 
Appendix 10.4.8. 
 
Figure 7:4 Aggregated SBRR tree (n refers to the group’s size). Size classification 
was used according to the EU definition offered in Table 1:1 (Introduction and 
Background Chapter). Full version with size, year, region and labour productivity 
variables is available in Appendix 10.4.2. 
Unlike in BR case, both random forests and decision trees found year variable to be 
the most important. Random forests ordered other variables according to their importance: 
labour productivity, turnover, sectors, regions, employment. Now, sector and region were 
found to be more influential than employment.  
More specifically, the outputs showed the misclassification of SBRR. For instance, 
the intense mistargeting is evident in Figure 7:4, where not just micro but also medium and 
large firms were receiving substantial reliefs up to 100% and this misallocation particularly 
increased after 2009.  
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With regards to the timescale, the decision tree in Figure 10:7 (p. 279) showed that 
none of the firms received SBRR during 2000-2004. Between 2005 and 2009, highest relief 
(~30%) was received by micro (according to turnover) firms in construction, retail and 
other services sectors in North West, East of England and South West. Further branches on 
these sectors show that in Yorkshire, East & West Midlands, London and South East large, 
medium or small firms would be more likely to receive more extensive relief than micro 
firms (according to employment).  
Somehow similar patterns but with higher SBRR were evident for 2010-2015 data. 
More substantial reliefs were likely to be given to firms with a micro turnover. On average, 
firms with lower productivity were also likely to receive more substantial reliefs. Also, 109 
micro (according to employment) firms in Yorkshire and London in catering, production 
and retail sectors were receiving lower SBRR than larger firms with exact circumstances. 
However, micro firms according to both turnover and employment were receiving higher 
reliefs than other firms, but SBRR seemed to be highly dependent on regions. For instance, 
micro firms in North East, North West, Yorkshire, East Midlands and London were receiving 
lower reliefs than other areas. 
Regional effects were present, but depended on other variables. This is 
understandable given different factors such as competition or supply of the premises. 
Between 2005 and 2010, micro firms operating construction, retail, production, wholesale 
sectors were receiving 4% relief in London and North East, and Wales and Scotland just 1% 
on average, while in other regions ~2%. Construction, retail and other service sectors 
deviated more substantially with an average relief of 33% in North West, East of England 
and South West, 8% in Wales, Scotland and North East and 26% in other countries (in other 
just with employees <= 10). More recently (2010-2015), micro firms in construction, 
property and other services in North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humberside, East 
Midlands and London received 58% SBRR, whilst similar firms in other regions received 
reliefs of ~36% on average. On the other hand, in catering, production, retail and wholesale 
sectors micro firms in Scotland, North West, West Midlands, South East and South West 
reported reliefs of 26%, while similar firms in other regions reported 51% on average. 
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7.2 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
This section describes the results from TFP estimation. It starts by providing an 
extensive discussion on the results from Wooldridge’s System GMM estimator (Section 
7.2.1) combined with REEM trees (Section 7.2.2) and then in relation to standard 
econometric techniques equipped to deal with dynamic models (Section 7.2.3). The 
primary results are supplemented with sensitivity analysis reported in the Appendix 
10.4.1. The functional forms and methodology were defined in the Research Design 
Chapter. 
Shortly, system GMM estimator combined with REEM trees identified some 
relationships between SBRR and TFP. The unbiased REEM tree found cases where SBRR 
was having mainly negative links to TFP. Other factors such as region, rent, sector, 
competition indexes (HHI, PD, PS) and foreign ownership were also found to be influential.  
7.2.1 Dependent Variable in REEM & Independent in Survival Analyses 
Figure 7:5 (p. 197) provides the firm level evolution of estimated TFP during 2005-
2015 and links this to the receipt and degree of SBRR. TFP peaked in 2009 and subsequently 
declined, reflecting the generally negative economic shock. The average estimate of TFP 
was relatively similar whether firms were in receipt of SBRR or not. The small difference 
may be explained in part by the tapping nature of the relief, but there is no particular 
pattern in TFP. However, some differences were evident between SBRR recipients and non-
recipients after 2006-2007, 2011 and 2012. These patterns might be related to either 
introduced or increased SBRR. Non-recipients seemed to outperform recipients before the 
SBRR introduction (2005) but in the following year, the recipients seemed to outperform 
non-recipients. Overall, it is clear there is diverse and complex variation around the average 
levels of productivity even among these carefully matched firms. 
 The TFP was estimated with Woodridge (2009) method. The matched data with 
imputation and without provided consistent estimates. As reported in Table 7:3 (p. 198), 
the coefficients stayed relatively similar after bootstrapping. The imputed dataset with 
bootstrapping estimated labour and capital coefficients to be 0.018 (SE=0.003) and 0.025 
(SE=0.020), respectively. The capital coefficients deviate significantly across the methods. 
For instance, for the unmatched and unimputed data, estimates deviated significantly with 
labour and capital coefficients of 0.013 (SE=0.001) and -2.273 (SE=0.226), respectively. 
The main reason for this may be that the sample size decreases when the data is not 
imputed, resulting in bias. Also, as described in the Research Design, the capital was 
approximated. Thus, some estimation errors can be expected.
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Figure 7:5 The comparison of TFP between SBRR recipients and non-recipients. The white lines correspond to the annual averages of all 
firms. The white dotted line is the average of SBRR recipients. The white dashed line is the average for non-recipients. The other lines are 
shaded by the proportionate level of SBRR. Where dark blue is 0% and light blue is 100%. 
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Table 7:3 Comparisons of various TFP estimates with different approaches and 
different data.  
Method Labour Capital SE(Labour) SE(Capital) 
OP 
0.008 0.272 0.003 0.207 
LP 
0.006 0.286 0.003 0.210 
Wooldridge (one sample)  
0.008 0.023 0.002 0.022 
Wooldridge (bootstrapping) 
0.018 0.025 0.003 0.020 
Wooldridge (matching, no 
imputation) 
0.033 0.006 0.004 0.020 
Wooldridge (no matching, no 
imputation) 
0.013 -2.273 0.004 0.226 
     
 
 
 
 
7.2.2 Unbiased REEM trees 
The estimated TFP with Wooldridge (2009) method reported in the previous 
subsection was used as a dependent variable in unbiassed REEM trees. The following 
paragraphs describe the key relationships in Figure 10:8 (Appendix 10.4.9, p. 289) with its 
simplified extracts in Figure 7:6 - Figure 7:9 and with particular emphasis on the firms for 
which SBRR was causing changes in TFP according to the unbiased REEM trees. The 
algorithm splits these cases into 45 groups. The root was consistently split on the SBRR’s 
second lag. The aggregate results imply that those 2,540 records of the firms that received 
the relief after two years had 6% lower productivity than other firms.  
The focus is on the most influential branches, with the greatest numbers of firms in 
the final nodes. In Figure 10:8 (Appendix 10.4.9, p. 289), the root first splits on a two year 
lag of SBRR. The 2,540 observations for firms receiving lagged SBRR had 6% lower TFP 
than the other observations of firms not receiving SBRR.  
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The branch for firms in receipt of SBRR (lagged by two years) is followed in Figure 
7:6. The following split is on the level of competition and region. In the South and East of 
England, Wales and Scotland, a split for 1,222 observations is on the five-year lagged SBRR 
at 38% relief. Observations for firms receiving less relief having ~5% higher TFP. However, 
TFP for all observations in these regions is over 4% lower than for firms in other regions. 
In fact, in the other regions, we also see the next significant node is the five-year SBRR lag, 
this time at 40%. The pattern of TFP is the same, with lower TFP for the 248 observations 
from firms receiving more relief than the 981 observations with less or no relief. The 
conclusion from this branch is that irrespective of region and sector (excluding catering in 
some regions) there is a negative relationship with two year and five year lagged SBRR and 
firm TFP. This aligns with the Framework which suggested firms receiving SBRR would be 
less likely to invest and may increase mark-ups. 
 
Figure 7:6 Extract of the tree for firms that received the relief two years prior. 
The full tree is available in Appendix 10.4.1 (p. 276). The outcome value refers 
to the estimated TFP as reported in Figure 7:5 (p. 197). 
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Figure 7:7 follows the observations for firms which did not receive two year lagged 
SBRR and were based in London. The specific characteristics of London firms made them 
different to observations in other regions. London firms were not significantly affected by 
SBRR but by other variables. The firms that were operating in catering, construction, 
production, property, retail and wholesale were dependent on R&D. Those 669 
observations related to firms that were not planning to invest on R&D had 5% higher R&D. 
For those that were planning to invest in R&D, their TFP was dependent on PS. Firms with 
PS>-0.47 had 15% higher productivity. 
The other split refers to those firms which were operating in other sectors had 10% 
higher TFP than other firms. The following splits for those firms operating in other sectors 
show the importance of foreign ownership, where this component is associated to 24% 
higher productivity, particularly among those firms competing in more competitive 
industries (HHI>0.03). UK owned firms younger than 18 years seem to also depend on the 
competition with PS>-0.38 being linked to 12% higher TFP. Those older than 18 years old 
tend to have higher TFP than younger firms.  
 
Figure 7:7 Extract of the tree for firms that did not receive any SBRR lagged 
two years ago and were operating in London. The full tree is available in 
Appendix 10.4.1 (p. 276). The outcome value refers to the estimated TFP as 
reported in Figure 7:5 (p. 197). 
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Figure 7:8 turns towards the right of the full tree (Appendix 10.4.1, p. 276) and 
describes instances where firms had SBRR lagged by two greater than 0 and were operating 
in other regions than London and older than 32 years. 1,738 regional firms older than 32 
years had 5% lower TFP than younger regional firms. The unbiased REEM tree did not split 
on BSRR for those firms. However, they depend on other variables. Foreign-owned firms 
were positively related to diversification with PD>0.79 had 45% higher TFP than other 
foreign firms operating in less diversified regions (PD≤0.79). The tree then separates old 
firms (>38 years) and shows that those experiencing higher employment growth were 
likely to have lower TFP than those which cannot be regarded as high growth firms 
depending on the region. Those not older than 38 years, tended to depend on sector and 
region representing various mixes. The property, wholesale and other services sectors had 
7% lower TFP in North West and Scotland, while catering, construction, production and 
retail sectors in North East, South East and Wales underperformed other regions by ~6%. 
 
 
Figure 7:8 Extract of the tree for firms that did not receive SBRR two years ago 
and were operating in other regions than London and older than 32 years. The 
full tree is available in Appendix 10.4.1 (p. 276). The outcome value refers to the 
estimated TFP as reported in Figure 7:5 (p. 197). 
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Figure 7:9 focuses on 10,911 observations outside of London. With a division by 
firm age. For the observations of 2,983 firms younger than 32 years, an end node quickly 
comes defined by high levels of local diversity, above 0.84 on the PD index. The Jacobian 
diversity hypothesis is that greater local diversity increases innovation. This is supported 
because the weighted average TFP of these observations is approximately 3.6% higher than 
the TFP of others in two-digit postcode areas with a lower level of diversity. In the entire 
tree, the tree only splits on Marshall Specialisation for areas of London.  
Moving down the branch, for all sectors except catering, there is a complex division 
between long-term and short-term reliefs. In particular, for observations with five year 
lagged SBBR below 10% and one year lagged SBBR below 70% are associated with TFP 
generally higher than observations that have five year lagged relief above 10%. 
Consistently more relief is associated with lower TFP. Broadly, SBRR lagged by five (>10%) 
was related to 7% lower TFP, SBRR lagged by one (>70%) was related to 8% lower TFP 
and SBRR lagged by three (≥1%) to 8% lower productivity. 
 
Figure 7:9 Extract of the tree for firms that did not receive the relief two years 
prior, were operating in other regions than London and were younger than 32 
years. Note that * refers to the aggregated cell. The full tree is available in 
Appendix 10.4.1 (p. 276). The outcome value refers to the estimated TFP as 
reported in Figure 7:5 (p. 197). 
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 The estimation was performed on 13,951 observations of 1091 firms. To test the 
validity, k-fold assurance method was employed. As shown in Table 7:4, the REEM model 
performed ~3% better and provided lower standard errors than OLS. This method was 
supplemented with both dynamic system-GMM estimator and random forests.  
  
Mean Min Max SD 
REEM (2) 0.331532 0.306428 0.361278 0.000218 
OLS (1) 0.347494 0.307494 0.404882 0.000652 
(2)/(1) 0.954067 0.996534 0.892304 0.334366 
Table 7:4 The K-fold validation. REEM predictions compared to OLS. 
To test the estimates, effects to TFP were also estimated with random forest (RF) 
algorithm. Table 7:5 shows estimated importance scores for the REEM tree. Without 
controls for correlation between observations, Jacobian externalities, HHI and region 
variables became the most influential. Whilst, current SBRR and SBRR lagged by two were 
8th and 9th on the list. The results were broadly consistent with the REEM tree. 
Variables Productivity 
PD  282669470.2 
HHI 224507266.6 
Region 141526539.9 
Age 127377111.5 
Sector 122741434.3 
R&D 89087896.4 
High growth firm (HGF) dummy 75200671.6 
SBRR 44403483.8 
SBRR lagged by 2 39536232.9 
PS  28489371.1 
Immediate foreign ownership 16754358.7 
Ultimate foreign ownership 16754358.7 
SBRR lagged by3 10722731 
SBRR lagged by 5 8099703.5 
SBRR lagged 6526279 
SBRR lagged by 4 512537.5 
SBRR (first enhanced/ first 
introduced) 
-340104.4 
 
Table 7:5 Random forest importance scores – productivity 
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7.2.3 Dynamic Model 
The long-run coefficients obtained from an estimation of the dynamic productivity 
equation using CEM to control for self-selection into the treatment group and with 
bootstrapping through 1000 samples are displayed in Table 7:6 (p. 205) and compared 
with other models in Appendices (Table 7:8, p. 281 and Table 10:2, p. 282). These results 
are useful in establishing a baseline set of estimates that allow comparison with the 
estimates obtained with not imputed data and no matching.  
Various lags of SBRR were included in the equation. However, the only variable 
indicating whether SBRR was the first recipient of enhanced/introduced relief was 
significant at 90%. This implies that those receiving the relief had approximately 12% 
higher TFP. Other variables were insignificant but showed the direction towards which the 
SBRR might influence some of the firms. All variables but SBRR lagged by three years were 
related to slightly higher productivity (0.04%-3%). However, even the cumulative sum 
totalling to 0.031 (excluding the first recipient of enhanced/introduced relief) did not 
indicate any substantial influence.  
The estimates of the coefficients on lagged employment and capital were 
statistically significant at the 99% level and lagged investment at 95% level, meaning that 
holding all other variables constant, a 10% increase in employment would result in .04% 
decrease in GVA. However, 10% increase in capital and lagged investment would result in 
39% and 8% increase in GVA.  
The coefficient on the Herfindahl Index was negative and statistically significant at 
the 95%, indicating that 100% increase in the index would result in 12% lower TFP than 
the initial value. Herfindahl Index is a measure of the size of firms in relation to their 
industry, indicating the amount of the concentration. It should also be noted that the HHI 
does not take account of either potential or international competition and is dependent on 
the definition of the industry (Okada, 2005). Thus, the result may suggest that higher 
market concentration (e.g. monopoly) would result in lower TFP. In addition to that, age 
was significant implying that those firms that were older were less likely to be productive. 
In fact, with each year, the productivity seems to lessened by approximately 2%. Other 
variables were insignificant. PD, PS, HGF dummy seemed to contribute to TFP positively 
while R&D dummy had an adverse effect.  
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Variable name Estimate SE Z Pr(>|z|)  
Intercept 0.0223 0.028 0.791 0.43  
GVA (defl & 1st lag) 0.0295 0.031 0.956 0.34  
Employment (log) 0.0277 0.033 0.834 0.40  
Employment (log & 1st lag) -0.0043 0.002 -2.396 0.02 *** 
SBRR (log) 0.0010 0.001 0.776 0.44  
SBBR (log & 1st lag) 0.0004 0.001 0.482 0.63  
SBRR (log & 2nd lag) 0.0006 0.001 0.600 0.55  
SBRR (log & 3rd lag) -0.0015 0.001 -1.461 0.14  
SBRR (log & 4th lag) 0.0305 0.046 0.670 0.50  
Capital (defl & log) 0.3859 0.135 2.857 0.00 *** 
Capital (defl, log & 1st lag) -0.1119 0.074 -1.517 0.13  
Investment (defl, log & 1st lag) 0.0788 0.038 2.098 0.04 ** 
SBRR (first introduced & first 
enhanced) 
0.1166 0.068 1.702 0.09 
* 
HGF dummy 0.0045 0.009 0.484 0.63  
R&D dummy -0.0116 0.035 -0.332 0.74  
PD (log) 0.0036 0.010 0.369 0.71  
PS (log) 0.0443 0.028 1.600 0.11  
Age (log) -0.0220 0.011 -2.041 0.04 ** 
HHI (log) -0.1174 0.055 -2.141 0.03 ** 
Materials (defl & log) 0.3915 0.344 1.137 0.26  
 
Table 7:6 The coefficients obtained from the estimation of the dynamic 
productivity equation using CEM to control for self-selection into the treatment 
group bootstrapped through 1000 samples. 
7.2.3.1 Dynamic Model Diagnostics and Sensitivity Analysis 
One of the imputed samples was used to assure that the overall model passed the 
standard tests. The variables indicating rent, sector and region did not have sufficient 
amount of different values within observations. Thus, they had to be excluded from this 
model. To allow for measurement error, instruments were lagged by two to eight periods. 
This proved to be a sufficient number of lags to avoid rejection of the null of valid 
instruments in the Sargan test at 5% level. Both hypotheses of autocorrelation were 
successfully rejected with p-values of 0.3 and 0.5. The model also passed Wald test for 
coefficients and time dummies with chisq of 240.81 (df=21, p=~0) and 201.44 (df=11, 
p=~0) indicating that it fits better with coefficients and time dummies than without.  
The sensitivity analysis with various data is reported in Appendix 10.4.4 (Table 
10:1, p. 281 and Table 10:2, p. 282). The long-run coefficients obtained from an estimation 
of the dynamic equation using no mechanism to control for selection into the treatment 
group are displayed in the two last columns. These results were used for comparison with 
the estimates obtained using CEM. To allow for measurement error, instruments were also 
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lagged two to eight times. As reported in Appendix 10.4.4 (Table 10:2, p. 282), it also passed 
all standard tests. The Sargan test was rejected at the 10% level. The second-order 
autocorrelation was rejected with -1.62 (p=.10). The model passed Wald test for 
coefficients and time dummies with chisq of 409.13 (df=19, p=~0) and 142.85 (df=11, 
p~0). 
Due to the increased number of NAs, R&D dummy and HGF dummy had to be 
excluded. The model now had highly significant (at 99%) lagged dependent variable. 
Holding all other variables constant, a 10 % change in lagged GVA resulted in 0.9% higher 
GVA. It is likely that this lagged variable captured some of the employment and capital 
effects. Employment was insignificant. Current capital seemed to be positively related to 
GVA, but lagged capital showed a negative relationship. 
Standard errors were now significantly increased and slightly different 
relationships were identified. Current SBRR was significant at the 99% indicating that 
holding other variables constant, 10% increase in SBRR would increase TFP by .04% 
(previously reduced by .03% and standard error was increased by 12%). In this model 
SBRR (first introduced or enhanced) was significant and showed a negative relationship. It 
seemed that firms that were first-time SBRR recipients of introduced or enhanced SBRR 
reduced their TFP by 3.1%. This model separated these two effects because of fewer 
periods. It seems that this model also separated those firms that were granted SBRR 
according to their characteristics, which is why the same relationship was not identified 
after matching. The model had higher standard errors. 
Although HHI became insignificant, PD was significant. Holding other variables 
constant, 10% increase in PD would decrease TFP by .2%. Additionally, English firms had 
8.7% higher TFP than Welsh and Scottish firms.  
Other types of GMM estimators were also reporeted in Appendix 10.4.4 (Table 10:1, 
p. 281 and Table 10:2, p. 282). The relationships were weaker and standard errors higher. 
This was particularly evident once the difference in difference transformation was 
employed, resulting in the loss of ~53% observations. It was the only model that failed to 
reject Sargan’s test even with eight lags and found only one variable to be significant. The 
overall fit of the first model seemed to be the best. 
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7.3 SURVIVAL ANALYSIS 
This subsection describes the results of survival analysis. To achieve this aim, it 
starts by providing extensive discussion on the results from Stratified Cox Proportionate 
Hazard Model (CPH) (Section 7.3.1). It then turns to survival trees (Section7.3.1).  
CPH consistently with Dynamic Estimator (Section 7.2.3), found a variable capturing 
the initial41 effects of receiving any relief, or the uplift in relief, very influential. Firms that were 
granted the relief during the first year of SBRR existence (or enhancement) were found to 
be far more likely to survive. No other variables related to SBRR were found to be highly 
significant. However, there was some indication that industry concentration plays a part in 
survival. Furthermore, a small number of firms operating in the property and retail sectors 
were less likely to close. Also, the North West and East of England were less negatively 
associated with closure.  
On the other hand, survival trees did not identify any relationship between firms 
that were granted the relief during the first year of SBRR existence (or enhancement) and 
survival. However, there was a small level effect indicating that recipients were slightly 
more likely to survive and were less fragile than other firms. Also, variables such as foreign 
ownership, rent and competition indexes seemed to highly influence survival.  
7.3.1 Stratified Cox Proportionate Hazard Model 
The long-run coefficients obtained from an estimation of the survival equation 
using CEM to control for self-selection into the treatment group with imputation are 
displayed in Table 7:7 and compared to other models in Appendix 10.4.5 (p. 283). The 
model was estimated with 14,926 observations (some removed due to being missing), 242 
deaths and 504 relocations.  
One of the imputed samples was used to assure that the overall model passed the 
standard tests. The proportional hazards test revealed that sector and region classifications 
and age did not satisfy the proportional hazards assumption requiring covariates to 
multiplicatively shift the baseline hazard by the same amount through time. The model was 
therefore stratified on region and sector. Furthermore, a different classification of age was 
introduced. It took a value of 1 if it was the first operational year for that firm, a value of 2 
if it was in between second and fifth operational year and a value of 3 if it was older than 
five years. It then passed the standard hazard assumption test with chi-square of 46.28 
                                                             
41 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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(p=.12). The model was clustered on company ID (entref) to control for correlation 
between observations.  
All models then passed all standard statistical tests as reported in Table 10:4 
(Appendix 10.4.5). The main model had low explanatory power with R2 of 0.3% (max=9%) 
and a concordance score of 61%(+/-10%). It is worth noting that economic conditions, 
particularly during the recession, were not directly controlled for but rather indirectly by 
employing matching. This resulted in relatively low R2. Yet, it passed all standard tests. The 
likelihood-ratio, Wald and score chi-square statistics are asymptotically equivalent tests of 
the omnibus null hypothesis that all of the βs are 0. In this instance, the test statistics were 
in close agreement, and the omnibus null hypothesis was soundly rejected: likelihood ratio 
was 39.22 (df=17, p<0.01), Wald test = 961.7 (df=17, p=<0.01), Log-rank test = 44.62 
(df=17, p=<0.01) and robustness test with 31.62 (p=0.02).  
In line with the dynamic productivity estimation, the only highly significant variable 
directly related to SBRR was 𝜌 capturing the initial42 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift 
in relief. Both outcomes of the variable had a p-value of <0.01%, with hazard ratios of -
14.86 and -14.49, respectively. Thus, holding other covariates constant, if a firm was 
granted the relief during the first year of SBRR existence, its hazard ratio (e-14.86 = ~0) 
indicates that it has a high probability of survival. Likewise, if a firm was the first to receive 
the enhanced relief, it has (e-14.49 = ~0) much lower risk of death than others. Also, current 
SBRR was significant at 90% confidence level. Current SBRR was associated with 70% 
lower probability of closure.  
After accounting for other variables, there were no statistically significant 
associations between various SBRR lagged values and closure. This was not to say that 
these risk factors were not associated with all-cause mortality; their lack of significance is 
likely due to confounding (interrelationships among the risk factors considered). For the 
statistically significant risk factors, the 95% confidence intervals for the hazard ratios did 
not include 1 (the null value). In contrast, the 95% confidence intervals for various SBRR 
lagged values included the null value. They only indicate a trend towards significance. For 
instance, a weak positive effect on survival might exist from current SBRR and SBRR lagged 
by four to five periods. Some negative relationship may exist between SBRR and survival 
for other periods.  
Consistently, SBRR (first introduced) is significant and highly linked to the low 
probability of closure throughout all models with different imputation and matching 
                                                             
42 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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reported in Table 10:3 (Appendix 10.4.5, p. 283). All models, except the one using non-
matched and non-imputed data, have SBRR (first enhanced) also significantly related to 
TFP. Instead, it finds current SBRR to be negatively related to closure with a hazard ratio of 
-0.9 (p=0.03).  
There were two significant` variables not directly related to SBRR in the main model 
reported in Table 7:7. Firms with non-UK immediate ownership were almost three times 
more likely to close. The relationship was consistent across models reported in Table 10:3 
(Appendix 10.4.5, p. 283). 
Furthermore, those that planned to invest in R&D in the following two years were 
32% less likely to close than those that did not plan to invest in R&D. The relationship 
became weaker after matching probably because of the decreased sample size, but was 
evident before matching and after matching and imputation as showed in Table 10:3 
(Appendix 10.4.5, p. 283). 
 Estimate SE SE (r) Z Pr(>|z|) 
TFP 0.000002 0.000003 0.000003 0.50 0.62 
SBRR -1.12 0.56 0.67 -1.66 0.10* 
**SBBR (1st lag) 0.47 0.55 0.58 0.82 0.41 
SBRR (2nd lag) 0.002357 0.53 0.54 0.004383 1.00 
SBRR (3rd lag) 0.42 0.52 0.54 0.79 0.43 
SBRR (4th lag) 0.22 0.52 0.56 0.40 0.69 
SBRR (5th lag) -0.54 0.54 0.57 -0.95 0.34 
Age dummy -2 0.13 1.10 1.10 0.12 0.90 
Age dummy- 3 0.51 1.05 1.06 0.48 0.63 
PD 0.39 1.17 1.02 0.38 0.71 
PS 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.82 0.41 
HHI 0.001358 1.84 1.67 0.00 1.00 
Im. Foreign 
Ownership 
1.02 0.25 0.24 4.30 0.00*** 
R&D -0.39 0.17 0.17 -2.33 0.02** 
HGF -0.21 0.15 0.15 -1.44 0.15 
SBRR (first 
introduced) -14.86 6617.27 1.12 -13.23 0.00*** 
SBRR (first 
enhanced) -14.49 2051.14 0.88 -16.44 0.00*** 
 
Table 7:7 Cox model with matched imputed data bootstrapped through 1000 
samples. Tests and sample size are reported in Appendix (Table 10:2, p. 282). 
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7.3.2 Survival trees 
The survival trees estimated using CEM to control for self-selection into the 
treatment group and with automated imputation are displayed in Figure 7:10 and 
Appendix (Section 10.4.10 p. 291). The model was estimated with 15,047 observations and 
242 deaths. Another tree with controls for size instead of estimated TFP is presented in 
Figure 10:9 (Appendix 10.4.5.1.1, p. 285). 
 
Figure 7:10 The main survival tree.  
In Figure 7:10, the survival tree captures the importance of foreign ownership to 
survival. All observations are below the first node, which divides firms with UK and non-
UK immediate foreign ownership. For the small number of observations with non-UK 
immediate foreign ownership, the probability of survival is lower on average.  
However, the vast majority of observations refer to UK owned firms. The tree then 
divides UK firms into sectors. All sectors except production are then split on HHI, where 
small companies operating in sectors which are less concentrated towards several major 
players tend to outperform others.  
Firms in the production sector highly depend on the estimated TFP and region 
where they are located. The graph for those with annual TFP at just under 135,314 
operating in North East, East Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside shows a steep decline 
in survival for firms above this threshold. Similarly, those with TFP of at least 135,314 in 
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North East, West Midlands, South West, Wales and Scotland seem to experience some of the 
lowest rates of survival. 
There is no relationship with SBRR as found in the CPH model. The inconsistency is 
around the initial effects of the reliefs. This clearly dissipates quickly and the tree focuses 
across the entire period, alternatively the effect is captured by the variables. Thus, Figure 
7:11 was estimated to illustrate level effects in the predicted likelihood of closure. Without 
controlling for other variables, SBRR recipients were slightly less likely to close. In 
particular, firms receiving the initial43 relief or the uplift in relief seem to outperform others 
slightly. The Cox Regression identified that those firms which received the relief would 
benefit from it at that year. However, survival trees were considering the overall impact 
and excluded it from the output.  
 
Figure 7:11 Average survival probabilities over time estimated with survival trees. 
The graph on the bottom refers to current SBRR recipients vs non-recipients., 
whilst the upper graph is for SBRR (first/enhanced) recipients. 
                                                             
43 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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7.3.3 Random Forests 
For the survival analysis, random forest (RF) algorithm provided somewhat 
different results to those estimated by the survival trees. The prediction error was 
estimated to be 18% with full data 30% and 25% with test sample. Table 7:8 suggests that 
the key variables identified by the RF are still immediate foreign ownership and TFP. 
However, now the RF algorithm suggests that current SBRR and age are also important.  
Given this inconsistency, a further comparison of survival probabilities of current 
SBRR-recipients with non-recipients was prepared. The survival graphs in Figure 8:13 
were estimated with random forests to compare the previously estimated probabilities to 
the current ones. It provided very similar relationships to the previous estimation. SBRR 
recipients were more likely to survive than firms not receiving the relief. However, it seems 
evident that firms with no SBRR had slightly more diverse but relatively similar survival 
probabilities on average to those that received SBRR.  
 
Variables Survival 
TFP 0.0072 
SBRR 0.0034 
Immediate foreign ownership 0.0032 
Age 0.0029 
SBRR lagged by3 0.0017 
R&D 0.0016 
SBRR lagged by 2 0.0015 
SBRR lagged by 4 0.0014 
Sector 0.0013 
PS  0.0013 
SBRR lagged 0.0012 
PD  0.0012 
High growth firm (HGF) dummy 0.0009 
SBRR lagged by 5 0.0001 
SBRR (first enhanced/ first introduced) 0 
Ultimate foreign ownership 0 
Region -0.0003 
HHI -0.0003 
Table 7:8 Radom forests - estimated variable importance with matched data 
with automated imputation 
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Figure 7:12 Survival curves estimated with Random Forests; In the upper graph, 
the grey lines show how curves deviate across 500 trees, whilst the black lines 
show average survival curves. In the bottom graph the averages are presented 
together. 
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7.3.4 Comparison of Survival Estimators 
The Cox Regression found SBRR (first introduced and enhanced) dummy highly 
significant. Further visualisations with other methods indicated some relatively marginal 
initial SBRR effects on survival. SBRR recipients seemed to have marginally higher chances 
of survival. Figure 7:13 shows how different methods estimated survival curves. The LTRC 
probabilities were converted to be comparable to Kaplan-Meier curves. The overall 
probabilities were somehow consistent. The LTRCART trees seemed to capture recession 
while others did not because they were based on Kaplan-Meier curves.  
 
Figure 7:13 Comparison of survival curves estimated by the three methods. 
Source: author’s calculations.  
7.4  DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The overall aim of this thesis is to understand whether Small Business Rate Relief 
has any effects on firms, in particular with regards to their productivity and survival. To 
achieve this aim, the following objectives were formed: 
To create a theoretical framework which suggests whether SBRR may influence 
productivity and survival. The framework should be based on the existing theories of tax 
incidence and the UK business environment. 
To find appropriate data and analytical technique which could be used to either 
support or disprove the framework. Simultaneously, to explore other fields for techniques 
that were not used in policy evaluation before. 
To acquire the knowledge through the theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence of the extent to which SBRR may influence productivity and survival. 
Results 
 
    
215 
 
Theory and Empirical Reviews achieved the first objective by extending Duranton’s 
framework and forming the key hypotheses which are presented below. The Methodology 
Review and Research Design Chapters found and described the datasets (ARDx, BSD, PMS) 
and techniques (system GMM, Wooldridge's GMM and unbiased REEM trees for 
productivity and Cox Regression and LTRCART trees for suirvival) applied within the 
analysis. This section focuses on the third objective. It discusses the empirical findings of 
the thesis by using both results from the analysis and theoretical insights from the 
Literature Review. The theoretical framework shaped the following hypotheses on 
productivity: 
o H2a: TFP of firms receiving a relief, awarded upon its introduction or 
enhancement, is lower than of firms that are not receiving the relief in the short 
term; 
o H2b: TFP of firms receiving SBRR is lower than of firms that are not receiving 
the relief in the medium term; 
o H2c: SBRR has little or no significant impact on productivity in the long term; 
and survival: 
o H1a: survival probability of firms receiving a relief, awarded upon its either 
introduction or enhancement, is higher than of firms that are not receiving the 
relief in the short term; 
o H1b: survival probability of firms receiving SBRR is lower than of firms that are 
not receiving the relief in the medium term; 
o H1c: SBRR has no significant impact on survival rates in the long term. 
This section starts by unfolding the basic description of firms receiving the relief to 
identify whether the right firms were actually rewarded the relief. This first part shows 
that, in fact, those SBRR recipients were mistargeted. The chapter then expands on the 
effects of SBRR, separated into three periods similar to those used in forming the 
hypotheses. 
7.4.1 Firm Characteristics 
This thesis started by discussing the primary aims expressed in policy reports. 
These were related to the support during the recession, economic growth and general 
support for ”genuinely” small firms. However, in the official policy papers, no objectives 
were identified. From the reports and speeches of politicians, intended recipients seemed 
to be micro firms. 
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Given this lack of definition for both expected and intended recipients, the Theory 
Review (Section 2.2) further investigated possible reasons the government might consider 
supporting small firms. These were mainly related to the equity, market failure and 
externalities introduced by BRs. The following paragraphs present the results, explaining 
why SBRR in its current form cannot be justified solely by these criteria. 
Firstly, this thesis argues that the rating system needs to take into account ability 
to pay and must also be able to respond to circumstances, such as the broader economic 
environment. BRs may well be a substantial expense for some businesses (Peck et al., 
2014). However, this relief is unlikely to reduce the bills for those in need and, 
simultaneously, to address the ability-to-pay principle or support firms with the potential 
to grow because it does not target those firms directly. The policy, which is solely based on 
the premises the firm is occupying, was found to be too simplistic to verify any extent of the 
ability to pay.  
This is predominantly evident in the decision trees (Section 7.1 and figures in 
Appendices 10.4.1 and 10.4.2), where on several occasions larger firms were entitled to 
more substantial reliefs than smaller firms. For instance, the decision trees with the 
broader data (in Section 7.1.1.2 and Appendix 10.4.1) indicated that the government did 
not necessarily support micro firms. According to the EU definition, micro firms are those 
with less than 11 employees, reporting turnover of less or equal to £2 mln44. However, the 
decision trees showed that on multiple occasions BR bills do not correspond to the 
groupings by size. For instance, according to the detailed tree reported in Appendix 10.4.1 
(Figure 10:5, p. 277), the firms that were employing under 50 individuals with turnover 
from £2 to £10 million, particularly in construction, motor trade and wholesale sectors 
often paid far lower bills than those with nearly exact circumstances but turnover under £2 
million. Furthermore, decision trees on SBRR as a dependent variable uncovered even more 
frequent and substantial cases. Figure 7:4 (Section 7.1.2.1, p. 194) highlighted that not only 
micro but also medium and large firms were receiving substantial reliefs of up to 100%.  
Furthermore, it is ambiguous whether recipients were actually in need of public 
funds. Instead of supporting firms that ask for help, the relief only introduced externalities 
in the already complex market. One indication of increasing complexity comes from the lack 
of SBRR dependence on the region. Regional effects in the decision trees (Appendix 10.4.1 
and 10.4.2) were highly dependent on other variables but they did not seem to be related 
to the supply of land or historic property prices. It is challenging to find any reasons why 
                                                             
44 See Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.1) for the exact definition. 
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the central government may intentionally provide more support for some firms in more 
affluent parts of the country. Although Southern micro firms were often seen as performing 
better than firms in other parts of the UK, SBRR did not follow the similar distribution. In 
fact, as illustrated in Appendix 10.4.2, before 2010, South West and East of England 
experienced higher reliefs than other regions, while firms based in Wales and Scotland 
were receiving lowest reliefs. However, after 2010 Wales received the highest reliefs and 
SBRR recipients in North West and West Midlands the lowest reliefs. This is contrary to the 
UK commercial property prices45. 
The distortion introduced by the SBRR is even more evident when the sector 
variable is also included in the equation. The detailed decision trees reported in Appendix 
10.4.2 showed that micro firms between 2010 and 2015 experienced some complex SBRR 
distribution between sectors and regions. In property, construction and other service 
sectors, SBRR was 22% lower in North East and West, Yorkshire & Humberside and East 
Midlands than in other regions. On the other hand, firms that were operating in wholesale, 
retail, catering and production sectors and were situated in the North West, East and West 
Midlands, South East and West and Scotland received 25% lower reliefs than those based 
in North East, Yorkshire & Humberside, East of England and Wales. The distribution 
between sectors and regions does not suggest any reasonable indication that firms in 
genuine need of support received the relief owing to little or no relationship between either 
property values or overall performance of areas being identified in the data. 
Thus, the government supported not just micro firms but also larger ones. With its 
simplified definition only weakly corresponding to expected rents46, it failed to 
accommodate the ability-to-pay principle, and by doing so to reduce market failure. Instead 
of removing externalities, the government introduced further distortions by encouraging 
businesses to reside in the premises with lower rateable values. By doing so, instead of 
strengthening the progressive taxation, the government supported some businesses almost 
irrespectively to their fundamental characteristics. It might not equate well with fairness 
around firms that deserve or need support. 
This new evidence on mistargeting is an important contribution given that the few 
existing studies of SBRR (Regeneris Consulting, 2015; Pieda Consulting, 2014; Peck et al., 
2014) isolated only intended recipients, which were usually small firms, and did not look 
for other businesses that were not supposed to be supported by the policy. Furthermore, 
                                                             
45 As according to the HM Land Registry: Price Paid Data: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/price-paid-data (Accessed 18.07.2018). 
46 See Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.1) for the exact definition. 
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even when only smaller firms were considered, Peck et al. (2014) found that for some SBRR 
was not useful and called for better targeting. The degree of mistargeting is far higher than 
Peck et al. (2014) uncovered as this thesis showed that some larger businesses were also 
entitled to SBRR. Furthermore, given that the data excluded all businesses that had more 
than one local unit, even more substantial mistargeting should be expect.  
As a result, this thesis suggests that relief of this nature should adhere to the clear 
principles set out in the broader consultation on the non-domestic rate review that has an 
aim with timescales and most importantly targeted – for example, at specific sectors, ability 
to pay or economic growth in order to achieve higher efficiency of government spending. 
This better targeting could help to support high growing firms (e.g. defined in Section 4.7.2, 
p. 92) or in temporary hardship situations. The need for reliefs should be regularly 
evaluated, including assessments of whether they are achieving their desired purpose and 
impact. 
An even more simplistic definition, depending on the characteristics of a firm, might 
substantially reduce mistargeting. To define the intended recipients, the relief might be 
based on the fundamental characteristics of intended recipients such as turnover or 
employment. Thus, building on to the definition derived in the Introduction and 
Background Chapter, a micro firm would have to employ less than 11 people, have a 
turnover of less or equal to £2 million and receive 100% relief post-2010 (and 50% pre-
2010). If one considered solely descriptive statistics of the data in this study, this criterion 
could be a good starting point in the SBRR reform, which may potentially reduce 
capitalisation effects discussed in various terms because it would be linked to the business, 
not just the premises. On the other hand, any changes should be well thought out since 
increasing tax costs associated with employment may result in rising unemployment or 
alternative business models. 
7.4.2 Short Term (H1a and H2a) 
This chapter previously uncovered that the relief was not dependent on business 
characteristics. This section discusses any changes with regards to total factor productivity 
and survival within the group of those mistargeted recipients in the short term. 
Simultaneously, it confirms the H1a and H2a hypotheses, which indicate that TFP (survival 
probability) of firms receiving a relief, awarded upon either its introduction or 
enhancement, is likely to be lower (higher) than firms that are not receiving the relief in 
the short term. 
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In line with the Framework, the initial recipients of higher SBRR were significantly 
related to the higher survival in that year. Cox Regression in Section 7.3.1 (p. 207), showed 
that holding other covariates constant, those firms that received the initial47 relief or the 
uplift in relief, had an extremely high probability of survival. However, it is important to 
state that the LTRCART trees did not capture this relationship directly but the graph in 
Figure 7:11 (p. 211) indicated a marginal effect owing to different reporting. The trees 
report on the overall importance throughout the years, while the Cox Regression reports 
on the impact in a particular year when the dummy variable takes the value of one. The 
random forest algorithm (Figure 7:12, p. 213) also found current SBRR to be influential. 
The primary reason for the very high probability of survival of those firms may be 
increased cash flow which is yet to be acquired by the landlord with increased rents. The 
business owner is the most likely to experience any measurable returns in this term. Thus, 
the increased cash flow would help underperforming firms to sustain their business. This 
supports Peck’s et al. (2014) qualitative study where some business owners found SBRR 
exceptionally helpful and even claimed that they would have to close their firms if they did 
not receive the SBRR.  
The dynamic model in Section 7.2.3 provided some indication that first introduced 
(enhanced) SBRR may be related to some improvements in TFP. However, this was 
inconsistent across models (Appendix 10.4.4). In fact, both methods showed that SBRR did 
not have a significant positive effect on TFP in the longer terms. However, the tree in Section 
7.2.2 showed many instances where firm’s SBRR was associated to lower TFP. The results 
from this TFP estimator directed to two-sided effects. One might claim that the supported 
firms might be more likely to have lower TFP than their competitors because they were 
initially occupying premises with a lower value. However, this is unlikely since the data was 
included from 2000 and matching was applied to control for the prior observable 
characteristics to assess whether it is related to the introduced SBRR or not.  
Thus, effects on both survival and productivity are according to the Framework, 
which indicated that firms which start receiving the relief were less likely to relocate or 
close than non-recipients, but more likely to either sublet their premises, decrease 
employment or reduce their investment in TFP. The latter case was captured in the analysis 
with the reduction in TFP and might be regarded as one of the unintended consequences 
that, according to Hilber (2017), is likely to offset the positive incentive effects of certain 
policy measures. Simultaneously, SBRR recipients received more cash flow, resulting in a 
                                                             
47 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010. 
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higher probability of survival. Thus, the relief possibly discouraged firms from investing in 
their productivity and provided them with an incentive to stay in the current premises in 
the short term.  
Thus, further than assisting, in a small way, existing businesses which may still be 
struggling, this intervention does not contribute to improving the economy. Those micro 
firms that did not receive the relief were probably less likely to survive as a result of the 
increase in competition or inability to reduce costs to the level achieved by recipients. 
Building on the previous argument, in the broader market, with regards to the key 
indicators such as turnover and employment, smaller firms may be recipients and non-
recipients at the same time in the same areas. The positive effect on survival by recipients 
would mean that some non-recipients were disadvantaged by the relief because their 
immediate competitors could reduce their prices owing to either already introduced or 
enhanced relief. Consistently lower TFP in the main tree (Appendix 10.4.3, p. 280) indicates 
that those recipients would be more discouraged to invest in their TFP than non-recipients. 
Thus, as according to the theory with the standard neoclassical assumptions on competitive 
markets, the supported, less efficient, firms took a share of possibly more efficient but not 
supported businesses. The resulting market is where consumers still pay the same price 
but the taxpayer's money is used for the relief, so the taxpayer pays more for the goods. 
This is also supported by the general trends in the business deaths across the UK which 
were presented in the Introduction and Background Chapter. 
7.4.3 Medium Term (H1b and H2b) 
In the short term, further than providing marginal support for existing businesses, 
which may still be struggling, SBRR did not contribute to improving the economy. Although 
it seems challenging to separate the short and long terms because many factors may 
influence how quickly SBRR is capitalised into rents, this thesis defines the medium term 
as a term in between short (low or no capitalisation) and long (full capitalisation) terms as 
discussed in the Framework with Hypotheses Chapter (Section 4.6). The speed and extent 
of capitalisation are likely to depend on the competition within the region and industry. 
This section focuses on H1b and H2b hypotheses. TFP and survival probability of firms 
receiving SBRR are more likely to be lower than those of firms not receiving the relief in the 
medium term. 
The theoretical framework suggested that the majority of firms that received SBRR 
would experience harmful distortions such as increased rents that would be likely to cause 
relocations or closures in the medium term. Although variables related to SBRR in survival 
analysis were insignificant, the effects were adverse. This indicates that SBRR might not 
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always have a medium-term effect. However, if it does, the effect is more likely to be more 
harmful than positive. Moreover, Wooldridge’s TFP estimator illustrated with Figure 7:5 
(p. 197) showed that in the medium term, the general trend is towards the decrease in TFP 
caused by the SBRR as well as the dynamic TFP estimator found lagged SBRRs by three 
years (Table 7:6, p. 205) to be negatively related to GVA but insignificant.  
It seems that the more companies that exist in the same industry and region, the 
higher competition for their premises would be expected. Those premises in competitive 
regions would be popular. Business owners would be likely to increase rents once the SBRR 
becomes available. However, in less competitive areas or/and sectors, recipients would be 
likely to continue receiving the reliefs because these would not be captured into higher 
rents. This explains why dynamic TFP estimator and Cox Regression could not identify 
significant uniform results for variables related to SBRR. 
The speed and extent of these effects were likely to be dependent on the 
competition within the region and industry. The analysis identified several variables 
related to competition to be influential on how the company performs in all models. For 
instance, once the focus is on the LTCARD tree (reported in Section 7.3.2), two of the most 
influential variables found were HHI and regions. It captured competition effects 
nationwide with the HHI and within regions with region variable. Likewise, dynamic TFP 
estimator (reported in Section 7.2.3) and random forests (Table 7:5, p. 203) found 
competition indexes and regions to be the most influential. 
The data indicates that those variables might include effects on how firms also 
behave once SBRR is granted for the premises in the medium term. The examples from 
unbiased REEM trees reiterate the same ideas that SBRR was negatively related to SBRR. 
For instance, Figure 7:9 (p. 202) refers to 6,088 observations from regional firms younger 
than 32 years which were operating in sectors other than catering, which were not awarded 
any relief two years prior and were situated in less diversified areas (PD <=0.825). The 
once lagged SBRR refers to the short-term effect. It separated those which were awarded 
higher than 70% SBRR a year prior. Those not awarded the relief of at least 70% were 
further divided according to region. North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, 
East Midlands, South West, Wales and Scotland were grouped together and further 
separated according to the competition across industries. Only those with low 
concentration towards major players across sectors (HHI<=0.008) were split according to 
the relief lagged by two years. This implies that those which did not receive the relief two 
years ago, but did three years ago and were operating in some of the least concentrated 
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industries were 7% less productive than those that were not awarded the relief but had 
similar circumstances. The effect was not identified even for slightly more concentrated 
industries (HHI>0.008), once again showing that the relief in competitive industries or 
regions was capitalised promptly with no added benefits to property owners. 
To supplement these findings, it is worth recalling Hilber’s (2017) reasoning on 
local supply constraints for commercial properties. He argued that they should depend on 
the degree of substitutability of locations, relocation costs and the preference of business 
owners. These seem to be important factors but they are difficult to measure especially with 
data from accounts. The data shows that competition between sectors and regions also 
influences the capitalisation process.  
Furthermore, this thesis identified two effects that might be explained by the 
economic theory. One of them is continued distortion similar to that previously described 
in the short term. In the medium term, some firms would still pay initial rents and 
experience similar benefits of increased cash flow as in the short term. Thus, the positive 
effect on survival by recipients would mean that some non-recipients were disadvantaged 
by the relief because their immediate competitors could reduce their prices due to either 
introduced or enhanced relief. On the other hand, in more competitive sectors and/or areas, 
an adverse effect is likely to be experienced by the recipients owing to potential 
overcapitalisation of SBRR into property prices. The recipients would be hit by the 
increased rents which may push them to bankruptcy or relocation.  
Duranton’s et al. (2011) study possibly misidentified these medium-term effects to 
the long-term effects because of their shorter term of study. The opposite effect of SBRR 
than Duranton’s et al. (2011) as the tax liability would be reduced instead of increasing tax 
burden as it was in the Duranton’s et al. (2011) study. They found that higher taxes damage 
employment but cause more entrants at the same time. They argued that in their business 
environment (pre-1990s), higher taxes would influence more businesses to relocate or exit 
and, thus, ease the entry of other firms. This would cause new entrants to come into the 
market. Similarly, this thesis found that SBRR supported some firms in the short and 
medium terms as well as that supported firms had lower incentive to invest in their TFP 
than other firms. Duranton’s et al. (2011) study was limited to the shorter period and was 
likely to have employment figures recorded only twice across that period. Therefore, it 
seems sensible that they captured the medium-term effects instead of the long-term effects 
as they were defined in our framework. 
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7.4.4 Long Term (H1c and H2c) 
In the Framework (p. 79), it was reasonable to assume a perfectly competitive 
market with small moving costs in the long term results in no benefit of SBRR because firms 
would be changing locations, with demand of properties increasing until an equilibrium 
where SBRR is fully capitalised into rents. As a result of these assumptions, the hypotheses 
were directed towards little or no effects of SBRR on both survival and TFP in the long term. 
The overall results support the hypotheses and confirm the perfectly competitive 
market. In Stratified Cox Proportionate Regression and dynamic TFP estimation, the 
further lags of SBRR were insignificant. The former presented some positive effects on 
survival and the latter suggested that the lagged SBRR might be likely to reduce TFP in the 
long term. 
However, some adverse effect might be evident in firms that were not endorsed to 
invest in their processes to become more competitive in the previous periods. Some firms 
may be underperforming with regards to TFP as a result of SBRR. The tree identified three 
instances in Section 7.2.3 (p. 204), where higher SBRR lagged five times would consistently 
be linked with lower TFP. This variable was affecting more than one-third of all 
observations. 
The findings are in line with the previous studies on capitalisation. In the Empirical 
Review, this thesis did not identify any studies related to both UK BRs and either TFP or 
survival, so only the findings on capitalisation can be broadly compared. The results 
support a wider message on capitalisation from such previous studies as Bond et al. (1996 
and 2013) and Mehdi (2003), who identified full capitalisation in the long term. The relief 
has no significant positive effect in the longer term but may not be fully offset by the rents 
in the short term. 
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8  CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter highlights how the aims of the thesis were achieved and how this 
thesis contributed to the existing empirical and theoretical knowledge. It gathered 
literature to build a theoretical model and employed sensitive datasets to increase our 
understanding of Small Business Rates Relief (SBRR) and its effects on firms, in particular 
with regards to their productivity and survival. These resulted in policy recommendations. 
Simultaneously, the thesis supplemented standard econometric techniques with advanced 
approaches from Computer Science that had previously not been employed in policy 
evaluation. This thesis defines total factor productivity (TFP) as the portion of output not 
explained by the amount of inputs used in production, whilst survival analysis in this 
setting is a method for analysing the expected duration of time until closure. 
This chapter is divided into five sections and follows a similar flow to the thesis. 
Section 8.1 is devoted to the theoretical contribution to knowledge made in this thesis, 
showing how SBRR may cause firms to change once SBRR is either introduced or enhanced 
in the short, medium and long terms. Section 8.2 then describes the contribution to 
knowledge regarding methodology in the field. The restricted, but extensive datasets were 
used with not only some of the most advanced approaches in Econometrics, but also 
suitable techniques from Computer Science. The complex empirical findings presented in 
this thesis broadly confirmed the Framework, making a further contribution to empirical 
knowledge of commercial property reliefs discussed in Section 8.3. The chapter concludes 
with policy implications coming from the theoretical and empirical findings in Section 8.4 
and avenues for future research in Section 8.5. 
8.1 CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY 
This thesis started by gathering theoretical and empirical literature on the tax 
incidence, capitalisation, property taxation and governmental intervention. This literature 
was then developed into a model to introduce a new understanding of the effect of SBRR. 
This was mainly achieved by updating the existing Duranton’s et al. (2011) framework 
according to the newly discovered evidence from the literature.  
The survey of the studies on SBRR identified few theoretical contributions directly 
linked to relief for firms occupying premises with lower rateable value. Thus, the thesis 
started with broader mechanisms on property taxation. The established literature on tax 
incidence and capitalisation to property prices directed the research to three views; old, 
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new and benefit. Out of these, most applicable to the current UK environment was the new 
view building on the general equilibrium mechanisms, implying, at least partial, 
capitalisation. This means that some part of the SBRR is likely to be handed to property 
owners through increased rents. This view was slightly more suitable for the more 
centralised UK environment. 
The assumptions in these models were often slightly unsuitable for the UK 
environment as the vast majority of theories were shaped by US scholars. A further survey 
of the literature (Chapters 2 and 3) and insights into differences across countries (Chapter 
1, Section 1.3) suggested that theories originating from abroad may not necessarily apply 
to the UK environment owing to differing tax systems, property markets and culture.  
Thus, the thesis focused on developments from the three theoretical studies from 
the UK (Sections 2.1.2-2.1.5 in the Theory Review Chapter). Fraser (1984) was one of the 
first scholars providing a complete view of property economics in the UK. His theory 
provided an indication of how business rates are likely to change rents and ownership in 
short, medium and long terms. This thesis adopted those terms. Fraser’s ideas were further 
extended by Duranton’s et al. (2011) who quantified various scenarios with the aim of 
predicting possible effects by looking at either a negative or positive shock in demand. Both 
Fraser and Duranton et al. theories were made for the pre-1990s UK with decentralised 
taxation, meaning that their assumptions may not necessarily be valid for the post-1990s 
UK. 
In addition, with a slightly similar perspective to that of the new view, Hilber (2017) 
suggested possible unintended consequences from property taxes. These were related to 
the distortions from the preferential taxation to some firms disadvantaging others. He also 
argued that there is no uniform capitalisation across the location, implying that SBRR may 
be beneficial for some areas but harmful for others,  
As a result, the framework proposed in this thesis, adopted Fraser’s short, medium 
and long terms and inspired by Duranton et al., mimicked either a negative or positive 
shock in demand with different scenarios depending on the relief. Furthermore, in line with 
Hilber’s theoretical argument on no uniform capitalisation, the framework controlled for 
capitalisation by employing indexes on the competition.  
Furthermore, all empirical articles related to the non-domestic property taxation in 
the UK were reviewed systematically in the Empirical Review Chapter. The empirical 
literature confirmed the importance of property tax incidence, implying that small 
businesses may not necessarily be receiving SBRR, especially in the shorter terms. The 
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previous literature on business rates mainly focused on capitalisation or qualitative cross-
sectional policy evaluation and had only discussed employment. No studies have been 
found that investigate how non-domestic property taxation reliefs relate to either survival 
or productivity. From this limited existing literature, it was evident that at least some 
amount of capitalisation should be expected. 
The gathered theoretical knowledge, supplemented by a systematic literature 
review of the business rates, resulted in the novel theoretical framework. It is novel because 
it reshaped the most sophisticated UK non-domestic property taxation framework to 
include SBRR and productivity and redefined assumptions for the framework to fit the post-
1990s environment. Furthermore, the framework removed some of the unrealistic 
assumptions, such as uniform capitalisation. This theoretical framework suggested that 
capitalisation is likely to be different across properties, proposing to control for this with 
three competition indices. Firstly, overall market concentration suggesting whether 
monopolies are predominant in the industry was estimated with Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index, market concentration in a particular region with Marshallian and local market 
diversification with Jacobian externalities. The proposed indexes accounted for the 
competition for similar premises, regionally and nationally and the extent of SBRR 
capitalisation into rents.  
The modelling showed that exits are positively related to higher rents, and taxes are 
negatively related to reliefs. Some small firms may then survive a given negative shock, 
irrespective of productivity. If a firm survives a negative demand shock, it will reduce the 
used output from installed capacity, leading to lower productivity. The higher the fixed level 
of rent and taxes, the greater this decline as these costs absorb a greater proportion of 
turnover, increasing the salience of the tax, but reliefs would ameliorate the effect.  
Once the positive shocks are considered, the reliefs may become an impediment to 
productivity gains, within existing supply constraints. In the decision between maintaining 
or increasing capacity at the current premises, the positive shock would need to be 
sufficient to cover the increased tax and loss of reliefs after revision of higher rateable 
values. Instead of enabling firms to overcome putative growth frictions, they could be less 
likely to invest, relative to the counterfactual of no reliefs. This would be in line with 
Duranton et al. (2011). Reliefs would also impede the decisions to relocate, relative to no 
relief, as the positive demand shock would need to be greater to induce firms receiving 
reliefs to change location and feasibly improve productivity. 
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In general, the static argument supporting the reliefs is that the higher relative cost 
of property taxes for small firms in their fixed costs (repeated in H.M. Treasury, 2016) 
disproportionately reduces profits and ability to invest. Givord et al. (2013) argue that 
small firms tend to be more financially constrained than larger firms and might be more 
responsive to tax incentives. However, Holtz-Eakin (2000) challenges this narrative, 
arguing studies that suggest finance restrictions limit small firms have not shown too few 
or the wrong firms are funded. The conclusions from this basic modelling show that the 
story is rather more nuanced than the arguments supporting the reliefs. Firms may be 
better placed to survive negative shocks, but they are also more likely to be less productive, 
with higher investment thresholds. Capitalisation will also reduce the putative negative 
effects of the property tax, but this could vary by the degree and type of competition for 
commercial space. That said, the statutory incidence on occupiers makes this a highly 
salient tax irrespective of economic incidence.  
8.2 CONTRIBUTION TO METHOD 
The theoretical modelling drew out some of the nuanced implications SBRR may 
have on survival and investment boundaries. It showed that the effects are likely to vary 
across businesses owing to the differences in SBRR capitalisation in rents. Firm 
characteristics are not solely additive, but interact such that the path along which any 
effects of the universal policy operate on survival or productivity is difficult to identify a 
priori.  
These considerations, supplemented by a review of methodologies in the 
Methodology Review Chapter, led to the adoption of two recently developed decision tree 
algorithms (Section 8.2.1) supplemented by more standard estimators (Section 8.2.2). The 
contribution to the methodology also comes from using three sensitive rich data sources 
(Section 8.2.3). 
8.2.1 Trees Not Used Previously in Policy Evaluation 
The thesis borrowed some of the most recent methodologies from Computer 
Science and applied them with more common approaches. Although the thesis estimated 
total TFP by employing relatively standard Wooldridge (2009) one-step estimator, the 
novelty is its use of the estimated TFP as a dependent variable in the REEM and 
independent in ST and Cox Regression to illustrate how SBRR affected TFP and survival. 
The trees were chosen because they are more capable of identifying changing relationships 
across regions, sectors and other variables that were likely to have multiple interactions 
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with each other and be non-linear. The standard analysis and its assumptions were too 
sensitive for this analysis. The traditional empirical analyses would assume a constant 
relationship between these independent variables and productivity because they are based 
on point estimates that lead to a single value of a statistic. Furthermore, the REEM trees 
were chosen instead of other machine learning approaches like random forests because 
they can account for a longitudinal aspect of the data. ST algorithm was capable of 
accommodating left-truncated and right-censored longitudinal data. 
8.2.2 Extensions to the Standard Approaches  
The thesis employed two relatively standard approaches to estimate TFP. The first 
was Wooldridge’s one step estimator, which provided a dependent variable to account for 
the effects of SBRR with REEM trees. The results were supplemented by TFP estimated with 
the dynamic estimator. Likewise, the Stratified Cox Regression was used to estimate 
survival. An innovative aspect within these two approaches is different matching and 
deflators. 
To estimate the effects of SBRR, the thesis recreated the conditions of a social 
experiment by employing Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) instead of more typically 
applied Propensity Score Matching (PSM). CEM does not use random pruning applied in 
PSM which was proven to increase the level of imbalance (King et al., 2011 and 2016). This 
is likely to boost effects, but the matching controls for the impact of other observed and 
unobserved variables makes data less model dependent, biased and inefficient.  
Furthermore, the majority of studies have used industry deflators to estimate firm-
level prices. To control for omitted price bias (as defined by Van Beveren, 2010), instead of 
deflating with a GDP estimator as usual in the field, PSM was used to estimate the exact 
values for the specific firm’s prices.  
8.2.3 Large Sensitive Datasets 
Moreover, the unique feature of this research project is its use of data sources that 
are extensive, but rarely employed because of security restrictions regarding access. None 
of the empirical studies discussed in the Empirical Review Chapter employed such 
extensive datasets. All coding and data analysis was performed in the Secured Lab managed 
by the UK Data Service. The analysis was based on the Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
Annual Respondents Database X (ARDx) first released in July 2016 combined with Business 
Structure Database (BSD) and Prices Survey Microdata (PSM). ARDx was combined with 
BSD to acquire annual observations of firms not included in the scope of ARDx in some 
years. This helped to estimate the competition indexes and fill missing observations in 
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ARDx. The BSD was an appropriate dataset to fill those gaps as it covers almost the entire 
UK business population. These datasets resulted in a sample of 1,092 firms over 17 years. 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION TO EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The Results Chapter (Section 7.4) showed that the effects on both, survival and 
productivity, broadly follow the Framework. In the short term, firms which start receiving 
SBBR were less likely to relocate or close than non-recipients, but more likely to either 
sublet their premises, decrease employment or reduce their investment in TFP. The latter 
scenario was captured in the analysis with the reduction in TFP and might be regarded as 
one of the unintended consequences that, according to Hilber (2017), is likely to offset the 
favourable incentive effects of such policy measures as SBRR. Simultaneously, SBRR 
recipients received more cash flow, resulting in a higher probability of survival. The relief 
possibly discouraged firms from investing in their productivity as they were able to sustain 
the competitive advantage without investment and provided them with an incentive to stay 
in their current premises in the short term.  
Thus, further than short term assistance of existing businesses which may still be 
struggling, this intervention does not contribute to improving the economy. In the short-
term results, the recipients were less likely to invest in their TFP than non-recipients. Thus, 
as according to the theory with the standard neoclassical assumptions on competitive 
markets, the supported but possibly less efficient firms may take a share of possibly more 
efficient, but unsupported businesses. The resulting market (as shown in the Theory 
Review, Section 2.2.1.3) is where consumers still pay the same price, but the taxpayer's 
money is used for the relief, so the taxpayer pays more for the goods.  
This effect might be even higher because SBRR is given to some firms with large 
turnover and/or employment. The thesis found that with regard to employment and 
turnover, medium and large sized firms were sometimes entitled to receive the relief. This 
new evidence on mistargeting is an important contribution, given that the few existing 
studies of SBRR (e.g. Peck et al., 2014) isolated only intended recipients, (usually small 
firms), and failed to consider other businesses that were not supposed to be supported by 
the policy. Furthermore, even when only the smaller firms were considered, Peck et al. 
(2014) found that for some firms, SBRR was not useful and called for better targeting. The 
degree of mistargeting is much higher than Peck et al. (2014) discovered because, as this 
thesis showed, some larger businesses were also entitled to SBRR. Furthermore, given that 
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the data excluded all businesses that had more than one local unit, even more substantial 
mistargeting should be expected.  
In the medium term, some firms would still pay initial rents and experience similar 
benefits of increased cash flow as in the short term. Thus, the positive effect on survival by 
recipients would mean that some non-recipients were hurt by the relief because their 
immediate competitors could reduce their prices due to either introduced or enhanced 
relief. On the other hand, in more competitive areas, the adverse effect is likely to be 
experienced by the recipients because of the possible overcapitalisation of SBRR into 
property prices. The recipients would be hit by the increased rents which may either push 
them to reduced investment in TFP, close or relocate.  
Duranton’s et al. (2011) study possibly misidentified these medium to long-term 
effects. The opposite effect should be present in this study because SBRR, as the tax liability, 
would be reduced instead of increasing the tax burden as highlighted in Duranton’s et al. 
(2011) study. They found higher taxes hurt employment, but also relate to more entrants. 
They argued that in their business environment (pre-1990s), higher taxes would influence 
more businesses to relocate or exit and, thus, ease the entry of other firms. This would cause 
new entrants to come into the market. Similarly, this thesis found that SBRR supported 
some firms in the short and medium terms, as well as that supported firms had less of an 
incentive to invest in their TFP than other firms. Duranton’s et al. (2011) study was limited 
to the shorter period and was likely to have employment figures recorded only twice across 
that period. Therefore, they were likely to capture the medium-term effects instead of the 
long-term effects. 
However, the findings are in line with the other UK studies on capitalisation and tax 
breaks. This thesis did not identify any studies related to both UK business rates and either 
TFP or survival, but the results support the broader message on capitalisation from such 
previous studies as Bond et al. (1996 and 2013), who identified full capitalisation in the 
long term implying that taxation is offset by the inverse rent adjustments in the long term. 
In a similar vein, it supports other studies (e.g. Wyld et al., 2010) showing that there is little 
evidence of a change in survivorship as a consequence of the introduction of tax breaks. 
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8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The thesis found that the substantial reductions in tax revenue totalling up to £9 
billion over five years in England alone48 results in only very marginal benefits in survival 
and no benefits to productivity. In fact, this study found that observations for firms with 
higher levels of lagged SBRR were consistently associated with lower levels of total factor 
productivity. 
The Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.4.3, p. 27) started with the 
narrative underlying the policy of reductions (HM Treasury 2016b, 2017). This thesis could 
not find any support for those arguments. Results show that property tax reductions are 
unlikely to enable small firms to lead local growth through a reduction in financial 
constraints which were believed to disproportionately limit their ability to invest and 
innovate, relative to larger firms. This feeds off the wider narrative. For instance, the Chief 
Executive of Tesco (BBC, June 2018), the largest supermarket chain in the UK, linked 
closures of high-street shops to BR. In July 2018 The Financial Times reported naïve 
research with the title ‘How UK Business Rates Shake-up is Deepening High Street Gloom’ 
(Bounds, 2018). These comments echo the influential position of the Federation of Small 
Businesses that the tax is an expensive, unfair burden, discouraging growth and investment 
(FSB website, no date). Contrary to this narrative, this thesis does not find any indication 
that the relief may enhance productivity, support more productive firms or extend the life 
time of firms, especially in the longer term. 
These findings are reported just as the UK government is gradually returning BR 
revenue to local control in England via devolution of powers or greater revenue retention. 
As approached in the Introduction and Background Chapter (Section 1.4.3, p. 27), powers 
have already been devolved to Scottish and Welsh national governments. These recent 
reductions are framed, on one side, by high profile concerns about ever-tighter funding for 
local authorities which will become increasingly dependent on local property taxes. On the 
other side, the strong perception from firms paying BR, i.e. commercial property taxes 
levied on business occupiers, is that the tax is an antiquated burden on entrepreneurial 
spirits. The pressures from firms have seen central governments incrementally move away 
from BR as a flat tax with the introduction of ever-deeper SBRR.  
                                                             
48 The most recent extension to reductions from April 2017 and 2018 will further reduce 
tax revenue across England by £9 billion over five years and remove 600,000 firms from liability 
(HM Treasury, 2017). 
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However, it is worth noting that the thesis looked only at productivity and survival. 
Some may argue that SBRR may exist for the sake of enabling people to pursue 
independence, creativity, a family tradition or even an opportunity to adopt new ideas in 
the hope of founding the next growth firms. Others may suggest that there is a 
concentration of difficulty to employ people in these firms. These might be the real 
intentions and they might be legitimate, but only if business owners received the relief. 
Although the thesis did not model these explicitly, the results suggest that the relief is likely 
to be capitalised into rents, especially in the longer term, meaning that intended recipients 
would not receive any benefit.  
Thus, the thesis reasons that there is little justification for the relief and its 
enhancement was likely to be more based on political rhetoric than evidence. This thesis 
supports Bergstrom (2000), who states that policy-makers may be focused too heavily on 
maximising political objectives rather than economic efficiency. This is because removing 
policies like SBRR might be very unpopular amongst voters. Although some politicians may 
know that SBRR is not benefiting small firms but rather property owners as the Northern 
Ireland Centre for Economic Policy uncovered in 2014. They are unlikely to act against 
these policies because of negative perceptions.   
However, the government is investing in projects such as Making Tax Digital (2019) 
which should help to improve the relief by enabling the government to account for the key 
characteristics of businesses operating in particular premises and, thus, to reduce 
capitalisation. This is important because a relief of this nature should adhere to the clear 
principles set out in the broader consultation on the non-domestic rate review that has the 
stated aim with timescales. The relief should be targeted – for example, at specific sectors, 
ability to pay or economic growth. The need for reliefs should be more regularly evaluated, 
including assessments of whether they are achieving their desired purpose and impact. 
Whilst region also plays a consistent defining role in grouping observations, this 
thesis finds interesting evidence from its use of competition indexes. This suggests nuanced 
and targeted policy on understanding accounting for local drivers and constraints could be 
more fruitful than the current generic firm-based policy. Regional differences consistently 
play a role in explaining TFP. There was no simple, consistent regional pattern, except for 
London, which has no relationship with SBRR. This region has a higher weighted average 
TFP, although only a small number of extreme firms cause this difference; most 
observations are in-line with the rest of the country. More interestingly, for approximately 
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one quarter of observations49 greater Jacobian Diversity explains firm’s higher 
productivity. The mainstream logic underlying the SBRR focuses on firm-level constraints 
and sees tax reductions as solutions, whereas the Jacobian argument is that urban areas 
facilitate innovation through their institutional organisation and attraction of economic 
actors (i.e. innovation) and as such is spatially orientated rather than firm orientated 
(Florida et al. 2017). The findings support this latter case, but not for all areas and as such 
this thesis would argue research and policy focused on diverse location factors rather than 
generic subsidies would prove to be a more fruitful means of targeting rate relief. 
Conversely, the current market, with multiple support incentives, may only 
increase the churn of businesses, which is already higher in the UK than the average across 
OECD countries (as reported in the Introduction and Background Chapter, Section 1.2). 
This thesis highlights the need to look for alternatives. It broadly supports the dynamic 
capabilities theory (introduced in the Theory Review Chapter, Section 2.2.2.3) implying 
that the government should directly help firms to enhance their dynamic capabilities, for 
example, by supporting broadband or infrastructure projects instead of providing extra 
cashflow with SBRR which might be quickly capitalised into rents. Even if not capitalised, 
this direct capital through the relief can help to overcome liquidity constraints, but not 
increase dynamic capabilities because building and land are generic and not a source of 
dynamic capabilities. However, it may be a resource that businesses command - so dynamic 
capability may lead businesses to use their space better by enhancing productivity, for 
instance. Programmes such as innovation grant schemes may be more beneficial in this 
case, dependent upon how effectively businesses are using these incentives. In fact, even 
public subsidies to R&D were not found to trigger additional firm-financed spending 
greater than the subsidy itself (Dimos and Pugh, 2016). More specifically, in the context of 
micro firms, the primary focus probably should be on the decision maker, so a business 
owner. Thus, incentives to undergo management training would be an appropriate way to 
enhance dynamic capabilities within a small firm. Theoretically this may help small 
businesses to compete in national or even international markets. 
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study was limited by several assumptions mainly imposed due to its use of 
secondary data. Ideally, another study with extensive primary data observing firms after 
                                                             
49 This figure principally comes from combining end nodes for firms which are in the branch 
for observations of firms younger than 32 in Appendix 10.4.3 (p. 290). For more detail, see the 
Results Chapter (Section 7.2.2, p. 208). 
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further reforms in 2018, could be conducted. The primary study would not have limitations 
imposed in this thesis. It would not have to be limited by available variables and would not 
require imputation. It could then also include firms that have more than one local unit. 
Removing these limitations imposed due to the usage of secondary data could directly 
estimate capitalisation and impact on both, TFP and survival. This thesis supplemented the 
main models with other outputs in Appendices 10.4.4-10.4.6 which provided broadly 
consistent results. However, a further study with primary data could provide greater 
credibility and directly control for the effects discussed in Section 4.7. 
More importantly, further research should directly quantify capitalisation because 
policy makers and firms seem unable to fully comprehend how capitalisation of the SBRR 
occurs. This makes challenging and changing policy difficult, and as such requires the 
support of considered research. If the research finds overwhelming capitalisation, 
governments would have the opportunity to raise awareness of this and reduce the salience 
of the tax and consequential political pressure by aligning the economic and statutory 
incidence of BR on property owners and removing the reliefs. If research finds this not to 
be the case and the least productive firms are simply absorbing the gains rather than 
innovating, again there would be a clear-cut case for removal of the reliefs. Both of these 
outcomes lead to the revocation of the policy, but without an evidence base, any policy 
change could prove to be politically complicated.  
The theoretical evidence is also lacking. This thesis uncovered extensive theoretical 
arguments on property taxation and reliefs, but mainly focused on the US. The empirical 
evidence related to UK non-domestic taxation is relatively limited. To supplement the 
evidence from this study, a further study, possibly qualitative or even ethnographic, looking 
at several different firms over the change in the business rates between 2018 and 2021, 
could provide fruitful results and could potentially replicate Peck’s et al. (2014) study to 
understand the perspective of the business owner a bit better. It could answer such 
questions as how the relief is experienced by business leaders and staff, what happens to 
the relief, and how landlords and property agents behave. A case study with ethnographic 
aspects could possibly be employed. Sensitive issues for management such as an increase 
in taxes, organisational difficulties, and accounting could be investigated with a personal 
touch. Flexible and opportunistic data collection methods could be employed to account for 
the extent of capitalisation. For instance, the phenomenon could be explored with the case 
study approach. but by collecting and writing up the project including for the existence of 
the researcher. This would support authors such as Richardson (1990:10) who states that 
the researchers “weigh and sift experiences, make choices regarding what is significant, 
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what is trivial, what to include, what to exclude … we [researchers] craft narrative, we write 
lives.” 
Additionally, methodological development should be further continued. Firstly, the 
thesis invites more interdisciplinary research projects. adopting approaches from different 
fields and applying them to policy evaluation. This would result in capturing more diverse 
interactions across variables and, thus, estimating more precise effects. This thesis 
employed pioneering trees to estimate the effects on TFP, which were measured with the 
control function approach. Future research may provide the whole mechanism that 
estimates TFP and draws trees in one step. Furthermore, the development of algorithms 
such as random forests, but including the longitudinal aspects of the data is required to 
facilitate the more complex understanding.  
8.6 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
Figure 8:1 Overview of contribution to the knowledge of the thesis. 
The key contributions of this thesis are summarised in Figure 8:1. The thesis 
reviewed fundamental literature on property taxation to form a theoretical framework, 
which includes varying capitalisation, is fit for the post-1990s UK environment and models 
effects of SBRR. To test those effects, the thesis employed large sensitive datasets. It used 
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this data not only with improved50 standard econometric techniques, but also advanced 
approaches from Computer Science that were not previously employed in policy 
evaluation. This resulted in a contribution to empirical evidence and policy implications. 
The thesis did not find any evidence that SBRR is effective. Thus, together with other 
recommendations it invited to review SBRR and look for alternatives.  
                                                             
50 Improved by CEM matching and more precise deflators. 
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10  APPENDICES 
10.1  APPENDICES TO INTRODUCTION 
10.1.1 BR Bill 
The BR bill as presented and explained by the Aberdeenshire Council 
(https://www.aberdeenshire.gov.uk/business/business-rates/your-bill/, 2018).  
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No Description 
1. The person(s) or company liable for payment of the bill 
2. Contact address – where the business rates bill will be issued 
3. Date, the business rates bill was issued 
4. Your business rates reference number - to help us deal with your query 
quickly, always quote this number when you contact us 
5. & 
6. 
This is the financial year that your bill relates to 
7. Phoning us – if you have any questions about your bill, please phone this 
number 
8. The reason the business rates bill has been issued; for example, annual bill, 
duplicate bill, exemption, relief 
9. Charges for your bill and any reductions that have been awarded to your 
account 
10. This is the period the charges on this bill relates to 
11. Payments that have been made to this account up to the date the bill was 
issued 
12. Payments that have been transferred from other reference numbers or other 
financial years 
13. This shows the outstanding balance payable for this bill 
14. This is the current payment method of your bill 
15. Payment instalment dates 
16. This is the instalment value to be paid by each instalment date 
17. Please note this is the annual charge for this property based on the rateable 
value and rate poundage 
18. This is the subjects that the Business Rates bill relates to 
10.1.2 Regions and Sectors 
ONS also provides births and deaths by sector. Figure 10:1 (p. 265) offers a 
description of the data for 2010 and 2015. It seems evident that sectors deviate a lot. 
Manufacturing sector seems to deviate less than service sector. The most extreme case is 
business administration and support service sector which experienced many deaths 
(22.6%) in 2010 but also experienced the most births (20.4) in 2015. The only industries 
that did not have more deaths than births in 2010 were health, education, and information 
& communication industries.  
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Figure 10:1 Business birth and death rates by sector, UK, 2015. Source: ONS 
(2010,2015). 
On the other hand, Figure 10:2 (p. 265) shows that birth and death rates do not 
deviate much between regions. The two extreme cases are London and Northern Ireland. 
The former has the highest business birth rate at 18.6% and 13.1% and death rate at 10.5% 
and 15% in 2015 and 2010, respectively, while Northern Ireland had the least deaths and 
births in both years. Figure 10:2 further confirms that firms recovered after the post-
recession period and the amount of births significantly exceeds deaths in all regions in 
2015. 
 
Figure 10:2 Business birth and death rates by region, UK, 2015. Source: ONS 
(2010,2015). 
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10.1.3 Other reliefs 
The descriptions of other reliefs are adopted from the UK government website 
(https://www.gov.uk/apply-for-business-rate-relief).  
10.1.3.1 Charitable Relief  
Properties that are occupied by charities and mostly used for charitable purposes 
can claim a reduction of 80% in business rates, same as community amateur sports clubs. 
Billing authorities have the discretion to increase this to 100%.  
10.1.3.2 Empty Buildings Relief 
In general, empty commercial buildings are not taxed for three months.  
10.1.3.3 Transitional Relief 
Transitional relief limits how much BR bill can change each year as a result of 
revaluation. It is automatically applied by the local authorities in England.  
10.1.3.4 Rural Rate Relief 
Properties which are occupied by businesses in a rural area with a population 
below 3,000. 100% SBRR is also applied to the only village shop or post office, with RV of 
up to £8,500 and the only public house or petrol station, with RV of up to £12,500. Local 
councils in Wales can also give relief to other rural retail businesses of up to 100% (for 
properties with RV under £16,500). Rural Rate Relief takes precedence over Small Business 
Rate Relief, so it is possible for a property to attract a 50% mandatory discount under the 
former, in place of a 100% mandatory discount under the latter.  
10.1.3.5 Discretionary (Hardship) Relief  
Section 69 of the Localism Act 2011 provides a power for billing authorities in 
England and Wales to reduce the business rates of any local ratepayer. The Government has 
not issued guidance in respect of how this power might be used, though councils must 
ensure that the reliefs they allow do not transgress state aid rules.  
10.1.3.6 Exempted Buildings  
Agricultural land and buildings, including fish farms, buildings used for training or 
welfare of disabled people, buildings registered for public religious worship or church halls 
are exempt from business rates. 
10.1.3.7 Relief for Pubs 
Pubs in England with RV of less than £100,000 will receive £1,000 off their business 
rates bill. The relief will be applied from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018.  
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10.2  APPENDICES TO THEORY REVIEW 
10.2.1 Fundamental Concepts Related to Business Rates 
Figure 10:3 shows differences between progressive, proportional and regressive 
tax rate. A progressive tax rate would increase proportionately to the taxpayer’s income. 
Probably the most widely discussed is the ability to pay principle, which is a progressive 
taxation principle that maintains that taxes should be levied according to a 
taxpayer's ability to pay. The opposite is a regressive tax, which would be decreasing 
proportionately to the taxpayer’s income. A proportionate tax is in between regressive and 
progressive. A proportionate tax rate should be constant.  
 
Figure 10:3 Progressive, proportional and regressive tax rate. 
Horizontal equity is a theory claiming that individuals with similar income and 
assets should be taxed equally regardless of the tax system in place. 
Administrative costs are indirect costs that an organisation incurs not directly tied 
to a particular function such as manufacturing, production or sales. 
Land. Early economists such as Marshall (1890) treat land as a separate factor of 
production. Arguably, this changes once economy shifts from the agriculture to the service 
sector. Thus, these are reviewed very briefly. Mills (1972) summarises early urban land 
models, which includes Wingo’s (1961) analysis around urban transport costs and rents 
and Alonso’s (1964) general theory of land rent. The latter also considers commercial 
leases (for a more extensive summary see Mills, 1972). The first British study focusing on 
land is by Evans (1972 and 1973) who explains residential location decisions. All these 
models assume perfect competition and are based on Thunen’s theory, which relies on 
many unrealistic assumptions such as homogeneity of producers and consumers (for the 
more extensive list, see Launhardt, 1983).  
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Perfect competition and efficiency. Evans (1995) summarises early literature on 
property market efficiency and perfect competition. He concludes that in the short-term 
property markets are not efficient, but in the long-term, they should be 90% efficient. Many 
models including Fraser’s rental surplus model assume market perfection. On the other 
hand, other models may consider market being not perfect but either weak, semi-strong or 
strong (as introduced by Fama in 1970). This is a common trade of a market efficiency 
hypothesis (for an extensive review, see Brown, 1991:62-138).  
Law of diminishing returns. This principle reasons that once one combines fixed 
factor (land) with other variable factors (e.g. buildings, crops), increments in output 
eventually decrease. Fraser (1984) illustrates this with an example of farmland and crops. 
He assumes that a fixed factor is a land and a variable element is a seed. The total output 
would increase with each seed. However, marginal product (a result of the use of each extra 
unit of seed) would be rising in the beginning but decreasing once the peak is reached. 
Then, Fraser, in hand with neoclassical economics, attempts to identify the optimal amount 
of land and capital (see Fraser, 1984:186-195). He focuses on the two main factors causing 
rent to be paid, profit potential and competition. 
10.2.2 Econometric Techniques 
10.2.2.1 Fixed Effects Estimator 
To understand the empirical papers, the central estimation techniques are 
introduced in the following paragraphs. The introduction follows Mandaka and Lahiri’s 
(2010) chapter 15. They provide an extensive discussion on econometrics for panel data 
analytics.  
They start by defining fixed effects estimator, which is given by: 
, 
where yit is the output and xit is the vector of inputs for the ith farm in the tth period. 
i captures farm-specific inputs (e.g., managerial skills) and is assumed to be constant over 
time. 
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For the simplicity, it is assumed that uit  IN(0, 2) and there is just one explanatory 
variable. If group means are , then within-group sums of 
squares and sums of products are  
 
Let Wxx = ΣiWxxi with Wxy and Wyy defined similarly. 
The estimates of the parameters i and  are obtained by minimising 
 with respect to i and .  
We get 
 
 
Substituting the expression for  in the second equation and simplifying we get 
 
The residual sum of squares is  In the case of several explanatory 
variables, Wxx is a matrix and  and Wxy are vectors. 
We get within-group estimator of  and . 
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10.2.2.2 Random Effects Estimator 
If I’s are treated as random variables rather than fixed constants, then we should 
turn to the random effects model.  
For simplicity, just one explanatory variable is used and it is further assumed that  
 
and that i and uit are independent. 
Since i are random, the errors now are vit = i + uit. The presence of i produces a 
correlation among the errors of the same cross-section unit. The errors from the different 
cross-section units are independent. Thus we have: 
 
Due to the correlation of errors, generalised least squares (GLS) estimator should 
be used to get efficient estimates. For simplicity, Maddala’s (1971) simplified GLS is 
defined: 
 
 , 
where W refers to within-group, and B refers to between-group data, and 
 
where T refers to total (and W refers to within) sums of squares and sums of products 
defined earlier. 
Note that  Thus the OLS and LSDV estimators are 
special cases of the GLS estimator with  = 1 and  = 0, respectively. 
Many studies have been published discussing which method is more appropriate 
for the estimators (Wallace and Hussain, 1969; Maddala and Mount, 1973; Mundlak, 1978). 
The most common way to access whether fixed or random effect estimator should be used 
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is Hausman test. The typical tests for serial correlation of  are either Durbin-Watson or 
Berenblut-Webb test. 
10.2.2.3 Hausman Test 
The Hausman test is often applied to tests for fixed versus random effects models. 
The Mundlak argument says that i are correlated with xit but in a particular way. We can 
test the hypothesis 
 
Under H0, the GLS estimator is consistent and efficient. On the other hand, the 
within-group estimator  is consistent whether the null hypothesis is valid or not since 
all time-invariant effects are subtracted out. Thus, we can construct and 
 Hence we use  as a χ2-statistic with d.f. k where k 
is the dimensionality of . Hausman (1977) also shows that this test can be more 
conveniently implemented by augmenting the -transformed GLS regression with
,  
i.e.,  
and testing the statistical significance of corresponding to these additional 
demeaned variables. 
10.2.2.4 Dynamic Panel Estimator 
Note that  and i and uit are independent. 
Dynamic panel models are usually divided into two categories. The serial 
correlation model  and state dependence model 
. 
There are a few problems introduced by the inclusion of a lagged dependent 
variable in the model. Since  is a function of , it immediately follows that  is also 
a function of . As a result, is correlated with the error term. This makes the 
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OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the  are not serially correlated. For the 
fixed effects (FE) estimator, the within transformation wipes out , but  
where  will still be correlated with 
 even if  is not serially correlated. The within estimator is biased and 
inconsistent.  
The random effects GLS estimator is also biased in a dynamic panel data model 
because  correlates with . Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest 
first differencing the model to get rid of the : 
 
Then, using  or  as an instrument for 
. These instruments will not be correlated 
with , as long as the  themselves are not serially 
correlated. This instrumental variable (IV) estimation method does not make use of all the 
available moments conditions (instruments) and does not take into account the differenced 
structure on the residual disturbance . In simple dynamic error components models, 
the estimator that uses differences  rather than levels  for instruments has a 
singularity problem and substantial variance over a significant range of parameter values. 
In contrast, the estimator that uses instruments in levels, i.e. , has no singularities and 
much smaller variance. 
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a generalised method of moments (GMM) 
procedure that is more efficient than the Anderson and Hsiao (1982) estimator. Rather 
than using only the instrument for all t, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using 
increasingly more number of lagged instruments as t approaches T. Thus, at t=T, the 
procedure uses [y2, y3, …, yT-2] as the instruments set. These and the successive models like 
Arellano–Bover and Blundell and Bond (ABBB) will be discussed in detail in the Research 
Design Chapter. 
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10.3 APPENDICES TO METHODOLOGY REVIEW 
10.3.1 Productivity Functions  
10.3.1.1 (Marginal) Labour Productivity 
The output depends on which form of productivity function is assumed. There are 
several forms of production functions in standard economic theory. The more recent 
textbooks by Besanko et al. (2013) and Nicholson and Snyder (2011) have separated them 
into two: single input and multiple input functions. The most common examples of single 
input productivity are labour productivity(LP) and marginal labour productivity (MLP). 
The former is the average output per unit of labour. The latter is the rate at which total 
output changes as the firm changes its quantity of labour. These methods are being 
continuously used even in the recent studies (Vandenberghe et al., 2013; Chatzimichael and 
Tzouvelekas, 2014; Nishida et al., 2014) because of their simplicity: 
𝐿𝑃 =
𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑖𝑡
 
𝑀𝐿𝑃 =
∆𝑌
∆L
;     𝑀𝐾𝑃 =
∆𝑌
∆K
 
However, the simplicity comes with inherent limitations such as the lack of 
technological knowledge included in the analysis, unlike in the TFP. 
Another important concept in productivity functions is the marginal rate of 
technological substitution of labour for capital (MRTS) which measures the rate at which 
labour can be substituted for capital while holding output constant along an isoquant. As 
described by Nicholson and Snyder (2011:299-300), the marginal rate of technical 
substitution of labour for capital is equal to the ratio of the marginal product of labour 
(MPL) to the marginal product of capital (MPK): 
 𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑆 =
𝑀𝐿𝑃
MKP
 
10.3.1.2 Multiple inputs 
In the clear majority of studies, multiple inputs were used to estimate productivity. 
Once two or more inputs are introduced, substitution and output effects could influence the 
form of the production function. An extensive discussion of these is presented in section 
2.1.1.1.2 (p. 37). Shortly, the effect of a decrease in the price of capital on the amount of 
capital demanded where output, Y, would remain unchanged. This induces the firm to shift 
its input mix towards the capital, and away from labour. The elasticity of substitution 
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measures the proportionate change in capital/labour relative to the proportionate change 
in the MRTS along an isoquant: 
 𝐸𝑆 =
%∆(
𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟
)
%∆(𝑀𝐿𝑃/𝑀𝐾𝑃)
 
10.3.1.3 Linear form 
𝐸𝑆 = ∞. This form exhibits constant returns to scale for any t>1: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = 𝛽𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝐾𝐾 → 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝐿, 𝑡𝐾) = 𝛽𝐿𝑡𝐿 + 𝛽𝐾𝑡𝐾 = 𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) 
Therefore, all isoquants are parallel straight lines with slope -𝛽𝐿/𝛽𝐾. Because the 
MRTS is constant along any straightline isoquant, the denominator in the definition of ES is 
equal to 0 and hence ES is infinite. The obvious drawback of this productivity function is 
that labour and capital could be used as perfect substitutes, which is by no means 
reasonable.  
10.3.1.4 Fixed proportions form  
ES=0. Capital and labour must always be used in a fixed ratio. Because k/l is a 
constant, it is easy to see from the definition of the elasticity of substitution that σ must 
equal 0. The mathematical form of this function is:  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = min(𝛽𝐿𝐿, 𝛽𝐾𝐾) → 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑡𝐿, 𝑡𝐾) = t ∗ min(𝛽𝐿𝐿, 𝛽𝐾𝐾) = 𝑡 ∗ 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) ,
𝑎, 𝑏 > 0, 
where the operator 𝑚𝑖𝑛 means that q is given by the smaller of the two values in 
parentheses. 
Again, increasing or decreasing returns can be easily incorporated into the 
functions by using a nonlinear transformation of this functional form for any t>1. 
This production function could be beneficial in some circumstances. For instance, 
factories with machines requiring a certain number of people to run them, but any excess 
labour is superfluous. However, in the vast majority of cases, it is not valid. 
10.3.1.5 Constant elasticity of substitution (CES).  
Arrow et al. (1961) introduced a function that that incorporates all of the three 
previous cases and allows SE to take on other values. For 𝑝 ≤ 1, 𝑝 ≠ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾 > 0, this 
function is: 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝐿, 𝐾) = (𝐾
𝑝 + 𝐿𝑝)𝛾/𝑝 
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The inclusion of 𝛾/𝑝 does allow to permit introduction of returns to scale. It could 
exhibit either increasing (𝛾 > 1) or diminishing (𝛾 < 1) returns. The direct application of 
the definition of SE to this function provides (see Besanko et al., 2013):  
 𝑆𝐸 =
1
1−𝑝
→ 𝑝 =
𝑆𝐸−1
𝑆𝐸
 
This offers a way to estimate other p values: linear (p = 1), fixed-proportions (𝑝 =
−∞) and Cobb Douglas (p=0). That is why by assuming constant returns and p = 0, the CES 
function takes Cobb-Doulas form. The many-input CES function would take the following 
form: 
 𝑌 = [∑𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖
𝑝
]
𝛾/𝑝
, 𝑝 ≤ 1 
Similarly, the function has either constant (for 𝛾 = 1) or increasing ( for 𝛾 > 1) 
returns to scale. 𝑝 ≤ 1 that is why function exhibits diminishing marginal productivities for 
each input. Elasticity of substitution stays unchanged. 
Furthermore, nested functions that use a CES aggregator to contract a composite 
for related variables that have different rates of substitution has been used. For instance, 
assuming that two variables (x1 and x2) are closely related. They can be expressed with CES 
function framework and then included in Cobb Douglas function: 
 𝑥4 = [𝛾𝑥1
𝑝 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑥2
𝑝
]
1/𝑝
→ 𝑦 = 𝑥3
𝛽3𝑥4
𝛽4 
10.3.1.6 Stochastic frontier analysis with Cobb-Douglas productivity function 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and Broeck (1977) have started gathering ideas 
around the stochastic production frontier models. The production frontier model with 
random component exp(vi), which is a stochastic component that describes random shocks 
affecting the production process, can be written as: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖 , 𝛽)𝑇𝐸𝑖 exp(𝑣𝑖) 
,where 𝑦 is output, 𝑥 is a vector of inputs used, 𝑓(. )is a production frontier, β is a 
vector of technology parameters and TE denotes the technical efficiency and is also a 
stochastic variable, with a specific distribution function, common to all producers. 
Assuming that TE is also a stochastic variable, so 𝑇𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢) and that 𝑓(. ) takes 
the log-linear Cobb-Douglas form, the model can be written as:  
 𝑙𝑛𝑌 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖 +
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑢𝑖 
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10.4 APPENDICES TO RESULTS 
10.4.1 Decision tree with the Whole Data and Business rates as a Dependent Variable 
 
Figure 10:4 Decision trees indicating how BR can be predicted with employment, turnover, sector, region and labour productivity; split 
only when there are at least 1000 cases; It is worth noting that illustration was limited to criterion 0.999, the minimum split of 10,000 
and a minimum bucket of 10,000 to find just the largest and most significant slips.  
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Figure 10:5 An extension of Figure 10:4 (p. 276) but by separating turnover and employment. Region and sector annotations are 
present in Figure 7:3 (p. 193). 
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10.4.2 Decision Trees with SBRR as a Dependent Variable 
 
Figure 10:6 Decision tree indicating how SBRR can be predicted with employment, turnover, sector, region and labour productivity. 
Region and sector annotations are present in Figure 7:3 (p. 193).
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Figure 10:7 An extension of Figure 10:6 (p. 278) but by separating turnover (T in the graph) and employment (E in the graph). Region 
and sector annotations are present in Figure 7:3 (p. 193).
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10.4.3 Main REEM Tree 
 
Figure 10:8 Unbiased REEM Tree indicating how other factors might influence TFP. 
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10.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis (Dynamic TFP) 
  Matched and imputed data (one sample) Unmatched and unimputed 
  Twoways, onestep Oneway, one step Twoways, two steps Twoways, onestep Twoways, one step 
Variable name Estimate SE P Estimate SE p Estimate SE P Estimate SE Pr(>|z|) Estimate SE P 
V2 0.236 0.158 0.13 0.500 0.252 0.05 0.239 0.158 0.13 -0.197 0.052 <0.01 0.593 0.059 0.00 
GVA (defl & 1st lag) 0.020 0.025 0.41 0.001 0.041 0.99 0.015 0.021 0.47 -0.027 0.029 0.35 0.093 0.022 0.00 
Employment (log) -0.006 0.020 0.75 -0.155 0.100 0.12 -0.013 0.019 0.51 -0.020 0.021 0.34 -0.006 0.015 0.68 
Employment (log & 1st lag) 0.003 0.001 0.01 -0.004 0.003 0.22 0.002 0.001 0.10 -0.006 0.006 0.36 0.001 0.002 0.44 
SBRR (log) -0.003 0.001 0.01 -0.001 0.001 0.34 -0.002 0.001 0.07 0.008 0.009 0.35 0.004 0.001 0.00 
SBBR (log & 1st lag) -0.001 0.000 0.08 -0.001 0.001 0.04 -0.001 0.000 0.12 0.001 0.001 0.59 0.000 0.002 0.80 
SBRR (log & 2nd lag) 0.000 0.001 0.76 -0.002 0.001 0.17 0.000 0.000 0.87 0.001 0.001 0.54 0.000 0.002 0.81 
SBRR (log & 3rd lag) -0.001 0.001 0.21 -0.003 0.002 0.10 -0.001 0.001 0.20 0.000 0.001 0.60 0.003 0.002 0.05 
SBRR (log & 4th lag) 0.307 0.015 0.05 0.256 0.322 0.43 0.151 0.154 0.33 -0.248 0.241 0.30 -1.296 0.780 0.10 
Capital (defl & log) -0.059 0.136 0.66 0.870 0.466 0.06 0.079 0.161 0.62 0.309 0.277 0.26 2.332 0.797 0.00 
Capital (defl, log & 1st lag) -0.027 0.012 0.03 0.129 0.180 0.47 -0.026 0.012 0.02 -0.054 0.055 0.32 -0.982 0.582 0.09 
Investment (defl, log & 1st lag) -0.092 0.030 0.00 0.015 0.038 0.69 -0.051 0.023 0.02 0.199 0.210 0.34 0.025 0.031 0.41 
SBRR_F dummy 0.018 0.020 0.38 0.236 0.135 0.08 0.024 0.021 0.25 -0.007 0.007 0.30 -0.031 0.009 0.00 
HGF dummy -0.001 0.008 0.93 0.005 0.015 0.72 -0.002 0.005 0.66 Insufficient Insufficient 
R&D dummy -0.004 0.009 0.67 0.030 0.024 0.22 0.000 0.008 0.97 0.094 0.091 0.30 Insufficient 
Endland dummy -0.002 0.027 0.94 -0.014 0.061 0.82 -0.015 0.036 0.68 0.038 0.019 0.04 0.087 0.036 0.02 
PD (log) 0.023 0.015 0.12 0.033 0.025 0.18 0.017 0.010 0.11 0.004 0.008 0.58 -0.020 0.008 0.01 
PS (log) 0.012 0.011 0.28 0.123 0.071 0.08 0.013 0.013 0.29 -0.060 0.063 0.34 -0.009 0.008 0.25 
Age (log) 0.002 0.004 0.64 -0.016 0.011 0.12 0.000 0.003 0.91 -0.015 0.012 0.20 0.001 0.003 0.70 
Her Index (log) -0.055 0.027 0.04 -0.086 0.051 0.09 -0.035 0.022 0.10 0.252 0.235 0.28 0.000 0.008 0.97 
Materials (defl & log) 0.000 0.000 0.10 0.003 0.003 0.37 -0.003 0.006 0.63 0.000 0.000 0.16 0.000 0.000 0.27 
Table 10:1 Sensitivity analysis (Dynamic TFP) - various specifications of model; number of observations used and various tests are 
reported in Table 10:2 (p. 282); 
  
 282 
 
 
Matched and imputed data 
Unmatched and 
unimputed 
Two ways, onestep One way, one step Two ways, two steps 
Two ways, one step but diff 
in diff transformation 
Two ways, one step 
Lags used 2 to 8 2 to 8 2 to 5 2 to 8 2 to 8 
Sample 
n = 1091, T = 2-16, N 
= 15040 
n = 1091, T = 2-16, N 
= 15040 
n = 1091, T = 2-16, N 
= 15040 
n = 1091, T = 2-16, N = 
15040  
n = 7786, T = 1-15, N 
= 32267  
Number of 
Observations  
19841 19841 19841 9380 7885 
Sargan test 
chisq(621) = 
667.6319 (p-value = 
0.1) 
chisq(670) = 
691.0494 (p-value = 
0.28) 
chisq(432) = 414.1932 
(p-value = 0.72) 
chisq(421) = 653.2655 (p-
value = 0.01)  
chisq(406) = 442.3601 
(p-value = 0.1)  
Autocorrelati
on test (1) 
-0.99 p=0.32 -1.05 p=0.3 -0.62 p=0.53 -1.13 p=0.26 -5.75 p=<0.01 
Autocorrelati
on test (2) 
0.73 p=0.47 0.9 p=0.37 0.36 p=0.72 -1.03 p=0.3 -1.63 p=0.1 
Wald test 
chisq(21) = 240.8072 
(p = < 0.01) 
chisq(21) = 3390634 
(p= < 0.01) 
chisq(21) = 134.4476 
(p = < 0.01) 
chisq(20) = 445.7199 (p-
value = < 0.01) 
chisq(19) = 409.1293 
(p-value = < 0.01) 
Wald test 
(time 
dummies) 
chisq(11) = 201.4404 
(p= < 0.01) 
  chisq(11) = 157.5674 
(p-value = < 0.01) 
chisq(11) = 198.8505 (p-
value = < 0.01) 
chisq(10) = 142.845 
(p-value = < 0.01) 
Table 10:2 Sensitivity analysis (Dynamic TFP) - characteristics and tests of models. 
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10.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis (Cox Regression) 
 One sample Matching, no imputation 
No Matching, no 
imputation 
Variable Estimate SE (r) Pr(>|z|) Estimate SE (r) Pr(>|z|) Estimate SE (r) Pr(>|z|) 
TFP 0.00001 0 0.08* 0 0 0.35 0 0 0.21 
SBRR -1.055 0.649 0.1* -1.012 0.952 0.29 -0.895 0.418 0.03** 
SBBR (1st lag) 0.398 0.551 0.47 -0.407 1.197 0.73 0.076 0.457 0.87 
SBRR (2nd lag) -0.049 0.531 0.93 0.665 1.22 0.59 0.172 0.488 0.72 
SBRR (3rd lag) 0.428 0.522 0.41 0.071 1.462 0.96 0.223 0.517 0.67 
SBRR (4th lag) 0.284 0.549 0.61 -3.574 4.145 0.39 -1.734 1.156 0.13 
SBRR (5th lag) -0.57 0.566 0.31 3.75 3.607 0.3 -1.254 1.529 0.41 
Age dummy -2 0.157 1.114 0.89 0.046 0.883 0.96 1.865 0.725 0.01*** 
Age dummy- 3 0.56 1.076 0.6* -0.278 0.797 0.73 1.757 0.719 0.01*** 
PD 0.336 1.015 0.74 1.689 1.691 0.32 0.322 0.58 0.58 
PS 0.139 0.193 0.47 0.511 0.336 0.13 0.035 0.091 0.7 
HHI -0.146 1.669 0.93 -1.232 2.367 0.6 -1.692 1.079 0.12 
Im. Foreign 
Ownership 0.977 0.24 0*** 1.168 0.413 0*** 0.505 0.111 0*** 
R&D -0.391 0.17 0.02** -0.423 0.285 0.14 -0.196 0.08 0.01*** 
HGF -0.15 0.145 0.3 -0.397 0.248 0.11 -0.066 0.079 0.4 
SBRR (first 
introduced) -14.891 1.108 0*** -15.593 1.219 0*** -13.744 0.258 0*** 
SBRR (first enhanced) -14.525 0.86 0*** -15.822 1.206 0*** 0.103 0.545 0.85 
Table 10:3 Sensitivity analysis (Cox Regression), tests and the sample size is reported in Table 10:4 (p. 284).
 
 
 One sample 
Matching, no 
imputation 
No Matching, no 
imputation 
Concordance 0.605 (SE=0.099) 0.685 (SE=0.166) 0.576 (SE=0.049) 
R square 
0.003 
(max=0.092) 
0.005 
(max=0.063) 
0.002 
(max=0.167) 
Likelihood ratio 
test 
39.22 (df=17, 
p=0.002) 
29.53 (df=17, 
p=0.030) 
79.25 (df=17, 
p<0.001) 
Wald test 961.7 (df=17, p=0) 843.5 (df=17, p=0) 4109 (df=17, p=0) 
Score (logrank) test 
44.62 (df=17, 
p<0.001) 
32.08 (df=17, 
p=0.01) 
68.78 (df=17, 
p<0.001) 
Robust 31.62 (p=0.02) 25.34 (p=0.087) 88.05 (p<0.001) 
Sample 14926 5917 39294 
Table 10:4 Sensitivity analysis (Cox Regression) - characteristics and tests of 
models 
10.4.5.1.1 Influential Observations and Nonlinearity 
To find the most influential observations, the index plots were made. Comparing 
the magnitudes of the largest dfbeta values to the regression coefficients suggested that 
none of the observations is influential individually, even though some of the dfbeta values 
were more extreme compared to the others. The graphs were not reported because of the 
disclosure controls. 
Nonlinearity—that is, an incorrectly specified functional form in the parametric 
part of the model— is a potential problem in Cox Regression as it is in linear and generalised 
linear models. The martingale residuals were plotted against covariates to detect 
nonlinearity. The graphs were not reported because of the disclosure controls. 
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10.4.6 Sensitivity Analysis (Survival Tree) 
 
Figure 10:9 Survival tree with turnover (turn_defl), capital (K_defl), employment 
and GVA (gva_defl) included instead of the estimated TFP as it was done in the 
main tree available in Figure 7:10 (p. 210). 
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10.4.7 Decision Tree from Section 7.1.2.1 (p. 194) 
1) year == {2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015}; criterion = 1, statistic = 2081.797 
  2) turn_d == {T micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 194.633 
    3) sect == {cn, pr, st}; criterion = 1, statistic = 96.075 
      4) emp_d == {E medium, E micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 43.843 
        5) region == {F, G, J, K, W, X}; criterion = 0.979, statistic = 26.179 
          6)*  weights = 220  
        5) region == {A, B, D, E, H} 
          7)*  weights = 134  
      4) emp_d == {E large, E small} 
        8) labour_prod <= 32.18035; criterion = 1, statistic = 16.367 
          9)*  weights = 196  
        8) labour_prod > 32.18035 
          10)*  weights = 489  
    3) sect == {ca, pd, re, wh} 
      11) emp_d == {E micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 62.56 
        12) region == {A, D, G, H, W}; criterion = 1, statistic = 37.284 
          13)*  weights = 151  
        12) region == {B, E, F, J, K, X} 
          14)*  weights = 176  
      11) emp_d == {E large, E medium, E small} 
        15) region == {E, J, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 92.4 
          16) labour_prod <= 45.91013; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 14.175 
            17)*  weights = 149  
          16) labour_prod > 45.91013 
            18)*  weights = 113  
        15) region == {A, B, D, F, G, H, W, X} 
          19) region == {A, B, F, G}; criterion = 0.998, statistic = 27.642 
            20)*  weights = 334  
          19) region == {D, H, W, X} 
            21)*  weights = 350  
  2) turn_d == {T large, T medium, T small} 
    22) region == {D, G, H, W}; criterion = 1, statistic = 120.316 
      23) sect == {cn, pr, st, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 39.726 
        24)*  weights = 942  
      23) sect == {ca, pd, re} 
        25) region == {G, W}; criterion = 0.995, statistic = 16.469 
          26)*  weights = 263  
        25) region == {D, H} 
          27) emp_d == {E large, E medium, E micro}; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 20.253 
            28)*  weights = 128  
          27) emp_d == {E small} 
            29)*  weights = 109  
    22) region == {A, B, E, F, J, K, X} 
      30) region == {A, B, E, F, J, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 52.043 
        31) sect == {ca, cn, re, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 41.206 
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          32) sect == {ca, re, wh}; criterion = 0.998, statistic = 18.246 
            33)*  weights = 377  
          32) sect == {cn} 
            34)*  weights = 230  
        31) sect == {pd, pr, st} 
          35)*  weights = 1061  
      30) region == {X} 
        36)*  weights = 264  
1) year == {2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009} 
  37) year == {2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009}; criterion = 1, statistic = 1147.848 
    38) sect == {cn, re, st}; criterion = 1, statistic = 348.716 
      39) turn_d == {T micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 200.481 
        40) region == {B, G, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 125.961 
          41)*  weights = 192  
        40) region == {A, D, E, F, H, J, W, X} 
          42) region == {D, E, F, H, J}; criterion = 1, statistic = 42.325 
            43) emp_d == {E large, E medium, E micro}; criterion = 0.997, statistic = 17.779 
              44)*  weights = 125  
            43) emp_d == {E small} 
              45) sect == {cn, re}; criterion = 1, statistic = 19.303 
                46)*  weights = 100  
              45) sect == {st} 
                47)*  weights = 129  
          42) region == {A, W, X} 
            48)*  weights = 158  
      39) turn_d == {T large, T medium, T small} 
        49) sect == {cn}; criterion = 1, statistic = 55.491 
          50) region == {B, D, F, G, J, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 41.329 
            51)*  weights = 188  
          50) region == {A, E, H, W, X} 
            52)*  weights = 128  
        49) sect == {re, st} 
          53) region == {A, B, D, E, G, J}; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 34.807 
            54)*  weights = 278  
          53) region == {F, H, K, W, X} 
            55) emp_d == {E large, E micro}; criterion = 0.995, statistic = 16.715 
              56)*  weights = 114  
            55) emp_d == {E medium, E small} 
              57)*  weights = 199  
    38) sect == {ca, mt, pd, pr, wh} 
      58) region == {B, D, E, F, G, J, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 140.955 
        59) emp_d == {E micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 111.128 
          60)*  weights = 180  
        59) emp_d == {E large, E medium, E small} 
          61) turn_d == {T micro}; criterion = 1, statistic = 71.079 
            62) region == {G, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 80.87 
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              63)*  weights = 185  
            62) region == {B, D, E, F, J} 
              64) region == {B, E, J}; criterion = 0.957, statistic = 14.022 
                65)*  weights = 292  
              64) region == {D, F} 
                66)*  weights = 167  
          61) turn_d == {T large, T medium, T small} 
            67) sect == {ca, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 48.073 
              68)*  weights = 440  
            67) sect == {pd, pr} 
              69) region == {D, E, J, K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 41.233 
                70) emp_d == {E medium}; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 16.741 
                  71) region == {D, E}; criterion = 1, statistic = 23.321 
                    72)*  weights = 132  
                  71) region == {J, K} 
                    73)*  weights = 101  
                70) emp_d == {E large, E small} 
                  74)*  weights = 315  
              69) region == {B, F, G} 
                75) emp_d == {E large, E small}; criterion = 0.992, statistic = 13.246 
                  76)*  weights = 240  
                75) emp_d == {E medium} 
                  77)*  weights = 174  
      58) region == {A, H, W, X} 
        78) emp_d == {E micro, E small}; criterion = 1, statistic = 27.132 
          79) region == {A, H}; criterion = 1, statistic = 25.179 
            80)*  weights = 269  
          79) region == {W, X} 
            81)*  weights = 393  
        78) emp_d == {E large, E medium} 
          82)*  weights = 234  
  37) year == {2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004} 
    83)*  weights = 4658  
 
10.4.8 Ranger Output from Section 7.1.2.1 (p. 194) 
      
Type:                             Regression    
Number of trees:                  500     
Sample size:                      15077     
Number of independent variables:  6    
Mtry:                             2     
Target node size:                 5     
Variable importance mode:         permutation   
OOB prediction error (MSE):       0.04512334   
R squared (OOB):                  0.3501332    
> importance(r_fit)     
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emp_d turn_d labour_prod year sect region 
0.012859 0.018546 0.023243 0.031834 0.01471253 0.0136837 
      
Prediction error full dataset    
0.140831      
Prediction error when just 75% of the data is used and then tested on 25% 
[1] 30.89183      
10.4.9 Unbiased REEM form Section 7.2.2 (p. 198) 
Response:  AdjustedTarget  
Inputs:  SBRR, SBRR_lagged2, SBRR_lagged3, SBRR_lagged4, SBRR_lagged5, SBRR_lagged, 
Ther_i, region, SBRR_f, HGF, age, ult_foc_d, imm_foc_d, TPS, jacob, rd, sect  
Number of observations:  15042  
 
1) SBRR_lagged2 <= 0.002713661; criterion = 1, statistic = 121.197 
  2) region == {H}; criterion = 1, statistic = 85.308 
    3) sect == {st}; criterion = 1, statistic = 119.12 
      4) ult_foc_d == {1}; criterion = 1, statistic = 83.268 
        5) Ther_i <= 0.02676917; criterion = 1, statistic = 42.963 
          6)*  weights = 61  
        5) Ther_i > 0.02676917 
          7)*  weights = 11  
      4) ult_foc_d == {0} 
        8) age <= 18; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 15.557 
          9) TPS <= -0.3825368; criterion = 1, statistic = 18.073 
            10)*  weights = 73  
          9) TPS > -0.3825368 
            11)*  weights = 297  
        8) age > 18 
          12)*  weights = 370  
    3) sect == {ca, cn, pd, pr, re, wh} 
      13) rd == {0}; criterion = 1, statistic = 20.025 
        14)*  weights = 669  
      13) rd == {1} 
        15) TPS <= -0.4742959; criterion = 1, statistic = 25.604 
          16)*  weights = 19  
        15) TPS > -0.4742959 
          17)*  weights = 91  
  2) region == {A, B, D, E, F, G, J, K, W, X} 
    18) age <= 32; criterion = 1, statistic = 74.811 
      19) jacob <= 0.8347701; criterion = 1, statistic = 32.074 
        20) sect == {cn, pd, pr, re, st, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 108.512 
          21) SBRR_lagged5 <= 0.1030314; criterion = 1, statistic = 63.928 
            22) SBRR_lagged <= 0.6992277; criterion = 1, statistic = 56.151 
              23) region == {F, G, J}; criterion = 1, statistic = 64.596 
                24) age <= 16; criterion = 1, statistic = 32.982 
                  25)*  weights = 883  
                24) age > 16 
                  26) SBRR_lagged3 <= 0; criterion = 1, statistic = 20.204 
                    27) jacob <= 0.7714286; criterion = 0.991, statistic = 16.031 
                      28) sect == {pd, re, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 30.007 
                        29)*  weights = 311  
                      28) sect == {cn, st} 
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                        30)*  weights = 126  
                    27) jacob > 0.7714286 
                      31)*  weights = 869  
                  26) SBRR_lagged3 > 0 
                    32)*  weights = 17  
              23) region == {A, B, D, E, K, W, X} 
                33) Ther_i <= 0.008165094; criterion = 1, statistic = 29.139 
                  34) SBRR_lagged3 <= 0.01467797; criterion = 1, statistic = 21.592 
                    35) rd == {0}; criterion = 0.997, statistic = 18.1 
                      36)*  weights = 1728  
                    35) rd == {1} 
                      37) sect == {pd, pr, re, st, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 37.06 
                        38)*  weights = 365  
                      37) sect == {cn} 
                        39)*  weights = 46  
                  34) SBRR_lagged3 > 0.01467797 
                    40)*  weights = 25  
                33) Ther_i > 0.008165094 
                  41) region == {A, E, K, W}; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 29.312 
                    42)*  weights = 676  
                  41) region == {B, D, X} 
                    43)*  weights = 776  
            22) SBRR_lagged > 0.6992277 
              44)*  weights = 79  
          21) SBRR_lagged5 > 0.1030314 
            45) SBRR_lagged <= 0.2062243; criterion = 0.999, statistic = 16.396 
              46)*  weights = 177  
            45) SBRR_lagged > 0.2062243 
              47)*  weights = 10  
        20) sect == {ca} 
          48) age <= 18; criterion = 1, statistic = 46.769 
            49) jacob <= 0.7776184; criterion = 1, statistic = 33.006 
              50)*  weights = 25  
            49) jacob > 0.7776184 
              51)*  weights = 38  
          48) age > 18 
            52) region == {K}; criterion = 1, statistic = 33.42 
              53)*  weights = 10  
            52) region == {D, E, W, X} 
              54)*  weights = 29  
      19) jacob > 0.8347701 
        55)*  weights = 2983  
    18) age > 32 
      56) ult_foc_d == {1}; criterion = 1, statistic = 85.118 
        57) jacob <= 0.7931034; criterion = 1, statistic = 19.111 
          58)*  weights = 41  
        57) jacob > 0.7931034 
          59)*  weights = 15  
      56) ult_foc_d == {0} 
        60) age <= 38; criterion = 1, statistic = 79.408 
          61) sect == {pr, st, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 60.592 
            62) region == {A, D, E, F, G, J, K, W, X}; criterion = 1, statistic = 40.229 
              63)*  weights = 311  
            62) region == {B} 
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              64)*  weights = 30  
          61) sect == {ca, cn, pd, re} 
            65) region == {B, D, E, F, G, K, X}; criterion = 1, statistic = 52.178 
              66)*  weights = 703  
            65) region == {A, J, W} 
              67)*  weights = 194  
        60) age > 38 
          68) HGF == {0}; criterion = 1, statistic = 32.612 
            69) region == {A, E, X}; criterion = 0.993, statistic = 30.239 
              70)*  weights = 112  
            69) region == {B, D, F, G, J, K, W} 
              71)*  weights = 265  
          68) HGF == {1} 
            72)*  weights = 67  
1) SBRR_lagged2 > 0.002713661 
  73) Ther_i <= 0.1368429; criterion = 1, statistic = 76.996 
    74) region == {A, B, D, E, F, H}; criterion = 1, statistic = 80.156 
      75) sect == {cn, pd, pr, re, st, wh}; criterion = 1, statistic = 60.226 
        76) ult_foc_d == {1}; criterion = 1, statistic = 26.099 
          77)*  weights = 30  
        76) ult_foc_d == {0} 
          78) SBRR_lagged5 <= 0.397831; criterion = 1, statistic = 20.139 
            79)*  weights = 981  
          78) SBRR_lagged5 > 0.397831 
            80) jacob <= 0.87; criterion = 0.993, statistic = 12.555 
              81)*  weights = 228  
            80) jacob > 0.87 
              82) SBRR_lagged3 <= 0.5; criterion = 0.994, statistic = 12.65 
                83)*  weights = 10  
              82) SBRR_lagged3 > 0.5 
                84)*  weights = 10  
      75) sect == {ca} 
        85)*  weights = 21  
    74) region == {G, J, K, W, X} 
      86) SBRR_lagged5 <= 0.3842167; criterion = 1, statistic = 18.499 
        87)*  weights = 940  
      86) SBRR_lagged5 > 0.3842167 
        88)*  weights = 282  
  73) Ther_i > 0.1368429 
    89)*  weights = 38 
 
10.4.10 Survival Tree from Section 7.3.1 (p. 207) 
Node number 1: 15047 observations,    complexity param=0.01412019 
  events=213,  estimated rate=0.9872724 , mean deviance=0.1100632  
  left son=2 (14522 obs) right son=3 (525 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      as.factor(imm_foc_d) splits as  LR, improve=23.58767, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(sect)      splits as  LLRLLLL, improve=16.09901, (0 missing) 
      TPS                  < 0.4537595    to the left,  improve=13.90591, (0 missing) 
      Ther_i               < 0.0006941195 to the left,  improve=13.07639, (0 missing) 
      prodWRDG             < 179429.5     to the left,  improve=11.66135, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
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      prodWRDG < 318533.4     to the left,  agree=0.965, adj=0.002, (0 split) 
 
Node number 2: 14522 observations,    complexity param=0.009060683 
  events=191,  estimated rate=0.9137517 , mean deviance=0.1039696  
  left son=4 (7820 obs) right son=5 (6702 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      as.factor(sect)   splits as  LLRLLLL, improve=13.554180, (0 missing) 
      Ther_i            < 0.0006941195 to the left,  improve=11.614860, (0 missing) 
      TPS               < 0.4655493    to the left,  improve= 9.024202, (0 missing) 
      SBRR              < 0.008620319  to the right, improve= 7.984590, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(region) splits as  RLRLRLLLLLL, improve= 7.741308, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      Ther_i            < 0.007563241  to the left,  agree=0.627, adj=0.191, (0 split) 
      TPS               < 0.3562317    to the left,  agree=0.616, adj=0.168, (0 split) 
      as.factor(region) splits as  LRRRRLLLRLR, agree=0.589, adj=0.110, (0 split) 
      as.factor(HGF)    splits as  RL, agree=0.570, adj=0.068, (0 split) 
      as.factor(rd)     splits as  LR, agree=0.563, adj=0.053, (0 split) 
 
Node number 3: 525 observations 
  events=22,  estimated rate=3.006936 , mean deviance=0.2340746  
 
Node number 4: 7820 observations,    complexity param=0.009060683 
  events=79,  estimated rate=0.6938388 , mean deviance=0.08204731  
  left son=8 (6206 obs) right son=9 (1614 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      Ther_i            < 0.01630127   to the left,  improve=16.465080, (0 missing) 
      jacob             < 0.8317756    to the right, improve=11.030890, (0 missing) 
      TPS               < -0.7302228   to the right, improve=10.309100, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(region) splits as  RLRLRRRLRLL, improve= 9.074925, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(old)    splits as  RRL, improve= 6.259138, (85 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      TPS      < -0.6386625   to the right, agree=0.811, adj=0.084, (0 split) 
      prodWRDG < 237211.3     to the left,  agree=0.795, adj=0.004, (0 split) 
 
Node number 5: 6702 observations,    complexity param=0.008536462 
  events=112,  estimated rate=1.179109 , mean deviance=0.1275267  
  left son=10 (2934 obs) right son=11 (3768 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      prodWRDG          < 135313.5     to the left,  improve=11.316460, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(region) splits as  RLRRRLLLLRR, improve=11.025350, (0 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged3      < 0.0002618941 to the right, improve= 7.225316, (0 missing) 
      SBRR              < 0.4826693    to the right, improve= 5.415101, (0 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged2      < 0.0002618941 to the right, improve= 5.410041, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      SBRR_lagged2 < 0.002912079  to the right, agree=0.592, adj=0.069, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged3 < 0.01060165   to the right, agree=0.591, adj=0.066, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged  < 0.002296636  to the right, agree=0.589, adj=0.062, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged4 < 0.005841728  to the right, agree=0.587, adj=0.056, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged5 < 0.0886938    to the right, agree=0.585, adj=0.052, (0 split) 
 
Node number 8: 6206 observations,    complexity param=0.007707709 
  events=39,  estimated rate=0.4859578 , mean deviance=0.05547351  
  left son=16 (3243 obs) right son=17 (2963 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
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      jacob          < 0.7942652    to the right, improve=12.858420, (0 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged2   < 0.8655489    to the left,  improve=10.557630, (0 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged    < 0.7650706    to the left,  improve=10.191080, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(old) splits as  RRL, improve= 8.772043, (67 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged5   < 0.734662     to the left,  improve= 8.651518, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      as.factor(region) splits as  LRLLLRRLRLR, agree=0.605, adj=0.173, (0 split) 
      prodWRDG          < 130273.7     to the right, agree=0.575, adj=0.109, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged5      < 0.001356831  to the left,  agree=0.573, adj=0.106, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged4      < 0.001356831  to the left,  agree=0.567, adj=0.093, (0 split) 
      as.factor(rd)     splits as  LR, agree=0.564, adj=0.087, (0 split) 
 
Node number 9: 1614 observations 
  events=40,  estimated rate=1.205819 , mean deviance=0.1740291  
 
Node number 10: 2934 observations,    complexity param=0.008536462 
  events=46,  estimated rate=0.8548913 , mean deviance=0.1258084  
  left son=20 (2201 obs) right son=21 (733 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      as.factor(region) splits as  RLRRLLLLLLL, improve=16.282360, (0 missing) 
      SBRR              < 0.9777969    to the right, improve= 7.041286, (0 missing) 
      SBRR_lagged       < 0.9773902    to the right, improve= 6.502461, (0 missing) 
      prodWRDG          < 104054.6     to the right, improve= 6.492487, (0 missing) 
      TPS               < -0.1184181   to the left,  improve= 6.001894, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      TPS    < 0.8657923    to the left,  agree=0.758, adj=0.031, (0 split) 
      Ther_i < 0.1567363    to the left,  agree=0.756, adj=0.022, (0 split) 
      jacob  < 0.04079228   to the right, agree=0.751, adj=0.003, (0 split) 
 
Node number 11: 3768 observations,    complexity param=0.008536462 
  events=66,  estimated rate=1.600184 , mean deviance=0.125863  
  left son=22 (2259 obs) right son=23 (1509 obs) 
  Primary splits: 
      as.factor(region) splits as  RLLLRLLLRRR, improve=14.907050, (0 missing) 
      jacob             < 0.9299691    to the left,  improve= 7.023843, (0 missing) 
      prodWRDG          < 135397.7     to the right, improve= 6.696602, (0 missing) 
      Ther_i            < 0.05736955   to the right, improve= 5.006725, (0 missing) 
      as.factor(HGF)    splits as  RL, improve= 4.723643, (0 missing) 
  Surrogate splits: 
      jacob             < 0.6778797    to the right, agree=0.635, adj=0.087, (0 split) 
      Ther_i            < 0.1053371    to the left,  agree=0.606, adj=0.015, (0 split) 
      prodWRDG          < 176705.7     to the left,  agree=0.602, adj=0.007, (0 split) 
      as.factor(status) splits as  LLR, agree=0.602, adj=0.007, (0 split) 
      SBRR_lagged       < 0.7372459    to the left,  agree=0.602, adj=0.006, (0 split) 
 
Node number 16: 3243 observations 
  events=6,  estimated rate=0.1991876 , mean deviance=0.01987756  
 
Node number 17: 2963 observations 
  events=33,  estimated rate=0.7056603 , mean deviance=0.09012514  
 
Node number 20: 2201 observations 
  events=22,  estimated rate=0.5503635 , mean deviance=0.08405021  
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Node number 21: 733 observations 
  events=24,  estimated rate=1.760553 , mean deviance=0.2290305  
 
Node number 22: 2259 observations 
  events=25,  estimated rate=0.9957268 , mean deviance=0.08787011  
 
Node number 23: 1509 observations 
  events=41,  estimated rate=2.504248 , mean deviance=0.1728956  
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Trees Discover Small Business Property Tax Reductions do not 
Liberate Productivity 
We model and investigate the effect of deep reductions in property taxes for 
small businesses on their productivity and survival and hence their expected 
ability to enable local transformative growth. To define and capture the complex 
interaction and clustering of hierarchical effects, we use the recently developed 
non-parametric Random Effects Expectation Maximisation Decision Tree 
algorithm for productivity analysis and a Survival Tree algorithm for interval-
censored observations. We employ rich microdata for all UK firms and show, 
contrary to policy expectations, that generic tax reductions are associated with 
lower productivity and do not affect survival. We further show local output 
diversity is more relevant to higher productivity. 
Keywords: Productivity, Survival, Business Rates, Taxation, Policy 
Subject classification codes: C14 C54 D24 H22 H71 
Introduction 
This study utilises non-parametric hierarchical analyses to analyse whether the 
homogeneous reductions in commercial property taxes for small firms has released 
putative pent up animal spirits and led to gains in firm productivity or ability to survive 
demand shocks. These reductions, termed Small Business Rate Reliefs (SBRR), were first 
introduced in Scotland in 2003, England in 2005 and Wales in 2007. The most recent 
extension to reductions from April 2017 and 2018 will further reduce tax revenue across 
England by £9 billion over five years and remove 600,000 firms from liability (HM Treasury 
2017). This is just as we see the gradual return of Business Rate (BR) revenue to local 
control in England via devolution of powers or greater revenue retention. Powers have 
already been devolved to Scottish and Welsh national governments. 
These recent reductions are framed on one side by high profile concerns about 
ever-tighter funding for local authorities, which will become increasingly dependent on 
local property taxes. Whilst on the other, the strong perception from firms paying BR, i.e. 
commercial property taxes levied on business occupiers, that the tax is an antiquated 
burden on entrepreneurial spirits. The pressures from firms have seen central 
governments incrementally move away from BR as a flat tax with the introduction of ever-
deeper SBRR.  
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The weak narrative (Shane, 2009, Anyadike-Danes et al., 2015, Gobey and 
Matikonis, 2018) underlying the policy of reductions is one of enabling small firms to lead 
local growth (HM Treasury 2016b, 2017) through a reduction in financial constraints 
which are believed to disproportionately limit their ability to invest and innovate, relative 
to larger firms. This feeds off the wider narrative. For instance, the Chief Executive of Tesco 
(BBC, June 2018), the largest supermarket chain in the UK, linked closures of high-street 
shops to BR. The Financial Times reported in July 2018 naïve research with the title ‘How 
UK Business Rates Shake-up is Deepening High Street Gloom’ (Bounds, 2018). These 
comments echo the influential position of the Federation of Small Businesses that the tax is 
an expensive, unfair burden discouraging growth and investment (FSB website, no date). 
Our theoretical model clarifies how SBRR could change the decision thresholds for 
firms around exit, the use of current capacity, expansion or relocation. We show how 
survival could be enhanced following a negative shock but following positive shocks the 
reliefs may become an impediment to investment. For instance, in the decision between 
maintaining or increasing capacity at the current premises, a positive shock would need to 
cover both the increased tax and loss of reliefs. Hence, instead of enabling firms to 
overcome putative growth frictions, they could be less likely to invest, relative to the 
counterfactual of no reliefs.  
Our initial modelling framework shows that the investment story is rather more 
nuanced than initially presented. We also have to assume capitalisation of reliefs into rents 
is far from perfect, with market frictions differentially delaying the process sufficiently to 
affect investment. The model focuses on firm-level decisions, but these are not independent 
from the critical hierarchical effects of regions and industries, which themselves are 
modified by industry concentration, Marshall Specialisation or Jacob diversity. All these will 
interact with firm-level factors in a non-linear manner to complicate the decision points.  
In order to capture the complex clustered nature of the data fully, our empirical 
methodology is to employ the Sela and Simonoff (2012) and Fu and Simonoff (2015) 
Random Effects Expectation Maximisation (RE-EM) decision tree algorithm for 
productivity analysis. This algorithm allows the data to define non-parametrically the 
interaction of effects, whilst also controlling for firm-level differences. We further employ 
the Fu and Simonoff (2017) Survival Tree (ST) algorithm, which accounts for left truncated 
and right censored observations to identify complex effects on exits. 
We base the empirics on rich and detailed micro data from the Office of National 
Statistics’ recently combined Annual Respondents Dataset X (ARDX) and out of sample 
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administrative data from the Business Structure Database (BSD) for all UK firms. This 
microdata enables us to use coarsened exact matching across a wide range of 
characteristics to create a well-balanced dataset of small firms divided on whether they 
receive relief and ensure our results are less model dependent.  
We find observations for firms with higher levels of lagged SBRR are consistently 
associated with lower levels of total factor productivity (TFP), calculated using 
Wooldridge’s (2009) one-step GMM approach. Whilst region also plays a consistent 
defining role in grouping observations, there is interesting evidence of greater Jacob 
(turnover) diversity increasing productivity in small two-digit postcode areas. This 
suggests nuanced and targeted policy on understanding local drivers and constraints could 
be more fruitful than the current generic firm based policy. We find no association between 
survival and SBRR.  
We structure the rest of the paper as follows. In section two, we discuss the tax and 
construct a model of the production decision points. In section three, we discuss our 
empirical approach. In section four, we discuss our data and construction of the matched 
dataset, in section five we present the findings and in section six we conclude.  
Model 
We adopt and adapt the Duranton et al. (2011) BR model in order to establish how 
the property taxes of the different nations (England, Scotland, Wales) and the tax 
reductions for small businesses could influence decisions on survival, production and 
investment. The model is simple but importantly allows us to incorporate the relevant 
empirical peculiarities of the British tax framework.  
Policymaking tends to ignore any divergence between the statutory and economic 
incidence of taxation (Oates and Fischel, 2016), yet this divergence is central to the 
effectiveness of SBRR and the support for the policy. BR is levied on property occupiers and 
this makes it particularly salient to firms and puts policy makers on the defensive. Yet the 
relative inelasticity in the supply of business properties to the flexibility of demand means 
economic incidence transfers to property owners through capitalisation into rental prices. 
We should then observe in response to a reduction in taxation property owners increasing 
rents such that the total cost of taxes plus rents stays consistent. The degree and time it 
takes for SBRR and other changes to capitalise, provide space in which the tax and policy 
could influence production and survival decisions.  
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We assume property taxes and expected increments are fully capitalised into new 
rental contracts. Otherwise, tax shocks take time to be (partially) capitalised due to market 
rigidities. In the empirical section, we control for the heterogeneous capitalisation due to 
levels of concentration or diversity in small areas.  Rigidities also drive from standard 
contracts, in which rent reviews usually occur at five-year intervals and are only upward. 
The annual national tax adjustments are reasonably predictable as they are revenue neutral 
and reflect inflation. Shocks are likely following the implementation of BR revaluations, 
which should take place every five years and can both lower and raise the obligation.  
Additionally, governments can introduce shocks and distortions to the flat tax 
through the introduction of loosely targeted reductions, like SBRR. The SBRR, depending 
on the nation and period, reduces the tax obligation in steps or sets a maximum tax 
reduction, which then tapers linearly. E.g. in England, for 2010-17 the 100% threshold was 
up to £6,000 rateable value after which it tapered to zero at £12,000 (please see Appendix 
One for details). All these frictions may reduce the degree of capitalisation and the time it 
takes.  
In the sparse literature on BR and capitalisation Bond et al. (1996) used rental data 
for the period 1987-1992, to explore the 1990 shift in tax setting powers from local 
authorities to the national government. They found rents fell in response to BR rises more 
than in areas that saw a fall in BR during this transition period. They do not reject a pound 
for pound negative relationship between rents and BR, although with a wide confidence 
interval51. Their priors were that market rigidities would delay the process, but they further 
show it took only two years for the incidence to shift in retail properties. Bond et al. (2013) 
found a similar impact in Enterprise Zones where rates were reduced and planning 
restrictions relaxed.  
In order to focus more on property taxes, we make a number of simplifying 
assumptions. We first conceptualise supply as; 
𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡 = [𝛽𝑣𝑓𝑉𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑜𝑓𝑂𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡] + 𝛽𝑟𝑠𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑡,                                  (1) 
where 𝑄is the output of firm i in nation j at time t, 𝑉𝐹 are the general variable inputs, 
(such as labour and materials) OF are other fixed factors (such as machinery, installations 
or overheads) excluding rented space (RS) which we consider separately. The 𝛽𝑠 represent 
their relative weights in output. We take all variable and other fixed inputs together as 
                                                             
51 Commercial research employing rental data finds 75% capitalisation of BR over 
a period of two to three years (Regeneris, 2015) 
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numeraire. Firms live for up to two periods and can enter at any point. During the firm’s 
first period, demand is normalised to unitary. Period one profit is given by; 
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = [𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝑗)],       (2) 
where 𝑝 is the exogenous final good price, r is rent, 𝜏 is property tax and 𝛼 is the 
proportionate reduction in the tax for small firms within a given nation and period. We 
express rent and tax in units of output in order to relate them directly to price and unit 
profits. These values represent the input value divided by total output value and as such 
can reflect changes in productivity. We fix rents in both periods to reflect rigidities in the 
contractual norms. In period two, we observe a demand shock;  
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 1 + 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡+1,        (3) 
where 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 is a realisation from a random draw over a continuous distribution at 
the beginning of the period. The draw can be positive or negative. We consider responses 
to the shock and the influence of reliefs. 
In extremis, a negative shock (𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 < 0) will lead to firm exit (E), in which case;      
𝜋𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑖𝐸 = 0. The level of reliefs could affect exit thresholds, with greater relief adding 
greater resilience. If a firm has negative draw but survives (S), we assume a fall in output 
and productivity. This means the unit cost of the fixed rent and tax increase, as does the 
relative value of any relief. This captures why since the great recession BR is at the principle 
concern of small business groups (Adam and Miller, 2014 and Cabinet Office, 2014) and led 
to significant political pressure for reform. Profit in period two is;  
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = (1 + 𝜌𝑖𝑗)[𝑝 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗 − 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡+1(1 − 𝛼𝑗)]     (4) 
If the demand shock is negative, then [𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝑗)] < [𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡+1(1 − 𝛼𝑗)], 
i.e. first period unit costs of rent and tax are lower than second period unit costs. We 
implicitly assume relocation is too costly. Figure One, page 16, in which we plot the 
evolution of productivity nicely captures the marked dip in average productivity following 
the 2008 great recession.  
If a firm faces a positive shock (𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 ≥ 0), it has three choices. The first is to 
continue (C) in the current premises and increase output within capacity limitations, the 
unit cost of rent and tax decline as they are defrayed over a larger production run and 
productivity would increase. In which case we would now see  [𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡(1 − 𝛼𝑗)] > [𝑟𝑖𝑗 +
𝜏𝑖𝑗𝑡+1(1 − 𝛼𝑗)] in period two profits. This means reliefs would reduce this gain from lower 
unit costs given they neutralise the tax costs. Moreover, tighter capacity constraints for 
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small firms and limited scale effects in some industries, would see constraints bite more 
quickly and we may see increases in variable unit costs offsetting the fixed factor or 
productivity gains. In which case, the decision thresholds we now discuss are more relevant 
to small firms.  
Secondly, the firm could expand production within the current premises. This 
would result from, say, changing the way in which the space is utilised or installing fixed 
capital. This may increase total rent, but we assume that any per unit change only derives 
from productivity changes. The adjustment to property usage could lead to a Valuation 
Office Agency52 revaluation. This revaluation process considers a number of elements 
beyond the simple building space. It would look at the amount and type of installed capital 
(capital integral to the property from furnaces to air conditioning) and gives different 
values to different zones. Spaces near windows in small retail units have greater values 
than other spaces such as storerooms. These factors underscore the complexity of the tax 
and why there are 300,000 appeals currently under consideration (Sandford, 2017). Any 
increase in the rateable value may in turn trigger a reduction in any relief. Again, this means 
firms in receipt of reliefs have a different threshold to those which do not. Profits in this 
growth (G) scenario are then; 
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑖𝐺 = (1 + 𝜌𝑖𝑗) [𝑝 − 𝑟𝑖𝑗 − (𝛾𝜏𝑖𝑗+1(1 − 𝛿𝛼𝑗))],   (5) 
Where 𝛾 ≥ 1 represents a revaluation of the rateable value per unit of output and 
𝛿 ≤ 1 the associated reduction in relief.  
Duranton et al. (2011) principally demonstrate that the increase in BR following 
expansion can deter expansion of large manufacturing firms. This was in the period 1984-
1989, before centralisation and SBRR. They show manufacturing occupiers still bear some 
of the incidence and the tax and this could have an effect on production decisions. However, 
they do note high relocation costs and the net effect of the tax change would limit any move 
to lower tax jurisdictions. This brings us to our final decision threshold. 
If the demand shock is sufficiently positive, a firm may decide to relocate (R) to 
larger premises. We assume unit rental and taxation per unit are the same or lower, than 
staying in the current premises and producing at the same level or intensifying production. 
However, such relocation will lead to lower reliefs, given the firm will probably now face a 
higher total initial tax. Hence, in addition to relocation costs (c) there would be small extra 
                                                             
52 The Valuation office Agency is a UK government agency, which values properties for 
taxation purposes. 
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tax costs for growing small firms. Nonetheless, we would expect relocation costs to be 
greater than relief losses.  
𝜋𝑖𝑗𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑖𝑅 = (1 + 𝜌𝑖𝑗)[𝑝 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?𝑖𝑗(1 − 𝛿𝛼𝑗) − 𝑐𝑖𝑗],   (6) 
where ?̅? and ?̅? represent reduced unit values than in period one which do not derive 
simply from productivity changes. 
The above, simplified scenarios provide us with a number of differentiated decision 
thresholds which vary depending on a nation’s property taxes and degree of relief. Namely, 
exit (𝜋𝑖𝐸), survive but reduce production (𝜋𝑖𝑆), continue within existing capacity (𝜋𝑖𝐶), 
invest at the same premises (𝜋𝑖𝐺), or invest at a new larger premises (𝜋𝑖𝑅). Our above 
modelling shows exits will be positively related to higher rents and taxes and negatively 
related to reliefs. Some small firms may then survive a given shock, irrespective of 
productivity. If a firm survives a negative demand shock, it will reduce output from installed 
capacity and higher absorption of the reduced turnover by fixed rent and taxes. This 
increase the salience of the tax, whilst reliefs ameliorate the effect.  
Once we move to positive shocks, the reliefs may become an impediment to 
productivity gains within existing supply constraints. In the decision between maintaining 
or increasing capacity at the current premises, the positive shock would need to be 
sufficient to cover the increased tax and loss of reliefs after revision of rateable values. 
Instead of enabling firms to overcome putative growth frictions, they could be less likely to 
invest, relative to the counterfactual of no reliefs. This would be in line with Duranton et al. 
(2011). Reliefs would also impede the decisions to relocate, relative to no relief, as the 
positive demand shock would need to be greater to induce firms receiving reliefs to change 
location and feasibly improve productivity. 
The static argument supporting the reliefs is that the higher relative cost of 
property taxes for small firms in their fix costs (repeated in HM Treasury 2016) 
disproportionately reduce profits and ability to invest. Givord et al. (2013) argue small 
firms tend to be more financially constrained than larger firms and might be more 
responsive to tax incentives. Whereas Holtz-Eakin (2000) challenges this narrative, 
arguing studies that suggest finance restrictions limit small firms have not shown too few 
or the wrong firms are funded. The conclusions from this basic modelling show that the 
story is rather more nuanced than the arguments supporting the reliefs. Firms may be 
better placed to survive negative shocks, but they are also more likely to be less productive, 
with higher investment thresholds. Capitalisation will also reduce the putative negative 
effects of the property tax, but this could vary by the degree of competition for commercial 
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space. That said the statutory incidence on occupiers makes this a highly salient tax 
irrespective of economic incidence.  
Regional clustering factors add further complexity to these firm-level decisions. 
Regional levels of competition can have differential effects on investment, relocation or exit 
thresholds. Porter (2003) and Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) argued greater competition 
might drive more or less investment in processes or product differentiation depending on 
the degree and speed with which competitors adopt competitive advances. In turn, any 
local Marshall intra-industry or Jacob diversity externalities could modify the source and 
rate of absorption. Finally, we can layer age effects on these complications. We may see 
learning by doing effects as firms age, but we may also see slower adoption of new 
techniques or machinery, relative to new firms. In turn, most new firms are simple 
“copycat” firms and they do not drive incremental innovation.  
Rather than trying to model these complex factors, which would be messy and 
provide little insight, we employ an empirical strategy, which combines random effects 
with decision trees that allows the data to discover how these factors group firms and 
consequentially any influence of the tax reliefs. We now discuss this approach. 
Empirical Methodology 
Our modelling draws out some of the nuanced implications SBRR could have on 
survival and investment boundaries. We also observe other firm characteristics such as age 
and clusters by region or sector may influence decisions. These factors will not be solely 
additive but interact such that the path along which any effects of the universal policy 
operate on survival or productivity will be difficult to identify a priori.  
These considerations lead us to adopt two recently developed decision tree 
algorithms rather than standard parametric multilevel estimators. For our productivity 
analysis, we exploit the Random Effects Expectation Maximisation (RE-EM) decision tree 
approach of Sela and Simonoff (2012) and subsequently Fu and Simonoff (2015). The 
Random effects element accounts for the constant differential firm-level factors whilst the 
decision tree allows the data to discover the complex groupings of firms and their different 
levels of productivity without imposing a complex parametric structure. 
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The RE-EM model is: 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑖 + 𝑓(. ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,       𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼    𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑛     (7) 
(
𝜀𝑖1
:
:
𝜀𝑖𝑛
) ~𝑁(0, 𝑅𝑖), 
𝑏𝑖~𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,𝐷), 
𝑓(. ) = 𝑓 (∑(𝑆𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑡−𝑗),
4
𝑗=0
𝜌𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 , 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 , 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝐻𝐺𝐹𝑖𝑡 , 𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 , 𝐼𝑂𝑖𝑡)  
The dependent variable 𝜔𝑖𝑡, is our bootstrapped estimate of total factor 
productivity, as discussed below, for each firm i in period t. 𝑍 is a matrix of independent 
variables which may vary over time and firms and 𝑏𝑖 is the vector of random effects. f(.) 
contains the same variables as Z, although they can differ, which we use to estimate the 
fixed effects via the decision tree. 
Within f(.) we have SBRR and four lags to capture medium-term effects and account 
for the periodicity of the reliefs. We complement these variables with the dummy variable 
𝜌 to capture the initial53 effects of receiving any relief or the uplift in relief, irrespective of 
level.  
We next include basic classification variables of firm age (a), the regions and 
nations (r) of Wales, Scotland, North East, North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, East of 
England, East Midlands, West Midlands, London, South East and South West. We classify 
firms into the broad sectors (s) of wholesale, catering, construction, production, property, 
retail and other services. 
In order to account for the effects of local industry structure and competition on 
productivity, we include indices for Jacob diversity (JD) and Marshall production 
specialisation (PS). We control for industry concentration at the national level via a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). We capture the Marshallian Specialisation externalities 
by calculating the specialisation index as suggested by Feldman and Audretsch (1999) and 
Paci and Usai (1999). We exploit our access to firm-level micro data to calculate the 
specialisation within small two-digit postcode areas, relative to national SIC (2003) two-
digit industry output. We further exploit the data and use firm turnover rather than 
                                                             
53 Scotland in 2003, England in 2005, Wales in 2007, with increase in relief in 2010 
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employment. This produces a less noisy control for TFP than employment and a much more 
accurate perspective on the concentration and value of activity. The index is: 
𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑇𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑖
⁄
∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑗
∑ ∑ 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖
⁄
 ,        (8) 
where T is industry i turnover in area j. We calculate the turnover of a given 
industry (i) in an area (j) as a proportion of all turnover in a given area and then place it in 
relation to national turnover from the same industry as a proportion of national turnover. 
For given levels of local infrastructure and public pool of research knowledge, the index 
helps to capture whether greater proximity enables the creation of better labour pools, 
supplier services or the spillover of incremental process and product innovations. SBRR 
may interact with these local factors as they may help reduce the assumed financial barriers 
to adoption or creation of incremental changes. That said, we may also observe increased 
competition for specific types of premises and as such a more rapid capitalisation of any 
tax reliefs. Proximity may also diminish innovation if spillovers occur before firms can 
exploit monopoly rents and as such there may be a negative association with SBRR as it 
leads to greater mark-up rather than innovation, although survival may improve as 
productivity differentials do not widen. 
We capture any local Jacob (Production) Diversity effects via an index based on the 
reciprocal of the Gini Coefficient as proposed by Paci and Usai (1999). 
𝑃𝐷𝑗 =
2
(𝑛−1)𝑄𝑛
∑ 𝑄𝑖
𝑛−1
𝑖=1  ,        (9) 
where 𝑛 is the number of industries in region j, 𝑄𝑖  is the cumulative turnover up to 
industry 𝑖, then ordered by ascending size. The index, bounded by zero and one, increases 
with variety. Differently to SBRR or PS location rather than the firm or industry is at the 
centre of analysis and driving change (Florida et al., 2017). Innovation is aided by access to 
ideas and procedures that firms can copy or modify from a diverse set of industries or 
knowledge generating institutions within small areas or given the positive correlation with 
urban areas more diverse and stable demand. That said, at our two-digit postcode level we 
will observe a good degree of variation even within urban areas. In the same vein, we also 
control for the choice to invest in Research and development with the variable R&D, this 
comes from the survey element of the ARDx dataset and asks whether a firm intends to 
invest in such activity within the next two years.  
The Office of National Statistics (ONS, 2017), building on a well-established body of  
literature, e.g. Harris and Moffat (2015), calculates that UK firms receiving foreign 
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investment have 74% higher productivity than firms which do not attract foreign 
investment, after controlling for firm characteristics. There are of course selection effects 
which bias these findings. Consequently, we include the dummy variable 𝐹𝑂 that takes one 
for firms with a foreign majority owner. In this era of concerns about complex ownership 
structures and use of complex taxation schemes, we also use the variable 𝐼𝑂 to denote a 
foreign country registration of the firm’s immediate parent firm, this is also the variable 
ONS used in their calculations. This can be different to 𝐹𝑂, which denotes the ultimate 
country of the owner. HGF controls for high growth firms, HGF is a dummy taking the value 
of one in the years it meets the Eurostat-OECD (2007) definition, namely average 
annualised growth in employment greater than 20% per annum, over a three-year period 
with initial employment not lower than ten.  
The error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is assumed to be uncorrelated with the random effects and 
independent across observations. 𝑅𝑖 is a non-diagonal matrix to account for 
autocorrelation within firms. The algorithm proceeds by initially setting the random effects 
to zero and building a decision tree. The random effects are then estimated, given the 
decision tree and the process iterates until the random effects converge using a restricted 
maximum likelihood estimator. The decision tree values are then finally updated. 
Dependent Variable: Total Factor Productivity 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is not directly observable from production 
functions and consequently needs to be extracted once the weighted sum of inputs has been 
estimated with controls for simultaneity and selection biases. We estimate TFP using 
Wooldridge’s (2009) one-step GMM estimator, which has been successfully employed in a 
range of settings and has been cited in at least 205 different papers since its publication 
(Repec, 2018). Wooldridge builds on the influential work of Olley and Pakes (1996) and 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and overcomes the identification issues of variable inputs 
such as labour. We estimate TFP assuming a Cobb Douglas functional form:  
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛𝐾𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑖𝑡,      (10) 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is TFP of the ith firm in period t, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the firm’s logarithmic gross 
value added in order to simplify the model and eliminate intermediate inputs, 𝐾 is 
logarithmic capital and 𝐿 is logarithmic labour. We bootstrap through thousand estimates 
to reduce serial correlation. 
Survival Analysis 
 
 
308 
 
The Fu and Simonoff (2017) Survival tree (ST) algorithm advances pervious work 
through its combination of controls for the typical left truncated right censored nature of 
panel data. Decision trees have traditionally struggled to cope with such structures when 
there are time variant repressors. The authors argue that this non-parametric approach is 
preferable to the standard Cox proportional hazards model as the required parametric 
assumptions are not met or unrealistic. 
Unlike the RE-EM, this algorithm does not control for firm-level intercepts, although 
clustering on firm is feasible with Huber-white standard errors. We use the author’s 
LTRCART extension of existing models, which control for left truncation. Given space 
limitations, please see their paper for the full details. Our report employs the same 
independent variables as in the RE-EM algorithm with the addition of TFP.  
We test the stability and validity of the ST and RE-EM using standard approaches. 
First, we use the k-fold validation method, in which we compare the predictive capacity of 
our trees to OLS. We then split our sample into ten random subsamples and use each 
subsample as a validation subset for the estimates coming from the remaining nine 
subsamples. To test the stability of the results, we employ the random forests algorithm, 
which does not include the longitudinal aspect of the tree, but gives guidance as to which 
are the most influential variables. The output is provided in Appendix Two. 
Data 
We base our analysis on the U.K. Office of National Statistics (ONS) Annual 
Respondents Database X (ARDx) first released in July 2016 combined with Business 
Structure Database (BSD) and Prices Survey Microdata (PSM). 
The ARDx combines two existing surveys, the Annual Business Inquiry (1998-
2008) and the subsequent Annual Business Survey (2009-14) which firms’ representatives 
are legally required to complete, producing high response rates. It is a census of firms with 
250 plus employees and complex stratified sample across size, sector and region of smaller 
firms. The sample framework is constructed using administrative data on employment and 
turnover from PAYE54 and VAT registered firms. Importantly for our purposes, it captures 
information at both the enterprise and local unit levels. We do however need to calculate 
firm’s rateable value and SBRR from the survey reported BR. The calculations are set out in 
Appendix One.  
                                                             
54 Pay as you earn, is the taxation withholding mechanism whereby employers deduct 
taxation from employee income on behalf of the tax authorities.  
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We combine this data source with the BSD to acquire the annual observations of 
smaller firms that were not included in the ARDx sample in some years and as such fills in 
some missing variables. The BSD contains an annual release of a small number of critical 
variables on all UK registered firms and is complementary to the above business surveys. 
There are nevertheless still missing observations particularly on the smaller firms, 
which would tend to attract SBRR. To ensure a representative sample, we clean and impute 
the data where appropriate. We use predictive mean matching, with the key variables of 
turnover, employment, region, sector and legal status that have almost no missing data 
from the ARDx or BSD data sources. To estimate TFP, we then bootstrap over a thousand 
samples and average their coefficients and standard errors in order to reduce serial 
correlation55. 
The ARDx and BSD do not directly provide controls for input price changes that we 
require for estimation of TFP. To control for omitted price bias (as defined by Van Beveren, 
2010), we do not use the typical approach of employing the inherently biased general GDP, 
but use the PSM data, which contains more precise regional and sector level prices. We 
devalue to 2016 prices. 
Finally, we exploit our large representative dataset to recreate the conditions of a 
social experiment in which firms that receive SBRR are matched to similar single-unit firms 
which did not. This should make the results less model dependent. Our large dataset 
enables us to produce good matches by using a wide range of observable characteristics, 
namely: materials, age, investment, rent, output per employee, employment, sector, legal 
status, turnover, and GVA. The dependent variable is a dummy taking a value of one for 
those firms that received the relief at least twice between 2003-2015 and zero otherwise.  
We match using Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). CEM does not use the random 
pruning applied in Propensity Score Matching, which is shown to increase the level of 
imbalance (King et al., 2011 and 2016). The broad mechanism behind CEM is to group each 
variable by recoding so that nearly similar values are assigned the same value (Iacus et al., 
2009). The firms were matched one year prior to the SBRR introduction or for youthful 
firms their first observable year. This produced a final dataset for the years 2000 to 2015 
of 15,047 observations for 1,092 firms, 546 SBRR recipients matched to 546 firms that 
never received the relief but with similar characteristics.  
                                                             
55 We also run estimates on non-imputed data and these results are available on request. 
TFP estimates of capital coefficient sometimes differs but other estimates (or major splits) are 
consistent. 
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Findings  
In Figure One, we provide the firm-level evolution of estimated TFP during 2005-
2015 and link this to receipt and degree of SBRR. We see a dramatic drop and rebound just 
after the start of the economic crisis in 2008 that we discussed in the modelling section. 
The average level of TFP was similar whether firms did or did not receive SBRR, although 
those in receipt of SBRR saw a steeper drop in 2008. The degree of relief does not produce 
any particular pattern in TFP, even after reliefs became more generous post 2010. Overall, 
there is diverse and complex variation around the average levels of productivity even 
among these carefully matched firms.  
Figure 1. Estimated TFP 2005-2015 by SBRR 
 
TFP estimates as described in the method section  
The white lines correspond to the annual averages of all firms 
The white dotted line is the average firms  SBRR recipients 
The white dashed line is the average for non-recipients 
The other lines are shaded by the proportionate level of SBRR. Where black is 0% 
and light gray is 100%.  
ONS Data, Author’s calculations 
 
We present the full TFP decision tree in Appendix Three, but for clarity and to 
isolate SBRR effects, we focus on the two extracts in Figures Two and Three. The Decision 
tree algorithm works by allowing the data to define ever more “pure” groups of firms which 
explain variation in the dependent variable (reduce the RSME), in that the firms in the final 
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groups (nodes) are increasingly homogeneous. The final nodes give the number of firms in 
the group and the average level of TFP, in terms of GVA. The splits are not strictly 
hierarchical as variables can enter a branch more than once but with different sub-values 
for points at which the data split.  
The principle split is on a two-year lag of SBRR, 12,502 with zero relief and 2,540 
with some relief. In Figure Two, we follow the 2,540 observations for firms receiving SBRR. 
The weighted average TFP of these observations is six percent lower than the other 
observations of firms not in receipt of SBRR. We focus on the most influential branches, 
those with the greatest numbers of firms in the final nodes. 
Figure Two: TFP Tree Extract Following Firms Receiving Two Year Lagged SBBR   
 
 
Figures in final nodes: TFP in terms of GVA and n is number of observations in 
the final node  
ONS Data, Author’s Calculations 
 
The next significant grouping along this branch is by region. In the Southern and 
Eastern regions of England, Wales and Scotland (other in Figure Two), we identify a group 
of 1,222 observations on the five year lagged SBRR at 38% relief. Observations for the 940 
firms receiving less relief have higher TFP. Nonetheless, weighted TFP for all observations 
 
 
312 
 
in these regions is over three percent lower than for observations in the Northern, Midlands 
and London regions of England. In fact, for these English regions, the next significant node 
is equally five-year lagged SBRR at a similar value of 40%. The pattern of TFP is the same, 
with lower TFP for the 248 observations from firms receiving higher relief than the 981 
observations with lower or no relief. We conclude from this branch that irrespective of 
region and sector (excluding catering in some regions), the firms which consistently receive 
the higher levels of SBRR are those with lower TPF. This aligns with our basic model, which 
suggested firms receiving SBRR would be less likely to invest, but it could also simply mean 
capitalisation strips the relief of any meaningful long-term effect.  
Following the observations for firms which did not receive two year lagged SBRR, 
we find the specific characteristics of London firms make them different to observations in 
other regions. We first consider the 10,911 observations outside of London which next 
group on age 32. In Figure Three, we follow the 9,173 younger observations as these are 
influenced by SBRR. The 1,738 observations from firms at least 32 years old (not shown) 
have no grouping on SBRR and ultimately the observations group by sector and then by 
region. The weighted TFP of these older observations is approximately five percent lower 
than for the younger observations, but with significant variation. For 2,983 of the younger 
firm observations (shown), we quickly come to an end node defined by high levels of local 
diversity, above 0.84 on the PD index56. The Jacobian diversity hypothesis is that greater 
local diversity enables innovation. Here we find some support for this, as the weighted 
average TFP of these observations is approximately 3.6% higher than the TFP of others in 
two-digit postcode areas with a lower level of diversity. In the entire tree, we only find splits 
on Marshall Specialisation for areas of London.  
Moving down the branch for the majority of firms, those with lower PD, we see for 
all sectors except catering that there is a complex division between long-term and short-
term reliefs. In particular, observations with five year lagged SBBR below 10% and one year 
lagged SBBR below 70% are associated with TFP generally higher than those which have 
five year lagged relief above 10%. We do see some subsequent small divisions with similar 
TFP. Overall, we find the recipients of greater SBRR are those with lower TFP.  
The 1,591 observations from London have a weighted average TFP five percent 
higher than in the rest of the UK, this seems to be driven by a relatively small number of 
                                                             
56 We observe similar pattern further down the branch for the regions, West Midlands, East 
and South East of England that we do not show in figure, for space reasons. 869 Firms in these 
regions between 16 and 32 years old with a PD above 0.77 have TFP greater than that for the 437 
firms in areas with lower PD, although the difference is only around 2.5%. Central part of the tree in 
Appendix Three.  
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observations in sectors other than catering, construction, production, property, retail or 
wholesale. However, we find no association with SBRR.   
Figure Three: TFP Tree Following Firms Not Receiving 2 Year Lagged SBBR, 
outside of London  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
final
 
Figures in final nodes: TFP in terms of GVA and n is number of observations in 
the final node  
* denotes that this is a truncated branch for the regions West Midlands, East of 
England and South East England which does not subsequently group on SBRR. The TFP 
figure is a weighted average for the 2,206 observations 
ONS Data, Author’s Calculations 
 
Overall, our findings on SBRR and TFP are in line with our model, which shows 
continued receipt of higher reliefs are associated with lower TFP. This is not the only 
explanation, as capitalisation of consistent reliefs into higher rents becomes easier over a 
longer period, increasingly shifting any benefit to property owners. Other than SBRR 
regional effects consistently explain variation in TFP, but we cannot say, except for London, 
there is a simple dominant geographical pattern. Interestingly we find nearly 4,000 
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observations in small areas with greater turnover diversity have better TFP. This would 
suggest the underlying institutional factors stimulating diversity would be a more logical 
policy target than generic tax reductions.  
Survival 
Above we assume SBRR would help survival when firms face an extreme demand 
shock. However, we find no groupings on current or lagged SBRR. The complete tree in 
Figure Four shows an initial division on immediate ownership, with firms with a legal 
ownership not in the UK going straight to a final node where the Kaplan-Meier curve shows 
survival probability drops of quickly and is similar to the most precarious UK registered 
firm groups.  For UK firms we see production sector firms differ from all others. These do 
divide on TFP, but in the subsequent groups region play a greater role. The North East is 
consistently in groups with the worst survival probability and Northwest, East of England, 
South East and London consistently in the better groups. The 7800 observations in other 
sectors divide on HHI. Survival is higher for small firms in the less concentrated towards 
several major players sectors.  
Figure Four: Survival Decision Tree 
 
The graphics on the final nodes are Kaplan –Meier Survival Curves, showing the 
decay in survival probability over the period.  
n is the number of observations in the final nodes 
ONS data, Author’s Calculations 
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Conclusions 
This study utilises recently developed non-parametric algorithms to discover 
complex hierarchical relations and analyse whether property taxes reductions for small 
firms enable them to grow and become more productive or on the contrary, whether the 
tax policy is poorly targeted at has the long tail of small firms with consistently lower than 
mean TFP.  
The estimates from the RE-EM productivity analysis align with our initial model in 
that the dominant grouping and all subsequent groupings on variously lagged SBRR, are 
associated with current lower levels of productivity. SBRR has not demonstrably enabled 
over reasonable periods recipients to invest and align with matched firm’s TFP. This would 
suggest BR are not the growth impediment that a wide circle of commentators and policy 
makers claim. The tax reductions do not achieve their objective of enabling small firms to 
release untapped growth potential. On the contrary, they have been gone to the least 
productive small firms and property owners through capitalisation of long-term reductions 
into rents. We also show SBRR do not aid survival either, which again could be due to 
capitalisation.  
In addition to SBRR, regional differences consistently play a role in explaining TFP. 
There is no simple consistent regional pattern, except for London, which also has no 
relationship with SBRR. This region has higher weighted average TFP, although just a small 
number of extreme firms cause this difference, most observations are in-line with the rest 
of the country. More interestingly, for approximately one quarter of observations57 greater 
Jacobian Diversity explains their higher productivity. The mainstream logic underlying the 
SBRR focuses on firm-level constraints and sees tax reductions, subsidies as solutions. 
Whereas the Jacobian argument is urban areas facilitate innovation through its institutional 
organisation and attraction of economic actors, i.e. innovation is spatial rather than firm 
orientated (Florida et al. 2017). Our findings support this latter case, but not for all areas 
and as such we would argue research and policy focused on diverse location factors rather 
than generic subsidies would prove to be more fruitful. 
Clear policy implications and future research agendas flow from these findings. Tax 
reductions failed to liberate economic growth. Policy makers and firms failed to understand 
the mechanisms underlying how the incentives are used and how capitalisation of the 
benefits may occur. This makes challenging and changing policy difficult and as such 
                                                             
57 This figure principally comes from combining end nodes for firms which are in the branch 
for observations of firms younger than 32. 
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requires the support of considered research. If the research finds overwhelming 
capitalisation, then governments would have the opportunity to reduce the salience of the 
tax and consequential political pressure by aligning the economic and statutory incidence 
of BR on property owners and removing the reliefs. If research finds this is not the case and 
the least productive firms are simply absorbing the gains and not innovating, again there 
would be a clear-cut case for removal of the reliefs. Both of these outcomes lead to the 
revocation of the policy, but without an evidence base, any policy change could prove to be 
politically complicated. The findings on Jacobian Diversity also hint at an alternative locally 
directed policy based on rigorous analysis of local constraints and opportunities.  
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Small Business Tax Policy: Reductions, Capitalisation, Age and No 
Growth  
Dr Matthew Gobey58 and Karolis Matikonis59 
Abstract 
The incomplete devolution of English Local Government taxation powers has been 
constrained by central government’s doubling of reductions in property taxes for small firms. The aim 
is to stimulate local growth, but we question the economic logic. We analyse reductions in place since 
2005, with a newly linked dataset for all firms that incorporates administrative data down to local units. 
We find the reductions do not overcome supposed market failures, do not stimulate growth and once 
we control for firm age, that the targeted small firms do not produce extra employment. Young firms 
and larger firms have better growth rates, but there is no systematic size effect. High growth firms enjoy 
some locational benefits. We conclude that the tax reductions fail because they do not account for tax 
capitalisation, the basic characteristics of the average small firm or develop a clear mechanism for 
change among heterogeneous economic actors. 
 
JEL CODES: C55 D22 H22 H25 J21 L25 O43  
Keywords: Local Property Taxation, Capitalisation, Devolution, Growth, Firm Age 
___________________________________________ 
1. Introduction  
 
The UK Government announced the “end of the national tax on local growth” (HM Treasury 
2016 p. 9) in the autumn of 2015. The Government planned to devolve the setting and administration 
of English60 Business Rates (BR), a property-based tax historically levied on all firms, from the national 
to local governments in 202061. A principle element of this policy was greater local flexibility to reduce 
(not increase) rates set nationally for specific projects or types of firms and stimulate local growth. Yet 
in the March 2017 Budget, the same national Government undermined this flexibility.  The Government 
significantly expanded and made permanent the current policy of National (English) reductions in the 
property tax for small firms (called Small Business Rate Reliefs or SBRR). The reductions now remove 
600,000 firms (i.e. one third of all firms) from local tax bases and will reduce revenue by £9bn over 5 
years (HM Treasury 2017). This raises concerns about future revenue, greater reliance on a small 
number of large firms and restrictions on local autonomy to achieve local objectives.  
 
The policy to expand and reduce the property tax follows a persistent campaign by the small 
business community. The then Prime Minister told the Federation of Small business in 2014 that small 
business’ number one complaint was Business Rates, which had risen relative to other costs (Adam and 
Miller 2014 and Cabinet Office 2014). In April 2017, we also saw a vociferous campaign against BR 
increases in areas such as London that led to some minor changes in that year’s budget. Yet at the same 
                                                             
58 Manchester Metropolitan University, Future Economies, All Saints Campus, Manchester 
United Kingdom. Email: M.Gobey@MMU.AC.UK:  Tel: 0161 2473872 ORCID: 0000-0001-5943-2471, 
corresponding author. 
59 Manchester Metropolitan University, Business School, All Saints Campus, Manchester 
United Kingdom. 
60 Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales have slightly different BR systems and devolved control. 
61 The timetable for the devolution of local finance has become unclear following the unexpected 
national elections in June 2017, which interrupted the legislative progress of the Local Government Finance Bill 
2017. 50% Retention of BR began in April 2013, with 50% returned to central government for redistribution. 
Increasingly BR funds local activities, but the ability to vary rates is restricted and infrequently employed.    
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time, there were offsetting declines in rates across most of the country given the instruments revenue 
neutral structure, which received much less attention.  
 
The narratives supporting this high profile policy draw together preconceptions about the 
universal negative effects of tax on firm growth and small firms’ transformative growth potential, both 
of which are superficially plausible. In a novel combination of economic literatures, we question the 
theoretical and empirical cogency of these arguments using rich newly linked micro data. In support of 
SBRR, introduced in 2005, it is argued (e.g. repeated in HM Treasury, 2016) that BR forms a greater 
proportion of small firm’s fixed costs than those of large firms and limits their ability to compete or 
innovate. This is not a sufficient condition for differential tax reductions, unless there is a greater social 
benefit from small firm’s growth and becomes immaterial, if through tax capitalisation, the economic 
cost/benefit transfer to property owners. 
  
We first address the policy mechanism and contribute to the tax capitalisation literature by 
exploring where the economic incidence falls and hence how the tax reduction could generate growth 
or innovation. Secondly, we explore the policy’s target of small firms, which is based on the perception 
small firms contribute more to employment levels than their share of gross value added. This is a 
fundamental issue, as whether firm size has a systematic effect on employment has not been clearly 
resolved for the U.K. (Hijzen et al. 2010). 
 
Critical to our novel combination of literature and analysis of the current tax reductions is our 
access to rich administrative data. We base our analysis on the Office of National Statistics (ONS) 
Annual Respondents Database X (ARDx). The ONS recently (July 2016) released this dataset, which 
is a combination of the Annual Business Inquiry and the subsequent Annual Business Survey. These 
are the largest datasets collected by the ONS, as they are an annual census of large firms and a sample 
of smaller ones. Importantly they include firm level administrative data on employment and turnover 
at both local unit and parent firm levels, making it a reliable and rich source, which overcomes a number 
of limitations on earlier work. 
 
Our analysis of the tax reductions in place between 2005 and 2014 shows these tax reductions 
have not enabled any growth in employment; in fact, we argue there is no feasible channel through 
which they could. We then show that even if there were a mechanism  the principle recipients, small 
old firms, are the least likely to be the catalyst for local employment growth. These findings bring into 
question the Treasury’s homogeneous micro management of local property taxes. 
 
We structure this paper in the following manner. In section two, we describe BR and their 
relevance. In section three, we discuss the two strands of theory that this policy combines on 
capitalisation and employment growth and confront them with the existing empirical evidence. In 
section four, we describe the data source and in section five, we discuss the estimation framework. We 
report the findings in section six and then conclude.  
2. The Business Rates System 
 
Business Rates (officially known as Non Domestic Rates) is a tax levied on all occupiers of 
commercial properties based on the property’s estimated rental value. BR constitute a significant UK 
tax instrument, which raised £29bn in the 2017 tax year (office of Budget Responsibility 2017). For 
context, this is equivalent to over half that raised by the more widely analysed Corporation Tax. The 
U.K. is the most reliant country in the OECD on property taxes. In 2015 the U.K. collected 13% of tax 
revenue from properties (including domestic property), whilst the OECD average was 6% (OECD 
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2017). BR are particularly salient to the business community because the statutory incidence falls on 
all commercial property occupiers rather than the property owners and consequently they perceive it 
as a substantial additional fixed cost. However, we argue below that this is a perception given economic 
incidence ultimately transfers to property owners following capitalisation into rents.  
 
Prior to 1990, each local government set its own BR, however since 1990 central government 
(and latterly devolved governments of the UK nations) has this power. The Valuation Office Agency 
(VOA) assesses the rateable value (RV) of each commercial property based on type of property, 
location, some types of installed machinary and other specified factors. The VOA revalues RVs on a 
five-year cycle, except for the 2010-15 cycle, which was extended to 2017. The 2010 revaluation was 
based on 2008 valuations.  
 
Firms pay a proportion (multiplier) of the RV, e.g., for the financial year 2013-14 it was 
47.1%. This can constitute a significant fixed cost and underscores the salience to firms. As and when 
BR are devolved, local governments would use the setting of the multiplier to encourage specific 
economic or social activities. Until April 2018, the annual increases in the multiplier were limited to 
increases in the Retail Price Index (RPI). Following wider pressure, they are now linked to the generally 
lower Consumer Price Index, rather than the RPI or indeed underlying property valuations. 
 
The Local Government Act of 2003 introduced Small Business Rate Relief (SBRR) from 
2005, until then BR was principally a flat tax. This relief (reduction) is partially funded by a supplement 
on the BR of firms occupying properties with slightly higher RVs.  Initially the supplement was on 
RVs above £15,000 (£21,500 in the city of London) then from 2010 above £18,000 (£25,000) and from 
2017 above £51,000. The SBRR started at 50% for properties with RVs up to £5,000 and tapered to 
zero at £10,000. In 2010, SBRR increased to 100% for properties with RVs up to £6,000 and tapered 
to zero at £12,000. This increase was for one year, but following pressure became permanent. As 
discussed in the introduction, the government brought forward from 2020 to 2017 the doubling of 
reliefs.  The 100% threshold rose to £12,000 and tapered to zero at £15,000. This change increased 
from 400,000 to 600,000 the number of firms not paying BR and 900,000 (approximately half of all 
firms) receiving some reduction. The cumulative five-year reduction in revenue of this and other 
changes from 2017 is estimated at £9 billion (HM Treasury 2016b, 2017). 
 
Table One provides a summary of the SBRR in England for the period we study. The nominal 
value of the relief rose rapidly to over £1 billion in 2014-15, more than double the value in 2010-11 
and quadruple the 2007-8 revenue loss. The supplement paid by firms in more expensive properties has 
consistently failed to cover 50% of this relief, yet the multiplier supplement has risen from 0.82% in 
2009-10 to 2.3% in 2014-15.   
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Table One: Business Rates Collected by Councils in England: 2005 to 2015 
£ million (nominal values) 
Year 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 
Net Value of BR Collected 15,677 16,853 17,138 18,722 19,039 18,927 20,661 21,352 20,541 21,610 
Cost of SBRR Granted Not pub Not pub -259.9 -298.2 -333.2 -506.5 -784.3 -900.3 -985.9 -1,061.5 
Business Funding  of SBRR (a) Not pub Not pub 132.3 176.3 176.6 372.8 375.6 399.2 447 543.2 
Net SBRR (b) 104 57 -147.8 -144.8 -187.9 -162.5 -432.1 -550 -590.5 -580 
SBRR Multiplier (pence)(a) 41.5 42.6 44.1 45.8 48.1 40.7 42.6 45 46.2 47.1 
BR multiplier (pence)(a) 42.2 43.3 44.4 46.2 48.5 41.4 43.3 45.8 47.1 48.2 
Additional multiplier to fund SBRR 
(pence) 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.1 
Number of Properties ('000) 1,651 1,663 1,681 1,692 1,698 1,718 1,735 1,759 1,771 1,787 
Total Rateable Value(c) 46,280 47,094 47,314 46,888 46,721 56,337 57,864 57,178 57,154 57,069 
Notes: £ million (nominal) 
Negative figures indicate relief being given 
BR = Business Rates; Not pub = Not published 
a: The Small business rate multiplier applied to firms with rateable value below £15,000 (City of London £21,500) between the financial years 
2005-6 and 2009.-10. From 2010-11 the thresholds rose to £18,000 (city of London £25,000). The national Domestic ( standard) rate applies from 
this threshold and incorporates a supplement for the Small Business Rate Relief 
b: includes adjusts with respect to any previous year 
c: This figure multiplied by the multiplier does not equal the Net Value of BR collected as the net value accounts for reliefs, collection costs, 
adjudications  
Source: Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Official Statistics 2011 to 2015, author's construction 
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3. Policy Debate and Literature Review 
 
This growth policy through reductions in property taxation covers two bodies of theory and 
empirical evidence, one for the policy mechanism and one for the economic group driving the desired 
growth. First, the policy’s homogenous changes in taxation for small firms putatively overcome market 
failure, from financial and market power constraints. Givord et al. (2013) suggest that relative to larger 
firms, small firms tend to be financially constrained and this may mean they are more responsive to tax 
incentives. Secondly, the government focuses these reliefs on small firms occupying cheaper 
properties. This focus reflects policy makers’ heuristic position (Shane, 2009), from which entrants and 
small firms can transform depressed economic regions, as they are believed to be more innovative and 
create more jobs than larger established firms. We argue that both the mechanism and the choice of the 
target group are poorly defined. 
 
Occupiers lobby against BR because they face the statutory responsibility for payment but 
ultimately there is little evidence they face the economic incidence. Policy maker’s failure to 
differentiate between the statutory and economic incidence of the instrument leads them to accept it 
distorts the decisions of small firms.  However, taxation theory (e.g. Stiglitz and Rosengard 2015 or 
Fischel et al. 2011) illustrates how property taxes will fall on the owners of immobile factors, land and 
buildings, ceteris paribus. Property prices and rents then reflect differences in taxes, with lower taxes 
increasing the purchase price of property if the statutory incidence falls on the property owner or 
increasing the level of rent occupants are willing to pay if it falls on the occupant. Whichever the 
statutory incidence, the relative immobility of the capital would see capitalisation, i.e. economic 
incidence passes backwards to the property owner. Rents and taxation do not move independently but 
combine to give a total cost threshold for occupation. If basic theory holds then there would be no social 
benefit from SBRR as it is captured by property owners, a group very different to the perceived 
beneficiaries. 
Bond et al. (1996)62 provide one of the few papers on BR post 1990. They examine the 1990 
change from local government rates to the national uniform BR using rental data for a sample of 2,964 
properties between 1987 and 1992. They show rents fell in response to BR rises more than in areas that 
saw a fall in BR during this transition period. They do not reject a pound for pound negative relationship 
between rents and BR, although with a wide confidence interval63. Bond et al. (1996) thought 
institutional rigidities in the frequency of rent reviews implied full capitalisation of changes would take 
a number of years. Yet, over a short two-year period, they find that there is a significant incidence on 
rents from changes in BR for retail properties. This would suggest there is only a short window in which 
any variation in BR could influence employment or other outcomes.  
 
Duranton et al. (2011) reinforce this finding on capitalisation of BR, although they also show 
some negative effect of higher rates on expansion. The authors apply innovative spatial methods to BR 
during 1984-89, when local governments previously set rates. They focus on large English 
manufacturing establishments and find BR had a significant negative impact on the level of 
(logarithmic) employment, for some growing firms. This indicates manufacturing occupiers still bear 
some of the incidence. The authors suggest that revaluation of a firm’s BR obligations following 
expansion discourages the development of premises and hence employment or encourage them to move 
                                                             
62 Also see Bond et. al. (2013) for work on capitalisation in Enterprise Zones 
63 Commercial research employing rental data finds 75% capitalisation of BR over a period of two to 
three years (Regeneris, 2015) 
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to areas with a lower BR. Although these factors will be limited by high relocation costs and because 
any change in BR will be net of the existing tax costs.  
 
Duranton et al. (2011) find a positive but insignificant association between BR and entry into 
areas, after matching entrants within one kilometre. I.e., higher BR does not deter entrants. They 
suggest selection effects may be driving these findings, with capital-intensive firms leaving areas and 
opening up space for less capital-intensive firms to enter, as commercial space is limited in its supply 
response. This may be the case, although it would suggest that the vacant space meets new occupants’ 
needs in terms of facilities and access to markets. More importantly, it indicates that there is some 
capitalisation of BR into new rents, otherwise entry would be in matched areas. In terms of local 
revenue, we can speculate there would be a limited effect on tax revenue and employment effects would 
depend on the selection of firms (with young and expanding firms entering as well as exiting) produced 
by relative BRs and demand conditions across areas.   
 
We cannot simply contribute to the literature on property taxes and capitalisation in isolation 
if we are to provide comprehensive analysis of the policy framework. Integral to the policy and pressure 
from the business community is the perceived need to target reductions on small firms, which could 
transform local communities.  
The narrative of transformative small firms implies that SBRR reduces financial constraints 
and this drives growth-enhancing pass through of lower prices or higher quality. Alternatively or in 
combination, firms may exploit market power and capture the tax reductions via increased mark ups. 
The pass through would lead to increases in market share at the expense of other firms, given there is 
no general demand stimulus. Holtz-Eakin (2000) challenges this narrative, arguing studies that suggest 
finance restrictions limit small firms have not shown too few or the wrong firms are funded. This 
finding weakens the efficiency arguments for intervention. Nightingale and Coad (2013) and Anyadike-
Danes et al. (2015) show the distribution of growth from small firms is skewed by a very small 
proportion of high performing firms, away from the vast majority, which produce much lower growth. 
Consequently, we argue the principle recipients of SBRR will be old small firms creating limited 
growth. Given these findings, mark up increases would be more prevalent than pass through as old 
small firms enjoy a softer budget constraint aiding short-term survival, but not growth.  
 
Reinforcing these conclusions is the output from research exploiting rich firm level datasets. 
The output frequently contests the perception that there is an inverse relationship between firm size and 
net employment growth (Nightingale and Coad 2013). Rijkers et al. (2014), Lawless (2014) and 
Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) attribute this perception to the work of Birch in the late 1970s. Birch’s 
work has subsequently been criticised for its failure to account for attrition and its ability to differentiate 
between gross and net flows.  
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) using US Census Bureau data and Huber et al. (2017) using Austrian 
data provide the recent leading studies into net employment growth that challenge the view on small 
firm employment growth. Both these studies use a current average of employment growth as the 
dependent variable, rather than logarithmic change to overcome regression to mean effects and enable 
an integrated approach to entry and exit. They both employ a saturated non-parametric OLS approach, 
whilst Huber et al. (2017) additionally use their own two-step approach, which produces similar 
findings. These authors find that once they control for age, small firm’s average growth is lower than 
that of larger firms, counter to the perception on which the reliefs are based. These findings are robust 
across institutional frameworks with Rijkers et al. (2014) work in Tunisia reaching similar conclusions. 
Haltiwanger et al. (2013) find a very limited positive relationship with size for firms with ten or more 
employees. This relationship weakens for continuing firms. Huber et al. (2017) and Rijkers et al. (2014) 
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find a stronger relationship for all firms, but again less so for continuing firms. Lawless (2014) for 
Ireland finds that there is no systematic effect of size, once she excludes the smallest firms. 
 
These papers consistently show that small firms do not drive growth because young firms, 
which tend to be small, have a particularly large volatile effect on employment growth if they survive. 
These large effects dissipate quickly. Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Rijkers et al. (2014) and Lawless (2014) 
find that the effect of youth is over by year five. Huber et al. (2017) by about year three and in periods 
of crisis slightly older firms may contribute more to employment growth given their greater stability. 
 
In terms of UK research on small firm employment growth, Hijzen et al. (2010) argue that it 
is rather limited and confined to the manufacturing sector. They also highlight the important debate 
over the relevance of firm size in employment growth is far from decided. These authors use 
decomposition methods on the Inter-Departmental Business register for the period 1997-2008. They 
conclude small firms across a wide range of sectors contribute a greater proportion of job creation than 
their employment share and a slightly greater proportion of job destruction. Overall, they find jobs 
created by small firms are no less persistent than jobs created by large firms. These findings are a little 
misleading for our purposes. 
 
The findings need challenging. Firstly, they define small firms as those which employ less 
than 100 people, which seems unnecessary when the data contains finer detail and is at odds with the 
finer groupings in the papers cited above. Our research divides firms below 100 employees into four 
groups, 0-9, 10-19, 20-49 and 50-99 to more clearly decipher growth patterns. Secondly, they conflate 
age and entry. They show entrants, which tend to be small, contribute a significant proportion of 
growth. The introduction of age is one important additional firm characteristic, which even if it is not 
sufficient to capture the complexity of dynamic firm environments (Shane 2009, Anyadike-Danes et 
al. 2015), is sufficient to empirically question the targeting of SBRR.  
 
The literature underscores the clear and significant disparities between basic tax theory, the 
evidence on small firm’s transformative potential and the relevance of the assumptions underpinning 
the homogeneous SBRR policy. There are also clear points of contention in the application of the 
property tax as; it leads to a significant level of resistance, it is collected from a group that is not aligned 
with the economic incidence and it will limit the flexibility of local governments in meeting local needs. 
Our strategy directly confronts these disparities between the different literatures and practice in order 
to comprehend how elements may support but not inform policymaking.  
4. Data Source 
Critical to our novel combination of literature to provide comprehensive policy analysis is our 
access to rich administrative data. We employ the ONS’ Annual Respondents Database X (ARDx) first 
released in July 2016. The ARDx combines two existing surveys, the Annual Business Inquiry (1998-
2008) and the subsequent Annual Business Survey (2009-14). These are the largest datasets collected 
by the ONS (62,000 questionnaires and over 600 variables) and firms’ representatives are legally 
required to complete the instrument64. It is a census of firms with 250 plus employees and complex 
stratified sample across size, sector and region of smaller firms. The sample framework is constructed 
using administrative data on employment and turnover from PAYE and VAT65 registrations. This can 
provide key information out of sample on changes in these variables as well as on births of firms.  
                                                             
64 Response rates vary by sector and year but overall oscillate between the high 70 and low 80 percent. 
65Pay As You Earn (PAYE) tax returns are collected by employers from each employee. Value Added 
Tax (VAT) registration is for firms above a turnover threshold who must then collect the tax on the goods and 
services they provide. 
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The power of the ARDx comes from the detailed information on both the dynamics of firms 
(reporting units) and their constituent units (local units). Access to administrative unit level data means 
we can control for mergers and acquisitions, which, if only observed at firm level, would lead to 
spurious measures of employment change due to changes in firm structures rather than true employment 
growth. Whilst data at parent level enables us to control for growth within appropriate age and size 
categories, as we can differentiate local unit activity from that of small single unit firms. Consequently, 
we can identify firms’ organic growth, within appropriate classifications. 
 
Firms report the BR paid in the survey period (October to October). This is not administrative 
data and hence it comes with the usual survey reporting issues. From this payment, we recover the 
rateable value and calculate firm’s SBRR for those that observably meet the SBRR criteria. Please see 
the appendix. 
 
In line with the recent net job creation literature, our dependent variable is the Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992) net average job creation measure. This enables an integrated treatment of entering, 
exiting and continuing firms. It is a bounded symmetrical measure between minus and positive two for 
exiting and entering firms, between which we find net employment creation of continuing firms. 
Frequently firm-level employment growth is zero or negative and this precludes the use of logarithmic 
differences. Huber et al. (2017), Haltiwanger et al. (2013), and Tornqvist et al. (1985) discuss the use 
of the current average to overcome negative biases from using a base year size classification, resulting 
from mean revision effects or positive biases from an end year classifications. 
 
At the local unit i, at time t, employment growth g is measured as a change in employment L, 
from the preceding year relative to the average employment over these years. i.e. 
 
𝒈𝒊𝒕 = (𝑳𝒊𝒕 − 𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏)/(𝟎. 𝟓(𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏))        (1) 
 
We aggregate equation one up to the firm/reporting unit as a weighted sum of local unit growth 
(gft) for the year in which the firm f controls a given unit, i.e. 
 
𝒈𝒇𝒕 = ∑ (𝟎. 𝟓(𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏)/∑ 𝟎. 𝟓(𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏)𝒊∈𝒇 )𝒊𝒕 𝒈𝒊𝒕       (2) 
 
This weighted aggregation from local to firm level allows us to account for a number of 
spurious changes in growth stemming from changes in local unit ownership as well as regression to the 
mean effects. The growth changes at local units will be greater than for firms given that the method 
accounts for within firm redistributions as well as non-organic growth66. 
 
Figure One about here 
 
In Figure One, we report the cumulative distributions of employment growth by the level of 
relief in the 2005-13 period. We group firms by their maximum relief, zero, up to 25, 50, 75 or 100 
percent. We also explode the central portion of these distributions between negative and positive 0.2 
growth, given their proximity. This proximity of the distributions strongly suggests relief has little or 
no systematic effect on employment growth. The darker broader band represents those with zero reliefs. 
                                                             
66 In a firm’s year of birth there would be a missing value, consequently we insert two if there is any 
employment or zero if none. 
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These firms have the greatest proportion of firms with negative growth, but also the largest proportion 
of firms with positive growth. Over the range of positive values, the differences from other groups, 
except that for firms with up to 100 percent relief is difficult to untangle. Firms with up to 100 percent 
relief have the smallest proportion of both negative and positive values. Only 20 percent of this 
distribution reports positive current growth. The pattern changes sharply as we approach the upper 
bound of two, indicating there is a larger proportion of entrants that qualify for the highest reliefs. 
 
 
5. Empirical Strategy 
We employ a saturated OLS estimation framework of interacted independent indicator 
variables67; 
 
𝒈𝒇𝒕 =∑𝜷𝒆𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆
𝟔
𝒆=𝟐
+∑𝜷𝒂𝑨𝒈𝒆
𝟔
𝒂=𝟐
+∑𝜷𝒓𝑺𝑩𝑹𝑹 +∑𝜷𝒏𝑩𝑹𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅
𝟑
𝒏=𝟐
𝟔
𝒓=𝟐
 +  ∑𝜷
𝒔
𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓
𝟗𝟔
𝒔=𝟐
   
        +∑𝜷𝒚𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓
𝟏𝟓
𝒚=𝟐
+∑𝜷𝒙(𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆, 𝑨𝒈𝒆, 𝑺𝑩𝑹𝑹,𝑩𝑹𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒅) 
𝝉
𝒙=𝟐
+  ∑( 𝑺𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓, 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓)
𝝎
𝒛=𝟐
+ 𝜺𝒇𝒕 ,    
 
where size is a vector of indicators, which varies with the employment groupings of 0-9 
employees, 10-19; 20-49; 50-99; 100-249 and 250 plus. Age is a vector of the categories, entrants and 
years; 1; 2-4; 5-9; 10-19; 20 plus. The division provides detailed information on the critical initial years 
of young firms. After year one, the other groupings are divided to give balanced numbers and provide 
reliable estimates. SBRR captures categories of percentage reliefs i.e., zero, greater than zero to < 25%; 
> 25% to < 50%; > 50% to < 75%; > 75% to < 100%. The variable BRperiod separates the periods by 
the revaluation periods 2000, 2005 and 2010. Sector is a vector of indicators for 96 two-digit Standard 
Industrial Classifications (SIC revision 2007). We include indicators for the years 2000-2013, the 
period we use for the analysis. We do not use the final year of 2014 in the dataset in order to avoid 
conflation of all observations and subsequent exits. The dataset does not give specific information on 
local unit and firm exit. However, identifiers are specific to units and are not recycled, as such we use 
exit from the sample frame as an indicator of exit. The errors are Huber-White cluster robust errors as 
observations within firms are unlikely to be independent. 
 
Initially, we estimate the average effects of size on weighted employment before adding 
controls for Age to assess its effect on the average adjusted effects for all firms and just continuing 
firms. We then add the SBRR and BRperiod indicator variables to estimate the average effects of SBRR 
on current employment growth. Finally, we focus on a subset of high growth firms, as defined by the 
EUROSTAT-OECD (2007). These are firms, excluding their year of entry, with three or more 
consecutive years of annualised employment growth of at least 20 percent, and in the initial year at 
least ten employees. 
 
Given the use of a bounded dependent variable, we employ saturated models of the discrete 
variables. I.e., we have coefficients for all main and interaction effects possible for all independent 
variables. Angrist and Pischke (2009), Haltiwanger et al. (2013) and Huber et al. (2017) provide 
                                                             
67 We undertook all work within the Secure ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory on Stata 14.  This 
limited the number of variables.  We explored smaller divisions of firm size/age with greater saturation. These 
produced results in line with this specification. 
(
3) 
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discussions on this approach, which provides a best estimate of the examined variation in employment. 
The downside is that we estimate a large number of coefficients (our largest estimate has 1,421 
coefficients). Consequently, we only report the average effects of principle variable groupings, adjusted 
for interactions. 
 
 
6. Findings 
Table Two contains the principle estimated average adjusted effects of firm size and age. It 
also reports Wald tests of the differences between average effects within each variable grouping. In 
Figure two, we represent these outcomes in a graphical format for easier comparisons.  
 
In the results with no age controls, we simply explore firm size and find that the smallest firms 
(0-9 employees) are associated with a level of growth that is three times that of the next size grouping. 
The groups with employees from 20 to 249 employees do not have statistically different growth. 
However, the subsequent inclusion of controls for the distribution of age produces a dramatic shift in 
growth patterns.  
 
The estimates with age group controls now show that growth of the smallest firms, 0-9 and 
10-19 employees is significantly lower than that of the other size groups excluding the largest group 
for the firms with 250 plus employees. There is no systematic size effect for firms with 20 to 249 
employees. The strong inverse relationship between age and growth leads to this dramatic shift. The 
average growth for entrants (year zero) is by definition close to the upper bound of two and that for 
firms a year after entry is still approximately a third of this level. Thereafter, there is a sevenfold fall to 
the 2-4 years age group and after ten years there is a marginally negative but significant effect of age. 
The youth effect then dissipates quickly for most firms. 
 
Although the final patterns of average growth by size and age are similar to that in the cited 
literature, we show in figure 2.1 the shift in average size effects comes through an increase in the 
average effects of larger firms, when we hold the age distribution constant, rather than a large reduction 
in the average effect of small firms. We present both the adjusted average coefficients and graphics 
with these same effects, whereas the cited authors do not generally present the adjusted average effects 
and the graphics are relative to the largest or oldest category. If we had simply followed suit, then we 
would have also presented similar findings, which seem to show a large drop in the average growth 
effect of small firms. 
 
Finally, for the estimates of continuing firms, i.e. those that do not enter this period or leave 
in the next, the number of observations falls by 18 percent to just over seven million. The age effects 
follow a similar pattern to the preceding estimates but there is a consistent uplift in the scale of average 
effects reflecting the effect of exits and older firms are still worse performers. The size effects are all 
reduced in scale given the exclusion of entrants. The pattern in coefficients is similar to the preceding 
estimates, but differences are weaker. Firms with at least 250 employees now have growth greater than 
that the 0-9 and 10-19 employment reflecting the stronger effect of entry on smaller firms rates.  
 
The findings are consistent with the work of Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Rijkers et al. (2014), 
Huber et al. (2017), and in particular Lawless (2014), although the shift in estimated size effects comes 
from increases for firms with more than ten workers, rather than declines for smaller firms. The findings 
are also in line with the broad-brush findings of Hijzen et al. (2010) for the UK. They established that 
firms with less than 100 employees in the manufacturing and service sector grew more rapidly than 
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larger firms do. However, they were not able to distinguish the patterns below this threshold or patterns 
among older firms. They did not observe that the smallest firms, which generally attract the highest 
reliefs, had the weakest mean growth. This final point is in line with Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015) and 
Nightingale and Coad (2013) who characterise the population of small firms as dominated by a large 
number of small old firms which contribute very little to employment growth. 
 
Figure Two about here  
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Table Two: Adjusted Average Employment Growth, with Age Controls 
 
1: No Age Control 2: Age Control 3: Continue Onlya 
Variable 
Average           
Effect 
Difference 
Testb 
Average           
Effect 
Difference 
Testb 
Average           
Effect 
Differenc
e Testb 
 Size β /SE β /SE β /SE β /SE β /SE β /SE 
0-9 0.229*** 
 
0.214*** 
 
0.094*** 
 
 
0.001 
 
0 
 
0 
 
10-19  0.076*** -0.153*** 0.229*** 0.015*** 0.111*** 0.018*** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
20-49  0.077*** 0.001 0.284*** 0.055*** 0.164*** 0.052*** 
 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
50-99  0.078*** 0.001 0.271*** -0.013*** 0.169*** 0.005 
 
0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.004 
100-249  0.073*** -0.005 0.249*** -0.022*** 0.151*** -0.017*** 
 
0.002 0.002 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.006 
250+  0.083*** 0.009*** 0.204*** -0.045*** 0.134*** -0.017* 
 
0.002 0.002 0.01 0.012 0.007 0.009 
Age: 
Entrant c 
  
 
1.971*** 
   
   
0.001 
   
1  
  
0.732*** -1.239*** 0.768*** 
 
   
0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
2-4 
  
0.103*** -0.629*** 0.118*** -0.65*** 
   
0 0.001 0 0.002 
5-9 
  
0.022*** -0.081*** 0.031*** -0.087*** 
   
0 0 0 0.001 
10-19 
  
-0.003*** -0.025*** 0.003*** -0.028*** 
   
0 0 0 0 
20+ 
  
-0.009*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.008 
  
  
0 0 0 0 
Year  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Sector  Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 0.02 
 
0.591 
 
0.199 
 
N 8,708,88
7 
 
8,551,485 
 
7,027,722 
 
DF 1,143 
 
1,172 
 
1,164 
 
Notes: 
 (β /SE) In each entry the first row is the adjusted average & the second is the standard 
error    *** 1% ; ** 5%; * 10%  
a: Excludes entrants & final year of firms not subsequently in the sample frame 
b: Wald test of the hypothesis there is no difference between successive averages  
c: firm age in years 
DF: number of variables: Year: Year controls: Sector: 96 2 digit SIC revision 
2007controls 
Source: ARDX dataset,  Author’s estimates 
 
 
Figure Three about here 
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Table Three: Adjusted Average Employment Growth, with SBRR Controls  
  Variable 4: Full Model 5: Continuea  6:   6: High Growth  
 Average  Differenceb Average     Differenceb Average           Differenceb 
Size: 0-9  0.116***  0.071***  0.360***  
 0.001  0.001  0.028  
10-19  0.160*** 0.044*** 0.114*** 0.043*** 0.315*** -0.044 
 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.012 0.031 
20-49  0.179*** 0.019*** 0.132*** 0.018*** 0.374*** 0.059*** 
 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.014 
50- 99  0.173*** -0.006 0.135*** 0.003 0.357*** -0.017 
 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.012 
100- 249  0.180*** 0.006 0.136*** 0.002 0.383*** 0.026** 
 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.012 
250  0.160*** -0.02* 0.123*** -0.013 0.336*** -0.047*** 
 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.01 
Entrant 1.887***      
  0.009        
Age 1 0.832*** -1.056*** 0.844***  0.789***  
 0.01 0.014 0.011  0.081  
Age 2-4 0.153*** -0.679*** 0.160*** -0.684*** 0.442*** -0.346*** 
 0.003 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.022 0.084 
Age 5-9 0.073*** -0.079*** 0.078*** -0.081*** 0.367*** -0.075** 
 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.01 0.024 
Age 10-
19 
0.039*** -0.034*** 0.041*** -0.037*** 0.347*** -0.02* 
 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.011 
Age: 20  
+ 
0.023*** -0.016*** 0.025*** -0.016*** 0.351*** 0.004 
  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 
SBRRc:  0.142***  0.099***  0.352***  
Zero 0.001  0.001  0.004  
SBRR  0.135*** -0.007 0.092*** -0.008* 0.265*** -0.087*** 
25% 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.037 0.038 
SBRR  0.140*** 0.006 0.096*** 0.004 0.442*** 0.177*** 
50% 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.044 0.057 
SBRR  0.142*** 0.002 0.100*** 0.004 0.674*** 0.232*** 
75% 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.056 0.069 
SBRR  0.129*** -0.013** 0.084*** -0.016 0.408*** -0.266*** 
 100% 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.027 0.062 
R2 0.416   0.142   0.354   
N (DF) 900,101 (1,421) 795,871 (1,381) 23,413 (1,129) 
Note: The first row is the adjusted average & second is the standard error  *** 1% ; ** 5%; * 
10% 
a: Excludes entrants & final year of firms not subsequently in the sample frame 
b: Wald test of the hypothesis there is no difference between successive  adjusted averages 
c: SBRR category numbers indicate upper bound of mutually exclusive groups 
(DF): number of variables, Estimates include Year, BR period & 96 2 digit SIC (2007) controls  
Source ARDx dataset,  Author’s estimates:  
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In Figures Three and Table Three, we report results incorporating the SBRR and BR period 
controls for all firms, continuing firms and a subset of high growth firms. Even though we see a sharp 
reduction in the number of observations, small firms continue to have significantly lower average 
adjusted growth, but the size effects for groups with 20 to 249 employees are no longer significantly 
different from each other. Age groups maintain the same inverse relationship, but the decline between 
one year and 2-4 year old firms is now by a factor of 5.4 for all firms and 5.25 for continuing firms, 
rather than a factor of seven estimated above.  
 
Importantly the SBRR coefficients do not identify any systematic effect on employment for 
all firms and continuing firms. There is very little difference in mean effects for firms receiving zero 
relief, through to those receiving 75 percent relief. Thereafter, there is some evidence of lower growth 
for those receiving up to 100 percent relief by between 11 and 16 percent to both the 75% and zero 
SBRR groups, respectively. Consequently, we demonstrate the tax mechanism is ineffective in 
increasing employment and reliefs would seem to capitalise into occupation costs.  
 
Finally, we focus on the subgroup of high growth firms. In Table Four, we group firms by the 
relief rates and observe the proportions, which meet the high growth criteria, decline rapidly from 8.5 
percent for firms attracting zero relief to around 0.5 of a percent for firms claiming up to the 
maximum68. Some care is needed with these figures, given that the higher rates of relief will have only 
been available from 2010 and as such will have been initially affected by the 2007/8 recession. We also 
calculate Gazelles, firms that become high growth before their fifth birthday, only constitute 0.98 of a 
percent of pooled observations of firms between three and seven years old. Whilst for older firms the 
percentage is 1.85. 
Table Four:  
High Growth Firms, Proportion of Pooled Observations by Relief Level 
2000-13 
SBRR Maximum Proportion High Growth 
0  0.085 
25% 0.018 
50% 0.015 
75% 0.006 
100% 0.004 
Notes: some firms will have more than the minimum three years of annualised growth of 
10%, Entrants excluded. Source ARDx dataset, author’s calculations 
 
Given the size and age thresholds, the employment estimates for high growth firms show a 
strong rise in overall average effects relative to the preceding estimates. Age is also less important, with 
a much shallower decline as we move from one year old firms to two-four year old firms of 
approximately 1.8, compared to the previously estimated fivefold decline in growth.  
 
Importantly, we now find significant differences by SBRR group. Firms that receive up to 25 
percent relief have a lower average adjusted effect than those firms that receive zero relief. Thereafter, 
the average growth effect is significantly higher than both these groups, peaking for firms with up to 
                                                             
68 Some firms have more than three years in which they are classified as high growth 
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75 percent relief. The estimated effect for the 100 percent relief group is now in line with the preceding 
two groups rather than being significantly lower than all other relief groups. 
 
It would be difficult to say that there is a systematic effect of SBRR on employment growth, 
given the findings from the larger sample of all firms. This leads us to surmise we are picking up 
location effects for these very small groups of firms (between 1.5 and 0.4 percent of observations), 
which are stronger for those occupying cheaper or smaller units. This is something we wish to examine 
with detailed geographical information in future research.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The “end of the national tax on local growth” may simply reflect political rhetoric, yet the 
underlying policy perspective (Shane 2009) of taxation constraining transformative small firms 
pervades the supporting consultation and policy documentation on SBRR (see HM Treasury 2016). In 
this paper, we confront the assumptions that taxation restricts growth and small firms produce greater 
growth than larger firms with rich firm level data.  
 
We show that the chosen policy mechanism of property tax reductions is not associated with 
employment growth, which we argue reflects their capture by property owners. It also suggests that this 
tax in general does not have a large long run effect on occupiers, as its level and changes pass backwards 
via rents and building value adjustments making it an efficient form of taxation. The complications 
arise from the misalignment of statutory and economic incidences. If property owners became liable, 
the salience to firms would be significantly reduced, as would the political pressure. It would be clear 
the tax is on the economic rents (capital gains), which in part derive from the social context rather than 
a confusion with economic activity. Other gains would be a return to a flat tax, as the power of 
arguments for preferences reduce and a fall in the number of valuation appeals, if the reformed tax only 
valued property not the productive additions made by occupiers.  
 
Yet even if the SBRR had an effect on costs, the target group would not provide any greater 
social returns, once we simply account for age differences. We find medium sized firms provide greater 
and probably more stable employment growth. Young firms also provide strong employment growth, 
but this rapidly dissipates and is conditional on these new firms surviving. There may be a positive 
association between the larger reliefs and high growth firms’ employment, but identifying this small 
number of firms’ ex-ante is problematic. 
 
In line with Holtz-Eakin (2000), Shane (2009) and Anyadike-Danes et al. (2015), we conclude 
generic reliefs based on naïve assumptions about homogeneous jobs and supply side restrictions do not 
provide social returns. Institutional frameworks, which target time constrained assistance on specific 
complex and shifting productivity and growth constraints as well as the quality and stability of 
employment may be better alternatives, but these require a richer understanding of firm level dynamics. 
The OECD (2015) document some viable alternatives that do not erode tax bases. Even these 
interventions cannot succeed in isolation. They need well-developed local and inclusive infrastructure, 
education and healthcare and rigorous sectoral analysis if they are to succeed. These factors require 
locally directed provision, which in turn requires a stable and diversified tax base.  
 
At a time of substantial changes in the powers of English local governments, this paper 
provides important research in the understudied area of local business taxation and adds to the debate 
on firm size and age. The results underscore concerns that the current framework for the devolution of 
tax raising powers could destabilise some local tax bases as local governments become more dependent 
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on a smaller and smaller number of larger firms restricting their ability to enable communities and 
economic growth. 
 
 
_____________________________________________ 
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